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  • NSA Economic Spy Order

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Information Need (IN) – France: Economic Developments
    EEI: H – Foreign Contracts/Feasibility Studies/Negotiations
    Information Need (IN) – France: Economic Developments

    Date 2012
    Classification SECRET
    WikiLeaks Synopsis
    This classified US intelligence “Information Need” spying order mandates long term economic espionage against France in order to obtain details about the economic activities of French companies and the economic policies and decisions of the French government. Information Needs (IN) are collection requirements extracted from the National SIGINT Requirements List, and are used to broadly justify the interception of communications in order to satisfy generic intelligence demands from U.S. policy makers and the U.S. Intelligence Community. This IN, identified as 2002-204 (first created in 2002 and updated for more than a decade) and referenced in the list of Top NSA French Targets previously published by WikiLeaks, shows which particular information of interest (“Essential Elements of Information”, EEI) the relevant Signals Intelligence units are instructed to collect and report about. Such requirements include France’s economic relations with the United States, other countries and international institutions, France’s financial and trade policies, and its views on G-8 and G-20 agendas. “Supported Elements” are those parts of the US government which are supported by (i.e receive intelligence reports derived from) the espionage.
    Download PDF

    IN Standard Report: S-C-2002-204

    Title : (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) France: Economic Developments

    Originator Classification : SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

    Table of Contents

    EEI A : (U//FOUO) Economic Relations with the United States
    EEI B : (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) French Business Practices
    EEI C : (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) French Financial/Macroeconomic Policy Development
    EEI D : (U//FOUO) Views On G-8, G-20 Developments/Issues
    EEI E : (U//FOUO) Budgetary Constraints/Contributions To NATO
    EEI F : (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) French Views
    EEI G : (U//FOUO) Relations With Least Developed Countries (LDCs) And Transitional States
    EEI H : (U//FOUO) Foreign Contracts/Feasibility Studies/Negotiations
    EEI I : (U//FOUO) Relations With International Financial Institutions
    EEI J : (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) French Trade Policies
    EEI K : (U//FOUO) Questionable Trade Activities

    (U//FOUO) Supported Element(s):

    CIA
    COMMERCE
    DHS
    DIA/DI
    DIA/OSR-2
    DIA/USEUCOM
    FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
    STATE/INR
    TREASURY
    US TRADE REP
    DOE/IN
    EEI: H – Foreign Contracts/Feasibility Studies/Negotiations

    Date 2012
    Classification SECRET//NOFORN
    WikiLeaks Synopsis
    This US economic espionage order (“Essential Elements of Information) for France instructs US spies to collect information on all French sales and financing of significant projects related to telecommunications, electrical generation, gas, oil, nuclear and renewable energy and environmental and healthcare technologies. Most substantially it also mandates the interception and reportage of all French company negotiations and contracts valued at over $200 million. The results of the spying are to be reported to various US trade, political and intelligence agencies (“Supported Elements”).
    Download PDF

    EEI : H

    EEI Classification : SECRET//NOFORN

    Originator EEI Classification : SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

    EEI Title : (U//FOUO) Foreign Contracts/Feasibility Studies/Negotiations
    Question(s) :

    1. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Report impending French contract proposals or feasibility studies and negotiations for international sales or investments in major projects or systems of significant interest to the foreign host country or $200 million or more in sales and/or services, including financing information or projects of high interest including:

    A. Information and telecommunications facilities networks and technology?

    B. Electric power, natural gas, and oil facilities and infrastructure to include nuclear power and renewable energy generation?

    C. Transportation infrastructure and technology to include ports, airports, high-speed rail, and subways?

    D. Environmental technologies used domestically and for export?

    E. Health care infrastructure, services, and technologies, including biotechnology developments?

    Find this story at 29 June 2015

    DOSSIER: LA RÉPUBLIQUE SUR ÉCOUTE ENQUÊTE 2006-2012: Hollande, Sarkozy et Chirac écoutés

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Au-delà des trois chefs d’État français, des ministres, des hauts fonctionnaires, des parlementaires et des diplomates ont été surveillés téléphoniquement pendant près d’une décennie par les services secrets américains, selon des documents obtenus par WikiLeaks.

    Les États-Unis ont placé la République sur écoute. Les présidents François Hollande, Nicolas Sarkozy et Jacques Chirac, ainsi que de nombreux ministres, des hauts fonctionnaires, des parlementaires ou des diplomates, ont été écoutés directement ou par ricochet pendant près d’une décennie par les services secrets américains, selon des documents confidentiels de la National Security Agency (NSA) obtenus par WikiLeaks (lire aussi notre version en anglais de cet article).

    D’après des notes de synthèse de la NSA auxquelles Mediapart et Libération ont eu accès, en collaboration avec WikiLeaks, dans le cadre de l’opération Espionnage Élysée, les interceptions se sont étalées de 2006 à 2012 – mais rien ne dit qu’elles n’ont pas commencé plus tôt et ne se sont pas poursuivies depuis. Toutes classifiées « top secret », ces notes détaillent les dessous d’un espionnage obsessionnel de la France par les États-Unis sur des questions diplomatiques, de politique locale ou économiques de tous ordres.

    Les trois présidents français écoutés par la NSA
    Les trois présidents français écoutés par la NSA © DR
    Que les États-Unis écoutent les principaux dirigeants d’un pays allié comme la France relève pour certains du secret de polichinelle. L’information est désormais prouvée par des documents issus du cœur de l’appareil d’État américain.

    Surtout, les éléments que nous rendons publics à partir d’aujourd’hui (voir ici l’analyse des documents) révèlent l’ampleur jusqu’ici insoupçonnée de l’espionnage états-unien, réalisé en dehors de tout cadre judiciaire et de tout réel contrôle. Car ce ne sont pas seulement les présidents de la République successifs qui ont été écoutés ces dernières années, mais toutes les strates de la puissance publique qui ont été, à un moment ou à un autre, la cible des États-Unis, qu’il s’agisse de directeurs d’administration, de ministres, de conseillers présidentiels et ministériels, de diplomates, de porte-parole. Au sein même de l’Élysée, par exemple, de très nombreuses lignes téléphoniques (fixes ou portables) ont été branchées.

    Déjà passablement écornée par les révélations de l’ancien agent Edward Snowden, l’image de la NSA et, avec elle, des États-Unis ne devrait pas sortir grandie de ces nouvelles révélations, qui jettent une lumière crue sur les pratiques agressives et déloyales de la première puissance mondiale à l’encontre d’un pays normalement considéré comme « ami ». Du moins, en façade.

    Contactée, la NSA n’a pas souhaité faire de commentaire.

    Comme ses deux prédécesseurs de droite, l’actuel président socialiste François Hollande n’a pas échappé à la curiosité des grandes oreilles de Washington. Un rapport du 22 mai 2012 de la NSA fait ainsi explicitement référence à une conversation tenue quatre jours plus tôt entre le président fraîchement élu et son premier ministre de l’époque, Jean-Marc Ayrault. La conversation porte sur la volonté de François Hollande d’organiser des « consultations secrètes » avec l’opposition allemande, concernant l’éventualité d’une sortie de la Grèce de la zone euro – un sujet toujours d’actualité.

    Les analystes de la NSA évoquent dans le même document l’existence de « précédents rapports » concernant des entretiens passés au sujet de la chancelière Angela Merkel. Ce qui laisse donc supposer que les interceptions américaines du président français ont bel et bien été monnaie courante.

    À l’Élysée, on indiquait mardi 23 juin que, sans avoir conservé la trace de cette conversation, celle-ci est « tout à fait crédible ». Mais sur le fond, la présidence de la République n’a souhaité faire aucun commentaire à ce stade. Dans l’entourage du président, on précise toutefois qu’en amont de la rencontre entre François Hollande et Barack Obama, le 11 février 2014 à Washington, puis lors de cette entrevue, « l’engagement a été pris de ne plus pratiquer d’écoutes indifférenciées des services de l’État d’un pays allié ».

    Le directeur général de LR (ex-UMP), Frédéric Péchenard, a communiqué l’information à Nicolas Sarkozy, qui « ne souhaite pas réagir pour l’instant ».

    Comme pour la plupart des documents obtenus par WikiLeaks, le rapport de mai 2012 de la NSA ciblant François Hollande est surmonté de nombreuses initiales qui, une fois décryptées, donnent la mesure du caractère ultrasensible des données désormais publiques. Estampillées « top secret » (TS), ces notes traitent de renseignements obtenus par des interceptions de signaux électroniques (SI pour SIGINT, soit “signal intelligence”) et ne doivent sous aucun prétexte être partagées avec un pays étranger (NF pour NOFORN, soit “no foreigner”).

    La note Hollande est également accompagnée, comme pour de nombreuses autres, de la mention « unconventional », une catégorie particulière dans la nomenclature de la NSA qui correspond aux opérations non conventionnelles.

    LIRE AUSSI
    Revealed: how US tapped phones of three French presidents
    PAR FABRICE ARFI ET JÉRÔME HOURDEAUX ET JULIAN ASSANGE (WIKILEAKS)

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    PAR LÉNAÏG BREDOUX ET MATHIEU MAGNAUDEIX

    WikiLeaks documents on US snooping on France – what the presidents said
    PAR LÉNAÏG BREDOUX ET ELLEN SALVI ET JULIAN ASSANGE (WIKILEAKS)

    France condemns ‘unacceptable’ spying on its presidents
    PAR LÉNAÏG BREDOUX ET MATHIEU MAGNAUDEIX ET ELLEN SALVI

    35 « leaders internationaux » espionnés par la NSA
    PAR LA RÉDACTION DE MEDIAPART

    Espionnage d’intérêts français par le renseignement allemand : la France se tait
    PAR MATHIEU MAGNAUDEIX

    Espionnage : à droite et à gauche, l’allié américain a déçu
    PAR LÉNAÏG BREDOUX ET MATHIEU MAGNAUDEIX ET ELLEN SALVI
    Toujours dans cette même note Hollande figure une petite mention supplémentaire, qui est tout sauf anodine : « Foreign Satellite ». Ce terme, FORNSAT en abrégé, désigne un réseau mondial de stations d’écoutes de la NSA réparties dans les pays alliés. Tous les regards se portent aujourd’hui, sans qu’il soit possible d’en avoir la certitude absolue, vers des antennes satellites allemandes.

    La presse a en effet plusieurs fois fait état ces derniers mois de la sous-traitance par les services secrets allemands (le BND) de l’espionnage américain, ce qui a provoqué une forte indignation en Allemagne et l’ouverture d’une enquête parlementaire qui cherche précisément le type de documents que WikiLeaks a obtenus.

    En dehors de l’actuel chef de l’État français, d’autres hautes personnalités françaises ont été écoutées. D’après les documents en notre possession, sur lesquels nous reviendrons dans les prochains jours, les anciens présidents Nicolas Sarkozy et Jacques Chirac, l’ancien ministre socialiste de l’économie Pierre Moscovici (aujourd’hui commissaire européen) ou l’ex-ambassadeur de France à Washington Pierre Vimont ont ainsi été espionnés.

    Il faut dire que l’appétit de renseignements des États-Unis pour la France relève de la boulimie. Un autre document confidentiel (voir ci-dessous) de la NSA, rédigé sous la présidence Sarkozy (2007-2012), révèle quant à lui la liste des cibles françaises définies par les États-Unis. Sont concernés, pêle-mêle : le portable personnel du président de l’époque, Nicolas Sarkozy, ceux du conseiller diplomatique Jean-David Levitte, du secrétaire général de l’Élysée Claude Guéant, du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères Bernard Valero, de l’ancien ministre Jean-Pierre Jouyet (aujourd’hui secrétaire général de l’Elysée), celui d’un responsable du Quai d’Orsay non identifié, ou du ministre du commerce extérieur Pierre Lellouche.

    La liste des cibles françaises établie par la NSA sous la présidence Sarkozy
    La liste des cibles françaises établie par la NSA sous la présidence Sarkozy
    Pour Claude Guéant, ancien secrétaire général de l’Elysée et ex-ministre de l’intérieur, « cette pratique est scandaleuse ». « Le gouvernement français doit réagir comme il se doit. Au minimum, cela nécessite une explication au plus haut niveau, un engagement absolu à mettre un terme à ces pratiques. Nous nous acheminons vers un monde qui est extrêmement préoccupant, où plus personne n’a plus d’intimité, de confidentialité », se plaint ce proche de Nicolas Sarkozy.

    « Si les Américains ont écouté Merkel, on ne voit pas pourquoi les autres n’auraient pas été écoutés », commente Frédéric Péchenard, ancien patron de la police nationale et actuel directeur général des Républicains. « Mais si l’on veut être capables de se défendre, il faut que nos services soient à la hauteur. Il nous faut des moyens techniques humains et juridiques plus efficaces. Être espionné par ceux qui sont censés être nos amis, ça peut poser un problème d’ordre diplomatique », précise-t-il.

    « Moi qui étais un grand ami de l’Amérique, je le suis de moins en moins », réagit pour sa part le député Pierre Lellouche auprès de Mediapart. « Je ne suis pas surpris. Ça ne m’étonne pas d’avoir été écouté lorsque j’étais au commerce extérieur, ça intéresse beaucoup les Américains, l’espionnage industriel. On a tout le temps ce genre de conversations. C’est d’ailleurs l’argument qu’on nous rétorque en ce moment dans le cadre de la loi sur le renseignement : on est écouté par tout le monde, pourquoi s’empêcher de nous écouter ? On s’écoute de partout. Malheureusement, je le dirai à l’Assemblée nationale, on est dans un imperium global sur le plan économique, où les États-Unis n’hésitent pas à mettre en réseaux la CIA, la NSA, mais aussi la justice américaine, qui ensuite fait des saisines. Je le dénonce sans arrêt », ajoute-t-il.

    D’après les documents de la NSA, les lignes fixes des conseillers africains en poste à l’Élysée et les numéros des… standards des ministères de l’agriculture et des finances sont également visés. On trouve encore dans la liste des cibles l’antenne du Centre de transmission gouvernemental (CTG) situé à l’Élysée. Celui-ci est chargé d’assurer, à l’abri du “secret défense”, la permanence des liaisons gouvernementales et tout particulièrement celles du chef de l’État et du Premier ministre. Un autre numéro, référencé sous l’intitulé « FR VIP AIRCRAFT REL », renvoie après vérification à une ligne de la flotte aérienne du gouvernement, l’Etec, qui dépend de l’armée de l’air.

    Au-delà du scandale que peut susciter aujourd’hui cet espionnage américain, la facilité avec laquelle les États-Unis paraissent pouvoir intercepter la moindre conversation des plus hauts dirigeants français interroge aujourd’hui la faiblesse des capacités de contre-ingérence des services de renseignement français. À ce propos, l’Élysée a coutume de rappeler que sur les questions diplomatiques et militaires, il n’y a jamais eu de fuite quelle qu’elle soit, précisant que s’agissant des sujets les plus sensibles, toutes les précautions sont prises. Jusqu’à preuve du contraire.

    23 JUIN 2015 | PAR FABRICE ARFI ET JÉRÔME HOURDEAUX ET JULIAN ASSANGE (WIKILEAKS)

    Find this story at 23 June 2015

    Copyright mediapart.fr

    Espionnage Élysée (2015)

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Press Release Top French NSA Targets Top French NSA Intercepts Economic Spy Order

    Today, 29 June 2015, WikiLeaks continues “Espionnage Élysée”, our ongoing publication of a collection of TOP SECRET documents from United States surveillance operations against France.

    Today’s publication comprises seven top secret documents detailing how the US has had a decade- long policy of economic espionage against France, including the interception of all French corporate contracts and negotiations valued at more than $200 million. The documents demonstrate that the US National Security Agency, far from being a rogue organisation, is carrying out an economic espionage policy created by the US Director of National Intelligence. The documents detail the intelligence process, from the tasking of the NSA with collection of desired economic information to the production of developed intelligence reports, which are sent to “Supported Elements” of the US government, including the US Department of Commerce, the US Trade Represenative, the US Treasury and the Central Intelligence Agency.

    Central within the cache of documents are two long-term spying orders (“collection requirements”) which define the kinds of intelligence the NSA is tasked with collecting in its surveillance operations against France. The documents make clear that the NSA has been tasked with obtaining intelligence on all aspects of the French economy, from government policy, diplomacy, banking and participation in international bodies to infrastructural development, business practices and trade activities. The documents establish that the US economic intelligence operations against France have run for more than a decade and started as early as 2002. Some of the documents are authorised for sharing with the “Five Eyes” partners – the group of Anglophone countries in close intelligence co-operation with the United States: Canada, New Zealand, Australia and France’s fellow member state of the European Union, the United Kingdom, strongly suggesting that the United Kingdom has also benefited from the United States’ economic espionage activities against France.

    The cache also includes five TOP SECRET intelligence summaries from US spying on the conversations and communications of French officials. The documents show US spying on the French Finance Minister, a French Senator, officials within the Treasury and Economic Policy Directorate, the French ambassador to the United States, and officials with direct responsibility for EU trade policy. The intercepts reveal internal French deliberation and policy on the World Trade Organization, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the G7 and the G20, the 2013 French budget, the decline of the automotive industry in France, and the involvement of French companies in the Oil for Food programme in Iraq during the 1990s.

    WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said: “The United States has been conducting economic espionage against France for more than a decade. Not only has it spied on the French Finance Minister, it has ordered the interception of every French company contract or negotiation valued at more than $200 million. That covers not only all of France’s major companies, from BNP Paribas, AXA and Credit Agricole to Peugeot and Renault, Total and Orange, but it also affects the major French farming associations. $200 million is roughly 3,000 French jobs. Hundreds of such contracts are signed every year. The United States not only uses the results of this spying itself, but swaps these intercepts with the United Kingdom. Do French citizens deserve to know that their country is being taken to the cleaners by the spies of supposedly allied countries? Mais oui!”

    For French-language interviews/comment regarding Espionnage Élysée please contact WikiLeaks’ Paris-based legal advisor, Juan Branco: Tel. +33 671 19 21 47

    Cartoon
    Today, 23 June 2015, WikiLeaks began publishing “Espionnage Élysée”, a collection of TOP SECRET intelligence reports and technical documents from the US National Security Agency (NSA) concerning targeting and signals intelligence intercepts of the communications of high-level officials from successive French governments over the last ten years.

    The top secret documents derive from directly targeted NSA surveillance of the communications of French Presidents Francois Hollande (2012–present), Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), and Jacques Chirac (1995–2007), as well as French cabinet ministers and the French Ambassador to the United States. The documents also contain the “selectors” from the target list, detailing the cell phone numbers of numerous officials in the Elysee up to and including the direct cell phone of the President.

    Prominent within the top secret cache of documents are intelligence summaries of conversations between French government officials concerning some of the most pressing issues facing France and the international community, including the global financial crisis, the Greek debt crisis, the leadership and future of the European Union, the relationship between the Hollande administration and the German government of Angela Merkel, French efforts to determine the make-up of the executive staff of the United Nations, French involvement in the conflict in Palestine and a dispute between the French and US governments over US spying on France.

    A founding member state of the European Union and one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, France is formally a close ally of the United States, and plays a key role in a number of US-associated international institutions, including the Group of 7 (G7), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

    The revelation of the extent of US spying against French leaders and diplomats echoes a previous disclosure in the German press concerning US spying on the communications of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other German officials. That disclosure provoked a political scandal in Germany, eventuating in an official inquiry into German intelligence co-operation with the United States, which is still ongoing.

    While the German disclosures focused on the isolated fact that senior officials were targeted by US intelligence, WikiLeaks’ publication today provides much greater insight into US spying on its allies, including the actual content of intelligence products deriving from the intercepts, showing how the US spies on the phone calls of French leaders and ministers for political, economic and diplomatic intelligence.

    WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said: “The French people have a right to know that their elected government is subject to hostile surveillance from a supposed ally. We are proud of our work with leading French publishers Liberation and Mediapart to bring this story to light. French readers can expect more timely and important revelations in the near future.”

    Find this story at 29 June 2015

    Trade Secrets : Is the U.S.’s most advanced surveillance system feeding economic intelligence to American businesses? (1999)

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    No one is surprised that the United States uses sophisticated electronic spying techniques against its enemies. But Europeans are increasingly worried about allegations that the U.S. uses those same techniques to gather economic intelligence about its allies.
    The most extensive claims yet came this spring in a report written for the European Parliament. The report says that the U.S.

    National Security Agency, through an electronic surveillance system called Echelon, routinely tracks telephone, fax, and e-mail transmissions from around the world and passes on useful corporate intelligence to American companies.

    Among the allegations: that the NSA fed information to Boeing and McDonnell Douglas enabling the companies to beat out European Airbus Industrie for a $ 6 billion contract; and that Raytheon received information that helped it win a $ 1.3 billion contract to provide radar to Brazil, edging out the French company Thomson-CSF. These claims follow previous allegations that the NSA supplied U.S. automakers with information that helped improve their competitiveness with the Japanese (see “Company Spies,” May/June 1994).

    Is there truth to these allegations? The NSA is among the most secretive of U.S. intelligence agencies and won’t say much beyond the fact that its mission is “foreign signals intelligence.” The companies involved all refused to comment.

    “Since the NSA’s collection capabilities are so grotesquely powerful, it’s difficult to know what’s going on over there,” says John Pike, an analyst at the watchdog group Federation of American Scientists, who has tracked the NSA for years.

    This much is known: The NSA owns one of the largest collections of supercomputers in the world, and it’s an open secret–as documented in the European Parliament report–that Echelon vacuums up massive amounts of data from communications satellites and the Internet and then uses its computers to winnow it down. The system scans communications for keywords–“bomb,” for instance–that might tip off analysts to an interesting topic.

    Fueling allegations of corporate espionage is the fact that defense contractors and U.S. intelligence agencies are linked extensively through business relationships. Raytheon, for instance, has large contracts to service NSA equipment, according to the European report.

    Englishman Glyn Ford, the European Parliament member who initiated the study, wants the NSA to come clean about its activities in Europe. And the Europeans have some leverage on this issue, if they decide to use it. In a drive to improve surveillance, the United States is pressuring European governments to make telephone companies build eavesdropping capabilities into their new systems. But if that’s what the U.S. wants, says Ford, it’s going to have to be open about what information it’s collecting: “If we are going to leave the keys under the doormat for the United States, we want a guarantee that they’re not going to steal the family silver,” he says.

    In the meantime, congressional critics have started to wonder if all that high-powered eavesdropping is limited to overseas snooping. In April, Bob Barr (R-Ga.), a member of the House Government Reform Committee, said he was worried by reports that the NSA was engaged in illicit domestic spying.

    “We don’t have any direct evidence from the NSA, since they’ve refused to provide any reports, even when asked by the House Intelligence Committee,” Barr says. “But if in fact the NSA is pulling two million transmissions an hour off of these satellites, I don’t think there’s any way they have of limiting them to non-U.S. citizens.”

    Last May, after the NSA stonewalled requests to discuss the issue, Congress amended the intelligence appropriations bill to require the agency to submit a report to Congress. (The bill is still in a conference committee.) And the NSA will face more questions when the Government Reform Committee holds hearings on Echelon and other surveillance programs.

    “We ought to prevent any agency from the dragnet approach–where they throw out a net and drag anything in,” Barr says.

    Kurt Kleiner
    Mother Jones November 1, 1999

    Find this story at 1 November 1999

    Copyright Mother Jones

    KGB spy shares details of his escape to Britain in 1985

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Oleg GordievskyA Soviet double spy, who secretly defected to Britain 30 years ago this month, has revealed for the first time the details of his exfiltration by British intelligence in 1985. Oleg Gordievsky was one of the highest Soviet intelligence defectors to the West in the closing stages of the Cold War. He joined the Soviet KGB in 1963, eventually reaching the rank of colonel. But in the 1960s, while serving in the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark, Gordievsky began feeling disillusioned about the Soviet system. His doubts were reinforced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was soon afterwards that he made the decision to contact British intelligence.
    Cautiously, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (known as MI6) communicated with Gordievsky, and in 1974 he secretly became an agent-in-place for the United Kingdom. Eight years later, in 1982, Gordievsky was promoted to KGB rezident (chief of station) in London. While there, he frequently made contact with his MI6 handlers, giving them highly coveted information on Soviet nuclear strategy, among other things. He is credited with informing London of Mikhail Gorbachev’s imminent ascendency to the premiership of the Soviet Union, long before he was seen by Western intelligence as a viable candidate to lead the country.
    But in May of 1985, Gordievsky was suddenly recalled to Moscow, where he was detained by the KGB. He was promptly taken to a KGB safe house in the outskirts of Moscow and interrogated for five hours, before being temporarily released pending further questioning. Remarkably, however, Gordievsky managed to escape his KGB surveillance and reappear in Britain less than a week later. How did this happen? On Sunday, the former double spy gave a rare rare interview to The Times, in which he revealed for the first time the details of his escape to London. He told The Times’ Ben Macintyre that he was smuggled out of the USSR by MI6 as part of Operation PIMLICO. PIMLICO was an emergency exfiltration operation that had been put in place by MI6 long before Gordievsky requested its activation in May of 1985.
    Every Tuesday, shortly after 7:00, a British MI6 officer would take a morning stroll at the Kutuzovsky Prospekt in Moscow. He would pass outside a designated bakery at exactly 7:24 a.m. local time. If he saw Gordievsky standing outside the bakery holding a grocery bag, it meant that the double agent was requesting to be exfiltrated as a matter of urgency. Gordievsky would then have to wait outside the bakery until a second MI6 officer appeared, carrying a bag from the Harrods luxury department store in London. The man would also be carrying a Mars bar (a popular British candy bar) and would bite into it while passing right in front of Gordievsky. That would be a message to him that his request to be exfiltrated had been received.
    Four days later, Gordievsky used his skills in evading surveillance and shook off (or dry-cleaned, in espionage tradecraft lingo) the KGB officers trailing him. He was then picked up by MI6 officers and smuggled out of the country in the trunk of a British diplomatic car that drove to the Finnish border. Gordievsky told The Times that Soviet customs officers stopped the car at the Finnish border and surrounded it with sniffer dogs. At that moment, a British diplomat’s wife, who was aware that Gordievsky was hiding in the car, came out of the vehicle and proceeded to change her baby’s diaper on the trunk, thus safeguarding Gordievsky’s hiding place and masking his scent with her baby’s used diaper. If it hadn’t been for the diplomat’s wife, Gordievsky told The Times that he might have been caught.
    After crossing the Soviet-Finnish border, Gordievsky traveled to Norway and from there he boarded a plane for England. Soviet authorities promptly sentenced him to death, but allowed his wife and children to join him in Britain six years later, after British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher personally lobbied the Soviet government. Gordievsky’s death penalty still stands in Russia. In 2007, the Queen made Gordievsky a Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George for services rendered to the security of the British state.

    JULY 6, 2015 BY JOSEPH FITSANAKIS LEAVE A COMMENT

    Find this story at 6 July 2015

    Copyright intelnews.org

    Top KGB defector begged Margaret Thatcher to secure release of his family

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Oleg Gordievsky told the prime minister that without his wife and young daughters his “life has no meaning”, papers released by the National Archives show

    Oleg Gordievsky, the most prominent Soviet agent to defect to Britain during the Cold War, personally pleaded with Margaret Thatcher to help secure the release of his family from Moscow.
    The KGB colonel told the prime minister that without his wife and young daughters, who were prevented from following him to London, his “life has no meaning”.
    Files released by the National Archives reveal that MI6 secretly sought to broker a deal with the Russians to secure the safe passage of his family. When the offer was rejected, Mrs Thatcher insisted on expelling every KGB agent in Britain.
    Mr Gordievsky, who was one of the most important spies during the Cold War, provided Britain with reports on Soviet operations for more than a decade.
    When he issued his appeal to Mrs Thatcher in 1985, she responded personally in an emotive note on Sept 7 1985 urging him to have hope.
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    “Our anxiety for your family remains and we shall not forget them,” she said. “Having children of my own, I know the kind of thoughts and feelings which are going through your mind each and every day. But just as your concern is about them, so their concern will be for your safety and well-being.
    “Please do not say that life has no meaning. There is always hope. And we shall do all to help you through these difficult days.”
    Mrs Thatcher went on to suggest that the pair should meet when the “immediate situation” – the public announcement of Mr Gordievsky’s defection to Britain – had passed.
    Her personal involvement was greeted with extreme gratitude by Christopher Curwen, the MI6 chief who had arranged Mr Gordievsky’s extraction from Moscow.
    Curwen said: “The reassurance that his family would not be forgotten provided the help and support which he most needs at this difficult time.”
    Her comments “greatly assisted” MI6’s dealings with Mr Gordievsky at a “very dificult time,” he added.
    Mr Gordievsky arrived in London as a result of an emergency extraction sanctioned by Mrs Thatcher in the summer of 1985. Originally recruited in 1974, Mr Gordievsky became Britain’s star source inside the KGB after being posted to the Soviet secret service’s London bureau.
    However, on May 17 1985, having just been promised the job of head of station in London, he was suddenly summoned back to Moscow and subsequently accused of being a spy. He eventually escaped to London with the help of MI6, who smuggled him across the border into Finland, after giving his KBG minders the slip.
    When she formally announced Mr Gordievsky’s defection Mrs Thatcher said she hoped that “on humanitarian grounds” the Soviet authorities would agree to his request for his family to join him in London.
    However it was another six years before he was reunited with his wife Leila and children. His elder daughter Mariya was 11 on her arrival in London in 1991, and his second child Anna was 10.
    The National Archives files show that the prime minister took a close interest in Mr Gordievsky’s well-being, asking his handlers “whether he has some sort of companion to talk to and confide in at what is obviously a very difficult time for him.”

    By Edward Malnick7:00AM GMT 30 Dec 2014

    Find this story at 30 December 2014

    © Copyright of Telegraph Media Group Limited 2015

    Inside Toronto’s secret Cold War History

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    In the 50s and 60s, Soviet and American spies waged a secret war of espionage across the city of Toronto.

    At the height of the Cold War, Toronto was the site of an elaborate game of espionage played between the U.S and the Soviet Union, declassified CIA documents show.
    The records provide new details about how the CIA and the KGB spied on the city’s growing community of eastern European immigrants.
    And those details came as a surprise to at least one Toronto target who learned she was the subject of the CIA investigations.
    “I’m amazed. I’m absolutely in shock,” says Ukrainian-born Natalie Bundza, 78, who worked as a travel agent at an agency on Bloor St. when the CIA first began to monitor her travels.
    Because of her line of work, Bundza was used to being singled out by Soviet authorities. But when the Star showed her the declassified CIA file bearing her name, Bundza was stunned. The depth and breadth of the information that had been collected on her was startling.
    In one of Bundza’s trips to Ukraine in the late ’60s, the CIA had amassed enough intelligence to describe everything from the people she met with overseas to the content of her suitcase, even going as far as to mention the art books she had packed.
    “Took many books to Ukraine: several copies of Archipenko’s monograph Hnizdovsky monograph, poetry collections of the New York group, a Bible for Ivan Mykolaychuk,” the file reads.
    As a young travel agent in her early 30s, Bundza, who now lives in a bungalow in Etobicoke, would often accompany performance groups and tourists across the Iron Curtain and to the Soviet Union. She believes her job and her friends in the art world made her an attractive target for CIA spies.
    Mykolaychuk, an actor, and her other friends, she says, were part of what she calls the “Ukrainian intelligentsia.”
    They included famous sculptor Ivan Honchar, poet Ivan Drach, and prominent political activist Dmytro Pavlychko — names which were all dutifully noted by the CIA spy.
    “I was constantly followed (by the Soviets). They just knew my background. They knew I was a patriot, that I wasn’t a communist,” she says.
    She kept abreast of news from her home country, and she wasn’t afraid to take risks. In her early 30s, Bundza was “all guts, no brains,” she remembers. “I would have knocked on the president’s door if I had to.”
    “We were great tourist guides. We took no BS from (the Soviets),” she says.
    During one of her organized trips, she noticed that a Soviet customs official had been eyeing the stack of Bibles she carried with her. And so, without prompting, Bundza handed him a copy.
    Still, as far as Bundza remembers, she never divulged the minutiae of her travels to anyone — let alone an American spy. How, then, was the CIA able to monitor her travels?
    In Toronto, many served as the agency’s eyes and ears.
    “This was a period of time when the United States did not know nearly as much about the Soviet Union, whether it be its intentions or its capabilities,” said Richard Immerman, a Cold War historian at Temple University in Philadelphia. For the CIA, the goal was to “put different pieces (together) in the hope that one pattern would emerge.”
    Eyewitness accounts were deemed especially important by American intelligence officials.
    At the time, it was not uncommon for those venturing beyond the Iron Curtain to spy on behalf of the CIA, says Immerman. “Our aerial surveillance was limited (so) in many cases, those who did travel to the Soviet Union willingly co-operated with the CIA to provide information — whatever information,” he says. “These could be tourists. These could be businessmen. This was not a time when thousands of people from the West would travel to the Soviet Union.”
    http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20VOL.%2021_0111.pdf
    But for the CIA, Toronto was also rife with potential enemies. In a 1959 declassified file, an American spy describes how 18 Canadians, 11 of whom lived in Toronto, were suspected of working for the KGB. According to the CIA agent, the Canadians had secretly travelled to the Soviet Union and received special training, only to return years later as undercover KGB operatives.
    Other suspected KGB spies, such as Ivan Kolaska, had apparently immigrated to Toronto as part of a bold Soviet plan to infiltrate Ukrainian communities overseas. Kolaska, along with other alleged KGB operatives, one of whom lived a double life as a Toronto City Hall employee, regularly met with Soviet diplomats in Toronto, the files say.
    http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20VOL.%2033%20%20%28OPERATIONS%29_0048.pdf
    In one of those meetings with Soviet embassy staff, the files say, Kolaska revealed the identities of dozens of Ukrainian students who had held a secret meeting in Kyiv. They were later arrested by Soviet authorities, according to the files.
    In many of the declassified documents, the CIA’s informants are named. Bundza’s file contains no such information, leaving only one clue as to the identity of the mysterious spy: Bundza’s full name.
    There is no mention of a “Natalie Bundza” in the file. Her name is listed as “Natalka” instead.
    Only another Ukrainian, she says, would have known her as “Natalka.”
    “It must have been someone from the community here.”

    By: Laurent Bastien Corbeil Staff Reporter, Published on Thu Jul 02 2015

    Find this story at 2 July 2015

    © Copyright Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. 1996-2015

    The Spy Among Us

    Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

    Jack Barsky held a job at some of the top corporations in the U.S. and lived a seemingly normal life — all while spying for the Soviet Union

    The following is a script from “The Spy Among Us” which aired on May 10, 2015. Steve Kroft is the correspondent. Draggan Mihailovich, producer.

    Tonight, we’re going to tell you a story you’ve probably never heard before because only a few people outside the FBI know anything about it. It’s a spy story unlike any other and if you think your life is complicated, wait till you hear about Jack Barsky’s, who led three of them simultaneously. One as a husband and father, two as a computer programmer and administrator at some top American corporations and three as a KGB agent spying on America during the last decade of the Cold War.

    The FBI did finally apprehend him in Pennsylvania but it was long after the Soviet Union had crumbled. What makes Jack Barsky’s story even more remarkable is he’s never spent a night in jail, the Russians declared him dead a long time ago, he’s living a quiet life in upstate New York and has worked in important and sensitive jobs. He’s now free to tell his story…as honestly as a former spy ever can.

    Jack Barsky CBS NEWS
    Steve Kroft: So who are you?
    Jack Barsky: Who am I? That depends when the question is asked. Right now, I’m Jack Barsky. I work in the United States. I’m a U.S. citizen. But it wasn’t always the case.

    Steve Kroft: How many different identities do you have?

    Jack Barsky: I have two main identities. A German one, and an American one.

    “Who am I? That depends when the question is asked. Right now, I’m Jack Barsky. I work in the United States. I’m a U.S. citizen. But it wasn’t always the case.”
    Steve Kroft: What’s your real name?

    Jack Barsky: My real name is Jack Barsky.

    Steve Kroft: And what name were you born with?

    Jack Barsky: Albrecht Dittrich. Say that three times real fast.

    Steve Kroft: Just say it once slowly…(laughs)

    Jack Barsky: Albrecht Dittrich.

    How Albrecht Dittrich became Jack Barsky is one of the untold stories of the Cold War, an era when the real battles were often fought between the CIA and the KGB. Barsky was a rarity, a Soviet spy who posed as an American and became enmeshed in American society. For the 10 years he was operational for the KGB, no one in this country knew his real story, not even his family.

    Steve Kroft: Did you think you were going to get away with this?

    Jack Barsky: Yeah, otherwise I wouldn’t have done it (laughs).

    youngbarsky.jpg
    Young Jack Barsky
    What Barsky did can be traced back to East Germany, back to the days when he was Albrecht Dittrich. A national scholar at a renowned university in Jena, Dittrich was on the fast track to becoming a chemistry professor, his dream job.
    Jack Barsky: Didn’t work out that way, because I was recruited by the KGB to do something a little more adventurous.

    Steve Kroft: Spy?

    Jack Barsky: We called it something different. We used a euphemism. I was going to be a “scout for peace.”

    Steve Kroft: A KGB “scout for peace”?

    Jack Barsky: That is correct. The communist spies were the good guys. And the capitalist spies were the evil ones. So we didn’t use the word spy.

    He says his spying career began with a knock on his dorm room door one Saturday afternoon in 1970. A man introduced himself, claiming to be from a prominent optics company.

    Jack Barsky: He wanted to talk with me about my career, which was highly unusual. I immediately, there was a flash in my head that said, “That’s Stasi.”

    Steve Kroft: East German secret police?

    Jack Barsky: East German secret police, yeah.

    60 MINUTES: SEGMENT EXTRAS
    HOW DOES A COVERT SPY GET AROUND?
    It was a Stasi agent. He invited Dittrich to this restaurant in Jena where a Russian KGB agent showed up and took over the conversation. The KGB liked Dittrich’s potential because he was smart, his father was a member of the Communist party and he didn’t have any relatives in the West. Dittrich liked the attention and the notion he might get to help the Soviets.

    Steve Kroft: And what did you think of America?

    Jack Barsky: It was the enemy. And, the reason that the Americans did so well was because they exploited all the third-world countries. That’s what we were taught, and that’s what we believed. We didn’t know any better. I grew up in an area where you could not receive West German television. It was called the “Valley of the Clueless.”

    For the next couple of years, the KGB put Dittrich through elaborate tests and then in 1973 he was summoned to East Berlin, to this former Soviet military compound. The KGB, he says, wanted him to go undercover.

    Jack Barsky: At that point, I had passed all the tests, so they wanted, they made me an offer.

    Steve Kroft: But you had been thinking about it all along, hadn’t you?

    Jack Barsky: That’s true. With one counterweight in that you didn’t really know what was going to come. Is– how do you test drive becoming another person?

    It was a difficult decision, but he agreed to join the KGB and eventually found himself in Moscow, undergoing intensive training.

    Jack Barsky: A very large part of the training was operational work. Determination as to whether you’re being under surveillance. Morse code, short wave radio reception. I also learned how to do microdots. A microdot is, you know, you take a picture and make it so small with the use of microscope that you can put it under a postage stamp.

    60 MINUTES: SEGMENT EXTRAS
    JACK BARSKY SHARES SOME HOW-TOS OF SPYING
    The Soviets were looking to send someone to the U.S. who could pose as an American. Dittrich showed a command of English and no trace of an East German accent that might give him away. He learned a hundred new English words every day.

    Jack Barsky: It took me forever. I did probably a full year of phonetics training. The difference between “hot” and “hut.” Right? That, that’s very difficult and, and most Germans don’t get that one.

    Steve Kroft: Did you want to go to the United States?

    Jack Barsky: Oh yeah. Sure. There was New York, there was San Francisco, you know, we heard about these places.

    Steve Kroft: Your horizons were expanding…

    Jack Barsky: Oh, absolutely. Now I’m really in the big league, right?

    Dittrich needed an American identity. And one day a diplomat out of the Soviet embassy in Washington came across this tombstone just outside of D.C. with the name of a 10-year-old boy who had died in 1955. The name was Jack Philip Barsky.

    60 MINUTES: SEGMENT EXTRAS
    THE ORIGINAL JACK PHILIP BARSKY
    Jack Barsky: And they said, “Guess what? We have a birth certificate. We’re going to the U.S.”

    Steve Kroft: And that was the Jack Barsky birth certificate.

    Jack Barsky: The Jack Barsky birth certificate that somebody had obtained and I was given. I didn’t have to get this myself.

    Steve Kroft: Did you feel strange walking around with this identity of a child?

    Jack Barsky: No. No. When you do this kind of work, some things you don’t think about. Because if you explore, you may find something you don’t like.

    The newly minted Jack Barsky landed in New York City in the fall of 1978, with a phony back story called a legend and a fake Canadian passport that he quickly discarded. The KGB’s plan for him was fairly straightforward. They wanted the 29-year-old East German to get a real U.S. passport with his new name, then become a businessman, then insert himself into the upper echelons of American society and then to get close to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski so that he could spy on him.

    Jack Barsky: That was the plan. It failed.

    Steve Kroft: Why?

    Jack Barsky: Because I was not given very good instructions with regard to how to apply for a passport.

    When he went to apply for a passport at Rockefeller Center, Barsky was thrown off by the list of questions.

    Jack Barsky: Specific details about my past, for which I had no proof. So I walked out of it.

    Steve Kroft: Did the KGB have a pretty good grasp on the United States and how things worked there?

    Jack Barsky: No.

    Steve Kroft: No?

    Jack Barsky: Absolutely not. They made a number of mistakes in terms of giving me advice, what to do, what not to do. They just didn’t know.

    Left to fend for himself in a country the KGB didn’t understand, he got himself a cheap apartment and tried to make do with a birth certificate and $6,000 dollars in cash the Soviets had given him. His spying career at that point more resembled the bumbling Boris Badenov than James Bond…

    Steve Kroft: So you were working as a bike messenger?

    Jack Barsky: Right.

    Steve Kroft: That doesn’t sound like a promising position for a spy.

    Jack Barsky: No. But there were a lot of things that I didn’t know…

    Steve Kroft: So how close did you ever get to Brzezinski?

    Jack Barsky: Not very.

    To get a Social Security card, which he would need if he wanted a real job, Barsky knew he would have to do some acting.

    Jack Barsky: It was unusual for a 30-plus-year-old person to, to say, “You know, I don’t have a Social Security card. Give me one.” So in order to make my story stick I made my face dirty. So I looked like somebody who just came off a farm. It worked! The lady asked me, she said, “So how come you don’t, you don’t have a card?” And when the answer was, “I didn’t need one.” “Why?” “Well, I worked on a farm.” And that was the end of the interview.

    The Social Security card enabled him to enroll at Baruch College in Manhattan, where he majored in computer systems. He was class valedictorian but you won’t find a picture of him in the school yearbook. In 1984, he was hired as a programmer by Metropolitan Life Insurance where he had access to the personal information of millions of Americans.

    Steve Kroft: You were writing computer code?

    Jack Barsky: Right. Yes. Lots of it. And I was really good at it.

    What he didn’t write, he stole, on behalf of the KGB.

    Steve Kroft: What was the most valuable piece of information you gave them?

    Jack Barsky: I would say that was the computer code because it was a very prominent piece of industrial software still in use today.

    Steve Kroft: This was IBM code?

    Jack Barsky: No comment.

    Steve Kroft: You don’t want to say?

    Jack Barsky: No. It was good stuff. Let’s put it this way, yeah.

    Steve Kroft: It was helpful to the Soviet Union…

    Jack Barsky: It would’ve been helpful to the Soviet Union and their running organizations and, and factories and so forth.

    Steve Kroft: How often did you communicate with the Russians?

    Jack Barsky: I would get a radiogram once a week.

    Steve Kroft: A radiogram, meaning?

    Jack Barsky: A radiogram means a transmission that was on a certain frequency at a certain time.

    Every Thursday night at 9:15 Barsky would tune into his shortwave radio at his apartment in Queens and listen for a transmission he believed came from Cuba.

    Jack Barsky: All the messages were encrypted that they became digits. And the digits would be sent over as, in groups of five. And sometimes that took a good hour to just write it all down, and then another three hours to decipher.

    During the 10 years he worked for the KGB, Barsky had a ready-made cover story.

    Steve Kroft: When somebody’d ask you, you know, “Where you from Jack?,” what’d you say?

    Jack Barsky: I’m originally from New Jersey. I was born in Orange. That’s it. American. Nobody ever questioned that. People would question my, “You have an accent.” But my comeback was, “Yeah, my mother was German and we spoke a lot of German at home.”

    Steve Kroft: You had to tell a lot of lies.

    Jack Barsky: Absolutely. I was living a lie.

    Steve Kroft: Were you a good liar?

    Jack Barsky: The best.

    You had to be a good liar to juggle the multiple lives he was leading. Every two years while he was undercover for the KGB, Barsky would return to East Germany and Moscow for debriefings. During one of his visits to East Berlin he married his old girlfriend Gerlinde and they had a son.

    Steve Kroft: Did that complicate matters?

    Jack Barsky: Initially it wasn’t complicated at all, it got complicated later.

    Steve Kroft: Because?

    Jack Barsky: Because I got married in the United States to somebody else.

    Steve Kroft: Did she know about your other wife in Germany?

    Jack Barsky: No.

    Steve Kroft: Did your wife in Germany know about the…

    Jack Barsky: Not at all.

    Steve Kroft: So you had two wives?

    Jack Barsky: I did. I’m, I was officially a bigamist. That’s, that’s the one thing I am so totally not proud of.

    Steve Kroft: Being a spy was all right. Being a bigamist…

    Jack Barsky: In hindsight, you know, I was a spy for the wrong people. But I, this one hurt because I had promised my German wife, that you know, we would be together forever. And I broke that promise. And the one way I can explain it to myself is I had separated the German, the Dittrich from the Barsky to the point where the two just didn’t know about each other.

    Not only did he have two different identities, and two wives, he had a son named Matthias in Germany and a daughter named Chelsea in America. And by November 1988, a radiogram from the KGB would force him to make an excruciating choice.

    Jack Barsky: I received a radiogram that essentially said, “You need to come home. Your cover may soon be broken and you’re in danger of being arrested by the American authorities.”

    Barsky was given urgent instructions from the KGB to locate an oil can that had been dropped next to a fallen tree just off this path on New York’s Staten Island. A fake passport and cash that he needed to escape the United States and return to East Germany would be concealed inside the can.

    Jack Barsky: I was supposed to pick up the container and go on, leave. Not even go back home to the apartment, just disappear. The container wasn’t there. I don’t know what I would have done if I had found it, but I know what I did when I didn’t find it. I did not tell them, “repeat the operation.” I made the decision to stay.

    Steve Kroft: Why?

    Jack Barsky: Because of Chelsea.

    Steve Kroft: Your daughter.

    Jack Barsky: Yes. If Chelsea’s not in the mix, that’s a no brainer, I’m outta here.

    Barsky had chosen Chelsea over Matthias.

    Jack Barsky: I had bonded with her. It was a tough one because on the one hand I had a wife and child in Germany but if I don’t take care of Chelsea, she grows up in poverty.

    Steve Kroft: This may be a little harsh but it sounds like the first time in your life that you thought about somebody besides yourself.

    Jack Barsky: You’re absolutely right. I was quite an egomaniac. I was.

    Jack Barsky was still left with the not insignificant matter of telling the KGB that he was staying in America. In a moment, we’ll tell you how he duped the KGB and how the FBI changed his life.

    PART TWO
    At the end of 1988, Jack Barsky’s 10-year run as a clandestine KGB agent in the United States was about to come to an end. He had ignored Soviet warnings that his cover had been blown and decided to remain in America and not return to his native East Germany. He was taking a chance that no one in America would ever find out who he really was. And he was taking a bigger chance that the KGB wouldn’t retaliate for disobeying an order. The urgency with which the Soviets seemed to view the situation became clear one morning in Queens.

    Jack Barsky says he was on his way to work in December 1988, standing and waiting for an “A” train on this subway platform when a stranger paid him a visit.

    Jack Barsky: There’s this character in, in a black coat and he sidles up to me and he whispers in my ear, he says, “You gotta come home or else you’re dead.” And then he walked out.

    Steve Kroft: Russian accent?

    Jack Barsky: Yes.

    Steve Kroft: That’s an incentive.

    Jack Barsky: It’s an incentive to go.

    Steve Kroft: I mean spies get killed all the time.

    Jack Barsky: They do. But not me. The entire time I always had this childlike belief that everything would be all right.

    “There’s this character in, in a black coat and he sidles up to me and he whispers in my ear, he says, ‘You gotta come home or else you’re dead.’ And then he walked out.”
    Steve Kroft: So what are you going to tell the Russians?

    Jack Barsky: Well, I (sighs) I sent them, this “Dear John” letter, the goodbye letter in which I stated that I had contracted AIDS and that the only way for me to get a treatment would be in the United States.

    Steve Kroft: You just wrote them a letter and said, ‘I can’t come back. I’ve got AIDS”?

    Jack Barsky: There’s three things I tell people that the Russians were afraid of. AIDS, Jewish people and Ronald Reagan. And they were deathly…

    Steve Kroft: In that order?

    Jack Barsky: I think Ronald Reagan took the top spot. They thought he would push the button.

    The AIDS letter apparently worked because in East Berlin the Soviets told his German wife Gerlinde he wasn’t coming back.

    Jack Barsky: They went to Gerlinde and told her that I had died of AIDS. So I think they just wrote me off completely.

    Steve Kroft: You were officially dead in East Germany?

    Jack Barsky: Right. After five years she was able to declare me dead.

    Once the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union fell apart, Barsky was a man without a country. No one would want him back. He felt his secret was safe in America. He became a family guy, with a wife, two kids, Chelsea and Jessie, and a job. He burrowed himself into suburbia, keeping a low profile.

    Jack Barsky: I was settling down, I was living in the, in rural Pennsylvania at the time, in a nice house, with two children. I was, like, typical middle class existence.

    And his life would have stayed quiet if a KGB archivist named Vasili Mitrokhin hadn’t defected to the West in 1992 with a trove of notes on the Soviets’ spying operations around the world. Buried deep in his papers was the last name of a secret agent the KGB had deployed somewhere in America: Barsky.

    Joe Reilly: We were concerned that he might be running an agent operating in the federal government somewhere. Who knows? In the FBI, the CIA, the State Department. We had no idea.

    Joe Reilly was an FBI agent when the bureau got the Mitrokhin tip, and the Barsky case quickly became serious enough that FBI director Louis Freeh got personally involved. The FBI didn’t know who or where he was, but the best lead seemed to be a Jack Barsky who was working as an I.T. specialist in New Jersey, with a suburban home across the border in Mount Bethel, Pennsylvania.

    Steve Kroft: Aside from his name was there anything else that made you suspicious and make you think that this was the guy you were looking for?

    Joe Reilly: Yes. One thing was the fact that he had applied for a Social Security number late in life. Especially someone like him who was educated and intelligent.

    The FBI began following Barsky, and when this surveillance photo caught him talking to a native of Cuba, the bureau grew increasingly concerned.

    Joe Barsky: There were some indications that I could possibly be the head of a international spy ring, because I had a friend who was originally from Cuba. And it so happened that this friend owned an apartment that was rented to a Soviet diplomat. So that one and raised all kinds of flags and they investigated me very, very, very carefully.

    FBI agent Joe Reilly went so far as to set up an observation post on a hillside behind Barsky’s house. This is a picture he took of his view.

    Joe Reilly: I got a telescope and binoculars, as if I was a birdwatcher. But I was looking at his backyard and at him. Over time, I learned a great deal about him.

    Steve Kroft: Like what?

    Joe Reilly: …just watching him. Well, I became convinced that he loved his children. And that was important because I wanted to know if he would flee. There was less chance of that if, if he was devoted to his children. And he was.

    But that wasn’t enough for the FBI. The bureau bought the house next door to get a closer look at the Barskys.

    Steve Kroft: Did you get a good deal?

    Joe Reilly: I think we paid what he was asking. And we had agents living there so that we could be sure who was coming and going from his house without being too obvious in our surveillance.

    Steve Kroft: You had no idea the FBI was living next door to you?

    Jack Barsky: No.

    Steve Kroft: Never saw…

    Jack Barsky: No.

    Steve Kroft: …Joe Reilly up on the hill with the binoculars?

    Jack Barsky: Absolutely not.

    When the FBI finally got authorization from the Justice Department to bug Barsky’s home, the case broke wide open.

    Joe Reilly: Within, I’d say, the first two weeks that we had microphones in his house, he had an argument with his wife in the kitchen. And during the course of that dispute, he readily admitted that he was an agent, operating from the Soviet Union.

    It was all the FBI needed to move in on Barsky. They set a trap for him at a toll bridge across the Delaware River as he drove home from work late one Friday afternoon in May of 1997.

    Jack Barsky: I’m being waved to the side by a state trooper. And he said, “We’re doing a routine traffic check. Would you please get out of the car?” I get out of the car and somebody steps up from, from behind and shows me a badge. And he said, “FBI. We would like to talk to you.”

    Joe Reilly: His face just dropped. And we told him that he had to go with us.

    Jack Barsky: The first words out of my mouth were, “Am I under arrest?” And the answer was, “No.” Now that took a big weight off of me, so I figured there was a chance to get out of this in one piece. And the next question I asked, “So what took you so long?”

    The FBI had rented an entire wing of a motel off Interstate 80 in Pennsylvania for Barsky’s interrogation.

    Joe Reilly: But on the way to the motel, I remember turning to him. And I, I told him that this didn’t have to be the worst day of his life. And he immediately realized that he had an out.

    Jack Barsky: I said to them, “Listen, I know I have only one shot out of this and that means I need to come clean and be 100 percent honest and tell you everything I know.”

    The FBI questioned Barsky throughout the weekend and gave him a polygraph test that he passed. Convinced that his spying days were over, and that his friendship with the Cuban was just that, the FBI decided to keep the whole thing quiet and allowed Barsky to go back to work on Monday morning.

    Steve Kroft: Was he charged with something?

    Joe Reilly: No.

    Steve Kroft: Even though he confessed to being a Soviet spy?

    Joe Reilly: Yes.

    Steve Kroft: That seems odd.

    Joe Reilly: Well, we wanted him to cooperate with us. We didn’t want to put him in jail. He was no use to us there.

    Barsky continued to meet not only with the FBI but with the National Security Agency to offer his first-hand insights into the KGB and the Russians.

    Jack Barsky: I was able to provide them with a lot of valuable information how the KGB operated.

    The only people who were aware of his secret were the FBI and Penelope, his wife in America, who subsequently filed for divorce. His daughter Chelsea, then a teenager, knew only that he wanted to tell her something when she turned 18. That day finally arrived on a four-hour drive to St. Francis University.

    Chelsea: He started chuckling to himself and he said, “Well, I’m a, I was a spy. I was a KGB spy.” I was like “What? Really?”

    Jack also revealed to Chelsea why he had decided to stay in America.

    Chelsea: He said that, you know, he fell in love with me and my, my curls when I was a little baby. And then I cried.

    Steve Kroft: Did he tell you everything?

    Chelsea: No, he didn’t. He didn’t tell me 100 percent the whole truth. He left some things out at that point.

    Jack Barsky: I told her everything that you can tell in four hours that is age appropriate. She was still a teenager. I may not have told her that I was married in Germany.

    He waited another two years before he matter-of-factly dropped another bombshell about his past.

    Chelsea: He just looked straight ahead at the TV. And he said, “Did I tell you you have a brother?” And I turned my head. I’m like, “What? Are you serious?”

    The half brother was Matthias, the boy Jack had left behind in Germany. Chelsea was determined to find him. Jack didn’t like the idea.

    Jack Barsky: I did not feel comfortable getting in touch with him. I did not feel comfortable with my acknowledging my German past.

    After a year of trying to track him down online, Chelsea finally got a reply from Matthias…

    Chelsea: The subject line said, “Dear little sister.” And when I saw, “Dear little sister,” I just started weeping, because that meant everything to me. That meant that he accepted me.

    Matthias: And this is me…

    A month later, Matthias was in Pennsylvania visiting Chelsea and her brother Jessie. They hit it off. Matthias wasn’t interested in seeing his father, then changed his mind.

    barksys-american-kids-with-his-german-son.jpg
    Barsky’s children, from left: Jessie, Matthias and Chelsea
    Steve Kroft: Was it awkward?
    Jack Barsky: I just remember he stared at me for a couple of minutes. He just stared at me.

    Steve Kroft: I mean he had reason to be angry with you.

    Jack Barsky: When I told him the dilemma that I was faced with, he actually said, “I understand.”

    Steve Kroft: And what’s your relationship like with Matthias now?

    Jack Barsky: He feels like he’s my son.

    Gerlinde, the wife in Germany who thought he was dead, wants nothing to do with Jack today – or with 60 Minutes.

    He has remarried and has a four-year-old daughter. They live in upstate New York where Jack has worked as director of software development for a company that manages New York’s high voltage power grid, a critical piece of U.S. infrastructure. When he told his employer recently that he had once been a KGB spy, he was placed on a paid leave of absence. Before becoming an American citizen last year, he had been given a clean bill of health by the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies. But in the world of espionage it’s often difficult to tell what’s true and what’s legend.

    Steve Kroft: Are you telling the truth right now?

    Jack Barsky: I am, absolutely. The truth as far as I know it. Yes.

    Steve Kroft: As far as you know it?

    Jack Barsky: Well, you know, sometimes memory fails you. But I am, I am absolutely not holding back anything.

    Steve Kroft: Why tell the story now?

    Jack Barsky: I want to meet my maker clean. I need to get clean with the past. I need to digest this fully.

    The FBI agent who apprehended him, Joe Reilly, still believes in Barsky. And in yet another twist to this story, the two are good friends and golfing buddies.

    Joe Reilly: He’s a very honest person. And if you want to find out how honest someone is, play golf with them.

    Steve Kroft: But you’re a former FBI guy and he’s a former spy. What’s the bond?

    Joe Reilly: It’s personal. He credits me for keeping him out of prison.

    After nearly 30 years, Jack Barsky went back to visit a unified Germany, first in October, then again last month.

    [Jack Barsky: So that was essentially the very beginning of my career…]

    He showed his kids where this improbable tale began and some other key settings in his odyssey. And he caught up with old classmates who knew him as Albrecht Dittrich.

    barsky-in-germany-with-his-american-kids.jpg
    Barsky in Germany with his American children CBS NEWS
    Steve Kroft: When you’re here in Germany…
    Jack Barsky: Yeah…

    Steve Kroft: …are you Albrecht or are you Jack?

    Jack Barsky: No, I’m Jack. I am 100 percent Jack. You know, the, I let the Albrecht out and sometimes he interferes, but they, they get along very well now (laughs)…

    The Berlin wall, which once divided east and west, is now gone except for a section that has been turned into an art display. Checkpoint Charlie, once the epicenter of the Cold War, is now a tourist attraction, full of kitsch. Statues of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels still stand in the eastern part of Berlin, relics of another era as is the man who straddled two worlds and got away with it.

    2015 May 10 CORRESPONDENT Steve Kroft

    Find this story at 10 May 2015

    © 2015 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    De pot verwijt de ketel

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Vandaag 3 juli 2015, bericht de NOS het volgende:

    ‘De particuliere beveiligingsbranche neemt maatregelen om infiltratie van criminelen te voorkomen. Dat zegt Laetitia Griffith, voorzitter van de branchevereniging voor beveiligingsbedrijven, in het Financieele Dagblad. Daarmee reageert de branche op waarschuwingen van de politie dat omstreden motorclubs pogingen doen om beveiligingsbedrijven in handen te krijgen. De branchevereniging heeft maatregelen genomen die het moeilijker moeten maken voor leden van deze motorclubs om actief te worden in de beveiliging. Zo toetst het ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie sinds kort bij het verlenen van een beveiligingsvergunning of de aanvrager betrokken is bij criminele activiteiten. Dat dit tot nu toe niet gebeurde, is “een kwestie van voortschrijdend inzicht,” aldus Griffith. Volgens het voormalige Kamerlid moeten bedrijven en overheidsinstanties er beter op letten met welk beveiligingsbedrijf ze in zee gaan. Ze maken nog te vaak gebruik van bedrijven zonder keurmerk.’

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    The man who would be king

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Het is 21 mei 2015. Langs de kant van de straten staan links en rechts ME-busjes. Geuniformeerde politie-agenten, het wapen aan de heup, lopen door de verder verlaten straten. Sommigen hebben over hun politie-uniform een oranje vestje aangetrokken. Geen mens kan er meer langs. Automobilisten keren hun voertuig. Het Binnenhof is hermetisch afgesloten en volledig omsingeld.

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    Herhaal de leugen totdat de mensen denken dat het de waarheid is

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    1 juli 2015, De Telegraaf bericht het Nederlandse volk het volgende:

    ‘Belgen verbieden feesten van motorbendes

    BRUSSEL –

    Burgemeesters van Belgische grensgemeentes met Nederland hebben feesten van twee motorbendes verboden. De Summerparty van de Outlaws en de Independence Party van de Hells Angels mogen niet doorgaan. Zij waren voor begin deze maand gepland in Lanaken en Maasmechelen, tegen de grens met Limburg.

    De politie van de twee gemeenten maakte het verbod woensdag bekend. De burgemeesters besloten tot de maatregel na de recente incidenten met leden van criminele motorbendes in Nederland en Duitsland. De bendes zijn betrokken bij zware misdaden. Zij verdienen geld met onder meer grensoverschrijdende drugshandel, afpersing en prostitutie.’

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    Ontmenselijking maakt van vreedzame mannen moordenaars

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Sinds enige jaren worden motorclubs door de overheid anders genoemd. Men zou toch zeggen dat de namen die de clubs zelf hebben gekozen veelzeggend genoeg zijn. Zo is de naam ‘Hells Angels’ synoniem met motorclubs in het algemeen, Harley-Davidson-Rijders, bikers of zelfs Onepercenters. Namen als ‘Demons’, ‘Outlaws’, ‘Veterans’ of zelfs ‘Mongols’, nazaten van de Mongoolse hordes die de oude wereld overspoelden, zijn allemaal vanzelfsprekend genoeg. Dat de overheid zelf een andere naam voor al dat motorvolk bedacht heeft is daarom bijzonder. ‘Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs’, oftewel afgekort ‘OMG’s’, worden de motorclubs genoemd door de Nederlandse overheid. Afgekeken van de Amerikanen, die dezelfde term gebruiken.

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    Veteranendag, veteranen, Veterans MC, criminelen en een militair historicus die de feiten niet kent

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Gisteren was het weer 27 juni. En dan is het Nationale Veteranendag. Op die dag worden de vele duizenden Nederlandse veteranen geëerd die in Nederlandse dienst uitzendingen of missies volbrachten. Jarenlang was er in Nederland helemaal geen veteranenbeleid. Veteranen werden aan hun lot overgelaten. Dat resulteerde in een steeds groter wordend gevoel voor onvrede onder veteranen en hun partners, maar ook in talloze schadeclaims ingediend door mensen die fysieke of psychische schade opliepen door hun militaire missies. Enige jaren geleden besloot men dus in Den Haag, als residentie, een grote veteranenbijeenkomst te houden. Compleet met défilé. De Nationale Veteranendag was hiermee een feit.

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    Arubaanse man doodgeslagen door Haagse politie

    Justitie op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Haagse agenten hebben gisteren (zaterdag 27 juni 2015) na het ‘Night at the Park’ festival in het Zuiderpark de 42 jarige Arubaan Mitch Henriquez doodgeslagen. In een verklaring stelt het Openbaar Ministerie (OM) dat Henriquez onderweg naar het politiebureau onwel werd, echter blijkt uit camerabeelden dat hij al buiten bewustzijn of in coma was voordat hij de politiebus in werd gesleurd zonder medische hulp te krijgen.

    Getuigen zeggen dat Henriquez na het festival grapjes aan het maken was met vrienden, toen een groep agenten bovenop hen dook. Henriquez belandde in een coma, en overleed vandaag in het ziekenhuis. Volgens omstanders en zijn familie hebben agenten veel geweld gebruikt bij zijn arrestatie.

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    De burgemeester en absoluut betrouwbare feiten en cijfers

    Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

    Vrijdag 26 juni. De dag voordat Onno Hoes afscheid nam van Maastricht, waar hij burgemeester was. NPO zendt een reportage uit, waarin Hoes wordt gevolgd en geïnterviewd. Volgens Hoes is Maastricht veel veiliger geworden sinds hij daar burgemeester was. Het Algemeen Dagblad kwam enige weken geleden met zijn misdaadmeter en jawel, daarin staat Maastricht op de tweede plaats. Direct achter Amsterdam. Maar desgevraagd was Onno het natuurlijk niet eens met de cijfers van het AD.

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