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Die CIA bemühte über Mittelsmänner anscheinend die Dienste der Kanzlei Mossack Fonseca: Laut einem Bericht der “SZ” ließen Agenten in den Achtzigern Briefkastenfirmen gründen, um ihre Aktionen zu verschleiern.

US-Geheimdienstler sollen “in erheblichem Umfang” die Dienste der Kanzlei Mossack Fonseca in Panama genutzt haben. Das geht laut der “Süddeutschen Zeitung” (“SZ”) aus den Panama Papers hervor. Demnach ließen Agenten Briefkastenfirmen gründen, um ihre Aktionen zu verschleiern. Unter ihnen seien auch Mittelsmänner aus dem Umfeld des amerikanischen Auslandsgeheimdienstes CIA.

Zur Kundschaft von Mossack Fonseca gehörten demnach in den Achtzigerjahren etwa Figuren der Iran-Contra-Affäre. Dabei ging es um geheime Waffenlieferungen der CIA an Teheran. In diesem Zusammenhang wird unter anderem ein US-Geschäftsmann genannt, der Flugzeuge verlieh. Mit einer seiner Maschinen sollen laut dem Bericht in den Achtzigerjahren im Auftrag der CIA Waffen nach Teheran geliefert worden sein. Der Geschäftsmann bestreitet, von der Operation gewusst zu haben.

Auch weitere Unternehmen, die immer wieder in Verdacht geraten sind, dem US-Geheimdienst geholfen zu haben, tauchen der “SZ” zufolge in dem Material auf.

Außerdem seien unter den gegenwärtigen oder früheren Kunden hochrangige Geheimdienstverantwortliche aus mindestens drei Ländern zu finden, konkret aus Saudi-Arabien, Kolumbien und Ruanda – auch der saudische Scheich Kamal Adham, der in den Siebzigerjahren als wichtigster Ansprechpartner der CIA in der Region galt.

Ein weiterer Kunde Mossack Fonsecas ist nach Angaben der “SZ” der Isländer Loftur Johannesson. Er werde im Zusammenhang mit mindestens vier Briefkastenfirmen genannt. Der SPIEGEL bezeichnete ihn Anfang der Neunziger in einem Artikel über die “guten Kunden der CIA” als Kontaktperson des Geheimdienstes. In mehreren Büchern und Artikeln heißt es, Johannesson habe im Auftrag der CIA Waffen in Krisenregionen geliefert, unter anderem nach Afghanistan, so die “SZ”.

Johannesson habe über einen Sprecher erklären lassen, er sei Geschäftsmann im Luftfahrtgeschäft und nicht für Geheimdienste tätig. Die Kanzlei in Kanada erklärte laut dem Bericht zudem, sie überprüfe ihre Kunden gründlich. Sollte ein Mandant seine Identität oder die Herkunft seiner Gelder nicht angemessenen nachweisen, so werde sie mit ihm nicht zusammenarbeiten.

12. April 2016, 00:03 Uhr
Find this story at 12 April 2016

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2016

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Secret agents from several countries, including intermediaries of the CIA, have used the services of Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca in order to “conceal” their activities, German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported Tuesday.
“Secret agents and their informants have made wide use of the company’s services,” wrote the newspaper, which obtained a massive stash of 11.5 million documents from the company that is sending shockwaves around the globe.
“Agents have opened shell companies to conceal their activities… Among them are close intermediaries of the CIA,” the newspaper reported.
China’s elite hiding billions overseas

The Munich-based newspaper said Mossack Fonseca’s clients included “several players” in the 1980s Iran-Contra scandal, which saw senior US officials facilitate secret arms sales to Iran in a bid to secure the release of American hostages and fund Nicaragua’s Contra rebels.
The Panama Papers also reveal that “current or former high-ranking officials of the secret services of at least three countries… Saudi Arabia, Colombia and Rwanda” are listed amongst the company’s clients, the Sueddeutsche said.
Hong Kong’s rich face exposure in tax-haven leak

Among them was Sheikh Kamal Adham, the former Saudi intelligence chief who died in 1999. Adham “spent the 1970s as one of the CIA’s key intermediaries” in the Middle East, the daily said.
The Sueddeutsche Zeitung received the huge stash of Mossack Fonseca documents from an anonymous source and shared them with more than 100 media groups through the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
A week after the first revelations, the documents have shed light on how the world’s rich and powerful have used offshore companies to stash their assets, forcing Iceland’s prime minister to resign and putting pressure on a slew of other leaders around the world.

PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 12 April, 2016, 1:49pm
Agence France-Presse

Find this story at 12 April 2016

Copyright © 2016 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd.

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Panama has long been a haven for money launderers—including the CIA.

It should come as no surprise that the CIA’s finances are a secret. One of the rare glimpses into the agency’s funding came when Edward Snowden leaked a copy of the intelligence “black budget” to The Washington Post in 2013. But if history is any indication, the CIA may well have resources that don’t appear on any congressional document, highly classified or otherwise. Covert operations, by their very nature, often require access to off-the-books funding. The CIA’s first operation was paid for with funds seized from the Nazis, and in the years since, the agency has been notoriously creative about how it obtains its money.

Signal

The Panama Papers underscore how tax havens are used by covert agencies and other shadowy players to launder dirty money, a practice that has a long history in which Panama, in particular, has played a notable part.

Adnan Khashoggi would know. A “principal foreign agent” of the United States, as one Senate report referred to him, the billionaire playboy made a fortune (more than $100 million between 1970 and 1975 alone) from commissions negotiating arms deals with his native Saudi Arabia. He used these windfalls, in turn, to cultivate political clout—including, allegedly, with President Richard Nixon. In the aftermath of Watergate, when Congress began reining in the CIA, Khashoggi helped establish the supranational intelligence partnership known as the Safari Club. Soon after, he aided the CIA in circumventing another congressional impediment. With money borrowed from the Saudi and U.S. intelligence-linked Bank of Credit and Commerce International, he financed the illegal arms sales that set off the Iran-Contra scandal.

One way Khashoggi structured his shadowy holdings during his heyday was through the specialized services of Mossack Fonseca, the law firm that is in the news for having helped global luminaries like Vladimir Putin hide their money. Thanks to a recent report from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, we now know Khashoggi to be among a number of former spies and CIA associates implicated by the 2.6 terabytes of offshore financial documents provided to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung last summer.

That his name should appear in an international dark money scandal suggests something about the nature of tax havens that much of the media’s coverage has thus far avoided grappling with. The Panama Papers have largely been presented as an unprecedented insight into how global elites hide their fortunes from tax collectors and other regulators. But they also underscore how tax havens are used by covert agencies and other shadowy players to launder dirty money, a practice that has a long history in which Panama, in particular, has played a notable part.

The Panama Papers date back to 1977. By then, the Carter administration, worried that it could jeopardize negotiations over the Panama Canal, had already willed itself into forgetting what the U.S. government had long known about Panama’s intimate role in the burgeoning South American cocaine trade. Serious allegations against Manuel Noriega, the intelligence chief who would go on to become the country’s ruler, had been brought to the attention of the now-defunct Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as early as 1971. But the United States’s interests in Panama were at least as strong as those of the emerging coke lords who were using Panama as a stopover for drug shipments headed north. In some cases, their interests were one and the same.

At the time, the Panama Canal Zone played host to the School of the Americas, the U.S. military training academy infamous for the remarkable array of atrocities committed by its highest-achieving graduates. Not far from the SOA facility was the classified U.S. communications network used to coordinate Operation Condor, the cross-border rendition, torture, execution, and assassination program implemented by the South American dictatorships of the era. With its abundance of U.S. surveillance hardware and constant influx of easily disguised foreigners, Panama became a sort of regional outpost for U.S. Cold War intelligence.

A proud SOA alumnus himself, Noriega was recruited by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1959 and received his first check from the CIA in 1967. The military coup that broke out that year catapulted him to the top of Panama’s spy agency, a position for which the ruthless, ideologically flexible Noriega proved to be uniquely well-suited.

Noriega had a talent for the double life. He would fly to Washington to meet with CIA Director William Casey one day and to Havana to meet with Fidel Castro the next, positioning himself as a key interlocutor between the sworn enemies and playing one side off the other. He was just as comfortable railing against Yankee imperialism as he was serving up rivals and narco-associates in exchange for DEA commendations. Noriega allegedly charged $200,000 a planeload to protect the Medellin Cartel’s shipment routes. The $200,000 a year he collected from the Reagan administration must have seemed a pittance by comparison.

CIA payments to Noriega were channeled through accounts he maintained at the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the agency’s preferred conduit for its secret dealings with Saudi and Pakistani intelligence and with the heroin-trafficking mujahedeen insurgency in Afghanistan. During the same period, Adnan Khashoggi, who was listed on a 1991 Defense Intelligence Report as having sold machine guns to the Medellin Cartel, was borrowing from the bank to finance weapons sales to Iran—the proceeds for which, like some of Noriega’s earnings, were then funneled to the Nicaraguan Contras. Subsequent federal prosecutions determined BCCI’s Panamanian branch, in particular, to be actively engaged in money laundering for the Colombian drug trade. A Senate subcommittee report called the bank a “fundamentally corrupt criminal enterprise.”

But BCCI was hardly the only Panamanian financial house awash in drug profits and covert intrigue. As a 1985 House Foreign Affairs report explained, it was hard to find a Panamanian bank that wasn’t engaged, to one degree or another, in some form of untoward activity. “With more than one hundred banks, the U.S. dollar as the national currency, and strict bank secrecy laws, Panama is an ideal haven for laundering narcotics money. Unlimited amounts of money may be brought into and out of the country with no reporting requirements, and money laundering is not a crime.” Corruption in government and the military, the committee found, was “endemic and institutionalized.”

Panama, to borrow the words of the Senate’s Iran-Contra report, had become the “hemisphere’s first ‘narco-kleptocracy,’” a major financial clearing house not just for the Colombian cartels, but for illegal groups of all stripes in the region, as well as “legitimate” businesspeople drawn to the exciting new services being offered thanks to the logistical demands and largesse of the drug trade. Americans were sinking millions into this innovative tax haven, and the surplus of available dirty currency actually insulated Panama from the debt crises that were sweeping the region at the time—converting it into a secure, relatively stable place for the Third World rich to hide their money.

“Particularly popular with Latin Americans,” writes Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld in Evil Money, “was a double-shell arrangement, in which the Bahamian cover was overlaid with Panamanian corporate shells. Panamanian lawyers were equally adept at creating fictitious companies. The money would be wired from one corporate account to another without revealing the identity of the real owner.”

Dummy companies of this sort, set up by the White House and registered in Panama, were used to float the Nicaraguan Contras. Noriega’s personal Swiss-based lawyer even helped Marine Colonel Oliver North construct a front for an airfield in Costa Rica. A veritable fleet of aircraft, including planes provided by Noriega and some paid for through a BCCI account, made the circuitous journey from secret runway to secret runway, dropping off weapons in Honduras and Costa Rica, cocaine in the southern United States, and large stacks of small-denomination bills in Panamanian bank vaults.

As we continue to dig through the many layers of corruption, lawbreaking, and bad faith that have accumulated in the intervening years, it’s important to recognize that the quintessentially private practices that now form the basis for the Panama Papers revelations emerged within a context of large-scale state criminality.

The 1989 U.S. invasion that led to Noriega’s arrest only exacerbated the underlying problems of Panamanian governance. As Jonathan Marshall, co-author of the indispensable Cocaine Politics, explained, between “economic sanctions, capital flight, war damage, and a more than a billion dollars’ worth of damage from post-conflict looting,” any new president would have faced significant challenges. It happened that the one the United States installed, Guillermo Endara, had dubious ties to a bank the DEA and FBI both suspected of money laundering. Endara’s appointees for attorney general, treasury minister, and chief Supreme Court justice had each served as director of a bank shut down for its alliance with Colombia’s Cali Cartel. By the U.S. government’s own estimation, trafficking and laundering got worse in the invasion’s aftermath, a legacy that has continued on to the present day. Facing corruption charges, the country’s most recent president has sought refuge in Miami.

After the invasion, a joke started circulating around Panama that seems fairly prescient, in light of the Panama Papers. “They took Ali Baba,” it went, “and left us with the 40 thieves.”

BY STEVEN COHEN
April 8, 2016
Find this story at 8 April 2016

Copyright 2016 © New Republic.

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THIS WEEK STARTED off big with the Panama Papers, the largest leak in history. The still-unfolding story uncovered a complex web of global tax evasion perpetuated by world leaders and their friends. Breaking the Panama Papers news required massive coordination: Over 100 journalists used a constellation of encryption tools and methods to help the whistleblower behind the leaks safely deliver 2.6 terabytes of documents.

Turkey had its own data spill this week as well, when an unnamed hacker posted the personal information of 50 million Turkish citizens extracted from poorly secured government servers. In other news, Kate Moussouris, the strategist behind the Department of Defense’s and Microsoft’s bug bounty programs, is branching out as an independent consultant. And a Maryland appeals court ruled that the Baltimore Police Department’s use of cell phone-tracking stingrays requires a warrant, setting a precedent that may inch the stingray debate closer to the Supreme Court.

On a more personal note, people looking for romance online should know they are increasingly common targets for scammers. And now that Facebook has live video, the social media giant is hoping that its users—like you—will help it police inappropriate live content, which will probably include live pornography. And while it might’ve seemed like the FBI’s public brawl with Apple over unlocking the San Bernardino iPhone had finally ended, the government jumped back in the ring by filing an appeal in a New York drug case in a second attempt to compel Apple to break the encryption on another iPhone.

And there was more: Each Saturday we round up the news stories that we didn’t break or cover in depth at WIRED, but which deserve your attention nonetheless. As always, click on the headlines to read the full story in each link posted. And stay safe out there.

The Law Firm at the Heart of the Panama Papers Had Very Lax Security
The computer systems used by Mossack Fonseca, the law firm that was revealed to be a primary conduit for world leaders and corporations seeking off-shore tax havens, are reportedly drastically unsecure. Reports surfaced midweek that its email client had not been updated for years, and that the version of Drupal behind its client portal had at least 25 vulnerabilities. While it’s still unclear who is responsible for the Panama Papers leak, security researchers say details point to a person who was working inside the company.

Judge Approves $15 Million Sony Payout in Class-Action Suit Over Hack
It’s been two and a half years since a group calling itself The Guardians of Peace hacked Sony in an epic breach, revealing the personal information of thousands of the entertainment company’s employees. In a class action lawsuit with 435,000 of its ex-employees, Sony struck a deal with the plaintiffs in what will amount to a $15 million payout, with a maximum of $10,000 awarded to each individual class action member. The hack, which the US government linked back to North Korea, didn’t just reveal employee data, but also exposed private correspondence between Sony executive staff that revealed embarrassing details about the film industry.

Voter Details of 55 Million Filipinos Revealed in Giant Hack
Weeks before the national elections in the Philippines, a hack exposed 55 million voters’ personal information. It’s being called the largest government-related data data breach in history. Reports say that The Philippines’ Commission on Elections was first compromised by Anonymous Philippines; LulzSec Pilipinas subsequently posted personal voter information just days later. Alarmingly, the data was posted in plaintext, including the passport numbers of overseas voters, along with 15.8 million fingerprints. Anonymous Philippines warned the election commission to enact stronger security over the country’s electronic vote counting system.

Signal Now Sends Encrypted Texts Between Mobile and Desktop Clients
The security community’s favorite encrypted text messaging app is now available for desktop chatting. That means that people who use Signal can now chat with other Signal users with both hands and seamlessly between mobile and desktop. Signal’s new service works like Apple’s iMessage and allows you to text friends via your computer. Like iMessage, it also offers a high level of encryption. The main difference between Apple’s iMessage and Signal, however, is that Signal works between Apple and Android devices, a huge deal for security-conscious friends who don’t all use the same products. A version of Signal for desktop was in invitation-only mode for the past few months; the crew at Open Whisper Systems released a public version on Thursday.

The CIA’s Venture Capital Firm Is Investing in a Line of Skincare Products for DNA Collection
The Central Intelligence Agency’s own venture capital firm, In-Q-TelA, is funding … a skincare startup. It’s investing in Skincential Sciences, a startup that created a patented technology to remove a thin layer of skin to help clear away blemishes. According to The Intercept, the CIA is interested in the skincare company’s method of DNA extraction, which intelligence agencies can leverage for a variety of uses, including event security and biometric identification programs. In-Q-Tel has been backing Silicon Valley startups for 17 years now, including popular videogame manufacturers and mapping software that was eventually acquired by Google.

The FBI’s Ability to Hack Into the San Bernardino Shooter’s Phone Only Works on iPhone 5
James Comey, director of the FBI, claimed this week that the agency’s ability to hack into the iPhone 5 used by the San Bernardino terrorist does not work on newer iPhone models, including the iPhone 6s and 5s. The FBI dropped its very public case against Apple two weeks ago, having obtained the ability to unlock the shooter’s phone via unnamed third party software. While the FBI contends that it can share the software with other law enforcement agencies attempting to open model 5 iPhones, evidence obtained would likely not be permissible in court.

APRIL GLASER. APRIL GLASER SECURITY DATE OF PUBLICATION: 04.09.16.

Find this story at 9 April 2016

Copyright http://www.wired.com/

Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl

Bradley Birkenfeld is the most significant financial whistleblower of all time, so you might think he’d be cheering on the disclosures in the new Panama Papers leaks. But today, Birkenfeld is raising questions about the source of the information that is shaking political regimes around the world.

Birkenfeld, an American citizen, was a banker working at UBS in Switzerland when he approached the U.S. government with information on massive amounts of tax evasion by Americans with secret accounts in Switzerland. By the end of his whistleblowing career, Birkenfeld had served more than two years in a U.S. federal prison, been awarded $104 million by the IRS for his information and shattered the foundations of more than a century of Swiss banking secrecy.

In an exclusive interview Tuesday from Munich, Birkenfeld said he doesn’t think the source of the 11 million documents stolen from a Panamanian law firm should automatically be considered a whistleblower like himself. Instead, he said, the hacking of the Panama City-based firm, called Mossack Fonseca, could have been done by a U.S. intelligence agency.
“The CIA I’m sure is behind this, in my opinion,” Birkenfeld said.
Birkenfeld pointed to the fact that the political uproar created by the disclosures have mainly impacted countries with tense relationships with the United States. “The very fact that we see all these names surface that are the direct quote-unquote enemies of the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, Argentina and we don’t see one U.S. name. Why is that?” Birkenfeld said. “Quite frankly, my feeling is that this is certainly an intelligence agency operation.”

A poolside view overlooking the newer side of the Panama City skyline.
Panama Papers show tax avoidance like a ‘cancer’
Asked why the U.S. would leak information that has also been damaging to U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, a major American ally, Birkenfeld said the British leader was likely collateral damage in a larger intelligence operation.
“If you’ve got NSA and CIA spying on foreign governments they can certainly get into a law firm like this,” Birkenfeld said. “But they selectively bring the information to the public domain that doesn’t hurt the U.S. in any shape or form. That’s wrong. And there’s something seriously sinister here behind this.”

The public relations office for the CIA did not immediately return a message for comment.
Birkenfeld also said that during his time as a Swiss banker, Mossack Fonseca was known as one piece of the vast offshore maze used by bankers and lawyers to hide money from tax authorities. But he also said that the firm that is at the center of the global scandal was also seen as a relatively small player in the overall offshore tax evasion business.
‹
The sign in front of the building that houses law firm Mossack Fonseca in Panama City, Panama.
Did ‘smart’ people avoid the Panama Papers?
Bradley Birkenfeld, a former banker with UBS AG, walks outside Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution after speaking to the media in Minersville, Pennsylvania, U.S., on Friday, Jan. 8, 2010.
Why did the US pay this former Swiss banker $104M?
›
“We knew that firm very well in Switzerland. I certainly knew of it,” Birkenfeld said.
But Mossack Fonseca was just one of a number of firms in Panama offering such services, he said. “The cost of doing business there was quite low, relatively speaking,” he said. “So what you would have is Panama operating as a conduit to the Swiss banks and the trust companies to set up these facilities for clients around the world.”

Eamon Javers CNBC.com
12 April 2016

Find this story at 12 april 2016

© 2016 CNBC LLC.

Multicultureel Vakmanschap bij de politie (samenvatting)

Het beleid ten aanzien van Multicultureel Vakmanschap bij de politie heeft gefaald. Dit blijkt uit openbaar gemaakte documenten. Daarnaast stelde het Landelijk Expertisecentrum Diversiteit, van 2007 tot eind 2014 verantwoordelijk voor beleid en trainingen om interne en externe discriminatie tegen te gaan, weinig tot niets voor.

Het beleid ten aanzien van Multicultureel Vakmanschap (MCV) bij de politie heeft gefaald. Het Landelijk Expertisecentrum Diversiteit (LECD) werd in 2001 opgericht en was van 2007 tot eind 2014 verantwoordelijk voor beleid en trainingen ten aanzien van MCV. De activiteiten van het LECD hebben weinig tot niets opgeleverd. De activiteiten van het LECD is niet geïmplementeerd binnen de NP. De politieagenten die werden bereikt door het LECD waren al geïnteresseerd in onderwerpen zoals discriminatie en diversiteit.

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meervoudig wegkijken (lang)

Multicultureel Vakmanschap bij de politie

Het beleid ten aanzien van Multicultureel Vakmanschap bij de politie heeft gefaald. Dit blijkt uit openbaar gemaakte documenten. Daarnaast stelde het Landelijk Expertisecentrum Diversiteit, van 2007 tot eind 2014 verantwoordelijk voor beleid en trainingen om interne en externe discriminatie tegen te gaan, weinig tot niets voor.

Onderzoeken naar eigen ervaringen met de politie maken duidelijk dat veel mensen de indruk hebben dat agenten discrimineren. Eind december 2015 verscheen het rapport Werelden van verschil, over de sociaal-culturele afstand en positie van migrantengroepen in Nederland van het Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP). [16-12-15] In het SCP-rapport wordt gesteld dat migrantenjongeren ‘in alledaagse situaties, op de arbeidsmarkt en in contact met de politie uitsluiting ervaren.’

Dit zorgt voor een tweedeling die spanningen kan oproepen: ‘Onder deze jongeren leeft ook een wantrouwen tegenover de Nederlandse media, de landelijke politiek en de politie. Dit draagt bij aan het gevoel geen onderdeel te zijn van de Nederlandse samenleving.’ Ervaren discriminatie is echter nog geen bewijs voor het structureel plaatsvinden van discriminatoir gedrag van agenten. Wetenschappelijke onderzoeken echter geven hier ook geen eensluidend antwoord op.

Als antwoord op de aantijgingen van discriminatoir optreden van politiefunctionarissen zet de politie sinds enkele jaren in op multicultureel vakmanschap. Op de website van de politie wordt dit vakmanschap gedefinieerd als ‘de professionaliteit van politiemedewerkers om om te gaan met de vele culturen en leefstijlen in de politieorganisatie en in de samenleving. Deze professionaliteit gaat over kennis, houding, respect, gedrag en het kunnen omgaan met culturele dilemma’s.’

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Meervoudig wegkijken (samenvatting)

Crowddigging, de Nederlandse cables

Doe mee aan deze zoektocht naar de Nederlandse werkelijkheid achter de Amerikaanse diplomatieke cables.

Crowddigging, de Nederlandse cables is een ode aan data-bevrijders als Chelsea Manning (Amerikaanse diplomatieke cables) en Jeremy Hammond (gegevens van het intelligence bedrijf Stratfor), Edward Snowden (NSA informatie) en anderen. Zij zitten lange gevangenisstraffen uit of kunnen hun land niet meer in, of vrezen vervolging en moeten daarom in de anonimiteit blijven. Dit terwijl zij de samenleving een belangrijke dienst hebben bewezen.

Buro Jansen & Janssen doet met de ode aan data-bevrijders (crowddigging: de Nederlandse cables) mee aan de Kunstmanifestatie Hacking Habitat in Utrecht.

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Crownddigging: de Nederlandse cables
Kunstmanifestatie Hacking Habitat

Schulze op Justitie en Veiligheid

19 april 2016 sloeg de politie weer een grote slag in de strijd tegen de ondergrondse krachten van het kwaad die een ondermijnende invloed zouden uitoefenen op de nietsvermoedende burgers in de bovenwereld. ‘Politie rolt groot communicatienetwerk voor criminelen op’ meldt RTL nieuws. Politie.nl: ‘Groot crimineel communicatienetwerk uit de lucht‘. En ook Hart van Nederland doet een duit in het zakje in versie 2 van het filmpje over de inval in een woonwagenkamp in Den Haag, eigenlijk voor een groot drugsonderzoek:

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Skafti op Justitie en Veiligheid

Het in 2014 verschenen onderzoek van de Universiteit van Leiden naar etnisch profileren in Den Haag, en de totstandkoming hiervan, roepen vragen op. De wetenschappelijke onafhankelijkheid en transparantie zijn in het geding. Zowel de Tweede Kamer als de Haagse gemeenteraad zijn onjuist geïnformeerd over de opzet en totstandkoming van het onderzoek.

Eind 2013 kwam etnisch profileren in de publieke en politieke belangstelling te staan. In november van dat jaar werd vanuit de Tweede Kamer en de Haagse gemeenteraad verzocht om een wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar het plaatsvinden van etnisch profileren. Toenmalig minister van Veiligheid en Justitie Opstelten en burgemeester van Den Haag Van Aartsen zeiden hierop een onderzoek toe. Het betrof een onderzoek uitgevoerd door de Universiteit van Leiden (UvL) naar etnisch profileren in Den Haag.

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Skafti op Justitie en Veiligheid

Het in 2014 verschenen onderzoek van de Universiteit van Leiden naar etnisch profileren in Den Haag, en de totstandkoming hiervan, roepen vragen op. De wetenschappelijke onafhankelijkheid en transparantie zijn in het geding. Zowel de Tweede Kamer als de Haagse gemeenteraad zijn onjuist geïnformeerd over de opzet en totstandkoming van het onderzoek.

De Universiteit van Leiden (UvL) publiceert in 2014 het rapport Etnisch profileren in Den Haag? Een verkennend onderzoek naar opvattingen en beslissingen op straat. Het betreft een wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar etnisch profileren in Den Haag waarin wordt geconcludeerd dat er geen aanwijzingen zijn voor het structureel plaatsvinden ervan.

Voorafgaand aan het onderzoek maakte de UvL echter afspraken met de politie Haaglanden om een afbreukrisico te voorkomen en het onderzoek aan te passen wanneer het zou wijzen op discriminatoir optreden van de Haagse politie. Dit blijkt uit stukken die recentelijk door Buro Jansen & Janssen zijn verkregen via een beroep op de Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur (WOB).

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Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

Wie op LinkedIn het woord ‘ondermijning’ als zoekwoord intoetst krijgt een grote reeks resultaten. Vrijwel alle resultaten hebben betrekking op leden van de politie of justitie. Maar liefst 186 resultaten kijken met hun stoere blik via kleine fotootjes de bezoeker van de website aan. LinkedIn lijkt daarmee een datingsite, maar niets is minder waar.

De mannen en vrouwen die op LinkedIn van hun kwaliteiten kond doen, doen dat niet om anderen te ontmoeten of om een toekomstige werkgever op zichzelf te attenderen maar geheel zonder enig ander oogmerk dan graag laten weten dat ze bij de aanpak van ‘ondermijning’ betrokken zijn. Ze laten eigenlijk de wereld weten dat zij bijzondere mensen zijn. Mensen gespecialiseerd in ‘ondermijning’.

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Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

Het Algemeen Dagblad berichtte op 27 april 2007 het volgende: ‘DORDRECHT – Een intern feestje van de politie Zuid-Holland Zuid is afgelopen weekeinde volledig uit de hand gelopen. Volgens bronnen binnen het korps zou een jonge agent zich ernstig hebben misdragen. De politieman ging totaal door het lint en zou verschillende collega’s hebben aangevallen en een politiebus hebben vernield. Wat precies de aanleiding was, is nog niet duidelijk.

Het incident zou hebben plaatsgevonden tijdens een zogeheten ’bindingsavond’: een bijeenkomst van politiemensen om elkaar beter te leren kennen. Gisteren maakte de korpsleiding bekend dat een 23-jarige agent van het district Dordrecht/Zwijndrechtse Waard buiten functie is gesteld, vanwege ’ernstig plichtsverzuim’ en ’mogelijk ontoelaatbaar gedrag’. De politie wil de precieze achtergronden van de schorsing niet bekendmaken. Ze wil evenmin officieel bevestigen of ontkennen dat het incident heeft plaatsgevonden. Wel laat het korps weten dat er een disciplinair onderzoekt komt.’

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Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

De Telegraaf schreef op 20 november 2013: ‘Jeugdhonken en gedoogde illegale barretjes op Urk ontlopen controles omdat de gemeente het ‘niet veilig’ vindt voor haar controleurs. „Onze toezichthouder is onvoldoende uitgerust om zelfstandig binnencontroles in jeugdhonken uit te voeren. Zo beschikt hij, in tegenstelling tot de politie bijvoorbeeld niet over een kogelvrij vest en geweldsinstructie”, stelt de gemeente in een verklaring.’ Het gaat hier om minderjarigen.

Tweeënhalf jaar later schreef De Stentor op 22 april 2016: ‘Het bootje waar de 17-jarige Urker Jan Baarssen deelnam aan een feestje, voordat hij dood werd teruggevonden, stond bekend als levensgevaarlijk. Dat blijkt uit een brief van Klankbordgroep jeugd aan college- en raadsleden van Urk.

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Dupont op Justitie en Veiligheid

Op 12 april 2016 berichtte De Telegraaf het volgende: ‘Politie hekelt charmeoffensief motorclubs.’ De politie doet niet alleen aan opsporing, maar heeft nu ook al een mening over sociale problemen. Want wat is het geval? Motorclubs blijken af en toe actief te zijn met vrijwilligerswerk voor minderbedeelden. Dat vindt de politie misplaatst. En een ‘charmeoffensief’? Kan het ook zijn dat die bikers er helemaal geen bedoelingen mee hebben anders dan dat ze het hart op de juiste plaats hebben?

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