Bij het toezichtsrapport inzake de rubricering van staatsgeheimen door de AIVD
Bij de uitoefening van zijn taken heeft de Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) in belangrijke mate te maken met staatsgeheime informatie. Staatsgeheime informatie raakt het belang van de Staat of van diens bondgenoten. Voorkomen moet worden dat staatsgeheime informatie ter kennis komt van personen die niet tot kennisneming daarvan gerechtigd zijn. Staatsgeheime informatie moet op een voorgeschreven wijze als zodanig worden aangemerkt. Het aanmerken van informatie als staatsgeheime informatie is het rubriceren. De Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (hierna: de Commissie) heeft een onderzoek verricht naar de vraag of de AIVD de rubricering van staatsgeheimen juist toepast. lees meer
Wordt dan donateur. Ook voor 2013 weer veel plannen. Natuurlijk een serie nieuwsbrieven met eigen onderzoek, maar ook enkele websites. Een archief website over de inlichtingendiensten, Crowd Digging, de Nederlandse cables, waarbij de informatie achter de Wikileaks documenten boven tafel wordt gehaald, onderzoek naar Mark Kennedy (engelse infiltrant in de milieubeweging), veilig internetten website, misschien nu eindelijk een magazine over preventief fouilleren, en eindelijk een nieuw boek project. Daarnaast zijn wij vraagbaak en proberen mensen te ondersteunen. Al die plannen en het werk kosten ook geld. Vandaar dat Jansen & Janssen 50 nieuwe donateurs zoekt die maandelijks met 10 euro ons werk ondersteunen. Wordt donateur of vraag familie, vrienden en bekenden donateur te worden. ING 603904 ten name van Stichting Res Publica, Postbus 11556, 1001 GN Amsterdam. Res Publica is de stichting van Jansen & Janssen (IBAN: NL56 INGB 0000 6039 04, BIC: INGBNL2A).
Buro Jansen & Janssen is aangemerkt als ANBI (Algemeen Nut Beogende Instellingen) instelling. Dit betekent voor mensen die ons willen steunen het volgende:
– Als een instelling door de Belastingdienst is aangewezen als een ANBI, kan een donateur giften van de inkomsten- of vennootschapsbelasting aftrekken (uiteraard binnen de daarvoor geldende regels).
Voor Buro Jansen & Janssen betekent dit:
– Een ANBI hoeft geen successierecht of schenkingsrecht te betalen over erfenissen en schenkingen die de ANBI ontvangt in het kader van het algemeen belang.
– Uitkeringen die een ANBI doet in het algemene belang zijn vrijgesteld voor het recht van schenking.
Op 3 juni 2011 kondigde De Telegraaf de onthulling van een informant in extreem-linkse kringen aan. Met op de achtergrond de zee is in een korte video te zien hoe John van den Heuvel een man interviewt die zegt dat hij 25 jaar voor de inlichtingendienst heeft gewerkt. Dezelfde dag is de naam van de persoon in de video bekend: Paul IJsbrand Kraaijer. Vervolgens verschijnen er twee artikelen over het leven van Paul Kraaijer op 4 en 6 juni 2011.
In de weken die volgen gaat de discussie in de media en op internet vooral over de dubbelrol die Kraaijer al die jaren zou hebben gespeeld: journalist en informant. Er ontstaat ophef over zijn informantenrol en in Suriname, waar Paul thans woont, wordt hij door de journalistenvakbond en zijn werkgever aan de kant gezet. Vervolgens probeert Kraaijer nog zijn verhaal in boekvorm uit te brengen, maar als uitgevers geen interesse tonen, zet hij het op het internet. ‘Het dubbelleven van een AIVD-infiltrant/informant’ is in wezen een uitgebreide versie van de artikelen in De Telegraaf, veel nieuwe feiten staan er niet in.
Hier volgt een korte schets van het onderzoek en de conclusies. Het volledige onderzoek is als pdf te downloaden of de website van Jansen & Janssen te lezen.
Bob Rae: Interim Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Former Premier of Ontario
OTTAWA – The RCMP spied on Bob Rae during his student activist days and likely amassed a personal dossier on the future Liberal leader, newly declassified documents reveal.
Mountie security agents, wary of late-1960s campus turmoil, kept a close eye on the University of Toronto student council — apparently relying on a secret informant to glean information about Rae and other council members.
The RCMP Security Service conducted widespread surveillance of universities, unions, peace groups and myriad other organizations during the Cold War in an effort to identify left-wing subversives.
A surprised Rae says he had no idea the RCMP was watching him.
“The notion that any of this posed a kind of a threat to the established order certainly would have come as news to all of us,” he said in an interview.
“The only thing sinister, frankly, in all of this is how much of it was being recorded and reported and presumably being put in a file somewhere.”
Hundreds of pages of RCMP files on the Students’ Administrative Council at the University of Toronto were released to The Canadian Press by Library and Archives Canada.
The RCMP’s intelligence branch was disbanded in 1984 following a series of scandals, and a new civilian agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, took over most domestic spying duties.
In 1968-69, Rae was a member of the student council led by Steven Langdon who, like Rae, would later serve as a New Democrat MP. The two were seen as moderates on a council that included more extreme representatives on both the left and right of the political spectrum.
Rae also helped put together large conferences, known as teach-ins — one on China and a followup on religion and politics for which Michael Ignatieff, another Liberal leader in the making, served as a principal organizer.
“It was an exciting time,” Rae recalled. “We did manage to reform the governance of the University of Toronto. There was a lot of activism and discussion about ideas and about politics.
“That’s what you do in university. The idea that there’s a cop at the back of the room who’s writing everything down — I guess that was also a reality of the time.”
Rae became interim Liberal leader following Ignatieff’s resignation from the post last year. As the party prepares for a biennial conference in Ottawa this weekend, there is renewed speculation that Rae is eyeing a run at the permanent leadership next year.
As a budding student politician, Rae was seized with issues including the university’s plans for increasing graduate program enrolment and renovations to campus residences.
A secret and heavily redacted memo prepared by an RCMP sergeant on Nov. 4, 1968 — likely based on details from an informant — notes seven individuals including Rae were planning to meet to discuss student business.
A space after Rae’s name is blacked out — almost certainly cloaking the number of the personal file the RCMP would have opened on him, said Steve Hewitt, author of Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997.
“So they’re obviously interested in monitoring student politicians — who are the ones they need to keep a longer-term watch on, who are the real radicals?” said Hewitt.
For privacy reasons, the public is allowed access to RCMP files on individuals only 20 years after the person’s death. While a number of files of historical value — including a large one on former NDP leader Tommy Douglas — were transferred to Library and Archives, many were destroyed.
Hewitt believes the RCMP file on Rae would have been preserved for posterity given that he was a young member of Parliament in the early 1980s before going on to become the first NDP premier of Ontario.
In an odd twist, Rae would later serve on the Security Intelligence Review Committee — the federally appointed watchdog that keeps an eye on CSIS — before re-entering politics as a Liberal. At the review committee he directly wrestled with the tension between the legitimate right to protest and security officials’ fears of extremist activity.
…
The Canadian Press
Published Thursday, Jan. 12, 2012 7:09AM EST
Find this story at 12 January 2012
© 2012 All rights reserved.
A Canadian naval intelligence officer has pleaded guilty to spying for Russia, a public admission of an embarrassing espionage scandal that has damaged Canada’s reputation among allies and will likely reverberate for years.
In a Halifax court Wednesday, Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle, 41, pleaded guilty to two charges under the Security of Information Act of “communicating with a foreign entity,” and a Criminal Code offence of breach of trust.
His admission lifts a publication ban placed on details of the Crown’s case against SLt. Delisle. A prosecutor at bail hearings in the spring said Russia was the beneficiary of SLt. Delisle’s four-and-a-half years of espionage, and cited intelligence sources who feared it could push Canada’s relations with allied intelligence organizations “back to the Stone Age.”
The sailor, whose last post was the ultra-secure Trinity naval intelligence gathering centre in Halifax, had access to top military secrets – databases with protected information from Canada and the country’s allies through intelligence-sharing systems such as the “Five Eyes” network linking Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain and the United States.
SLt. Delisle, the court was told, searched military databases for the term “Russia,” smuggled the details out of his office using a USB memory stick – and handed the fruits of his labours over to agents for Moscow every 30 days.
The information was mostly military but also contained reports on organized crime, political players and senior defence officials. It included e-mails, phone numbers and a contact list for members of the intelligence community.
The naval officer has been held in custody at the Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility in Halifax since his arrest in January and will not be sentenced until early next year.
SLt. Delisle could be looking at a long stay behind bars but not life imprisonment, his lawyer suggested.
The Crown, meanwhile, will be scouring the world for case law to convince a judge that the sailor must remain imprisoned as there are no precedents in law. This is the first time anyone in Canada will be sentenced under the Security of Information Act, which was created more than a decade ago in response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
SLt. Delisle was a rare catch for the Russian government: a spy who walked in from the cold.
It was back in mid-2007 that the Canadian Forces member first embarked on his traitorous side career. He strode into the Russian embassy in Ottawa, volunteering to sell out his country. He would earn about $3,000 a month for this service.
“I said I wanted to talk to a security officer, which are usually GRU,” SLt. Delise said of Russian military intelligence, in a statement read by a Crown prosecutor this spring. “I showed my ID card. They took me into an [office] … asked me a bunch of questions, took my name and off I go.”
It would be the only time SLt. Delisle would meet personally with a Russian handler on Canadian soil.
SLt. Delisle had an escape plan in place – one he never got a chance to use, the court heard. If he needed to seek refuge or re-establish contact with the Russians, he was told he could walk into a Russian embassy – preferably not the one in Ottawa – and inform them he was “Alex Campbell.”
The Russians would then ask him “Did I meet you at a junk show in Austria?” And he was supposed to reply: “No, it was in Ottawa.”
The “day I flipped sides,” as SLt. Delisle described it to his Canadian police interrogators, came as his marriage of nearly a decade was unravelling.
The naval officer told authorities he didn’t do it for money but rather for “ideological reasons” – and was acutely aware his life as he knew it was now over.
“That was the end of my days as Jeff Delisle,” the sailor said, according to the Crown prosecutor. “It was professional suicide.”
The Canadian sailor was paid by wire transfer for the first four years. At first he was paid $5,000 but this quickly dropped to about $2,800 a month and then finally $3,000 every 30 days. This continued until about five months before he was caught, when the Russians changed how they paid him.
The Russians had devised a simple method for SLt. Delisle to hand over information. He and his Russian handler shared a single e-mail account on Gawab.com, a Middle Eastern provider.
The Canadian spy would log in and compose an e-mail. He’d copy and paste the stolen information into the body of the e-mail. But instead of sending the message he would save it in the draft e-mail folder and log out.
The Russians would subsequently log in to the Gawab account, retrieve the information and then write him a draft e-mail in reply – one that was saved but never sent.
In the months before they arrested SLt. Delisle, Canadian authorities managed to break into the Gawab account and trick the sailor into leaving purloined secrets for them.
He also felt pressured to comply with the Russians, who made not too subtle threats.
“They had photos of me. They had photos of my children. I knew exactly what it was for,” the Crown said SLt. Delisle told them.
The Canadian spy’s relationship with Moscow began to change in late summer of 2011. It started with a trip to Brazil to meet a Russian handler named “Victor.”
The Crown’s narrative has gaps in it but it appeared that either the sailor or the Russians believed his ability to gather intelligence might be curtailed.
Moscow proposed that the Canadian Forces member’s role change – that he become what they called “the pigeon” – the liaison between all agents in Canada working for Russia’s military intelligence unit.
…
STEVEN CHASE and JANE TABER
OTTAWA and HALIFAX — The Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 8:52 PM EDT
Last updated Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 10:50 PM EDT
Find this story at 10 October 2012
© Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.
American intelligence officials supplied vital information in the early days of the investigation that climaxed with the arrest of an accused spy inside Canada’s top-secret naval signals centre, sources say.
The involvement of the United States in building the case against Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle adds a key new detail to a story that Ottawa is anxious to keep under wraps.
The Canadian government has been tight-lipped on how it learned that there was a leak of confidential secrets to a foreign power – and the way it went about building a case against the sub-lieutenant.
Canadian officials have privately identified Russia as the recipient of secrets, and the Russian ambassador to this country said last February that Moscow has an agreement with the Canadian government to “keep quiet” about any connection between his nation and the spy case.
SLt. Delisle is in custody after being charged in January with passing state secrets to a foreign country. The sailor, who last worked at Trinity, a Halifax naval intelligence hub, faces the possibility of life in prison if convicted.
SLt. Delisle, 41, has not yet entered a plea; his next court appearance is in June.
The Globe and Mail reported in March that the fallout from the Delisle case has done significant damage to Ottawa’s treasured intelligence-sharing relationships with key allies such as the U.S. It’s also embarrassed the Department of National Defence, which is now looking to restore confidence in its ability to keep secrets.
A source familiar with the matter said Canada helped build its investigation of SLt. Delisle through contact with its biggest ally: “It’s not just one nugget of information that I would describe as a tipoff. [Rather]It’s an accumulation of information that leads to an investigation coming to a point where, okay, we have enough to go after this person.”
The extent of what the U.S told Canada is still unclear. “Sometimes we’re able to match – or in some cases co-ordinate – some of that intelligence and paint the picture that we need to make decisions,” the source said.
The source said Canada and the U.S. have a privileged relationship in sharing this type of information through security forces including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
…
STEVEN CHASE
OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, May. 23 2012, 4:00 AM EDT
Last updated Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 10:48 AM EDT
Find this story at 23 May 2012
© Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.
OTTAWA—The Harper government had a host of military and possibly commercial reasons for not blaming and shaming Russia in the aftermath of an embarrassing spy scandal involving a junior intelligence officer, a series of internal briefings suggest.
The case of Sub-Lt. Jeffery Delisle, which exploded across the front pages in January, has largely disappeared into a black hole of secrecy and court-ordered silence that even a Wall Street Journal story failed to dislodge last spring.
The New York-based publication recently quoted U.S. intelligence sources saying Delisle’s breach in communications secrets was roughly as big in volume as the notorious U.S. data loss to WikiLeaks.
Yet, the Harper government has remained mute, even in the face of suggestions the case caused a major rift with Washington.
Several sources within the government and the military say there was a vigorous debate within the halls of power about whether to call out the former Cold War adversary over Delisle, whose case has been adjourned until June 13 while his lawyer awaits security-washed documents.
A small cadre of cabinet ministers, notably Defence Minister Peter MacKay, argued for a measured, nuanced response to the crisis, which continues to have the potential to cause serious strains among allies, said the sources.
The Conservatives have previously shown no hesitation to paint Moscow as a bogey man, especially when it comes to justifying their military build-up in the Arctic.
But to alienate Russia over the alleged betrayal by a navy sub-lieutenant, potentially setting off tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions, had more downsides than upsides, sources and briefing documents suggest.
The rivalry over Arctic boundaries, which is expected to come to a head next year with a United Nations submission, is being driven by the suggestion of mineral wealth under the melting polar sea.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and National Defence have repeatedly pointed out, in internal briefing reports, that Russian interest in the Arctic is weighted towards oil and gas exploration — something that Canada can appreciate and possibly exploit.
“Indeed, these commonalities could yield political and commercial opportunities for co-operation between Moscow and Ottawa,” said a July 12, 2011 briefing note prepared for MacKay.
“From a defence perspective, in spite of disagreements over Russian (Long Range Aviation) flights, there is mutual interest with regard to co-operation in (search-and-rescue) and Arctic domain awareness. Defence is continuing to explore the potential for further co-operation with Russia in these fields.”
The note was written as security services investigated Delisle’s alleged treachery.
Among the more sensitive areas of mutual co-operation is an international counter-terrorism exercise known as Vigilant Eagle.
The manoeuvres, which began in 2008, see NORAD and the Russian air force practise how to handle a hijacked airliner in international airspace. Tension over Russia’s intervention in Georgia cancelled the 2009 event, but at the time of Delisle’s arrest plans were already well advanced for Canada’s participation in the 2012 edition.
Russian co-operation in the Arctic and elsewhere was paramount to Canada’s interests, as well as Moscow’s ability to influence events in potential global flashpoints such as Iran and North Korea, MacKay reportedly argued with his colleagues.
The government’s initial reaction was to go public with the allegations, but sources said cooler heads pointed out that such a reaction would complicate relations with the erstwhile ally, which has been engaged in increasingly aggressive spy operations.
Defence and intelligence experts have said there is growing exasperation with Russia.
“As you know, about a year ago, a British minister complained publicly about Russian espionage, the scale of it and the intensity of it and the aggressiveness,” said Wesley Wark, an expert at the University of Ottawa. “He asked the question: What are you doing? And warned them to scale it back because you’re causing us problems in terms of us pursuing other legitimate targets.”
…
Published on Monday May 21, 2012
Murray Brewster
The Canadian Press
Find this story at 21 May 2012
© Copyright Toronto Star 1996-2012
Canadian government officials have refused to confirm or deny media reports that Ottawa expelled several Russian diplomats recently in connection with an alleged espionage affair. The alleged expulsions are reportedly connected with the case of Royal Canadian Navy Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle. Earlier this week, Delisle became the first person to be charged under Canada’s post-9/11 Security of Information Act, for allegedly passing protected government information to an unspecified foreign body. According to media reports, Delisle, who had top-level security clearance, worked at Canada’s ultra-secure TRINITY communications center in Halifax. Canadian authorities have refused to reveal the country for which Delisle allegedly spied. But late last night, CTV revealed that the names of two Russian diplomats and two technicians stationed at the embassy of the Russian Federation in Ottawa had been quietly dropped from the list of recognized diplomatic officials in Canada. The list, which is approved periodically by the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, contains the names of all foreign diplomats legally permitted to operate in Canada. One of the missing names, that of Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry V. Fedorchatenko, bears the title of the embassy’s Assistant Defense Attaché. Russian consular officials in Canada rejected speculation that the missing diplomats were expelled by the Canadian government in connection with the Delisle affair. It appears that Canadian counterintelligence investigators had been monitoring Jeff Delisle for quite some time, perhaps even before 2010. If Delisle acted —as he is reported to have done— as an unregistered foreign agent of Russia, it is certainly not surprising that he was a naval officer. He was probably selected by the Russians because he was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy. Ever since Canada joined NATO, in the late 1940s, its tactical contribution to the Organization has been mostly naval. Along with Norway and Iceland, Canada has acted as NATO’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the north Atlantic Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has been particularly critical when it comes to the maneuvers of Russian submarines —whether conventional or nuclear— in the northern seas. Delisle’s precise intelligence duties are not clear at this moment, and may never be publicly revealed; but if he had any access at all to ACOUSTINT (Acoustical Intelligence) data on Russian vessels, or other maritime intelligence collected by Canadian naval forces, he would have been especially useful to the GRU (Russian military intelligence). Meanwhile, Washington has remained silent on the subject.
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January 20, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis Leave a comment
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
Robert Baer is a former CIA case officer and the author of several books on the Middle East.
In the new James Bond thriller, “Skyfall,” the villain is a cyberterrorist named Raoul Silva, a disgruntled former British agent who’s trying to crash the digital universe. It’s a nice touch, creating a very real, very terrifying scenario that “could paralyze the nation,” as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned just last month.
And that is about the only aspect of the movie that is likely to be accurate.
Don’t get me wrong — I’m a fan of the Bond movies. I go to see them for the same reasons everyone else does: the gorgeous women, the most beautiful places on Earth and, of course, the roller-coaster ride of a plot. I delight in Bond’s complete defiance of gravity. His suits never wrinkle, his Aston Martin is never in the garage for repairs, the girls never say no.
But as a former spy, what I like most about the Bond movies is the way good always triumphs over evil. His cases end neatly, with the villain dispatched and the world safe for the good guys.
Real-life espionage is a lot less sexy — and a lot messier.
Sometimes, age-old wisdom notwithstanding, the enemy of our enemy turns out not to be our friend. Once, in the mid-1980s, I was handed the portfolio for Libya’s opposition leaders, many of whom were operating out of Khartoum, Sudan. At first, I had only a hazy idea of who Moammar Gaddafi’s opponents were. All I knew for sure was that the Reagan administration wanted Gaddafi to go.
Late one night, I woke up to the sound of the butts of assault rifles pounding my door. Two of my Libyan contacts were on the run from Gaddafi’s assassins and expected me to protect them. We talked most of the night — about Libya, history and Allah. By the time they could safely leave, I had come to understand that the people we’d picked to replace Gaddafi were militant Salafists determined to turn Libya into an Islamic republic. They didn’t succeed then, but you could argue that the people who attacked our diplomatic outpost in Benghazi in September were their linear descendents.
While occasionally I found myself in a Bond-like setting during my spying career, the story inevitably unfolded with a lot less panache.
One time, in pursuit of an elusive informant, the agency sent me to Monaco to troll the Casino de Monte-Carlo. The problems started before I even got on the plane. The CIA scoffed at the idea of buying me a tuxedo, and the dragon lady who did our accounting refused to give me a cent to put on the roulette table. Not surprisingly, as soon as I walked into the casino in my penny loafers, the security goons spotted me as an impostor and pulled me over for a polite interrogation. I never found our would-be informant, but I did come away with the certainty that I wasn’t James Bond.
Anyone who’s passed through Langley will tell you that a spy’s life is one of tedious endurance. It’s long hours of cubicle living, going through the same files everyone else in the office has gone through, hoping to catch a missed lead. Or it’s waiting by the phone hoping that the third secretary from the Ecuadorian Embassy will call you back. Or keeping your fingers crossed that your next three-year assignment isn’t in Chad. As CIA-operative-turned-novelist Charles McCarry said, spying is nothing more than an organized hunt for a windfall.That translates to waiting for that one “walk-in” who comes knocking on the agency’s door ready to hand over the crown jewels.
That’s not to say that, now and then, Bond moments don’t come along. The CIA operatives who located Osama bin Laden and self-proclaimed Sept. 11, 2001, mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed can tell you all about them. And tragedies such as the recent attack in Benghazi are few and far between.
Still, usually the bad guys are humdrum, hiding in some impenetrable slum or village hanging on the side of a mountain. They’re the kind of places James Bond would only drop in on for a quick shootout. In fact, most spooks will never hear a shot fired in anger.
The real MI6 — Her Majesty’s Secret Service — isn’t all that different. British agents, too, spend their time sitting in offices rather than jumping out of airplanes or off speeding trains. And like CIA operatives, they’d all make better anthropologists than marksmen.
Much of a spy’s work these days is wading through data and breaking into computers. No doubt the geeks who threw the Stuxnet monkey wrench into the Iranian nuclear works didn’t move far from their computer screens for months. The most dangerous part of the day was probably going for Chinese takeout.
Another recent Hollywood release evokes this ethos much better than any Bond movie. “Argo,” the tale of the CIA’s rescue of six Americans during the Iran hostage crisis, is grittier and grimmer and captures the air of monotonous procedure punctuated by moments of sheer terror.
Yes, parts of the movie are over-the-top dramatized or pared down to the unrecognizable. But could there be a better casting than Bryan Cranston as a rumpled CIA boss in a shabby suit and cheap haircut, a fiercely pragmatic and good guy?
I managed to end up on the periphery of the hostage crisis and spent a couple of days at the American Embassy in Tehran only months before the takeover. As I watched the opening sequences of “Argo,” I did a double-take; the embassy interiors were exactly as I remembered them. So were the two rescued Americans I knew, Kathy and Joe Stafford.
…
By Robert Baer, Published: November 9
Find this story at 9 November 2012
© The Washington Post Company
More than a year after French carmaker Renault found itself embroiled in an industrial espionage scandal, new documents show that the company had prepared statements in the event that the three employees blamed in the case committed suicide.
More than one year ago, French carmaker Renault found itself embroiled in a high-profile industrial espionage scandal. Three executives were fired, but the case turned out to be bogus, and in a desperate attempt to put the whole sordid affair behind them, the company issued a public apology to its former employees.
It appears, however, that the story is far from over. New documents have emerged showing that Renault had prepared statements in the event that the scandal drove the three employees concerned to kill themselves.
Executives Michel Balthazard, Bertrand Rochette and Mathieu Tenenbaum were dismissed from Renault in January of last year on suspicions that they had leaked information on the company’s electric cars to rivals. Although wrongly accused, the three found themselves at the heart of a very public scandal, with little recourse to defend themselves.Renault espionage scandal
AUTO INDUSTRY
Renault loses No. 2 man over industrial spying scandal
AUTO INDUSTRY
Renault apologises over spying claim
France
Renault braces for backlash in industrial spying case
Apparently aware of the possible consequences, Renault’s communications director took action. Two statements were prepared in the event of the “inevitable” – one for a botched suicide attempt, the other for a successful one.
Strain on executives
The documents, which French radio station France Info published on their website Friday, showed that Renault was not only fully aware that the strain of the situation might drive its employees to suicide, but also its apparent acceptance of what it saw as a certainty.
Written in dry, clinical terms, the two statements varied little in their content. The first, which was to be issued in the event of “option 1”, in other words a failed suicide attempt, read: “One of the three executives laid off on January 3, 2011, attempted to end his life on (date).”
The second, or “option 2”, was only slightly modified: “One of the three executives laid off on January 3, 2011, ended his life on (date).”
The statement then went on to convey the company’s regret over the tragic incident.
…
Latest update: 13/10/2012
By Luke BROWN (video)
FRANCE 24 (text)
Find this Story at 13 October 2012
© 2006 – 2012 Copyright FRANCE 24. All rights reserved – FRANCE 24 is not responsible for the content of external websites.
Kim Dotcom hat vor Gericht einen Sieg erstritten: Der Mitgründer des umstrittenen und stillgelegten Datenspeicherdienstes Megaupload darf die Geheimdienste in Neuseeland verklagen.
Der Gründer der Internetplattform Megaupload, Kim Dotcom, darf die neuseeländischen Aufklärungsdienste verklagen. Das entschied eine Richterin am Donnerstag in Neuseeland.
Dotcoms Anwalt Paul Davison sagte Reportern anschließend, der gebürtige Kieler wolle wegen illegaler Abhöraktionen Schadensersatz einklagen. “Das dürfte uns teuer zu stehen kommen”, sagte Oppositionspolitiker Winston Peters. “Es geht womöglich um mehrere hundert Millionen Dollar.”
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6. Dezember 2012, 12:49 Uhr
Find this story at 6 December 2012
© 2012 stern.de GmbH
Kim Dotcom wins right to sue New Zealand’s spy agency for unlawful spying.
Kim Dotcom maintains that Megaupload should not be held responsible for stored content [Reuters]
Kim Dotcom, internet tycoon and Megaupload founder, has won the right to sue New Zealand’s foreign intelligence agency for unlawful spying by a US led probe on online piracy which led to his arrest earlier this year.
Helen Winkelmann, High Court chief judge, on Thursday ordered New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to disclose all details of any information-sharing arrangements it had with foreign agencies, including the US authorities.
“I have no doubt that the most convenient and expeditious way of enabling the court to determine all matters in dispute is to join the GCSB in the proceedings,” she stated in a written judgement.
Dotcom, who changed his name from Kim Schultz, is fighting a US attempt to extradite him from New Zealand in what has been described as the world’s largest copyright case.
His US-based lawyer, Ira Rothken hailed the court decision as a major victory.
Armed police raided Dotcom’s mansion in January at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, leading to a court ruling that the search warrants used were illegal, opening the way for him to seek damages from New Zealand Authorities.
Dotcom was released on bail and New Zealand’s Prime Minister, John Key issued an apology after it was revealed in September that the GCSB had spied on Dotcom before police raided his Auckland mansion.
Dotcom is a German national with residency in New Zealand, making it illegal for the GCSB to spy on him.
…
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2012 10:37
Tim Weiner, a former New York Times reporter, is the author of “Legacy of Ashes: the History of the C.I.A.,” and “Enemies: a History of the F.B.I.”
The structure of the Central Intelligence Agency has remained essentially unchanged since the agency was created in 1947 to fight the cold war against the Soviet Union and its satellites. A 21st-century C.I.A. must be renovated to reflect present-day realities.
Generals should control paramilitaries. Analysts should be in the field, reporting to diplomats. An elite core should remain.
Before 9/11 the C.I.A.’s clandestine service never assassinated anybody itself (though at times it tried, as in the case of Fidel Castro). Since then drone airstrikes against suspected foreign terrorists have killed some 2,500 people, including civilians, without public discussion in Congress. Intelligence is the hard work of trying to know your enemy. It is not the dirty business of political murder. That is warfare, and war belongs to the Pentagon. The clandestine service’s paramilitary officers should work directly for the Department of Defense, deployed overseas, controlled by four-star combatant commanders and governed under military law. The president should acknowledge that they are a lethal weapon devoted to counterterrorism.
C.I.A. analysts should leave their desks in Virginia and move overseas. They need to get out of the prediction business, a losing proposition. They should work for the State Department’s highly regarded intelligence and research bureau, and they should serve in the nations they analyze. Then they will have a chance to see developing political pictures, to assay ground truths for themselves. That requires more C.I.A. officers with African, Arabic and Chinese languages, skills and backgrounds, reporting on conflicts requiring American intelligence more than American firepower.
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Updated December 4, 2012, 4:51 PM
Find this story at 4 December 2012
© 2011 The New York Times Co.
AMSTERDAM – Skype heeft illegaal persoonsgegevens verstrekt aan een bedrijf tijdens het onderzoek naar massale cyberaanvallen op PayPal. Het betalingsbedrijf werd aangevallen in reactie op blokkades van donaties aan Wikileaks.
Foto: AFP
Skype verstrekte persoonsgegevens van een 16-jarige jongen aan een bedrijf dat ermee naar de politie stapte.
Dat blijkt uit het dossier van het strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar de aanvallen op diverse financiële instellingen in 2010. NU.nl heeft dat dossier ingezien.
Het onderzoek met de codenaam Talang richtte zich op twee personen. Zij zouden een rol hebben gespeeld in de dagenlange aanvallen op de websites van Mastercard, VISA en PayPal. De aanval werd uitgevoerd onder de vlag van Anonymous en stond bekend als Operation Payback.
Paypal
Om de aanvallen te onderzoeken schakelde PayPal Joep Gommers in. Hij is senior director global research van beveiligingsbedrijf iSIGHT Partners, en ontdekte via een chatkanaal dat er ook Nederlanders bij de zaak betrokken waren. Op basis van een pseudoniem kwam een 16-jarige jongen in beeld.
Daarop nam Gommers contact op met Skype, een andere klant van zijn bedrijf. Skype was niet betrokken bij de zaak, maar hij wilde de inloggegevens en persoonsgegevens van de verdachte krijgen.
In een e-mail aan de politie, de OPTA en Govcert, dat inmiddels is opgegaan in het National Cyber Security Center, schrijft hij: “Hey, Ik heb spoedig inloginformatie, maar nu nog niet.”
Politiedossier
In het politiedossier staat dat Skype gegevens heeft verstrekt, zoals de gebruikersnaam, naam van de persoon, gebruikte e-mailadressen en het huisadres dat bij betaling is gebruikt. Dat adres bleek vervolgens overeen te komen met de gemeentelijke basisadministratie. Zo kwam de verdachte in beeld.
De informatie is vrijwillig verstrekt en niet gevorderd, zoals gewoonlijk gebruikelijk is.
Gommers stelt tegenover NU.nl dat zijn bedrijf niet in opdracht van opsporingsinstanties werkt, maar slechts in opdracht van klanten. Ook benadrukt hij kennis in producten en rapporten te stoppen en doorgaans niet bewijs te leveren.
Toch komt het wel voor dat kennis ‘wordt gedeeld met opsporingsinstanties als publieke dienstverlening’. De leeftijd van een verdachte valt volgens hem moeilijk vast te stellen, omdat hackers online bijna altijd anoniem zijn.
Vordering
De gang van zaken tijdens het onderzoek verbaast Gerrit-Jan Zwenne, hoogleraar recht en informatiesamenleving in Leiden en advocaat bij Bird & Bird te Den Haag.
“Opmerkelijk. Je zou verwachten dat abonnee-gegevens niet zomaar worden prijsgegeven. De gegevens moeten worden verstrekt als de politie een geldige vordering heeft, of als de rechter het opdraagt. Anders niet”, vertelt hij aan NU.nl.
“Je kan je afvragen of de telecom en privacywetgeving toestaan dat abonneegegevens worden verstrekt zonder vordering of rechterlijk bevel. Je kan kan je ook afvragen of politie die gegevens wel mag gebruiken als ze op deze wijze zijn verkregen. Had de politie die gegevens niet gewoon moeten vorderen, met alle waarborgen die daarbij horen?”
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Door: NU.nl/Brenno de Winter
Find this story at 4 November 2012
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Skype faces accusations that it handed user data to a private company without a warrant
Skype’s privacy credentials took a hit in July over a refusal to comment on whether it could eavesdrop on conversations. Now the Internet chat service is facing another privacy-related backlash—after allegedly handing over user data without a warrant to a private security firm investigating pro-WikiLeaks activists.
The explosive details were contained in a report by Dutch investigative journalist Brenno de Winter, published on NU.nl earlier this week. Citing an internal police file detailing an investigation called “Operation Talang,” Winter wrote that PayPal was attempting to track down activists affiliated with the hacker collective Anonymous. The hackers had attacked the PayPal website following the company’s controversial decision to block payments to WikiLeaks in December 2010.
As part of that investigation, PayPal apparently hired the private security company iSight to help find those responsible. Headquartered in Texas and with a European base in Amsterdam, iSight describes itself as a “global cyber intelligence firm” that “supports leading federal and commercial entities with targeted and unique insights necessary to manage cyber risks.” iSight’s Netherlands-based director of global research, Joep Gommers, followed an online trail in an effort to track down the hackers, ultimately leading to a number of Dutch citizens, among them a 16-year-old boy operating under a pseudonym. Gommers reportedly contacted Skype, also a client of iSight, and requested account data about the teenager. According to Winter’s report, “the police file notes that Skype handed over the suspect’s personal information, such as his user name, real name, e-mail addresses and the home address used for payment.” It adds that Skype disclosed the information voluntarily, “without a court order, as would usually be required.”
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By Ryan Gallagher
Find this story at 9 November 2012
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