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  • Up in arms: Warring over Europe’s arms export regime (2019)

    The European Union’s poorly co-ordinated arms export policy is undermining Europe’s security, its foreign policy and its defence industry.

    The EU’s arms export policy should have three aims. First, arms control, in order to keep arms out of the wrong hands. Second, targeted arms exports to allies and countries that share the EU’s security challenges. Third, supporting the development of European military technology.

    The Union’s current arms export regime, the ‘Common Position’, sets out eight criteria that member-states must test export licenses against, such as respect for international humanitarian law in the destination country. But because defence is considered a matter of national sovereignty, the Common Position is not implemented or enforced at the EU level.

    The recent spat over arms exports to Saudi Arabia – Berlin ceased arms exports to the kingdom, to the chagrin of Paris and London – exposed how national arms export decisions are often driven by different political, economic and industrial concerns. Such disunity makes it harder for Europe to help resolve conflicts or influence the behaviour of third countries.

    Arms export policies differ across European countries because there is little consensus on the threats to the EU or on the Union’s interests. This has been evident in the EU’s foreign policy towards Syria and Venezuela. In May 2013, the EU’s 28 foreign ministers failed to reach a consensus on renewing the embargo on arms sales to Syria, with some member-states vying to arm rebel groups. And when anti-government protests erupted in Venezuela in early 2017, EU member-states spent months debating whether or not to intervene, allowing the situation to deteriorate significantly before finally agreeing on a sanctions package that included an arms embargo. In both cases, the EU found itself unable to seize its opportunity to alleviate the situation.

    Exporting to third countries allows defence companies to enlarge their customer base and create economies of scale. At the same time it raises the bar for European firms to make more competitive products. By combining stricter export controls with more research and development spending, the EU would create incentives for defence companies to improve technology while reducing death, injury and destruction outside the EU.

    Member-states will only join forces to develop new military equipment or weapon systems if they trust each other to provide the necessary components in times of crisis – to customers both inside and outside the EU. Without a reliable and consistent arms export policy at European level, the EU’s recent high-profile initiatives to improve European defence capabilities risk falling flat.

    A truly common EU arms export policy would require a supervisory body controlled by the European Commission to report violations of the Common Position by member-states. The Commission could refer member-states that refused to follow the rules to the European Court of Justice. But such a radical overhaul would require changes to the EU treaties – and there is no appetite among member-states to surrender their autonomy.

    However, there are smaller steps that the EU can take without treaty changes that would more closely align member-states’ arms exports regimes:

    specify what constitutes a ‘clear risk’ or ‘serious violation’ in the Common Position, make it explicit that existing licenses can be suspended or revoked, and make reporting obligations more stringent;

    help member-states implement stronger ‘end-use’ controls to ensure arms do not end up in unintended hands;

    clarify terms in the EU’s regulation on ‘dual-use’ goods (those with both a civilian and military use such as cyber-surveillance technology), and encourage information exchange between member-states;

    reach inter-governmental binding commitments to abide by the EU’s toughened export criteria between some member-states, especially France and Germany, which would put greater pressure on laxer member-states.

    Together, the EU’s member-states are second only to the US in the volume of arms they export.1 But EU arms export policy is poorly co-ordinated. The divergence is weakening Europe’s ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives, undermining not only its credibility as a principled, values-driven power but also its recent high-profile initiatives to improve European defence capabilities.

    Europeans recently fell out over arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Following the murder of Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, Germany decided to suspend all arms exports to the kingdom. Other European countries including Finland, Denmark and Norway had already taken this decision following the devastating Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. France and the UK, however, sharply criticised Germany and pressed Chancellor Angela Merkel to revoke the decision.

    Too often, arms exports are driven by political, economic and industrial concerns, rather than by the EU’s own laws and guidelines. Governments are not only concerned with national security and regional stability, but also with facilitating the exports of domestic defence companies, which generate profits, jobs and tax revenues. Thus the allure of large arms contracts can skew a country’s foreign policy.

    The Saudi case underlines the need for a co-ordinated European arms export policy, which should have three strands. The first is arms control: keeping arms and dual-use goods out of the wrong hands, that is, state or non-state actors that could use them to violate international law or create instability.2 The second is targeted arms exports: selling military equipment to actors with shared security challenges. The third strand is the arms industry itself: a consistent, predictable and shared arms export policy would help support European capability development and foster a stronger European defence industry.

    Arms exports have been repeatedly excluded from EU treaty provisions. Member-states are unwilling to surrender their autonomy in this area of defence policy, which is guarded as a matter of national sovereignty. Attempts by the EU to co-ordinate national policies have repeatedly failed. The Council of the EU is currently reviewing the EU’s guidelines on arms exports: now is the time for a closer look at the EU’s arms export regime.

    This policy brief argues in favour of an effective common European arms export policy, examining its potential to support foreign policy through several case studies, and how it can support the EU’s ambition to build a strong European defence industrial base. We assess the EU’s current arms export regime, and ask whether a greater role for the EU in arms export regulation is possible and compatible with member-states’ interests. Finally, we make recommendations on how Europe’s arms export policy could be improved.

    Why does the EU need an arms export policy?

    A genuinely common policy would help prevent weapons made in the EU from being used to undermine stability or violate international humanitarian and human rights law. It would also help the EU to promote regional stability, protect allies and friendly states, and strengthen Europe’s defence industry.

    1. Control: Preventing weapons falling into the ‘wrong’ hands
    By restricting arms supplies, the EU can attempt to change a state’s behaviour. Arms embargoes can constrain aggressive behaviour by depriving a country of military resources. Restricting arms exports can also send a strong signal condemning human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.

    2. Export: Putting weapons in the ‘right’ hands
    Europeans sometimes export to strategic partners or allies in crisis-prone regions in the hope of contributing to regional stability. For instance, the German government is donating 50 Marder tanks to Jordan to protect its borders against Islamist militant groups.6

    Exporting arms to conflict zones is a risky strategy, and should always form part of a comprehensive support programme, including training security forces about how to use the arms in line with international law. Supplying arms can alter regional dynamics in unpredictable ways, making a previously militarily weak country more belligerent, as seen with US arms sales to Iran in the 1970s.

    European arms and equipment can, however, be exported to support countries struggling with globally significant security challenges. Maritime security, for instance, is crucial for Europe’s prosperity and stability: 50 per cent of EU external trade is transported by sea, and maritime crime in the forms of theft, smuggling, piracy and terrorism is widespread. EU member-states can assist countries in their attempts to combat piracy by selling them naval equipment.

    Arms exports can also ensure that European allies and partners maintain technological parity with or superiority over shared adversaries. This strategy is already being pursued in Asia. To counterbalance Chinese dominance in the region, the US and some EU countries are exporting arms to countries like Indonesia: the Dutch company Damen, for example, exported two Sigma naval frigates to the Indonesian navy in 2017 and 2018. Arms exports can also increase interoperability and make it easier to conduct joint operations with partners.

    3. Supporting the EU’s defence industry

    If Europe is to become a credible defence player, it needs to have a strong defence industry. But a competitive defence industry requires a coherent and credible EU arms export policy.

    First, EU defence policy can help companies become less dependent on exports, and more selective about who to export to. To cope with the relatively low national-level defence spending in Europe in recent years, and with the fragmentation of the market, companies have prioritised commercially attractive dual-use capabilities – which can be used for both military and civilian objectives – or have shifted away from their home market and focused instead on exports. A business model that relies on exports means that restrictions on arms exports immediately endanger jobs. And since European countries tend to ‘buy national’, the main export markets for European arms are often in countries outside the EU, rather than in other member-states. As a result, European industries at times prioritise the capability needs of non-European customers over those of EU states.7

    At the same time, pursuing a strict ‘buy EU’ policy would make it more difficult for European military forces to fill their capability gaps in time, since the EU’s defence industries are not able to cater to all of Europe’s equipment needs.8 The more units of goods with high development costs that are produced, the lower the average cost of each unit. To achieve such ‘economies of scale’ in defence production, European industry has an interest in enlarging its potential customer base through exports. Plus, keeping the European market open and exporting to partner countries (such as democratic, law-abiding NATO members) would also raise the bar for European companies and lead to more competitive products.
    In a best-case scenario, the EU would stimulate defence research and development spending from member-states, which would benefit European industries and simultaneously relieve at least some of the pressure on them to find export customers and prioritise their requirements over those of European security.

    Second, member-states’ arms export policies need to be reliable and consistent in order to engage in joint capability development. The EU has devised a range of new initiatives to improve its defence capabilities. Among the most high-profile of these new initiatives are the Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO). All of these aim to encourage member-states to co-operate on capability development.

    The EU envisages that the process will work as follows: the EU institutions together with European governments identify Europe’s capability gaps and opportunities for joint capability development through CARD; they agree on a list of military equipment that is needed in Europe (the so-called Capability Development Plan); a group of PESCO members decides to develop an item together; and that group gets co-funding from the European Commission via the defence fund. But so far, the EU has not yet developed a plan about what to do when these member-states cannot agree on arms export rules.

    Germany’s decision in the autumn of 2018 to suspend all arms exports to Saudi Arabia indicated just how much of an obstacle arms export policy could become to joint capability development. In 2018, Berlin put a halt to the sale of already assembled items, such as patrol boats, as well as German-produced components used by other companies across Europe. The freeze held up the delivery of Meteor air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia.9 The missiles are produced by the European company MBDA (jointly owned by Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo), but the propulsion system and warheads are built in Germany. German components are also needed to maintain European products after delivery, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon planes, produced jointly by the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain. Germany’s allies criticised the unpredictability of Berlin’s arms export policy and warned that European defence companies would resort to producing ‘German-free’ goods in the future.10

    Member-states will only come together to create new military equipment, like the next European fighter jet, if they can rely upon one another for the supply of components. Without a common arms export policy, jointly-produced systems will always be vulnerable to one of the partners introducing export controls on one or more of the potential purchasers.

    How does the EU export and control arms?

    The EU’s arms export regime is fragmented, and based on three layers of law: international, EU and national. The regime is made up of several legislative instruments, which are monitored by different EU institutions. And while the EU sets out basic tenets for arms exports, licensing and regulation is determined at the national level, resulting in 28 national licensing systems and sets of rules.

    Although arms exports ultimately remain a matter of national competence, EU member-states have agreed to “high common standards” and “convergence” in managing arms transfers.11 There are two parts to this commitment. First, the European Council adopted the Common Position on Arms Export Controls in 2008, which defines common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. Second, all member-states are party to the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which establishes the “highest possible common international standards” for the global arms trade. The ATT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 and entered into force in the EU in 2014. Both the ATT and the Common Position are legally binding, and regulate exports of conventional weapons.

    The Common Position sets out eight criteria against which member-states must test export licences, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the destination country.

    Saudi Arabia

    In 2015, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman launched a military intervention in Yemen. The Houthis, a Shiite tribal group, had taken control of the country’s capital, Sana’a, and forced the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and his government – which had been backed by the Saudis. Saudi Arabia presented the incursion as necessary to control Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula, exaggerating the extent of Iranian support for the Houthis.20 The Saudis formed a coalition of nine other Sunni Arab countries: the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco and Senegal.21 The coalition wants to restore the Hadi government and provides financial and military support to the Yemeni army and proxy armed groups. The US, UK and France provide the coalition with arms, military equipment and training. The conflict has left 22 million people, three-quarters of all Yemenis, in need of humanitarian aid and protection.22

    Syria

    Much like the Yemen conflict, the Syrian civil war has exposed Europe’s lack of common foreign policy, as exemplified by diverging arms export policies.

    Syria descended into civil war after President Bashar al-Assad brutally cracked down on pro-democracy protesters in April 2011. The EU responded by imposing sanctions on Syria, including an embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to all actors (other than humanitarian workers). The embargo was fleshed out by Council regulations in 2012, which banned specific items such as telecoms interception equipment.

    Venezuela

    Since Venezuela descended into crisis in 2010, Europe has struggled to speak with one voice. The EU’s High Representative for foreign and security policy Federica Mogherini has often been limited to making declarations when member-states could not reach a consensus on sanctions or who to designate as the country’s legitimate government.

    After months of anti-government protests, President Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in a rigged election in the autumn of 2017. The EU’s member-states spent months arguing over how to manage the unfolding crisis, with disputes over the EU’s right to intervene and encourage a change of regime. The EU was unable to reach a unanimous decision on sanctions, in part because Greece and the populist Five Star Movement within Italy’s coalition argued that sanctions interfered in Venezuela’s sovereign affairs. Only in November 2017 did the EU adopt sanctions on Venezuela and call for free and fair elections. The restrictive measures included asset freezes and travel bans on individuals, as well as an arms embargo, including on equipment that could be used for internal repression or monitoring. In an official communication, the Commission later argued that this delayed decision followed “a further substantial deterioration of the situation on the ground”.33

    Is a greater role for the EU in regulating arms exports possible?

    Europe needs more co-ordination when it comes to arms exports. Divergent arms export policies undermine Europe’s common foreign and security policy goals. Sanctions taken at the individual country level are ineffective. When Europeans act in unison, the impact of their foreign policy is multiplied, especially when their arms export policies are integrated into broader EU policies towards particular regions or conflicts.

    There are radical, and for now unrealistic, ways of bringing about a common European arms export policy. For example, to ensure that member-states adhere to the Common Position, the EU would have to introduce a mechanism to hold governments accountable for breaking the rules. Or if member-states agreed to give up some national decision-making authority over arms exports, the EU could establish a supervisory body controlled by the Commission or the High Representative to report violations of the Common Position by member-states. The Commission could refer member-states that refused to follow the rules to the ECJ.37 Such a new body would require a change to the EU fundamental treaties and therefore unanimity among EU member-states, however.

    At present, there is little appetite among member-states (including Germany) to give up decision-making power in this field. Anne-Marie Descôtes, the French ambassador to Germany, recently dismissed the idea of Europeanising arms exports as a cop-out and an attempt to pass responsibility to European institutions.38 She argued that it would be an unparalleled transfer of sovereignty and an unacceptable violation of Article 346. Her reading of the mood in Europe is accurate. But the EU’s plans to build a ‘defence union’ could open a window of opportunity for ‘more EU’ in arms export policy.

    Recommendations

    1. Improve the Common Position
    A review of the Common Position began in 2018, and is ongoing in COARM. Reviewers are considering how to improve the wording of the Position; possible changes to the users’ guide, including an e-licensing system for military goods; and adapting the annual report into a publicly available online database to improve transparency. Any change to the Common Position will require unanimity.43

    Conclusion

    Europe’s diverging export policies are harming the EU’s interests and credibility. Without stronger co-ordination at the EU level, Europe’s ability to protect its security is diminished, and the Union runs the risk of its member-states violating international law and being complicit in human rights abuses and other atrocities.

    A stronger, unified arms export policy is also vital for EU ambitions to develop a European defence industry. Joint European capability projects will perpetually stumble when governments run into disagreements on export rules.

    However, before a common arms policy can be agreed, EU member-states must first reach a shared analysis of any given conflict and establish what the EU’s interests are. This often proves difficult. For instance, EU member-states have different views on whether supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia will help stabilise the Gulf region, and how exports might affect European security. At the heart of the issue lies a lack of consensus on threat perception and strategic assessment. And many member-states think in terms of national efforts to protect national security, rather than considering that their national security is rarely distinct from wider EU and European security. Lucrative arms contracts for national defence industries and preserving or creating domestic jobs also generate pressure to interpret the Common Position liberally.

    A common and enforceable EU arms export regime, including a sanctions mechanism and supervisory arms control body, should be the goal. Conversations with EU officials and industry figures make it abundantly clear that this is a long way off. But the development of EU defence initiatives and the increasing role of the Commission in defence policy suggest the first tentative steps towards this end may be taking place.

    Even if an overhaul were legally possible without consensus, it would be unwise. EU member-states should attempt to reach a shared view on the security context of arms exports, improve the wording of the Common Position and agree on the format of reporting by member-states, tighten dual-use regulation and end-use controls, and reach inter-governmental export agreements. Europe’s security will benefit if the EU can keep moving towards convergence on arms export policy.

    1: The combined arms exports of European Union member-states accounted for 27 per cent of global arms exports between 2014-18.
    2: Goods that have both a military and a civilian application are known as dual-use.
    3: “It’s not as easy as saying cut off arms sales. If we don’t … sell them munitions that are precision-targeted … with our rigour and standards … the situation could get a whole lot worse”, British MP Johnny Mercer argued in defence of continued supply of arms to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, ‘Peston’s Politics’, ITV, October 25th 2018.
    4: Rolf Mützenich, deputy head of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the German Bundestag, ‘German ban on arms exports to Saudis spurs pushback’, Spiegel Online, March 6th 2019.
    5: Michael Brzoska, ‘Measuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2008; Clara Portela, ‘The EU’s use of ‘targeted’ sanctions: Evaluating effectiveness’, CEPS, March 2014.
    6: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Industry, ‘Report by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its policy on exports of conventional military equipment in 2016’, June 2017.
    7: 90 per cent of France’s arms exports and 73 per cent of Germany’s went to non-EU buyers between 2014 and 2018, and 89 per cent of UK arms exports went outside Europe in 2017. France and Germany data from Pieter Wezeman and others, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers’, SIPRI, 2018; UK data from UK Government, ‘UK defence and security export statistics for 2017’, March 14th 2019.
    8: Douglas Barrie and others, ‘Protecting Europe: meeting the EU’s military level of ambition in the context of Brexit’, IISS and DGAP, November 2018.
    9: Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Schult, ‘Britain accuses Berlin of lacking loyalty to allies’, Der Spiegel, February 19th 2019.
    10: Anne-Marie Descôtes, ‘Working Paper on Security Policy No. 7/2019: From “German-free” to mutual trust’, German Federal Academy for Security Policy, March 26th 2019.
    11: Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008.
    12: Sophia Besch, ‘Security of supply in EU defence: Friends in need?’, CER insight, August 17th 2016.
    13: Interview with COARM official.
    14: National Assembly, ‘Ordinary Session of 2010-2011’, 13th Legislature, 161st meeting, April 12th 2011.
    15: UN Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014’, August 17th 2018. The findings are still subject to a determination by an independent and competent court.
    16: House of Commons Hansard, ‘Export licences: High Court judgment’, volume 662, June 20th 2019.
    17: Giovanni de Briganti, ‘Dispute over arms exports: France threatens Germany with exit from fighter jet project’, Defense-Aerospace.com, October 2018.
    18: European Commission, ‘Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community’, November 2016.
    19: Interview with Ian Stewart, Senior Research Associate at War Studies Department, King’s College London, February 2019.
    20: A UN Security Council report from January 2017 concluded there was insufficient evidence to confirm large-scale supply of arms from the Iranian government to the Houthi rebels. See UN Security Council, ‘Letter from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2017/81, January 31st 2017.
    21: Qatar’s membership was suspended in 2017 following the GCC diplomatic crisis. Morocco left the coalition in February 2019 after increasing tension between Rabat and Riyadh.
    22: International Organisation for Migration, Yemen report, July 22nd 2018; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, ‘Press release’, March 20th 2019.
    23: See Common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention; Knut Dormann and Jose Serralvo, ‘Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations’, International Committee of the Red Cross, September 21st 2015.
    24: UN Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014’, August 17th 2018.
    25: See Marco Sassòli, ‘State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2002; and International Commission of Jurists, ‘Bearing the brunt of war in Yemen: International law violations and their impact on the civilian population’, July 2018.
    26: European Parliament, Resolution on the situation in Yemen, 2018/2853(RSP), October 4th 2018.
    27: Beth Oppenheim, ‘You never listen to me: The European-Saudi relationship after Khashoggi’, CER policy brief, May 2nd 2019.
    28: Beth Oppenheim, ‘UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been found unlawful’, Independent, June 20th 2019.
    29: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign secretary statement to parliament on Syria’, May 20th 2013.
    30: UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, June 4th 2013.
    31: Due to a lack of detail in the EU’s annual report, it is not possible to see precisely how many licences. These descriptions are those cited in ‘Brief descriptions of EU Common Military List categories’, ‘Annual report on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, the Official Journal of the European Union, 2014.
    32: Annual reports on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the Official Journal of the European Union, 2012-2014.
    33: European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Council, the European Parliament and the Council: A stronger global actor: A more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’, September 12th 2018.
    34: The exporting European member-states were Austria, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, see SIPRI’s trend-indicator value (TIV) tables, 1999-2016.
    35: Value of licensed goods, ‘Annual report on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, Official Journal of the European Union, 2009.
    36: Martin Arostegui, ‘Critics: Spain’s tank, arms deals with Venezuela prop up Nicolas Maduro’, The Washington Post, January 21st 2019.
    37: Bodil Valero, ‘The change we need in EU arms export control’, Friends of Europe, May 14th 2018.
    38: Anne-Marie Descôtes, ‘Working Paper on Security Policy No. 7/2019: From “German-free” to mutual trust’, German Federal Academy for Security Policy, March 26th 2019.
    39: ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund’, COM/2018/0254, June 13th 2018..
    40: The European Economic Area includes EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
    41: Alexandra Brzozowski, ‘EU lawmakers rubber-stamp European Defence Fund, give up parliamentary veto’, Euractiv, April 18th, 2019.
    42: Daniel Fiott, ‘European defence-industrial co-operation: From Keynes to Clausewitz’, Global Affairs, 2015.
    43: Anne-Marie Descôtes, ‘Working Paper on Security Policy No. 7/2019: From “German-free” to mutual trust’, German Federal Academy for Security Policy, March 26th 2019.
    44: European Parliament Policy Department, ‘The further development of the Common Position 944/2008/CFSP on arms exports control’, July 2018.
    45: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Industry, ‘Report by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its policy on exports of conventional military equipment in 2016’, June 2017.
    46: ‘Weapons of the Islamic State’, Conflict Armament Research, December 2017.
    47: Lawrence Marzouk, Ivan Angelovski and Miranda Patrucic, ‘Making a killing: The €1.2 billion arms pipeline to Middle East’, Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), July 27th 2016.
    48: Patrick Wilcken, Amnesty International, cited in Lawrence Marzouk and others, OCCRP, July 27th 2016.
    49: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Industry, ‘A restrictive, responsible policy on the export of military equipment’, accessed April 17th 2019.
    50: German Federal Ministry for Business and Energy, ‘Short question by MPs Sevim Dagdelen, Heike Hänsel, Matthias Höhn, and the Die Linke party concerning: “carrying out post-shipment controls on arms exports to third countries”’, September 2018.
    51: House of Commons Quadripartite Select Committee, ‘UK arms exports during 2016’, ‘The licencing regime’, July 18th 2018.
    52: This list would go beyond the international ‘Wassenaar list’, compiled under the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996), a voluntary multilateral export control regime with 42 participating states. The list is divided into dual-use and conventional items.
    53: In January 2018, a working paper of objections to the proposal was put forward by 11 member-states, including France, Germany, Italy and Spain. See Council of the European Union, ‘Working Paper: EU Export Control – Recast of Regulation 428/2009’, WK 1019/2018 INIT, January 29th 2018. In May 2018, a further working paper was put forward by a different, overlapping, group of nine member-states, including the UK. See Council of the European Union, ‘Working Paper: For adoption of an improved EU export control regulation 428/2009’, WK 5755/2018 INIT, May 15th 2018.
    54: Mark Bromley and Giovanna Maletta, ‘The Challenge of Software and Technology Transfers to Non-Proliferation Efforts: Implementing and Complying with Export Controls’, SIPRI, April 2018.
    55: Mark Bromley, ‘Export controls, human security and cyber-surveillance technology: Examining the proposed changes to the EU dual-use regulation’, SIPRI, December 2017.
    56: Thomas Wiegold, ‘German-French arms export plans – veto only in exceptional cases’, Augen Ggeradeaus!, February 22nd 2019.
    Sophia Besch , Beth Oppenheim
    10 September 2019