Josef Stalin’s only daughter, who went by the name of Lana Peters after marrying an American in 1970, died in a Wisconsin nursing home in 2011.

MADISON, Wisconsin — Newly declassified documents show the FBI kept close tabs on Soviet dictator Josef Stalin’s only daughter after her high-profile defection to the United States in 1967, gathering details from informants about how her arrival was affecting international relations.

The documents were released Monday to The Associated Press under the Freedom of Information Act following Lana Peters’ death last year at age 85 in a Wisconsin nursing home. Her defection during the Cold War embarrassed the ruling Communists and made her a best-selling author. Her move was also a public relations coup for the U.S.

When she defected, Peters was known as Svetlana Alliluyeva, but she went by Lana Peters following her 1970 marriage to William Wesley Peters, an apprentice of Frank Lloyd Wright. Peters said her defection was partly motivated by the Soviet authorities’ poor treatment of her late husband, Brijesh Singh, a prominent figure in the Indian Communist Party.

George Kennan, a key figure in the Cold War and a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, advised the FBI that he and Alliluyeva were concerned Soviet agents would try to contact her, a December 1967 memo reveals. The memo notes that no security arrangements were made for Peters, and no other documents in the file indicate that the KGB ever tracked her down.

One memo dated June 2, 1967, describes a conversation an unnamed FBI source had with Mikhail Trepykhalin, identified as the second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The source said Trepykhalin told him the Soviets were “very unhappy over her defection” and asked whether the U.S. would use it “for propaganda purposes.” Trepykhalin “was afraid forces in the U.S. would use her to destroy relationships between the U.S.S.R. and this country,” the source told the FBI.

An unnamed informant in another secret memo from that month said Soviet authorities were not disturbed by the defection because it would “further discredit Stalin’s name and family.”

Stalin, who was held responsible for sending millions of his countrymen to their deaths in labor camps, led the Soviet Union from 1924 until his death in 1953. Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced him three years later as a brutal despot.

Even though Peters denounced communism and her father’s policies, Stalin’s legacy haunted her in the United States.

“People say, ‘Stalin’s daughter, Stalin’s daughter,’ meaning I’m supposed to walk around with a rifle and shoot the Americans,” she said in a 2007 interview for a documentary about her life. “Or they say, ‘No, she came here. She is an American citizen.’ That means I’m with a bomb against the others. No, I’m neither one. I’m somewhere in between.”

Many of the 233 pages released to the AP were heavily redacted, with the FBI citing exemptions allowed under the law for concerns related to foreign policy, revealing confidential sources and releasing medical or other information that is a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

An additional 94 pages were found in her file but not released because the FBI said they contain information involving other government agencies. Those pages remain under government review.

More than half of the pages released to AP were copies of newspaper articles and other media coverage of her defection.

…

FBI Releases Stalin’s Daughter Files
21 November 2012
The Associated Press

Find this story at 21 November 2012

© Copyright 2012. The Moscow Times. All rights reserved.

“The police cannot be permitted to hide behind the cloak of secrecy, when they have been guilty of one of the most intrusive and complete invasions of privacy that can be imagined.”

The approach of the Metropolitan Police to the litigation has been obstructive from the outset, refusing to provide any substantive response to the allegations and hiding behind a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy about the activities of their officers. Now, to add insult to injury, following one of the most intrusive invasions of privacy imaginable, the police are attempting to strike out the women’s claim by arguing that the case should have been started in a shadowy secret court known as the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). [1]

The IPT exists for the sole purpose of maintaining secrecy, and under its jurisdiction the case could proceed with the women denied access to and unable to challenge police evidence, and powerless to appeal the tribunal’s decisions. This will mean that neither they, nor the public will ever find out the extent of the violations of human rights and abuses of public office perpetrated by these undercover units. Thus, the women, who have suffered a totally disproportionate, unnecessary and extremely damaging invasion of their privacy, may be denied access to justice by the very legislation which was purportedly designed to protect their rights.

The public outrage at the phone hacking scandal earlier this year focused on the cynical intrusion into lives of individuals by the press and the police. Today’s hearing relates to levels of intrusion far more invasive than phone hacking, yet so far most mainstream politicians remain silent.

What little information the women have garnered indicates that for 30 years or more these undercover units had (and still have) a rolling brief to inform on political movements and keep files on individuals (simply because they are or were politically active), without investigating any specific crime, and with no apparent intention to participate in any criminal justice process.[2] As a part of this, undercover officers lied and manipulated their way into people’s lives whilst their cover officers, back-room teams and the rest of the police command structure monitored and controlled people’s private lives and relationships. In certain cases, the false identity established by the police was able to be exploited by individual officers to continue their deceit after their deployment had officially ended, seemingly with no safeguard for the women involved, even fathering children in the process.

These massive intrusions into people’s lives are reminiscent of the activities of the Stasi in East Germany and those responsible should be brought to public account. These cases are, therefore, being brought in an attempt to expose the damage done by the Metropolitan Police and to make them publicly accountable for their actions.

This is a statement from supporters of eight women who are bringing legal against the Metropolitan Police. The eight women were deceived into long term intimate relationships with undercover police officers. The Metropolitan Police has applied to have the cases heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). [1] The application will be heard at the High Court on Wednesday 21 and Thursday 22 November 2012. Read the Press Release here

NOTES FOR EDITORS:
[1] The IPT is a little known tribunal set up under section 65 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA, 2000) to deal with claims brought under the Human Rights Act against the police and other security services.
[2] The HMIC report states that “for most undercover deployments the most intense scrutiny occurs when the evidence they have collected is presented at court. Accountability to the court therefore provides an incentive for police to implement the system of control rigorously: but in the HMIC’s view, this incentive did not exist for the NPOIU. This is because NPOIU undercover officers were deployed to develop general intelligence…rather than gathering material for the purpose of criminal prosecutions.” Source: HMIC “A review of national police units which provide intelligence on criminality associated with protest” (February 2012) p.7

Find this story at 19 November 2012

Mark Kennedy, in environmentalist mode: three of the women referred to in court had intimate relationships with him. Photograph: Guardian

Undercover police officers had long-term sexual relationships with political activists and joined them at family gatherings and on holidays to make their targets “emotionally dependent” on them, according to papers submitted to the high court.

The allegations were revealed at the start of a legal attempt by the Metropolitan police to have the claims heard in secret.

Ten women and one man have launched a legal action claiming they were conned into forming “deeply personal” relationships with the police spies.

The case is the first civil action to be brought before a court since the Guardian revealed police officers frequently slept with political campaigners as part of a spy operation over four decades.

Lawyers for the police are applying to have the cases struck out of the high court and moved to a little-known tribunal that usually deals with complaints about MI5.

The solicitor Harriet Wistrich, who is representing most of the claimants, said: “These women are suing for a gross invasion of privacy, and the Met’s response is to try and hive it off into a secret court.”

Most of the claimants had long-term and serious relationships with police spies, one lasting nearly six years. One was a man who had a close personal friendship with a police spy who ended up having a sexual relationship with his girlfriend.

The submissions also refer to the case of a woman who had a child with an undercover officer who was spying on her and who vanished from her life when the deployment came to an end.

Three of the women referred to in court had intimate relationships with Mark Kennedy, who spent seven years living as an environmental campaigner. Details of Kennedy’s deployment were made public last year after activists worked out he was a police mole.

Two other women in the case had sexual relationships with a colleague of Kennedy’s who served undercover alongside him. The police spy claimed to be a truck driver called Mark Jacobs when he infiltrated a small anarchist group in Cardiff until 2009.

As Jacobs, he had taken part in “deeply personal aspects of their lives”, even attending the funeral of one woman’s father after he died of cancer, barristers told the court in their written legal submissions.

“In doing so, he had exploited the vulnerabilities of the claimants and sought to encourage them to rely on him emotionally,” the documents added.

“Jacobs” had instigated a sexual relationship with one of the women, the court was told, while she was going out with another male activist, who is part of the legal action.

“During the course of those relationships, Jacobs purported to be a confidant, empathiser and source of close support to each of the claimants,” the barristers said.

Lawyers for the 10 women involved in the joint legal action against the Met, which had overall responsibility for the deployment of the spies, claim the deception caused their clients “serious emotional and psychiatric harm”.

They told Mr Justice Tugendhat the undercover officers had used the long-term relationships to gather intelligence on the women or for their own “personal gratification”, while pretending to support them emotionally.

They said the “grave allegations” of police misconduct raised serious questions about the “extent to which covert police powers have been and may in future be used to invade the personal, psychological and bodily integrity” of members of the public.

There is confusion over the rules governing the conduct of police spies. Senior officers have claimed it is “never acceptable” and “grossly unprofessional” for undercover officers to sleep with their targets; however, a government minister recently told parliament the tactic was permitted.

The evidence uncovered by the Guardian suggests the practice is routine. Eight of the nine undercover officers identified over the past 21 months are believed to have had intimate sexual relationships with protesters they were spying on.

Documents submitted to the court allege that Kennedy attended intimate family gatherings with all three women and joined them on holidays.

“He discouraged [them] from terminating the intimate sexual relationships,” their barristers said.

Kennedy, who was married with two children, had one relationship with an activist for two years. Another activist, who became his long-term girlfriend, was in a relationship with the police spy for six years.

…

Rob Evans and Paul Lewis
The Guardian, Wednesday 21 November 2012 13.05 GMT

Find this story at 21 November 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Scotland Yard has been accused of ‘trying to hide its secrets’ after appealing for a case involving female activists who were ‘conned into sexual relationships’ with undercover police officers to be heard in secret.

One man and 11 women from environmental activist groups are seeking damages from Scotland Yard for the ‘emotional trauma’ they suffered when undercover officers allegedly tricked them into having sexual relationships.

One of the women is planning to sue the Met for the financial burden of bringing up a child, now 27, fathered by an officer, it was reported.

Controversial: Scotland Yard has been accused of ‘trying to hide its secrets’ after appealing for a case involving female activists who were ‘conned into sexual relationships’ with undercover police officers to be heard in secret

But it emerged last night that the Metropolitan Police are aiming to move the case against them from the High Court to a secretive tribunal.

The Met is to appeal this week that some of the cases – which were due to be heard in the High Court – should be heard in the little-known Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) instead.

The IPT, which was established in 2000, has the power to investigate complaints about the conduct of Britain’s Intelligence Agencies, including MI5, MI6 and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

But complainants who take cases to the IPT have fewer rights than in court and are not able to choose their own lawyer or cross-examine witnesses.

Most hearings are held in private, no explanation has to be given for the judgement and there is no automatic right of appeal.

The Met claims that because it’s undercover operations were authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act (Ripa), which is monitored by the IPT, the cases cannot be heard in a normal court.

Action: The cases were sparked after activists exposed Met policeman Mark Kennedy, pictured, as an undercover officer

But critics have accused the Met of covering up its ‘dirty laundry’ by trying to have the cases heard by the IPT – which has upheld fewer than 1 per cent of complaints in its history.

Jenny Jones, deputy chairwoman of City Hall’s police and crime committee, which monitors the Met, told The Times: ‘I’m very concerned about this because clearly the Met is trying to hide its dirty laundry.

‘These women deserve to have their stories told and for people to understand that what happened to them was a complete betrayal of trust.

‘There seems to be a trend of the State clearly trying to hide its secrets and that’s not acceptable.’

The cases were sparked after activists exposed Met policeman Mark Kennedy as an undercover officer, leading to the collapse of a case against people charged with planning to invade a power station.

Several women then came forward to say they had had sexual contact with him, without realising he was a policeman.

…

By Rosie Taylor and Tim Shipman

PUBLISHED: 05:26 GMT, 19 November 2012 | UPDATED: 05:29 GMT, 19 November 2012

Find this story at 19 November 2012

© Associated Newspapers Ltd

Scotland Yard has been accused of trying to “hide its dirty secrets” after it sought secret hearings for cases brought by female activists who had sexual relationships with undercover police officers.

Eleven women and one man are suing the Met for emotional trauma after claiming they were tricked into forming intimate relationships with undercover officers.

One woman claims an undercover officer fathered her child and is planning a landmark legal claim that will test whether the Met should bear some financial responsibility for the child’s upbringing.

The cases have been lodged in the High Court, but the Met argues that some cases should be heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

…

Justin Davenport, Crime Edito

Find this story at 19 November 2012

© 2012 Evening Standard Limited

Police accused of planting weapons next to Marikana miners’ bodies in bloodiest such incident since end of apartheid

Police in South Africa have been accused of planting weapons on the bodies of dead miners as part of an official cover-up of the Marikana massacre, in August.

Damning photographic evidence was presented to an independent commission of inquiry examining the deaths of 46 people during nearly six weeks of violent strikes at the Lonmin-owned mine.

The revelation follows a series of media reports alleging that on the worst day of bloodshed, when 34 striking miners were killed, some were subjected to execution-style shootings away from the TV cameras.

Photographs taken by police on the night of 16 August showed more weapons by the bodies than photos taken immediately after massacre, the commission was told. The crime scene expert Captain Apollo Mohlaki, who took the night pictures, admitted the discrepancy.

In one picture, a dead man is seen lying on rocky ground near the mine; a second picture, taken later that same day, is identical except that a yellow-handled machete is now lying under the man’s right hand. Mohlaki said he saw the weapon under the man’s arm in the night photo he took, but when looking at the day photo of the same body, he said of the weapon: “It is not appearing. I don’t see it.”

George Bizos, a veteran human rights lawyer representing the mine workers, said the evidence presented at the commission indicated an attempt to alter the crime scene.

“The evidence clearly showed there is at least a strong prima facie case that there has been an attempt to defeat the ends of justice,” he said. “Changing the evidence is a very serious offence.”

Bizos, who defended Nelson Mandela during the Rivonia trial, half a century ago, called for high-ranking officials to be brought before the commission to explain whether they granted colleagues permission to move traditional weapons from where they had been found.

Ishmael Semenya, a police representative, said the national police commissioner, Riah Phiyega, had launched an investigation two weeks previously, after receiving evidence that one of the crime scenes had been tampered with.

But Bizos said Phiyega’s investigation was not to be trusted because of her public statements shortly after the massacre. Three days later, Phiyega was quoted as saying: “Safety of the public is not negotiable. Don’t be sorry about what happened.”

Video evidence shown to the inquiry on Monday also indicated that some of the slain miners may have been handcuffed. Family members at the hearing wept as they saw two lifeless bodies with their hands tied behind their back.

When asked if he had seen whether any of the dead miners’ hands were bound, Mohlaki said he had not. “If I am looking at the video, there is a person handcuffed possibly, but on the day I did not observe that,” he said.

In one of the videos, police can be heard joking and laughing loudly next to the dead bodies, which lie scattered amid dust and blood. Bizos called for a transcript of what the police were saying.

In August, television footage of police opening fire on the miners caused shock around the world. And in subsequent weeks, the journalist Greg Marinovich produced a series of reports for the Daily Maverick website pointing to evidence that some of the miners had died at a second site, having probably been killed in cold blood. Autopsy reports allegedly show that several of the dead had bullet wounds in the back.

On Monday Dali Mpofu, a lawyer representing about 270 injured and arrested miners, told the inquiry: “Evidence is going to be led to the effect that the people at scene two were hiding away when they were shot.”

Mpofu said one of the bodies recovered from the scene, known as Body C, stood out from the rest because it was “riddled” with 12 bullet wounds; all the other bodies had single bullet wounds.

The massacre of 34 workers was the bloodiest security incident since the end of apartheid, in 1994. The inquiry has heard that at least 900 bullets‚ “400 live rounds and 500 rubber bullets”, were fired that day. It followed 10 fatalities, including those of two police officers who were hacked to death.

In the immediate aftermath, the authorities sought to portray the miners, who were striking illegally, as responsible for the violence. Some 270 of the striking miners were arrested and charged with murder, though the charges were later dropped.

The strike ended in September after workers agreed a 22% pay rise with the mine’s owners, the platinum giant Lonmin.

The inquiry began last month and is expected to continue for four months, investigating the roles played by police, miners, unions and Lonmin in the deaths. It has been plagued by complaints that family members were unable to attend and allegations that police have arrested and tortured witnesses. Mpofu told the commission last week: “One person [said] he was beaten up until he soiled himself. Another lost the hearing in his right ear and another had visible scarring.”

With their reputation already in tatters, the police have been criticised for a lack of full disclosure to the commission, which last week was shown a 41-minute police video that appeared to have missed out everything important.

James Nichol, a lawyer representing the families of the dead miners, said of the photo anomaly: “Even the police service did not know about these new photos until two Thursdays ago. Who concealed them until then? It’s astonishing they have not come to light until now.

“There are only two possible conclusions: a cover-up and a systematic planting of evidence.”

Referring to a video played to the commission, Nichol added: “What was grossly offensive was that you see dead bodies and what you hear is the raucous laughter of police officers.”

Asked if he suspected a police cover-up, David Bruce, a senior researcher in the criminal justice programme at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, said: “To my mind, there is no question about that. When we’re talking about a cover-up, we’re talking about something very elaborate. There’s a massive pattern of concealment that seems to permeate what the government is doing at the moment.”

…

David Smith in Johannesburg
The Guardian, Tuesday 6 November 2012 18.06 GMT

Find this story at 6 november 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

A year ago Germany was rocked by the discovery of a group of right-wing extremists calling themselves the National Socialist Underground. Controversy and a number of investigations have since followed.

November 4, 2011: A bank robbery in Eisenach, Germany. The two robbers, who escaped on bicycles, got away with 70,000 euros ($89,800). Sharp-eyed witnesses provided the police with important clues. Two hours later, police officers approached a suspicious camper van, which went up in flames. In the wreckage they found the bodies of two men: Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, known neo-Nazis who had gone underground in the late 1990s. The two had shot themselves after setting fire to the vehicle.

At this stage, nobody suspected the full extent of the case. The police recovered several weapons, one of which turned out to be the pistol used to kill the policewoman Michele Kiesewetter in Heilbronn in April 2007. Things became even more mysterious when, that same afternoon, there was a fire caused by an explosion in a house in Zwickau. It was here that the two neo-Nazis had been living, together with a woman called Beate Zschäpe.

Macabre video
Ruins of the Zwickau house, where the incriminating video was found

In the rubble the investigators discovered a macabre video, in which the group boasted of committing a series of murders since September 2000. They claimed to have killed not only Kiesewetter but also nine men of foreign origin. This video, with its utter contempt for human life, proved to be the key to a series of murders that had baffled police for years. Suddenly it seemed that the murders of eight small business owners of Turkish origin and one Greek man had apparently been committed by these three terrorists, who called themselves the National Socialist Underground (NSU).

The motive for the murders, then, was xenophobia and criminal racism. But until the discovery of the video, investigators had assumed that the strange murder series must consist of acts of revenge connected to the Turkish-dominated mafia. This suspicion was also reflected in media reports on the case.

For years, the deaths were flippantly and crudely referred to as “the döner murders,” an allusion to Turkish kebab stands. “Bosphorus,” the name of the task force charged with investigating the crimes, was in itself an indication of the line of inquiry, drawing as it did on the name of the strait that cuts through Istanbul.

Head of domestic intelligence resigns
Heinz Fromm resigned his post due to the case

Eleven years after the first NSU murder, the news was broken to a horrified public that a trio of neo-Nazis had been traveling across the country, robbing numerous banks and executing at least ten people. It was an even greater shock to discover that their crimes could probably have been prevented. The German domestic intelligence service knew about the three extremists as early as the 1990s, but lost track of them despite initially having them under close surveillance.

For months now a number of parliamentary committees have been investigating this failure by the security services. Heinz Fromm, for many years the head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, resigned after admitting that important files his agency compiled on the group had been shredded, allegedly without his knowledge.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has promised relatives of the victims a full and rigorous investigation. Merkel said she felt sorrow and shame in the face of this extraordinary series of murders. At the memorial service in Berlin on February 23, she described as “nightmarish” the fact that for years the hunt for the murderers had focused primarily on the victims’ families and their milieu.

Merkel addressed the relatives, saying: “For that, I ask your forgiveness.” Barbara John, formerly the official responsible for the integration of foreigners in the Berlin region, has now been commissioned by the German government to look after the relatives, providing them with emotional support and assisting them with material claims, such as victims’ pensions.

Turkish community sees increase in racism

A few days ago Barbara John joined the head of the Turkish Community in Germany, Kenan Kolat, in warning that racism in Germany is on the rise. Both doubt that the revelation of the NSU terrorist cell will result in the right measures being taken. John criticized government offices as existing in a realm of their own, saying that the most important thing was for there to be a change in mentality. Kolat called for the dismantling of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in its present form. “It is endangering the democratic constitutional state,” the community representative said.

The prosecution in the murder series cases is still gathering evidence. The only key suspect still alive, Beate Zschäpe, has been in custody for the past year. A co-founder of the NSU, Zschäpe gave herself up to police four days after the group blew its cover – but she refuses to give evidence. She is expected to be charged in the coming weeks.

NPD ban still under discussion
Semiya Simsek (r.) and Gamze Kubasik’s fathers were murdered

In the course of the investigation, Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) has also come under scrutiny. The openly far-right party is regarded by many of those familiar with the scene as a kind of political wing of violent right-wing extremism. Certainly there was a personal connection between members of the NPD and the NSU. Experts are divided as to whether this is sufficient evidence to prove that the NPD itself has an “aggressive, militant” attitude towards the democratic constitutional state.

…

Find this story at 4 November 2012

© 2012 Deutsche Welle | Legal notice | Contact

A secret paper written by senior police officers paints a disastrous picture of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. It suggests that the service may have actually strengthened the country’s far-right scene through its large network of far-right informants.

It’s a Wednesday in early summer 2012, on the terrace of a Chinese restaurant in Nuremberg’s city center. Kai D., 48, once one of the most subversive activists in the German neo-Nazi community, is sitting at a table, drinking a glass of roasted wheat tea, the house specialty, eagerly answering questions about his past in the right-wing extremist community.

The ex-Nazi seems at ease as he chats about his experiences as the head of the Covenant of the New Front (Gesinnungsgemeinschaft der Neuen Front) and the Thule Network, a neo-Nazi data-sharing group, which he helped build. He describes his role as one of the organizers of the Rudolf Hess memorial marches — annual neo-Nazi ceremonies in memory of the prominent Nazi politician that were banned by German courts in 2005. He talks about the tiresome pressure from the police with all the interrogations and raids. He also admits to having known members of a group called the Thüringer Heimatschutz (loosely translated as “Thuringian Homeland Protection”), where the terrorists who later formed the National Socialist Underground (NSU) became radicalized. According to D., they were the people who organized regular meetings in the eastern state of Thuringia. The authorities found D.’s number on a phone list used by NSU terrorist Uwe Mundlos.

On one subject, however, D. becomes tight-lipped. No, he says vehemently, “at no time, not even remotely” was he an informant for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, and anyone who claims otherwise is lying.

Apparently, D. is still stretching the truth today. Responding to research conducted by SPIEGEL reporters, Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann, a member of the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU), has told members of the Bavarian state parliament that D. worked with the Bavarian state intelligence service between the end of 1987 and 1998. D. was a major informant, and he was also one of the masterminds in the neo-Nazi network.

German law enforcement authorities uncovered the NSU right-wing terrorist cell almost exactly a year ago. On Nov. 4, 2011, the police found the bodies of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt in a camper parked in the eastern city of Eisenach. The NSU claimed responsibility for killing at least nine men and a policewoman during a seven-year murder spree that began in 2000. The male victims, all of them shopkeepers or employeed in small businesses, belonged to ethnic minorities — eight were of Turkish origin and one was Greek.

Systematic Failure

Four parliamentary committees of inquiry are currently dissecting the work of law enforcement units, and four department heads have already resigned. The government’s failures in fighting right-wing terrorists have plunged the domestic intelligence service into the worst crisis since it was established. It was set up in postwar Germany to identify and stop the spread of precisely the kind of extremist thinking that allowed the Nazis to rise to power in the 1930s. The discovery of the NSU and its crimes, however, has shaken the system to its core.

The committees are currently examining more than 100,000 pages of classified documents. The more secrets come to light, the clearer it becomes how extensively intelligence agencies had infiltrated right-wing extremist groups. The trio of neo-Nazis that made up the NSU was surrounded by informants linked with the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and Kai D. was only one of many. Nevertheless, the authorities had no idea what plans were being hatched in the neo-Nazi underground. The system of undercover informants had failed.

One of the big questions now being asked is whether the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and its methods are suited to protecting the German constitution — or whether it actually strengthened militant right-wing groups. “It cannot be that informants are being used who are more harmful to the community than they are beneficial,” says Thomas Oppermann, a senior lawmaker for the opposition Social Democratic Party.

Once before, during the failed effort to ban the far-right NPD party in 2003, the links between law enforcement and right-wing extremist groups led to a political fiasco. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the motion to ban the NPD because it appeared as if the government could in fact be controlling the right-wing extremists through its informants.

Incendiary Agents

The discussion is now being fueled by a previously unknown position paper dating from 1997. It comes from an authoritative source: the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Germany’s version of the FBI. At the time, the police officials leveled serious charges against their counterparts with the German intelligence agencies, just a year before the NSU terrorists, who had operated in the eastern city of Jena, went into hiding. In the position paper that has now surfaced, which is still classified as “secret,” the BKA listed 10 theories that were presented to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

The BKA document centers around the core idea that the informants egged each other on, essentially acting as incendiary agents. Instead of decisively combatting the neo-Nazis, the BKA posits, the intelligence agency protected them, and judging by the way the Office for the Protection of the Constitution deployed its informants, they became part of the problem and not part of the solution.

The classified document, which SPIEGEL has obtained, is both an urgent warning and an indictment of the agents at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Did the intelligence service, intoxicated by the exclusive access it had gained, in fact protect some members of the far right? Is it indirectly responsible for the strengthening of militant neo-Nazi structures in the 1990s, from which the NSU, the most brutal and militant of all the extremist groups, emerged?

The BKA paper was written at a time, just after German reunification, when right-wing extremist groups were bursting with strength. Attacks against foreigners in the eastern cities of Hoyerswerda and Rostock in 1991 and 1992 respectively were followed by deadly arson attacks against Turkish inhabitants in Mölln, a town near Hamburg, and in Solingen in the west. Hundreds of neo-Nazi skinheads staged rallies every August to mark the anniversary of the death of Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess. Entire sections of eastern Germany became practically off-limits for foreigners. Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Beate Zschäpe — the third member of the NSU group who is being held in police custody as she awaits trial — grew up in a self-confident political movement that was enjoying unchecked growth.

The BKA stepped up its investigations to find out who was responsible for what crimes. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution, for its part, infiltrated the neo-Nazi community, wanting to understand its structures and identify the masterminds and leaders, on the one hand, and their followers, on the other.

In the mid-1990s, the intelligence agencies — which operate with both a national agency as well as regional branches in the 16 German federal states — managed to recruit a large number of sources within the far-right community. For some activists, this conspiratorial cooperation with what they in fact saw as the hated “federal system” proved to be a blessing, since the intelligence agents had a vital interest in making sure that their spies would not be prosecuted.

This had to lead to conflicts between police and intelligence. According to the position paper, the tensions came to a head on Nov. 27, 1996, during a top-level meeting between the presidents of the BKA and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to discuss the crisis. The BKA officials instructed their state security division, which works to combat politically motivated crime, to ascertain the problems at a “working level”.

BKA Warns Intelligence Services
A few months later, on Feb. 3, 1997, the BKA’s state security officers summarized their critique, as instructed, in a 14-page “position paper.” According to the document, the cause of the problems was the “increasing divergence between the operations of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and law enforcement measures.” From the BKA’s standpoint, this was attributable to “source activities.” The authors of the position paper reached the following conclusions:

There was a “risk that sources of the intelligence service (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) could goad each other on to undertake bigger actions;” in other words, the system threatened to create an “incendiary effect.”

“For reasons of source protection,” by the time the intelligence service passed on information to the police, it was often “too late,” so that right-wing extremist actions “could no longer be prevented.”

When the intelligence service was informed about police raids, it was noted that “the sources had often been warned beforehand.” This created “the risk that evidence would be destroyed prior to the arrival of law enforcement authorities.”

Intelligence service sources that were “found to be criminals,” were often “neither indicted nor convicted.”

“The majority of the sources” were “staunch right-wing extremists” who believed “that they could act with impunity and pursue their ideology, under the protection of the intelligence service, and didn’t have to take law enforcement seriously.”

In their analysis, the police listed nine sources by name and described how the intelligence service’s informants were repeatedly found to be organizers or instigators of right-wing extremist activities.

For instance, the BKA document notes, an informant within the leadership of the neo-Nazi Free German Workers’ Party (Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or FAP) organized conspiratorial party meetings that the police tried to prevent, but to no avail. The informant was apparently warned of the impending ban of the FAP in February 1995, so that he was able to shred two garbage bags full of incriminating material. When questioned, the informant’s father said that he had long been astonished over “how well-informed his son was about police and judicial activities.”

Another informant, who was suspected of involvement in letter-bomb attacks, was tipped off and managed to evade arrest by going to Greece in March 1995. The BKA allegedly searched his apartment during a nationwide raid. When the police questioned the neo-Nazi in another matter, after he had returned to Germany, they allowed him to call his attorney. But the informant called his handler instead and asked for help. The handler told the informant what to say to the police. During the conversation, the informant complained about not having been “warned in advance” that the BKA had had him under surveillance.

According to the BKA document, the intelligence service had even recruited Andree Z., one of the leaders of the notorious neo-Nazi group Sauerland Action Front (Sauerländer Aktionsfront), as a source. Z., who used the pseudonym “Lutscher” and died in a car accident in late 1997, was viewed as someone who had whipped up neo-Nazi sentiment and radicalized the community. When the Federal Attorney’s Office launched an investigation against Z., who was suspected of having formed a criminal organization, the intelligence service apparently notified Z. immediately. After that, the BKA complained, “no relevant telephone conversations” could be recorded anymore.

A Who’s Who of the Far-Right Community

The links between the neo-Nazi community and the intelligence services seemed especially apparent to the BKA when it came to the annual memorial marches for Rudolf Hess. If the BKA is to be believed, there were no fewer than five informants among the coordinators of the “Rudolf Hess Action Week” in August 1994. The list reads like a Who’s Who of the far-right community at the time, and it includes Andree Z. and Kai D.

Not long afterwards, the BKA’s state security division noticed that the duo was once again involved in organizing the Hess rally, this time on Aug. 17, 1996. “It was determined,” the BKA document reads, that the informants’ activities “went well beyond a passive role.” For instance, Z. was apparently named press spokesman for the event, while Kai D. designed the main flyer and propaganda stickers advertising the march.

According to the BKA, informant D., who was part of the 11-member “action committee” for the banned Hess festivities, took part in preparatory meetings and sent “strictly confidential” memos to fellow neo-Nazis. The main rally was planned in a highly conspiratorial way, so that the location of the event, in the southwestern city of Worms, was only announced shortly before the demonstration.

Uwe Mundlos and Beate Zschäpe attended the march in 1996. Kai D., however, chose to watch the carefully planned rally from a safe distance.

It wasn’t until the afternoon of that Aug. 17, 1996 that the police apprehended him, after he had crossed the border into Luxembourg in a car traveling above the speed limit. D. was taken to a police station in nearby Saarbrücken, where he demanded to speak to an agent with the state security division, saying that he had “an important message.” He was unwilling to accept “ordinary officers,” the police noted, and was only willing to talk to someone with the State Criminal Police Office (LKA).

When his request was granted and two LKA officers appeared a short time later, the right-wing extremist was assertive, saying that if he wasn’t released so that he could “de-escalate” the situation, things could very well get worse. He said that he had to call a certain number at regular intervals, or else there might be “attacks.” D. was released a few hours later.

It wasn’t the first time that the informant had gotten off lightly. An investigation launched against him by authorities in the eastern state of Thuringia, who suspected him and a friend, Thuringia informant Tino Brandt, of involvement in the “formation of a criminal organization,” also came to nothing.

Divided Loyalties
Confidential informants like Kai D. can be the most valuable tool for the intelligence services, because they can go to places were the authorities cannot. But they also pose a risk to democracy. The letter “V” in “V-Mann” — “Vertrauens-Mann,” the German term for informant, which translates loosely as “Confidence Man” — doesn’t really stand for “Vertrauen,” or “confidence,” but for “Verrat” (“betrayal”), says Hans-Jürgen Förster, the former head of domestic intelligence for the eastern state of Brandenburg.

Informants often have divided loyalties. In addition to lying to and deceiving their own people, they often do the same to the authorities. Under the cover of working for the intelligence services, they can operate without interference. When that happens, they are not protecting the constitution but are in fact combatting it, both benefiting from and weakening the state at the same time. This is why the use of informants is one of the most sensitive tools available to a constitutional state.

In the ideal world of the intelligence services, agents don’t sympathize with their informants or tell them when the next raid is going to take place. This ideal world is described in the “Procurement Regulation for the Office of the Protection of the Constitution,” which remains a classified document to this day. According to the regulation, informants, who are given grades of A through F, are at best “tried and tested for a longer period of time,” report “only the truth” and have “no character defects.”

And then there is the other world, the one that’s probably more in line with the truth. It is populated by neo-Nazis who serve up their handlers a mixture of truth and lies, and are paid to do so at the expense of taxpayers. In this world, government agents and their informants have become accustomed to one another, and handlers treat any access as a treasure, which is jealously guarded, both from other state agencies and the police. Passing on information is considered a risk.

This creeping fraternization is cold and analytical, especially in the far-right community, where there are no linguistic and sometimes hardly any cultural barriers between informants and their handlers, and the dangers of too much closeness are omnipresent.

Are Informants Really Necessary?

After 20 years with the intelligence service, it became clear to him that “the (German) constitutional state cannot afford to keep using informants in the way it has in the past,” Winfried Ridder, a retired former division head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, said last week. Ridder believes that the defect is embedded in the system, and that the government could ditch its extremist sources. Instead, he recommends that government agencies infiltrate potential terrorist groups by providing agents with false identities and sending them in to operate undercover.

So far, none of the state interior ministers has been willing to go that far. “It doesn’t work without informants,” says German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU). “If we no longer have informants, we get no information from the community.” The government, he adds, can’t operate blindly when it comes to right-wing extremist groups. Most of his counterparts at the state level agree.

In fact, informants have provided valuable information in many cases. When the Bavarian state Office for the Protection of the Constitution received a tip from a source in 2003, it was able to prevent a bombing that neo-Nazi Martin Wiese and his group had planned to commit at a groundbreaking ceremony for a Jewish community center in Munich. The BND foreign intelligence service and the Office of the Protection of the Constitution also learned of several bombings being planned by Islamists from their sources. “Without informants, we would no longer have access to key information,” warns Ulrich Mäurer, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the interior minister of the city-state of Bremen.

Mäurer has taken an unusual step. In the future, the Bremen parliament will monitor the use of informants, and no sources will be used without the approval of lawmakers. It’s a reform in which the executive is surrendering power to the legislative branch of government.

Mäurer’s initiative resembles a proposal by the former intelligence chief for the state of Brandenburg, Hans-Jürgen Förster, that informants could only be recruited after their case has been reviewed by a judge, a procedure similar to that required for telephone wiretapping. Förster hopes that this will “improve the legitimacy and standing” of the program, and that it will also enhance “internal discipline,” because intelligence agents will know that someone is looking over their shoulder.

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution has since established a task force to track and monitor the work of source managers. The supervisors will be able to keep tabs on their colleagues as they recruit, manage and follow up with informants, so that problematic cases can be detected early on and stopped if necessary. The interior ministers plan to approve new “guidelines for managing informants” soon and introduce uniform, nationwide standards. They are also discussing a central database for all informants.

“The culture of cooperation between the police and intelligence service has already changed,” says Hans-Georg Maassen, the new president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Thanks to positive experiences at the Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) in Berlin — which was established in 2004 and includes the BND, Office for the Protection of the Constitution and other state and national agencies — Massen adds, “a more intensive and trusting system of exchange has become established than in the past.”

Domestic Intelligence Ignored BKA Criticism

During the late 1990s, before the NSU had committed its series of murders, officials at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution simply ignored the criticism coming from the BKA. At a conference in the central German town of Goslar in April 1997, federal and state intelligence chiefs discussed the BKA’s position paper, but they saw no reason to change anything. The Interior Ministry, which became involved in the ongoing conflict, also took no action. Various cases came to light of high-ranking informants who had enjoyed the protection of the intelligence services.

…

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

11/06/2012 05:49 PM

Find this story at 6 November 2012

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Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat noch im Juni 2012 mehrere Akten im Bereich Rechtsextremismus schreddern lassen – trotz der auf Hochtouren laufenden Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie. Es ist nicht die erste Panne im Haus von Innensenator Henkel. Der spricht von “menschlichem Versagen”.

Berlin – Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat Akten geschreddert, die möglicherweise für den NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags von Interesse gewesen wären. Das bestätigten mehrere Berliner Abgeordnete SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. Am Nachmittag wurden die Mitglieder des Verfassungsschutzausschusses im Abgeordnetenhaus über den Vorfall informiert.

Den Angaben zufolge wurden am 29. Juni dieses Jahres mehrere Rechtsextremismus-Akten vernichtet. Es handelt sich um 25 Aktenordner, die unter anderem Informationen über den einstigen Terroristen der Rote Armee Fraktion und heutigen Rechtsextremisten Horst Mahler, die sogenannte Reichsbürgerbewegung, die Band Landser, die Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend und die Initiative für Volksaufklärung enthalten.

Generell ist die Vernichtung von Akten ein normaler Vorgang, sie unterliegen einer Löschfrist. Wenn diese als nicht mehr relevant eingeschätzt werden, müssen sie nach einer gewissen Zeit sogar vernichtet werden. Allerdings bietet man regulär dem Landesarchiv an, Altakten zu Dokumentationszwecken aufzubewahren. Das Berliner Landesarchiv hatte jene 25 Ordner mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug Ende September vergangenen Jahres als relevant erachtet und angefordert.

Doch die Dokumente wurden nie in das Archiv überführt. “Aufgrund eines Missverständnisses wurden auch die für das Landesarchiv bestimmten Akten zur Vernichtung ausgeheftet” und zum Schreddern geschickt, heißt es in einem Bericht des Berliner Verfassungschutzes.

“Unerfreulicher Vorgang”

“Es gibt keine Anhaltspunkte, dass die Akten irgendeinen NSU-Bezug hatten”, sagte eine Sprecherin der Behörde. Der Vorfall sei nach Bekanntwerden sofort hausintern aufgearbeitet worden. Doch im Zuge der Aufklärung der NSU-Morde bekommt dieser Vorgang nun eine besondere Brisanz. Auch der Zeitpunkt der Vernichtung ist pikant – Ende Juni lief die Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie längst auf Hochtouren.

Nur wenige Wochen später wurde zudem in Berlin per Erlass der Verfassungsschutzleiterin Claudia Schmid angeordnet, es sollten bis auf weiteres gar keine Akten mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug mehr vernichtet werden, um die höchstmögliche Aufklärung der NSU-Mordserie zu gewährleisten. Doch da war es für besagte Akten schon zu spät.

Berlins Innensenator Frank Henkel (CDU) spricht von einem “menschlichen Versagen”. “Es war mir wichtig, dass der NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss und die Verfassungsschutzexperten aus dem Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus schnell informiert werden”, sagte er SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. “Nach jetzigem Erkenntnisstand liegt kein NSU-Bezug vor”, betonte er. “Trotzdem lässt dieser unerfreuliche Vorgang Fragen offen, die jetzt schnell aufgearbeitet werden müssen”, fügte er hinzu. Henkel versprach, den zuständigen Sonderermittler Dirk Feuerberg mit der Aufklärung der Panne zu betrauen. “Zudem ist der Verfassungsschutz in der Pflicht, alles zu versuchen, um diese Akten in Abstimmung mit anderen Behörden zu rekonstruieren.”

Empörte Opposition

In der Vergangenheit hatte die Aktenvernichtung bei Verfassungsschutzbehörden mehrfach für Schlagzeilen gesorgt. Neben dem Präsidenten des Bundesamts, Heinz Fromm, mussten auch mehrere Landesamtschefs ihren Posten räumen.

Auch Henkel selbst war wegen Ungereimtheiten in der NSU-Affäre unter Druck geraten. Mitte September war bekannt geworden, dass ein mutmaßlicher NSU-Helfer mehr als ein Jahrzehnt als Informant mit der Berliner Polizei zusammengearbeitet und ab 2002 zumindest indirekte Hinweise auf den Aufenthaltsort der Rechtsterroristen gegeben hat. Zudem hatte er eingeräumt, dem Trio Sprengstoff besorgt zu haben.

Nach eigenen Angaben wusste Henkel davon seit März – hatte aber nur die Bundesanwaltschaft, nicht jedoch den Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags und das Abgeordnetenhaus informiert. Als Grund gab er eine Absprache mit der Bundesanwaltschaft an, die das aber bestreitet.

…

06. November 2012, 19:05 Uhr

Find this story at 6 November 2012

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Es gab eine Zeit, da trug Achim Schmid kein graues Sakko, sondern ein weißes Gewand und eine Kapuze über dem Kopf. Der 37-Jährige war damals Chef einer deutschen Gruppierung des Ku-Klux-Klans. Ende 2002 stieg er aus. Zehn Jahre später holt ihn seine Vergangenheit ein.

„Einmalige Ku-Klux-Klan-Affäre des Verfassungsschutzes“ titelte die „TAZ“ vor ein paar Tagen. „Dienstgeheimnis verraten“ die „Süddeutsche Zeitung“. Ein Verfassungsschützer habe Schmid Informationen zukommen lassen, heißt es darin. Ist der Klan ein Sammelbecken für Staatsbedienstete, die rechtsstaatliche mit rechten Werten verwechseln?

Die BILD-am-SONNTAG-Reporter finden Schmid in Schleswig-Holstein, im Örtchen Boostedt, eine Stunde nördlich von Hamburg. Der Ex-Klan-Chef lebt in einer Wohnstraße mit Reihenhaus-Idylle. Ursprünglich stammt er aus Baden-Württemberg.

Dort wird Schmid 1975 als Sohn einer Köchin und eines Binnenschiffers geboren. Als er neun Jahre alt ist, stirbt sein Vater. Mit 13 Jahren kommt Achim Schmid erstmals in Kontakt mit der rechten Szene. „Musik war immer mein Ding“, sagt der Vater von zwei Kindern. Er hört rechte Musik von „Störkraft“ und „Endstufe“, rasiert sich später den Kopf kahl.

Der Junge macht seinen Realschulabschluss, beginnt mit 22 Jahren eine Ausbildung zum Metzger, gerät mit der Hand in den Fleischwolf, bricht die Lehre ab.

„Ich habe dann gejobbt und bin auf die NPD gestoßen“, sagt der 37-Jährige. Auf einem Dorffest bei Stuttgart spricht ihn ein Bekannter an. Ob er Interesse am Ku-Klux-Klan habe?

Der rassistische Geheimbund wurde 1865 in den USA gegründet. Spätestens seit dem Film „Mississippi Burning“ kennt man seine Bräuche: Männer in weißen Kutten treffen sich um ein brennendes Kreuz, skandieren gegen Schwarze. Amerika eben, könnte man denken. Aber Kapuzenmänner, die schwäbeln? Eine merkwürdige Vorstellung.

So wurde der Klan von Polizisten und einem Verfassungsschützer beeinflusst

„Unsere Vereinigung hieß International White Knights of the Ku-Klux-Klan“, sagt Schmid. 1998 tritt er ein, zwei Jahre später reist er in die USA, wird dort zum „Grand Dragon“, zum Anführer seines Kapuzenklubs erklärt. Heute auf den Tag genau vor zwölf Jahren war das, nachts auf einem Feld in Mississippi. Es gibt ein Video von dieser Szene. Vor einem brennenden Kreuz ruft der Chef des US-Klans Schmids Namen, schlägt ihn mit einem Schwert.

So inthronisiert kehrt Schmid zurück nach Süddeutschland, gründet die European White Knights of Ku-Klux-Klan. „Wir hatten rund 20 Mitglieder“, sagt er. Brisant: Einige davon sind Polizeibeamte. Zwei Namen nennt Schmid. „Wir haben zeitweise sogar überlegt, eine eigene Polizeiabteilung im Klan zu gründen. Interessenten gab es genug“, behauptet Schmid. Dazu kommt es nicht, aber Schmid installiert einen Geheimdienst innerhalb des Klans. Zu den Mitgliedern gehört auch einer der beiden Beamten. Gemeinsam überlegen sie, eine Bürgerwehr zu gründen. „Wir wollten Dealer überwachen, die Ergebnisse der Polizei geben“, behauptet Schmid.

Einer der Polizisten in Diensten des Klans taucht später in einem anderen Zusammenhang auf. Er ist Zugführer von Michèle Kiesewetter, als die Beamtin am 25. April 2007 von den Mitgliedern der Terrorgruppe „Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund“ (NSU) erschossen wird. Ein Zufall?

„Ich war da längst raus aus der Nummer“, sagt Schmid. Für ihn wird es Ende 2002 brenzlig. „Ich wurde von einem Verfassungsschützer gewarnt, er hat mir in einem englischsprachigen Chatroom erzählt, dass wir überwacht werden“, sagt Schmid. „Aber V-Mann, wie oft spekuliert wird, war ich nie.“ Dass Schmid im Sommer 2002 Informationen von einem Mitarbeiter des Landesamtes für Verfassungsschutz erhalten hat, bestätigt inzwischen – 10 Jahre später! – auch der baden-württembergische Innenminister.

…

Quelle: BILD.de
04.11.2012 — 00:01 Uhr
Von
JÜRGEN DAMSCH und HOLGER KARKHECK

Find this story at 4 November 2012

© Copyright BILD digital 2011

In mid-October, a massive car bomb killed Wissam al-Hassan in downtown Beirut. The intelligence chief was buried as a hero and praised by the West for his help in investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Or was he a double agent, possibly also active sometimes for the Syrians?

It’s a story of personal oaths of allegiance and clan loyalties, a story of war, betrayal and deceit, a story that could only be written about the Middle East. At the story’s center stand four men and two murders.

Rafik Hariri, a business tycoon worth billions, helped rebuild Lebanon after its bloody 15-year civil war. He was an important political leader of the country’s Sunnis and Lebanon’s prime minister for roughly a decade. In October 2004, he resigned to protest the string-pulling exerted by neighboring Syria and Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shiite militia bankrolled by Damascus. A few months later, on Valentine’s Day 2005, Hariri would die in a massive roadside bombing attack.

Saad Hariri, Rafik’s 42-year-old son and political heir, swore that he would get to the bottom of the murder and even availed himself of foreign assistance to do so. In 2007, the United Nations decided to set up a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The tribunal has been operating from its headquarters near The Hague, in the Netherlands, since the spring of 2009. The younger Hariri came to be known as one of the leaders of the Cedar Revolution, which succeeded in driving almost all Syrian troops out of the country. Saad Hariri would serve as Lebanon’s prime minister from 2009 until 2011, when his coalition government collapsed. These days, he leads his opposition movement in exile from Paris.

Hassan Nasrallah, the 52-year-old head of Hezbollah, has oscillated between suppressed and open hostility with the Hariris. In addition to overseeing a militia that is stronger than Lebanon’s army, Nasrallah commands a powerful political organization. At the moment, his party essentially controls the government in Beirut, and he views himself as the only force fighting against “Zionist occupiers.” He also sees the STL as little more than an “American-Israeli conspiracy.”

And then there is Wissam al-Hassan, who is currently the main protagonist in this great game.

An Inside Job?

Al-Hassan was born in 1965 near Tripoli, Lebanon, into a Sunni clan that has enjoyed close ties with the Hariris. He became a member of Rafik Hariri’s security detail, eventually advancing to become his head bodyguard. Al-Hassan had taken off Feb. 14, 2005, the day that a massive car bomb exploded while Rafik Hariri’s motorcade was driving by, claiming at the time that he needed to study for a university exam. But this did not harm his career, and Saad Hariri would eventually elevate al-Hassan to the rank of brigadier general and a position as the country’s intelligence chief.

On Oct. 19, al-Hassan died in a car bomb attack that bore many similarities with the one that killed his boss seven years earlier: Both were in Beirut, both were in broad daylight, and both were carried out by professionals. Both attacks involved a huge amount of explosives that claimed the lives of many more people than just the intended targets.

Al-Hassan was given a hero’s burial and interred only a few steps from the grave of Rafik Hariri in a cemetery near Martyrs’ Square in central Beirut. The circumstances surrounding his death have given rise to a number of questions. In fact, some wonder whether the 47-year-old might have even been a double agent, someone who had switched allegiances once or perhaps even several times. And if this is true, they ask, what does that say about those suspected of killing him?

Whatever the answers might be, the terrorist attack of Oct. 19 continues to grow more and more mysterious, and the STL may consider investigating it. Responding to written questions, the International Criminal Tribunal says that one first needs to determine whether the attack was related to the Hariri bombing. Moreover, it adds that launching such an investigation would also require an expansion of the STL’s mandate by the United Nations and the Lebanese government, which covers 49 percent of the tribunal’s costs.

Sources close to the tribunal say that al-Hassan originally stood at the top of the list of suspects in the Hariri attack. Indeed, investigators found it rather odd that Hariri’s head bodyguard would go missing in action on the day he died. What’s more, they established that al-Hassan spoke on the phone 24 times on the morning of Hariri’s death even though he claimed he had to study for the university exam. An internal STL document says that al-Hassan’s statements are “not very convincing” and have led to doubts about his alibi.

Friends and Enemies

Still, the fact that he was far away when the attack occurred and that Saad Hariri believed his oath of loyalty was somehow enough to get al-Hassan out of the line of fire. Likewise, before long, he became the special tribunal’s most important informant, providing investigators with details about the type of explosive used and recordings from mobile phones at the scene of the attack. The phone calls would eventually be matched to four members of Hezbollah — and spell the downfall of them all.

In June 2011, the STL brought indictments against these four men, including Mustafa Badr al-Din, Nasrallah’s chief of intelligence. An enraged Nasrallah reacted by threatening to “cut off the hand” of anyone who tried to extradite him and the other men. The four have since disappeared and are rumored to have fled to Iran.

However, such investigations weren’t enough for al-Hassan. He soon became one of the most important political players in the region, forging some astonishing alliances along the way. For example, he arranged a meeting between Saad Hariri and Syrian President Bashar Assad. After the meeting, the former refrained from making any more vehement accusations that Syria was behind his father’s murder. What’s more, in a move that was highly unusual in terms of protocol, al-Hassan himself had a private conversation with Assad in Damascus.

At the same time, al-Hassan maintained extremely close ties with top-level officials in the intelligence apparatus of Saudi Arabia, which holds a critical stance toward the Syrian regime. Likewise, some Middle East insiders have even claimed that al-Hassan had ties to the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency. He ultimately allayed these suspicions with deeds: Under his leadership, Lebanese intelligence blew the cover of an entire network of Israeli spies operating in the country.

In recent months, the restless Lebanese intelligence chief had turned his attention to rebel forces in Syria. Just last summer, he apparently set a trap for Ali Mamlouk, who would be promoted in July from chief of Assad’s general intelligence directorate to head of his national security council. Via intermediaries, al-Hassan encouraged Mamlouk to supply Michel Samaha, a former minister of information in Lebanon and staunch ally of the Syrian regime, with explosives to be used in attacks. Samaha was arrested in early August and reportedly confessed. It was a serious loss of face for Assad — and a plausible reason for taking out the supposed turncoat al-Hassan.

Possible Hezbollah Involvement

Hezbollah might have also had a hand in the terrorist attack on al-Hassan, whose cooperation with the tribunal had made him a sworn enemy of the “Party of God.” In any case, al-Hassan had surely received warnings about an attack. Two days before the assassination, he traveled to Paris to bring his family to safety. The next day, while returning to Syria, he made a stopover in Germany. There, he met with his German counterpart, the head of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), for what was presumably a regularly scheduled talk.

In response to written questions, the STL confirms that the in absentia trial of the four Hezbollah members will begin on March 25, 2013, and that procedures allow “for evidence from unavailable persons to be admitted during the trial,” including that of al-Hassan. What’s more, the International Crimincal Court says that “Lebanon has an ongoing obligation to search for the accused” and the Lebanese authorities are obliged to report on a monthly basis. “We believe that justice should not be held hostage to the accused’s desire not to participate in the proceedings,” the tribunal wrote.

The FBI now has agents in Beirut to aid inthe investigation into al-Hassan’s murder. It has reportedly determined that the explosives used to kill al-Hassan bear similarities to the ones used in the Hariri assassination. The planning and execution of the attack are also thought to point to the same group of perpetrators.

Translated from the German by Josh Ward

11/05/2012 01:02 PM

By Erich Follath

Find this story at 5 November 2012

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2012
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH

The fallout from the assassination of Internal Security Forces (ISF) Information Branch chief Wissam al-Hassan nearly two weeks ago was very similar to that following the series of assassinations that has rocked Lebanon since 2005.

Syria was blamed immediately, and those who expressed doubt were labeled collaborators. March 14 alluded to Hezbollah’s involvement as well. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea even went as far as accusing Hezbollah directly.

Jumping to conclusions prevents honest dialogue. In reality, prior to his death, Hassan felt threatened by more than one party.

The intelligence chief made it clear that he feared a certain group within Hezbollah made up of “undisciplined elements who do not obey their leadership.”
People who knew Hassan heard him in recent years speak about those he thought wanted to kill him. Some of this information was based on analysis, but some of it was also based on data and facts on the ground.

Of course, Hassan had his suspicions regarding Syria’s role in Lebanon. Over the last few months, he became more apprehensive towards Syrian intelligence agencies. He would often mock their structural weaknesses, which became especially obvious following the arrest of former minister Michel Samaha [2] who was indicted for his involvement in “terror plots” in Lebanon on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Hassan also never hid his conviction that Hezbollah, along with Syria, was behind the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, but he was convinced it was the product of a conspiracy within the organization.

Hassan believed that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and assassinated Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh did not have prior knowledge of the killing and were not involved in it in any way.

The intelligence chief made it clear that he feared a certain group within Hezbollah made up of “undisciplined elements who do not obey their leadership.”

This apprehension did not prevent Hassan from cooperating with Hezbollah and even exchanging intelligence on several occasions.

While the Information Branch led the crackdown on Israeli spy networks over the last four years, the Resistance provided information that was crucial to their discovery.

“The are better than us in human intelligence gathering,” he would say of Hezbollah’s intelligence branch.

Hassan knew that the nature of his work made him a target. He often said that his job “left me without any friends.”

A few months ago, Hassan told people close to him about meetings he had with Jordanian officials, including the head of Jordanian intelligence, who he met in Germany, and a minister linked to Jordanian intelligence.

He said that each of them had relayed information – on separate occasions – about discussions with the Israelis regarding the situation in Lebanon.

As a result, both officials told Hassan that the Israelis do not look on him favourably and that he should be careful, even in Europe.

Hassan knew that the Israelis were after his neck. On several occasions, he reportedly said that he did not feel safe in Europe anymore.

He was aware of the damage done to Israel through the unraveling of its spy networks in Lebanon, starting in 2007 when the Intelligence Branch commenced its counter-intelligence operations.

Several US Senators explicitly informed Hassan that were facing Israeli pressure to stop their assistance to Lebanon.
Hassan also received a clear message from the US Congress, which cut back on some of the joint programs between his branch and its American counterparts. On one occasion, several US Senators explicitly informed Hassan that were facing Israeli pressure to stop their assistance to Lebanon.

But the clearest message came from the Jordanian intelligence officer he met with almost a year ago and whose warnings he took seriously.

Earlier this year, Hassan got another warning. In January 2012, he received a letter from the United Arab Emirates’ intelligence body saying they had credible information that a high ranking officer from the ISF would be targeted with a car bomb in Achrafieh on the road between the ISF headquarters and the officer’s safe house.

The information came as a surprise to Hassan, since he believed his safe house in Achrafieh was a secret. Even his closest aides were not informed of its location. He knew that the information from the UAE concerned him personally, the Achrafieh safe house being his own.

All he could do was leak the information to the press, to tell those who wanted to assassinate him that their plot had been discovered.

Urgent investigations conducted by the Information Branch did not show any suspicious activities in the area. But the precision of the information from the UAE led Hassan to treat it seriously.

The information was leaked to the press and treated, as usual, as fodder for internal Lebanese politicking. The Information Branch was accused of fabricating the information to use it to pry communications data [3] from telecom operators.

But for the security officers concerned with the investigation, the issue was critical. Hassan did not know who was behind the plot discovered by UAE intelligence.

He assumed it was related to Syrian intelligence operations. He remained convinced of this until he met a UAE intelligence official who told him that their information points to al-Qaeda, specifically one of their groups operating out of the Ain al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp.

Wissam al-Hassan knew he had to stay a step ahead of his adversaries, some of whom remained a mystery even to him. He knew his enemies were many and that the last seven years of his life as a top intelligence chief only made him more of a target.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

By: Hassan Illeik [1]

Published Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Find this story at 30 October 2012

Al-Akhbar English by Al-Akhbar English is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

online@al-akhbar.com

Four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, were killed in a six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission on September 11
CIA Director David Petraeus did not attend the ceremony when the coffins arrived back in US to conceal the CIA operation in eastern Libya
Al Qaeda in North Africa and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia were implicated
Timeline of CIA involvement blows open the dramatic sequence of events, revealing that of 30 American officials there, 23 were with the CIA
CIA team had been operating out of a building known as ‘the annex’, less than half a mile away from the consulate in central Benghazi
Timeline reveals heroic rescue effort by CIA team and the terrifying firefight they encountered

The CIA was operating a covert mission in the U.S. consulate in Libya when it came under attack by al Qaeda-linked militants on September 11, intelligent chiefs have admitted.

Four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, were killed in the six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission in the Libyan city, for which al-Qaeda and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia have been blamed.

The CIA made the revelation as it laid bare the heroic rescue by a handful of its agents in which they fought off wave after wave of mortar and rocket attacks with just their handguns as they sought to infiltrate the compound and shepherd its American staff to safety.

A timeline, released by the agency, has blown open the dramatic sequence of events, revealing for the first time that of the 30 American officials evacuated from the country following the deadly attack, just seven worked for the State Department.

Burning issue: Mr Stevens and three other Americans were killed in a six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission in Benghazi on September 11, for which Al Qaeda in North Africa and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia were implicated

The rest were part of a crack team of intelligence and security experts on a secret mission aimed at counterterrorism and securing heavy weapons held by the embattled regime.

They had been operating out of a building known as ‘the annex’, around a mile away from the consulate in central Benghazi.

Intelligence officials told how when the annex received a call about the assault, about a half dozen members of a CIA security team tried to get heavy weapons and other assistance from the Libyans.

But with time running out, the team went ahead with the rescue attempt armed only with their standard-issue small arms.

Killed: Ambassador Christopher Stevens (left) died of smoke inhalation, while agent Sean Smith (right) died in a desperate battle with insurgents

Heroic: Former Navy SEALs Glen Doherty (left) and Tyrone Woods (right) were killed in a mortar attack

A fierce firefight ensued and the team managed to get into the consulate and shepherd its occupants back to the annex under constant attack from machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades.

‘The security officers in particular were genuine heroes,’ an official said. ‘They quickly tried to rally additional local support and heavier weapons, and when that could not be accomplished within minutes, they still moved in and put their own lives on the line to save their comrades.

‘At every level in the chain of command, from the senior officers in Libya to the most senior officials in Washington, everyone was fully engaged in trying to provide whatever help they could.’

The CIA revelations come after Barack Obama’s administration came under sharp attack over its handling of the incident amid claims Washington told officers on the ground to ‘stand down’ before the rescue took place.

Heroic: CIA agents engaged in a fierce firefight with heavily-armed insurgents at the consulate before shepherding its occupants to safety under constant attack from machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades

‘There was no second-guessing those decisions being made on the ground, by people at every U.S. organization that could play a role in assisting those in danger,’ the official added. ‘There were no orders to anybody to stand down in providing support.’

In the first days after the attack, various administration officials linked the Benghazi incident to the simultaneous protests around the Muslim world over an American-made film that ridiculed Islam’s Prophet Muhammad.

Only later did they publicly attribute it to militants, possibly linked to al-Qaeda, and acknowledged it was distinct from the film protests.

The changing explanations have led to suspicions that the administration didn’t want to acknowledge a terror attack on U.S. personnel so close to the Nov. 6 election, a charge Obama has strongly denied.

Inferno: Armed attackers dumped cans of diesel fuel and set ablaze the consulate’s exterior

Siege: The compound came under heavy mortar and gunfire during the attack, which lasted several hours

According to the timeline, around 9:40 p.m. Benghazi time, officials at the CIA’s relatively fortified and well-defended base in Benghazi got a call from State Department officials at the U.S. diplomatic mission about a mile away that the less-fortified public mission complex had come under attack from a group of militants.

Other official sources said that the initial wave of attacks on the diplomatic mission involved setting fires using diesel fuel.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS: HOW THE RESCUE OPERATION UNFOLDED

9.40pm – CIA officials in ‘The Annex’ get a distress call from the consulate saying they are under attack.

10.05pm – Armed only with handguns, team of about six CIA security officers leave their base for the public diplomatic mission compound.

10.30pm – With bullets whistling overhead, the CIA team move into the compound after unsuccessfully trying to get heavy weapons and help from local Libyan allies.

11.10pm – A Defense Department drone, which had been on an unrelated mission some distance away, arrived in Benghazi to help officials on the ground gather information.

11.30pm – U.S. personnel who had been working or staying at the mission all accounted for, except for Ambassador Stevens.

11.40pm – Driving back to the secure base, the evacuees come under further fire.

12am – The installation itself comes under fire from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

12am – A CIA security team based in Tripoli, which included two U.S. military officers, lands at Benghazi airport and begins plotting how to locate the missing ambassador.

1am – The patchy attacks on the base begin to die down after 90 minutes of fierce fighting.

4am – The reinforcements from Tripoli take a convoy of vehicles to the CIA base to prepare for evacuation.

4.30am – a fresh round of mortar attacks is launched on the base, killing two U.S. security officers.

5.30 – A heavily armed Libyan military unit arrive at the CIA base to help evacuate the compound of U.S. personnel to the Benghazi airport.

From 6am – Roughly 30 Americans, as well as the bodies of Stevens and the other three Americans killed during the attacks, were loaded on planes and flown out of the city, several U.S. officials said.

The dense smoke created by the fuel both made it hard for people at the compound to breathe and to organise a response to the attack.

About 25 minutes after the initial report came into the CIA base, a team of about six agency security officers left their base for the public diplomatic mission compound.

Over the succeeding 25 minutes, the CIA team approached the compound, and tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to get local Libyan allies to bring them a supply of heavier weapons, and eventually moved into the burning diplomatic compound, the intelligence official said.

At around 11:10 p.m., a Defense Department drone, which had been on an unrelated mission some distance away, arrived in Benghazi to help officials on the ground gather information.

By 11:30, U.S. personnel who had been working or staying at the mission had been rounded up except for Ambassador Stevens, who was missing, the intelligence official said.

When they tried to drive out of the diplomatic compound to return to the CIA base, however, the convoy carrying U.S. evacuees came under fire.

Once they got back to the CIA base, that installation itself came under fire from what the intelligence official described as small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

These patchy attacks went on for roughly 90 minutes, the intelligence official said.

Around the same time, a CIA security team based in Tripoli, which included two U.S. military officers, landed at Benghazi airport. Upon its arrival, however, the team spent some time trying both to arrange local transport and to locate the missing Ambassador Stevens.

After some time trying to solve these problems, the security team that had flown in from Tripoli eventually arranged for an armed local escort and extra transportation, but decided not to go the hospital where they believed Stevens had been taken.

In part this was because they had reason to believe Stevens was likely dead, and because security at the hospital was believed, at best, to be ‘uncertain,’ the intelligence official said.

…

By Matt Blake

PUBLISHED: 12:11 GMT, 2 November 2012 | UPDATED: 17:16 GMT, 2 November 2012

Find this story at 2 November 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
© Associated Newspapers Ltd

BEIJING—Cruising around Beijing in a silver Jaguar with “007” in the license plate, Neil Heywood seemed to relish the air of intrigue that surrounded him.

In meetings, the British consultant hinted about his connections to Bo Xilai—the onetime Communist Party highflier—but often he would refuse to hand over a business card. He spoke Mandarin, smoked heavily and worked part time for a dealer of Aston Martin cars, the British brand driven by James Bond. Some thought him a fantasist, others a fraud.

But his contrived aura of mystery appears to have been a double bluff: He had been knowingly providing information about the Bo family to Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, known as MI6, for more than a year when he was murdered in China last November, an investigation by The Wall Street Journal has found.

The revelation is a new twist in the saga of Mr. Bo, whose wife was convicted in August of poisoning Mr. Heywood in his hotel room in the southwestern city of Chongqing, where Mr. Bo was then party chief. The downfall of one of the party’s most powerful families threw into turmoil China’s plans for a once-a-decade leadership transition, due to start at the 18th Party Congress opening Thursday, and raised questions about corruption, abuse of power and bitter personal rivalries within China’s political elite.

The Journal investigation, based on interviews with current and former British officials and close friends of the murdered Briton, found that a person Mr. Heywood met in 2009 later acknowledged being an MI6 officer to him. Mr. Heywood subsequently met that person regularly in China and continued to provide information on Mr. Bo’s private affairs.

China regards the private lives of its leaders as state secrets, and information about them and their families is prized by foreign governments trying to understand the inner workings of an opaque political system.
China’s Leadership Change

See an interactive guide to China’s 18th Communist Party Congress, read more about the outgoing leaders and some candidates for promotion.

View Interactive

The Chongqing Drama

See key dates in the death of Neil Heywood in Chongqing and the drama surrounding Bo Xilai.

View Interactive

Players in China’s Leadership Purge

Read more about the players in the case.

View Interactive

More photos and interactive graphics

British authorities have sought to quell speculation that Mr. Heywood was a spy ever since the Journal reported in March that he had been working occasionally in China for a London-based business-intelligence company founded by a former MI6 officer and staffed by many former spies.

William Hague, the British foreign secretary who oversees MI6, broke with standard policy of not commenting on intelligence matters and issued a statement in April saying Mr. Heywood, who was 41 when he died, was “not an employee of the British government in any capacity.”

That was technically true, according to people familiar with the matter. They said Mr. Heywood wasn’t an MI6 officer, wasn’t paid and was “never in receipt of tasking”—meaning he never was given a specific mission to carry out or asked to seek a particular piece of information.
The Fall of Bo Xilai

Earlier coverage from The Wall Street Journal:
Crash Puts New Focus on China Leaders
Amid China Scandal, Spy Game Unraveled
In Elite China Circle, Briton Feared for His Life
U.K. Seeks Probe Into China Death
China in Transition: Full Coverage

But he was a willful and knowing informant, and his MI6 contact once described him as “useful” to a former colleague. “A little goes a long way,” the former colleague recalls the contact saying in relation to intelligence reports based on Mr. Heywood’s information.

Mr. Heywood’s intelligence links cast new light on the response to his death from British authorities, who initially accepted the local police’s conclusion that he died from “excessive alcohol consumption” and didn’t try to prevent his body from being quickly cremated without an autopsy. The British government didn’t ask China for an investigation until Feb. 15—a week after a former Chongqing police chief, Wang Lijun, fled to a U.S. consulate in China and told U.S. diplomats that Mr. Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, had murdered the Briton.

There could be implications, too, for Chinese authorities, who would be guilty of a major security breach if they were unaware that MI6 had a source inside the inner family circle of a member of the Politburo—the party’s top 25 leaders—according to people familiar with the matter. If China’s security services were aware of Mr. Heywood’s contacts with MI6, they likely had him under surveillance during his final visit to Chongqing, those people said.

Until the scandal broke, Mr. Bo was a front-runner for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee—the party’s top decision-making body—in this year’s leadership change.

Mr. Bo, sacked from the Politburo in April, is now facing criminal charges after Chinese authorities accused him in September of a series of offenses, including bribe-taking and interference in the murder investigation into his wife.

Neither Chinese nor British officials have suggested Mr. Heywood was killed because of his MI6 links. A Chinese court found Ms. Gu guilty in August of killing him because she thought he threatened her son over a business dispute, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Enlarge Image

Zuma Press

Gu Kailai, wife of disgraced Chinese politician Bo Xilai, on trial in August for Mr. Heywood’s murder.

However, friends of Mr. Heywood and prominent Chinese figures have pointed out omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the official account of his killing presented by state media.

And when Mr. Wang fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu on Feb. 6, he told U.S. diplomats there that Ms. Gu had confessed to him that she “killed a spy,” according to one person who has seen a transcript of what Mr. Wang said.

A spokesman for Britain’s Foreign Office declined to comment on what was said in the U.S. consulate, and, when asked about Mr. Heywood’s relationship with MI6, referred back to Mr. Hague’s statement in April.

Asked whether Mr. Heywood had been knowingly passing information to an MI6 officer, without being a government employee, the spokesman said: “We do not comment on intelligence matters or allegations of intelligence matters.” Mr. Heywood’s MI6 contact declined to comment.

Former intelligence officials say most informants and agents in the field aren’t considered employees because they rarely have a contract and aren’t necessarily paid, but people are usually registered as “knowing” sources and assigned a code name if they are providing information to someone who has acknowledged being an MI6 officer.

Mr. Heywood’s Chinese wife, Lulu, declined to comment. His mother and sister didn’t respond to requests for comment through an intermediary. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Heywood was a potentially risky choice as an informant, not least because of the 007 license plate on his Jaguar. He was, on the other hand, an old-fashioned patriot with a taste for adventure. He was in the rare position of having regular contact with the family of a Politburo member as well as intimate knowledge of their private affairs, according to several of his closest friends. Ms. Gu was godmother to his daughter, Olivia, according to one close friend.

He got to know the family in the 1990s while living in the northeastern city of Dalian, where Mr. Bo was mayor at the time, according to several of his friends, and had become part of an “inner circle” of friends and advisers.

Mr. Heywood kept a low profile in the expatriate community, according to people who knew him, using his connections in China to build a modest freelance consultancy business advising companies and individuals on how to navigate Chinese politics and bureaucracy.

He had dealings with several British companies and politicians, including at least two members of Britain’s House of Lords—the upper house of Parliament. One of those peers met Mr. Heywood several times in the company of his MI6 contact, according to people familiar with the matter.

In the last two years of his life, Mr. Heywood’s relationship with the Bo family deteriorated, especially after Ms. Gu became convinced she had been betrayed by a member of her “inner circle” and demanded that Mr. Heywood divorce his wife and swear an oath of allegiance to Ms. Gu, according to friends of Mr. Heywood.

Mr. Heywood informed his contact of this, according to people familiar with the matter. The contact warned him at one point that he should be careful not to become “a headline,” but continued meeting him and filing confidential reports on those meetings, according to those people.

Mr. Heywood hadn’t seen Mr. Bo for more than a year when he died and had been making plans to leave China, but he appeared to be trying to persuade the Bo family to pay him money he felt he was owed, according to close friends. They said he seemed stressed and increasingly concerned that his emails and phone calls were being monitored. He also had put on weight and begun to smoke more heavily.

“He definitely felt that he should have got more out of the relationship” with the Bo family, said one close friend. “That may explain why he agreed to go to Chongqing that last time. I think he was still hoping to get what he thought he was owed.”

Mr. Heywood flew to Chongqing on Nov. 13 after being summoned at short notice to a meeting with the Bo family, according to Xinhua. He believed he was “in trouble,” according to one friend he contacted that day.

He was murdered that night in his hotel room. According to an official account of Ms. Gu’s trial from Xinhua, she poured potassium cyanide in his mouth after he vomited from drunkenness and asked for a drink of water.

The Foreign Office said that no British officials, including MI6 officers, were in contact with him in the 48 hours before his death, but declined to comment on when and how it became aware of his relationship with the Bo family and that he had been summoned to Chongqing to meet them.

Mr. Heywood’s body was found on Nov. 15, and the British consulate was informed by local authorities the next day, according to a statement by Mr. Hague to Parliament.

Enlarge Image

Reuters

Mr. Heywood’s body was found last Nov. 15 at the Nanshan Lijing Holiday Hotel, and Ms. Gu was subsequently convicted of fatally poisoning him.

Chongqing authorities initially told Mr. Heywood’s wife, who had traveled to Chongqing, that he had died of a heart attack, while informing the consulate that he died of “excessive alcohol consumption,” according to British officials. They said the body was cremated on Nov. 18 without an autopsy, but with the permission of Mr. Heywood’s wife.

British consular officials formally expressed to their superiors their concern and suspicion about how Chinese authorities handled Mr. Heywood’s death, but other British officials believed that asking for an investigation would be problematic, according to people with knowledge of the events.

The British officials who initially handled Mr. Heywood’s death are unlikely to have known about his MI6 links or his connection to the Bo family, these people said, but intelligence officials in Beijing and London would have been aware at the time of his death, or made aware soon after.

Britain’s Foreign Office says it had no reason to suspect foul play until members of the British community began raising suspicions on Jan. 18. But the Foreign Office didn’t raise the matter with Chinese authorities until almost a month later—after Mr. Wang’s flight to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu.

U.S. officials informed British authorities about Mr. Wang’s allegations while he was still in the consulate on Feb. 7, according to the Foreign Office. It also told the Journal that a British diplomat was sent to Chengdu to try to meet Mr. Wang, but arrived after he had left the consulate.

Mr. Hague has said that the British Embassy first asked the Chinese central government to investigate Mr. Heywood’s death on Feb. 15. But British authorities didn’t make that public until more than a month later—a delay that confused some U.S. officials following the matter.

Enlarge Image

Getty Images

Two British diplomats outside the Hefei Intermediate People’s Court in Anhui, China, where Gu Kailai was tried for Mr. Heywood’s murder.

“We couldn’t understand what the British were waiting for,” said one U.S. official who was unaware of any links between Mr. Heywood and MI6.

…

Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com

Updated November 6, 2012, 4:47 a.m. ET

Find this story at 6 November 2011

Copyright ©2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved

An investigation by The Wall Street Journal has concluded that Neil Heywood, the British businessman who was murdered in China last November, was an active informant for British intelligence at the time of his death. The news appears to confirm intelNews’ assessment of April 2012 that Heywood was in fact connected with British intelligence. A highly successful financial consultant and fluent Chinese speaker who had lived in China for over a decade, Heywood was found dead on November 14, 2011, in his room at the Nanshan Lijing Holiday Hotel in Chongqing. His death led to the dramatic downfall of Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai, a husband-and-wife team of political celebrities who were found guilty in a Chinese court of killing the British businessman. Immediately after Heywood’s death, there was widespread speculation that he may have been a spy for MI6, Britain’s external intelligence service. On April 27, 2012, I argued that I was not aware of anyone “with serious knowledge of intelligence issues who was not completely certain, or did not deeply suspect, that Heywood had indeed collaborated with British intelligence at some stage during the past decade”. I wrote this in the face of an official denial by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, who had said earlier in the week that “Heywood was not an employee of the British government in any capacity”. Now an extensive investigation by The Wall Street Journal has concluded that the dead British businessman had been an MI6 operative “for more than a year” prior to his death. The paper said it concluded that based on several interviews with unnamed “current and former British officials” as well as with close friends of the murdered man. One source told The Journal that Heywood had been willingly and consciously recruited by an MI6 officer, who met with him on a regular basis in China. Heywood allegedly provided the MI6 officer with inside information on Xilai and other senior Chinese government officials. The article quotes an unnamed British official as saying that Heywood’s MI6 handler once described him as “useful” to a former colleague. According to the paper, Heywood’s MI6 work does not technically contradict the British Foreign secretary’s statement that the late businessman had not been “an employee of the British government”.

…

November 7, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis 8 Comments

By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |

Find this story at 7 November 2012