Berlin Denies Military Knew About PrismAugust 30, 2013
A media report on Wednesday alleged that a NATO document proves the German military knew about the NSA’s Prism surveillance program in 2011. But both Berlin and the country’s foreign intelligence agency deny the account, saying there was a NATO program with the same name in Afghanistan.
The German government has so far claimed that it knew nothing of the United States’ Prism spying program, revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden last month. But parts of a confidential NATO document published by daily Bild on Wednesday show that the German military, the Bundeswehr, may have already been aware of the National Security Agency’s operations in 2011, the paper alleged.
The document, reportedly sent on Sept. 1, 2011 to all regional commands by the joint NATO headquarters in Afghanistan, gives specific instructions for working together on a program called Prism, which the paper said was the same as that run by the NSA. According to Bild, the document was also sent to the regional command in northern Afghanistan, for which Germany was responsible at the time under General Major Markus Kneip.
Should the media report be confirmed, Berlin’s claims of ignorance will prove to have been false. But on Wednesday afternoon, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s spokesman Steffen Seibert denied the Bild story, saying that the document referred to a separate program that had been run by NATO troops, and not the US. The programs were “not identical,” he said.
The BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, also weighed in with a statement, saying that the program had not been confidential and was also not the same as the NSA’s Prism operation. “The program called Prism by the Bild report today is a NATO/ISAF program that is not identical to the NSA’s program,” it said. “The BND had no knowledge of the name, range or scope of the NSA program.”
A Separate Prism Program?
According to the document cited by Bild, as of Sept. 15 that year, regional commands were instructed to apply for monitoring telephone calls and e-mails, according to the document, in which Prism is named at least three times. “Existing COMINT (communications intelligence) nominations submitted outside of PRISM must be resubmitted into PRISM IOT,” it reads.
It also states that access to the Prism program is regulated by the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which is used by various US intelligence services to transmit classified information.
“Coalition RCs (regional commands) will utilize the US military or civilian personnel assigned to their collection management shop ISRLO (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Liaison Officer),” it goes on. In Bild’s assessment, “military or civilian personnel” stands for US intelligence service staff.
Keeping Track of Terrorists
The purpose of all this was to “submit the telephone numbers and email addresses of terrorists into the surveillance system,” the paper reports.
It also claims to have seen documents indicating that the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, provided such telephone numbers to NATO, where they were ultimately fed into the surveillance system as well.
The reason for the NATO order was that the NSA’s director had tasked the US military with coordinating surveillance in Afghanistan, Bild reported.
The German Defense Ministry told the paper that it had “no information and knowledge of such an order,” but would be looking into the matter.
In response to the report, Green party parliamentarian and defense spokesman Omid Nouripour told SPIEGEL ONLINE that Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière must clarify the situation. “These circumstances destroy the government’s line of defense” on the NSA scandal, he said. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s center-right coalition can “no longer claim it didn’t know anything about Prism.”
As more details emerge about the scope of the NSA’s worldwide spying program and Germany’s alleged role in the surveillance, the scandal is becoming a central issue in the country’s campaign for the upcoming general election. Germans are particularly sensitive about data protection because of their history of state encroachment on civil liberties, first under the Nazis and then in communist East Germany. And if it turns out that Berlin knowingly tolerated and participated in the NSA activities, many would see it as a betrayal by the government.
07/17/2013 12:29 PM
Media Report
Find this story at 17 July 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
Germany backs away from claims NSA program thwarted five attacksAugust 30, 2013
German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich is backing off his earlier assertion that the Obama administration’s NSA monitoring of Internet accounts had prevented five terror attacks in Germany, raising questions about other claims concerning the value of the massive monitoring programs revealed by NSA leaker Edward Snowden.
Friedrich had made the assertion about the number of attacks that the NSA programs – which scoop up records from cellphone and Internet accounts – had helped to avert after a brief visit to the United States last week. But on Tuesday, he told a German parliamentary panel, “It is relatively difficult to count the number of terror attacks that didn’t occur.” And on Wednesday, he was publically referring to just two foiled attacks, at least one and possibly both of which appeared to have little to do with the NSA’s surveillance programs.
The questions about the programs’ value in thwarting attacks in Germany come as some members of the U.S. Congress have told Obama officials that the programs exceeded what Congress authorized when it passed laws that the administration is arguing allowed the collection of vast amounts of information on cellphone and Internet email accounts.
In Germany, the concern is that the NSA is capturing and storing as many as 500 million electronic communications each month, but Germans are getting little if anything back for what is seen as an immoral and illegal invasion of privacy.
Friedrich spent July 11-12 in the United States for meetings with U.S. officials on the NSA programs that German Chancellor Angela Merkel had requested. The point of the meetings was to gather information that would calm a building German angst over the spy scandal.
Instead of being reassured, however, opposition politicians and commentators now are talking about the arrogance of the U.S. application of “winner’s power” (a reference to the political authority the United States had here during the Cold War, when Germany was divided between east and west, and West Germany leaned heavily on America for support), and how traditionally strong relations between the two countries have been harmed by the scandal.
“German-American relations are at risk,” said Hans-Christian Stroebele, a Green Party member of the influential German intelligence oversight committee in the country’s legislature, the Bundestag, which is dominated by Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union. “The longer it takes to uncover the facts after this long silence, the more problematic it becomes. No one even bothers to deny what’s been said. It could be that German or (European Union) courts will have to deal with this.”
Even as emotions build, NSA plans for expanding a listening station in Germany were revealed this week, raising more questions.
Stroebele spoke Thursday to McClatchy, addressing Friedrich’s official report, delivered behind closed doors to the Bundestag committee. He said Friedrich received little information from the United States in his quick trip to Washington.
“We’re lucky to have had Snowden,” Stroebele said. “Without him, this surveillance that is not permissible under international law would have continued for a long time. In Germany, there are prison terms for such spying.”
Perhaps most troubling was how quickly the government backed down on the claims that the surveillance helped foil terror plots. Gisela Piltz, a Liberal Party member of the Bundestag intelligence committee, said she could not give exact details of what took place in the secret hearing but noted: “There was a clear discrepancy between the previously reported number of foiled terror attacks and the number we talked about.”
And even those cases raised questions. One of them, commonly known as the Sauerland Cell Plot, involved an alleged conspiracy in 2007 to detonate a series of car bombs in crowded places. Piltz was involved in a Bundestag study of what took place. The goal of the would-be bombers was to surpass the death and injured toll from commuter train attacks in Madrid in 2004, which killed 191 and wounded another 1,800.
The conspirators, who allegedly included two Germans, had gathered nearly a ton of liquid explosives.
News reports at the time mentioned an unnamed U.S. intelligence official saying that cellphone calls by the two Germans had been intercepted. But those calls were said to have been made when the Germans were leaving a terror camp in Pakistan – an entirely different scenario from the current monitoring program, which captures data from everyday citizens by casting a worldwide net.
Piltz said even that participation by U.S. intelligence agencies remains unverified.
The other case, involving four men with al Qaida connections arrested in Dusseldorf while allegedly preparing to make a shrapnel bomb to detonate at an undecided location, also raised questions about NSA involvement. During the trial, prosecutors said they were alerted to the cell by an informant, after which they studied emails from the four. But such targeted surveillance is not the issue in the NSA programs, one of which, PRISM, reportedly taps into the computers of users of nine Internet companies, including Facebook, Google and Yahoo.
Defending NSA practices, Friedrich noted that security is a “super fundamental right.” As such it outranks fundamental rights such as privacy. German newspapers were scathing in their assessment, calling Friedrich the “idiot in charge.”
Piltz said that while terrorism is a real threat, the U.S. monitoring programs have done little to prevent it.
“Germans are not safer because of U.S. espionage,” Piltz said. “It is true Germany has been lucky not to have suffered a terror attack, but there has to be a balance. We cannot sacrifice freedom for security, and when in doubt I would always opt for freedom.”
McClatchy special correspondent Claudia Himmelreich in Berlin contributed to this report.
McClatchy Washington Bureau
Posted on Thu, Jul. 18, 2013
By Matthew Schofield | McClatchy Foreign Staff
last updated: July 18, 2013 05:30:07 PM
BERLIN — ]
Find this story at 18 July 2013
© McClatchy Washington Bureau
Second Prism program emerges as Friedrich faces committeeAugust 30, 2013
As Germany’s interior minister faced a special select committee, another surveillance program – also called Prism – has come to light. Unlike its more famous global namesake, this Prism is said to be used in Afghanistan.
German mass-circulation daily Bild first found reference to the Afghanistan Prism program in an order sent out to regional command posts from the NATO headquarters in Kabul.
The communiqué told ISAF staff to use this Prism database for any data gleaned from monitoring telecommunications or emails, starting on September 15, 2011.
The German government said it knew nothing about the database, run by the US but accessible to ISAF troops across Afghanistan – including those with Germany’s Bundeswehr – until Wednesday’s report.
“I can only tell you that this was a NATO/ISAF program, one that was not classified as secret – according to the BND,” Chancellor Merkel’s spokesman Steffen Seibert said. Seibert was referring to a press release from Germany’s equivalent to Washington’s National Security Agency (NSA), the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The BND also said this Prism was “not identical” to the now renowned program revealed by NSA contractor turned whistleblower Edward Snowden in May.
DW.DE
Itching to ask: What does Merkel know about NSA surveillance?
A parliamentary oversight committee in Berlin would like to know how much the German government really knows about NSA spying activities in Germany. Their leverage, however, is limited. (17.07.2013)
Another ministerial spokesman, Stefan Paris with the defense ministry, said it was quite normal for information like this not to filter back to Berlin unless there was a specific need.
Friedrich faces closed-door grilling
Elsewhere in Berlin, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich completed two days in front of the special committee for internal affairs on Wednesday, facing further questions after his impromptu visit to Washington at the weekend.
Opposition politicians, who see increasing mileage in the alleged NSA espionage activities, said after the session that Friedrich’s appearance shed little light on proceedings.
“Everywhere people seem to accept the way the US side is acting with a shrug of the shoulders, while there’s no clarity anywhere,” Social Democrat parliamentarian Michael Hartmann said, adding that he felt the chancellor’s office should be answering questions instead of the interior ministry.
“My personal impression: Before September 22, nothing is meant to be put on the table here,” Green party politician Wolfgang Wieland said, naming the date of federal elections in Germany.
Friedrich has so far stressed the NSA’s supposed contribution to stopping five terror plots in Germany, offering data on two of them to date, when discussing the issue. The minister controversially said on Monday that there was a “super-fundamental right” to protecting public safety that trumped even privacy laws.
British blow to EU data dreams?
Free Democrat politician Hartfried Wolff, a member of the Bundestag’s interior committee, said on Wednesday that Friedrich had outlined one blow to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s proposed response.
Merkel said in a key television interview on Sunday that she would be seeking unified EU rules on data protection to allow the bloc to handle the issue better.
According to Wolff, Friedrich said that the UK was unlikely to support such a move. Since Snowden went public, a UK espionage program called “Tempora” has also come to light.
Friedrich is a member of the Bavarian sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democrats, the CSU. Bavaria votes in state elections one week before the German ballot.
msh/rc (AFP, AP, Reuters)
Date 17.07.2013
Find this story at 717 July 2013
© 2013 Deutsche Welle
Prism in Afghanistan Conflicting Accounts By German GovernmentAugust 30, 2013
In Germany, the scandal surrounding NSA spying is getting odder by the day. A new Defense Ministry memo suggests a claim made by a mass-circulation newspaper that Germany’s army knew about Prism in 2011 is, in fact, true.
The scandal in Germany surrounding spying activities by the United States’ National Security Agency took a surprising twist on Thursday. A report by a German mass-circulation daily that described the use of a program called Prism in NATO-occupied Afghanistan has led to the German Defense Ministry contradicting the foreign intelligence agency BND.
It started on Wednesday when the broadsheet Bild reported that the American intelligence service NSA had deployed the controversial data-collection tool Prism in Afghanistan and that Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, knew of the program by the autumn of 2011 at the latest.
German government spokesman Steffen Seibert, speaking on behalf of the BND, was quick to deny the Bild report. He said on Wednesday that the software which had been used in Afghanistan was part of “a NATO/ISAF program and was not the same as the NSA’s Prism program.” Seibert said the programs were “not identical.” According to Seibert’s account, there are two different Prism programs — the much discussed NSA Prism program, which has been used in recent years to intensively monitor German communications, as well as an ISAF program for Afghanistan.
But the Defense Ministry is now contradicting that characterization. In a two-page memo obtained by several German media outlets, Rüdiger Wolf, a high-ranking ministry official, states that the Prism program used in Afghanistan is a “computer-aided US planning and information analysis tool” used for the coordination of “American intelligence systems,” that is “operated exclusively by US personnel” and is “used Afghanistan-wide by the US side.”
Prism Accessible Exclusively to Americans
Wolf describes in detail how the Bundeswehr and NATO have no access to the US program. He adds that while there may be computer terminals at the German base in Mazar-e-Sharif that are equipped to access the program, they can only be used by Americans.
If members of the Bundeswehr wanted access to information, they had to send a special form to the IJC command center in Kabul, almost entirely controlled by the US Army — that is, if they wanted US data that went beyond the information possessed by NATO intelligence. When they got the data back, “the origin of the information” was “fundamentally unrecognizable” to the Germans.
It is precisely such procedures that Bild reported on this week, citing a classified September NATO order. In the paper, NATO members, including the German-led Regional Command North in Afghanistan, are called upon to direct requests for the “Prism” system to American personnel — military or civilian (which in this case is a reference to intelligence workers) because NATO has no access to the system. Given that Bild printed a copy of the order in its newspaper, the BND’s portrayal already seemed odd on Wednesday.
According to Wolf’s own admissions, the Germans don’t know very much about the Prism program in Afghanistan. It is unclear, for example, how Prism is deployed at the US Army-dominated headquarters in Kabul and the ministry doesn’t know the “extent of use.” However, Wolf once more reiterated that all information obtained from intelligence sources served to protect German soldiers — including “insights provided by the US side that could have come from Prism.”
A Slap in the Face
The Defense Ministry is also very cautious compared to the BND when it comes to deferentiating the Prism program in Afghanistan from the Prism spying program that was exposed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and involves the systematic monitoring of German communications. The information supplied by the US would have pertained only to the situation in Afghanistan. It was “not a data fishing expedition” on German citizens, according to the memo, and in fact had “no proximity” to the NSA surveillance program in Germany and Europe.
With his cautious formulation, Wolf deliberately avoids saying whether or not the two programs are identical.
This representation of the facts, which was already made to some extent on Wednesday by Defense Ministry spokesman Stefan Paris, is like a slap in the face for the BND. Shortly after Seibert appeared at the press conference, insiders wondered why the intelligence agency would so unambiguously commit itself to the position that the Prism program in Afghanistan is part of the composite ISAF system. But the BND didn’t pull back on its position, although Paris clearly said that the Prism program in Afghanistan is operated exclusively by Americans.
Members of the opposition were quick to attack the BND for its assertions. “The Chancellery, acting on behalf of the BND, deliberately lied to the public on Wednesday,” Green Party defense expert Omid Nouripour told SPIEGEL ONLINE. According to Nouripour, Wolf’s description makes it clear that there is no NATO Prism program. The German government, he says, should stop making excuses and finally begin to seriously investigate the spying scandal.
07/18/2013 09:26 PM
By Matthias Gebauer
Find this story at 18 July 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
Other Agencies Clamor for Data N.S.A. CompilesAugust 16, 2013
WASHINGTON — The National Security Agency’s dominant role as the nation’s spy warehouse has spurred frequent tensions and turf fights with other federal intelligence agencies that want to use its surveillance tools for their own investigations, officials say.
Agencies working to curb drug trafficking, cyberattacks, money laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement complain that their attempts to exploit the security agency’s vast resources have often been turned down because their own investigations are not considered a high enough priority, current and former government officials say.
Intelligence officials say they have been careful to limit the use of the security agency’s troves of data and eavesdropping spyware for fear they could be misused in ways that violate Americans’ privacy rights.
The recent disclosures of agency activities by its former contractor Edward J. Snowden have led to widespread criticism that its surveillance operations go too far and have prompted lawmakers in Washington to talk of reining them in. But out of public view, the intelligence community has been agitated in recent years for the opposite reason: frustrated officials outside the security agency say the spy tools are not used widely enough.
“It’s a very common complaint about N.S.A.,” said Timothy H. Edgar, a former senior intelligence official at the White House and at the office of the director of national intelligence. “They collect all this information, but it’s difficult for the other agencies to get access to what they want.”
“The other agencies feel they should be bigger players,” said Mr. Edgar, who heard many of the disputes before leaving government this year to become a visiting fellow at Brown University. “They view the N.S.A. — incorrectly, I think — as this big pot of data that they could go get if they were just able to pry it out of them.”
Smaller intelligence units within the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security have sometimes been given access to the security agency’s surveillance tools for particular cases, intelligence officials say.
But more often, their requests have been rejected because the links to terrorism or foreign intelligence, usually required by law or policy, are considered tenuous. Officials at some agencies see another motive — protecting the security agency’s turf — and have grown resentful over what they see as a second-tier status that has undermined their own investigations into security matters.
At the drug agency, for example, officials complained that they were blocked from using the security agency’s surveillance tools for several drug-trafficking cases in Latin America, which they said might be connected to financing terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere.
At the Homeland Security Department, officials have repeatedly sought to use the security agency’s Internet and telephone databases and other resources to trace cyberattacks on American targets that are believed to have stemmed from China, Russia and Eastern Europe, according to officials. They have often been rebuffed.
Officials at the other agencies, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the tensions, say the National Security Agency’s reluctance to allow access to data has been particularly frustrating because of post-Sept. 11 measures that were intended to encourage information-sharing among federal agencies.
In fact, a change made in 2008 in the executive order governing intelligence was intended to make it easier for the security agency to share surveillance information with other agencies if it was considered “relevant” to their own investigations. It has often been left to the national intelligence director’s office to referee the frequent disputes over how and when the security agency’s spy tools can be used. The director’s office declined to comment for this article.
Typically, the agencies request that the N.S.A. target individuals or groups for surveillance, search its databases for information about them, or share raw intelligence, rather than edited summaries, with them. If those under scrutiny are Americans, approval from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is required.
The security agency, whose mission is to spy overseas, and the F.B.I., its main partner in surveillance operations, dominate the process as the Justice Department’s main “customers” in seeking warrants from the intelligence court, with nearly 1,800 approved by the court last year.
In a statement, the security agency said that it “works closely with all intelligence community partners, and embeds liaison officers and other personnel at those agencies for the express purpose of ensuring N.S.A. is meeting their requirements and providing support to their missions.”
The security agency’s spy tools are attractive to other agencies for many reasons. Unlike traditional, narrowly tailored search warrants, those granted by the intelligence court often allow searches through records and data that are vast in scope. The standard of evidence needed to acquire them may be lower than in other courts, and the government may not be required to disclose for years, if ever, that someone was the focus of secret surveillance operations.
Decisions on using the security agency’s powers rest on many complicated variables, including a link to terrorism or “foreign intelligence,” the type of surveillance or data collection that is being conducted, the involvement of American targets, and the priority of the issue.
“Every agency wants to think that their mission has to be the highest priority,” said a former senior White House intelligence official involved in recent turf issues.
Other intelligence shops usually have quick access to N.S.A. tools and data on pressing matters of national security, like investigating a terrorism threat, planning battlefield operations or providing security for a presidential trip, officials say. But the conflicts arise during longer-term investigations with unclear foreign connections.
In pressing for greater access, a number of smaller agencies maintain that their cases involve legitimate national security threats and could be helped significantly by the N.S.A.’s ability to trace e-mails and Internet activity or other tools.
Drug agency officials, for instance, have sought a higher place for global drug trafficking on the intelligence community’s classified list of surveillance priorities, according to two officials.
Dawn Dearden, a drug agency spokeswoman, said it was comfortable allowing the N.S.A. and the F.B.I. to take the lead in seeking surveillance warrants. “We don’t have the authority, and we don’t want it, and that comes from the top down,” she said.
But privately, intelligence officials at the drug agency and elsewhere have complained that they feel shut out of the process by the N.S.A. and the F.B.I. from start to finish, with little input on what groups are targeted with surveillance and only sporadic access to the classified material that is ultimately collected.
Sometimes, security agency and bureau officials accuse the smaller agencies of exaggerating links to national security threats in their own cases when pushing for access to the security agency’s surveillance capabilities. Officials from the other agencies say that if a link to national security is considered legitimate, the F.B.I. will at times simply take over the case itself and work it with the N.S.A.
In one such case, the bureau took control of a Secret Service investigation after a hacker was linked to a foreign government, one law enforcement official said. Similarly, the bureau became more interested in investigating smuggled cigarettes as a means of financing terrorist groups after the case was developed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
Mr. Edgar said officials in the national intelligence director’s office occasionally allow other agencies a role in identifying surveillance targets and seeing the results when it is relevant to their own inquiries. But more often, he acknowledged, the office has come down on the side of keeping the process held to an “exclusive club” at the N.S.A., the F.B.I. and the Justice Department, with help from the Central Intelligence Agency on foreign issues.
Officials in the national intelligence director’s office worry about opening the surveillance too widely beyond the security agency and the F.B.I. for fear of abuse, Mr. Edgar said. The two intelligence giants have been “burned” by past wiretapping controversies and know the political consequences if they venture too far afield, he added.
“I would have been very uncomfortable if we had let these other agencies get access to the raw N.S.A. data,” he said.
As furious as the public criticism of the security agency’s programs has been in the two months since Mr. Snowden’s disclosures, “it could have been much, much worse, if we had let these other agencies loose and we had real abuses,” Mr. Edgar said. “That was the nightmare scenario we were worried about, and that hasn’t happened.”
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.
August 3, 2013
By ERIC LICHTBLAU and MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT
Find this story at 3 August 2013
© 2013 The New York Times Company
For Western Allies, a Long History of Swapping IntelligenceAugust 16, 2013
BERLIN — When Edward J. Snowden disclosed the extent of the United States data mining operations in Germany, monitoring as many as 60 million of the country’s telephone and Internet connections in one day and bugging its embassy, politicians here, like others in Europe, were by turns appalled and indignant. But like the French before them, this week they found themselves backpedaling.
In an interview released this week Mr. Snowden said that Germany’s intelligence services are “in bed” with the National Security Agency, “the same as with most other Western countries.” The assertion has added to fresh scrutiny in the European news media of Berlin and other European governments that may have benefited from the enormous American snooping program known as Prism, or conducted wide-ranging surveillance operations of their own.
The outrage of European leaders notwithstanding, intelligence experts and historians say the most recent disclosures reflect the complicated nature of the relationship between the intelligence services of the United States and its allies, which have long quietly swapped information on each others’ citizens.
“The other services don’t ask us where our information is from and we don’t ask them,” Mr. Snowden said in the interview, conducted by the documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras and Jacob Appelbaum, a computer security researcher, and published this week in the German magazine Der Spiegel. “This way they can protect their political leaders from backlash, if it should become public how massively the private spheres of people around the globe are being violated.”
Britain, which has the closest intelligence relationship with the United States of any European country, has been implicated in several of the data operations described by Mr. Snowden, including claims that Britain’s agencies had access to the Prism computer network, which monitors data from a range of American Internet companies. Such sharing would have allowed British intelligence agencies to sidestep British legal restrictions on electronic snooping. Prime Minister David Cameron has insisted that its intelligence services operate within the law.
Another allegation, reported by The Guardian newspaper, is that the Government Communications Headquarters, the British surveillance center, tapped fiber-optic cables carrying international telephone and Internet traffic, then shared the information with the N.S.A. This program, known as Tempora, involved attaching intercept probes to trans-Atlantic cables when they land on British shores from North America, the report said.
President François Hollande of France was among the first European leaders to express outrage at the revelations of American spying, and especially at accusations that the Americans had spied on French diplomatic posts in Washington and New York.
There is no evidence to date that French intelligence services were granted access to information from the N.S.A., Le Monde reported last week, however, that France’s external intelligence agency maintains a broad telecommunications data collection system of its own, amassing metadata on most, if not all, telephone calls, e-mails and Internet activity coming in and out of France.
Mr. Hollande and other officials have been notably less vocal regarding the claims advanced by Le Monde, which authorities in France have neither confirmed nor denied.
Given their bad experiences with domestic spying, first under the Nazis and then the former the East German secret police, Germans are touchy when it comes to issues of personal privacy and protection of their personal data. Guarantees ensuring the privacy of mail and all forms of long-distance communications are enshrined in Article 10 of their Constitution.
When the extent of the American spying in Germany came to light the chancellor’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert, decried such behavior as “unacceptable,” insisting that, “We are no longer in the cold war.”
But experts say ties between the intelligence services remain rooted in agreements stemming from that era, when West Germany depended on the United States to protect it from the former Soviet Union and its allies in the East.
“Of course the German government is very deeply entwined with the American intelligence services,” said Josef Foschepoth, a German historian from Freiburg University. Mr. Foschepoth spent several years combing through Germany’s federal archives, including formerly classified documents from the 1950s and 1960s, in an effort to uncover the roots of the trans-Atlantic cooperation.
In 1965, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, known by the initials BND, was created. Three years later, the West Germans signed a cooperation agreement effectively binding the Germans to an intensive exchange of information that continues up to the present day, despite changes to the agreements.
The attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, in the United States saw a fresh commitment by the Germans to cooperate with the Americans in the global war against terror. Using technology developed by the Americans and used by the N.S.A., the BND monitors networks from the Middle East, filtering the information before sending it to Washington, said Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, an expert on secret services who runs the Research Institute for Peace Politics in Bavaria.
In exchange, Washington shares intelligence with Germany that authorities here say has been essential to preventing terror attacks similar to those in Madrid or London. It is a matter of pride among German authorities that they have been able to swoop in and detain suspects, preventing several plots from being carried out.
By focusing the current public debate in Germany on the issue of personal data, experts say Chancellor Angela Merkel is able to steer clear of the stickier questions about Germany’s own surveillance programs and a long history of intelligence sharing with the United States, which still makes many Germans deeply uncomfortable, more than two decades after the end of the cold war.
“Every postwar German government, at some point, has been confronted with this problem,” Mr. Foschepoth said of the surveillance scandal. “The way that the chancellor is handling it shows that she knows very well, she is very well informed and she wants the issue to fade away.”
Reporting contributed by Stephen Castle from London, Scott Sayare from Paris and Eric Schmitt from Washington.
July 9, 2013
By MELISSA EDDY
Find this story at 9 July 2013
© 2013 The New York Times Company
Spy access to NZ used as bargaining toolAugust 16, 2013
The Southern Cross Cable Network links Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
The ability for US intelligence agencies to access internet data was used as a bargaining tool by a Telecom-owned company trying to keep down the cost of the undersea cable from New Zealand.
Lawyers acting for Southern Cross Cable quoted a former CIA and NSA director who urged the Senate to “exploit” access to data for an intelligence edge.
The value of intercepted communications to the US was raised during negotiations last year which could increase internet costs 15 per cent.
Documents on the Federal Communications Commission website show the issue was raised by lawyers acting for “undersea cable operators”, including Southern Cross Cables, half-owned by Telecom and owner of the 28,900km cable which links New Zealand to the internet.
Lawyers acting for the cable operators told the FCC there were benefits to their clients not having to pay for their cables to land on US soil.
The FCC was told the number of internet connections passing through the US was dropping.
“There has long been speculation that US surveillance following implementation of the Patriot Act could push internet content and information storage outside the United States-to the detriment of the United States.”
The legal team footnoted the statement with a 2006 quote from former CIA director and National Security Agency director General Michael Hayden, who set up domestic wiretapping and widespread internet snooping during his terms as an intelligence chief.
He was quoted as saying: “Because of the nature of global telecommunications, we are playing with a tremendous home-field advantage, and we need to exploit that edge.
“We also need to protect that edge, and we need to protect those who provide it to us.”
In other documents, Southern Cross Cables raised the possibility of submarine cables coming to land in Canada or Mexico.
Southern Cross Cables lawyer Nikki Shone said the company was legally obliged to co-operate with US laws and it was in relation to those obligations that “it noted that the FCC’s proposed universal services charges could harm US security interests by encouraging infrastructure to bypass the United States”.
She said Southern Cross Cable was “wholly unaware of recently disclosed US surveillance programmes”.
A Telecom spokesman cited the company’s contract with residential customers, which tells them it will pass on their information without permission if it believes it is legally required to do so or if it is necessary “to help maintain the law”.
Telecom Users Association chief executive Paul Brislen said revelations about US interception of internet traffic meant “we have to assume that all our communications are intercepted”.
He said internet and telecoms companies had to comply with US rules or be shut out of lucrative contracts.
Mr Brislen believed the cable from Auckland to Los Angeles was secure but said intelligence agencies would access information beyond the landing stations.
Tech Liberty director Thomas Beagle said any use of American services and networks exposed data to being captured by the US.
But shifting to other countries “will just expose you to surveillance from their national governments”.
“It seems that we now have the choice between taking the time to understand and implement secure encryption or choosing services based on which governments we don’t mind spying on us.”
By David Fisher @DFisherJourno
5:30 AM Saturday Aug 10, 2013
Find this story at 10 August 2013
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US spy agencies eavesdrop on KiwiAugust 16, 2013
The New Zealand military received help from US spy agencies to monitor the phone calls of Kiwi journalist Jon Stephenson and his associates while he was in Afghanistan reporting on the war.
Stephenson has described the revelation as a serious violation of his privacy, and the intrusion into New Zealand media freedom has been slammed as an abuse of human rights.
The spying came at a time when the New Zealand Defence Force was unhappy at Stephenson’s reporting of its handling of Afghan prisoners and was trying to find out who was giving him confidential information.
The monitoring occurred in the second half of last year when Stephenson was working as Kabul correspondent for the US McClatchy news service and for various New Zealand news organisations.
The Sunday Star-Times has learned that New Zealand Defence Force personnel had copies of intercepted phone “metadata” for Stephenson, the type of intelligence publicised by US intelligence whistleblower Edward Snowden. The intelligence reports showed who Stephenson had phoned and then who those people had phoned, creating what the sources called a “tree” of the journalist’s associates.
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New Zealand SAS troops in Kabul had access to the reports and were using them in active investigations into Stephenson.
The sources believed the phone monitoring was being done to try to identify Stephenson’s journalistic contacts and sources. They drew a picture of a metadata tree the Defence Force had obtained, which included Stephenson and named contacts in the Afghan government and military.
The sources who described the monitoring of Stephenson’s phone calls in Afghanistan said that the NZSIS has an officer based in Kabul who was known to be involved in the Stephenson investigations.
And since early in the Afghanistan war, the GCSB has secretly posted staff to the main US intelligence centre at Bagram, north of Kabul. They work in a special “signals intelligence” unit that co-ordinates electronic surveillance to assist military targeting. It is likely to be this organisation that monitored Stephenson.
Stephenson and the Defence Force clashed in the Wellington High Court two weeks ago after it claimed Stephonson had invented a story about visiting an Afghan base.
The Human Rights Foundation says Defence Force involvement in monitoring a journalist is an abuse of fundamental human rights.
“Don’t they understand the vital importance of freedom of the press?” spokesman Tim McBride said. “Independent journalism is especially important in a controversial war zone where the public has a right to know what really happens and not just get military public relations,” he said.
The news has emerged as the Government prepares to pass legislation which will allow the Defence Force to use the GCSB to spy on New Zealanders.
The Stephenson surveillance suggests the Defence Force may be seeking the GCSB assistance, in part, for investigating leaks and whistleblowers.
Stephenson said monitoring a journalist’s communications could also threaten the safety of their sources “by enabling security authorities to track down and intimidate people disclosing information to that journalist”.
He said there was “a world of difference between investigating a genuine security threat and monitoring a journalist because his reporting is inconvenient or embarrassing to politicians and defence officials”.
The Star-Times asked Chief of Defence Force Rhys Jones and Defence Minister Jonathan Coleman if they were aware of the surveillance of Stephenson, if they approved of it and whether they authorised the investigation of Stephenson (including the phone monitoring).
They were also asked if they thought journalists should be classified as threats. Neither answered the questions.
Defence Force spokesman Geoff Davies said: “As your request relates to a legal matter involving Jon Stephenson which is still before the court, it would not be appropriate for the Chief of Defence Force to comment.”
In fact, none of the issues before that court relate to the surveillance or security manual.
Coleman’s press secretary said the minister was not available for comment and to try again next week.
Green Party co-leader Russel Norman said the monitoring of Stephenson demonstrates that the security services see the media and journalists as a legitimate target.
“Democracy totally relies on a free and independent press,” he said. “Current attempts to strengthen the security apparatus for monitoring New Zealanders is deeply disturbing and menacing for democracy.”
An internal Defence document leaked to the Star-Times reveals that defence security staff viewed investigative journalists as “hostile” threats requiring “counteraction”. The classified security manual lists security threats, including “certain investigative journalists” who may attempt to obtain “politically sensitive information”.
The manual says Chief of Defence Force approval is required before any NZDF participation in “counter intelligence activity” is undertaken. (See separate story)
Stephenson took defamation action against the Defence Force after Jones claimed that Stephenson had invented a story about visiting an Afghan base as part of an article about mishandling of prisoners.
Although the case ended with a hung jury two weeks ago, Jones conceded during the hearing that he now accepted Stephenson had visited the base and interviewed its Afghan commander.
Victoria University lecturer in media studies Peter Thompson said the Afghanistan monitoring and the security manual’s view of investigative journalists confirmed the concerns raised in the High Court case.
There was “a concerted and deliberate effort to denigrate that journalist’s reputation for political ends”.
There is currently controversy in the United States over government monitoring of journalists. In May the Associated Press reported that the Justice Department had secretly obtained two months’ worth of phone records of its reporters and editors.
The media organisation said it was a “massive and unprecedented intrusion” into its news gathering process.
PROBING JOURNALISTS DEEMED THREAT
A leaked New Zealand Defence Force security manual reveals it sees three main “subversion” threats it needs to protect itself against: foreign intelligence services, organisations with extreme ideologies and “certain investigative journalists”.
In the minds of the defence chiefs, probing journalists apparently belong on the same list as the KGB and al Qaeda.
The manual’s first chapter is called “Basic Principles of Defence Security”. It says a key part of protecting classified information is investigating the “capabilities and intentions of hostile organisations and individuals” and taking counteraction against them.
The manual, which was issued as an order by the Chief of Defence Force, places journalists among the hostile individuals. It defines “The Threat” as espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, and includes investigative journalists under the heading “subversion”.
Subversion, it says, is action designed to “weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.”
It highlights people acquiring classified information to “bring the Government into disrepute”.
This threat came from hostile intelligence services and extreme organisations, and “there is also a threat from certain investigative journalists who may seek to acquire and exploit official information for similar reasons”, it says.
Viewing journalism as a security threat has serious implications. The manual states that “plans to counter the activities of hostile intelligence services and subversive organisations and individuals must be based on accurate and timely intelligence concerning the identity, capabilities and intentions of the hostile elements”.
It says “one means of obtaining security intelligence is the investigation of breaches of security”.
This is where the security manual may be relevant to the monitoring of Jon Stephenson’s phone calls. The Defence Force was unhappy at Stephenson’s access to confidential information about prisoner handling in Afghanistan and began investigating to discover his sources.
The manual continues that “counter intelligence” means “activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security”, including by individuals engaged in “subversion”.
It notes: “The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service is the only organisation sanctioned to conduct Counter Intelligence activities in New Zealand. [Chief of Defence Force] approval is required before any NZDF participation in any CI activity is undertaken.”
Under the NZSIS Act, subversion is a legal justification for surveillance of an individual.
The sources who described the monitoring of Stephenson’s phone calls in Afghanistan said the NZSIS has an officer based in Kabul who was known to be involved in the Stephenson investigations.
To reinforce its concern, the defence security manual raises investigative journalists a second time under a category called “non-traditional threats”. The threat of investigative journalists, it says, is that they may attempt to obtain “politically sensitive information”.
Politically sensitive information, such as the kind of stories that Stephenson was writing, is however about politics and political accountability, not security. Metro magazine editor Simon Wilson, who has published a number of Jon Stephenson’s prisoner stories, said the Defence Force seemed to see Stephenson as the “enemy”, as a threat to the Defence Force.
“But that’s not how Jon works and how journalism works,” he said. “Jon is just going about his business as a journalist.”
The New Zealand Defence Force “seems to be confusing national security with its own desire not to be embarrassed by disclosures that reveal it has broken the rules”, he said.
Last updated 05:00 28/07/2013
NICKY HAGER
Find this story at 28 july 2013
© 2011 Fairfax New Zealand Limited
Bundesheer-Lauschstation als Teil einer US-PeilketteAugust 16, 2013
Die Amerikaner finanzierten den Horchposten Königswarte bei Hainburg und banden ihn in ein ganzes Netz ein, das sich von Norwegen über Deutschland bis Italien zog.
Das österreichische Heeresnachrichtenamt (HNA) und der US-Militärgeheimdienst (NSA) tauschen seit mehr als 50 Jahren Informationen aus. Einer der Angelpunkte der Kooperation ist der Horchposten auf der Königswarte bei Hainburg an der Grenze zur Slowakei. Finanziert haben die Station die Amerikaner. Das bestätigte ein Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums bereits in der Samstagsausgabe der „Presse“. Das Nachrichtenmagazin „Profil“ förderte nun weitere Details zutage.
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Demnach waren die 1958 errichtete Königswarte und kleinere Stationen in Neulengbach, Großharras, Gols, Pirka bei Graz und Stockham bei Wels Teil einer amerikanischen Peilkette, die sich von Norwegen über Deutschland bis nach Italien zog. Österreich war der einzige neutrale Staat in diesem Nato-Lauschverbund. Die USA haben die immer noch aktive Anlage auf der Königswarte ständig erneuert. Von dort aus konnten vor 1989 Gespräche weit hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang belauscht werden. Jetzt stellt sich die Frage, ob immer noch in dieselbe Richtung gehorcht wird. Wie „Die Presse“ erfuhr, verhalfen die Österreicher der NSA zu Informationen, die 2007 zur Ergreifung einer deutschen Terrorzelle, der Sauerland-Gruppe, geführt haben.
Mit den abgefangenen Daten hat das Bundesheer laut „Profil“ immer schon wenig anfangen können. Die Bänder seien stets zu einer US-Station nahe Frankfurt geflogen worden. Wie „Die Presse“ berichtete, hat die NSA im Kalten Krieg einen Vertrag mit dem HNA abgeschlossen. In den Nullerjahren, nach den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001, soll das Dokument erneuert und ergänzt worden sein. Das bestätigten mehrere Quellen, sowohl Politiker als auch hochrangige Beamte aus dem Sicherheitsbereich. Das Verteidigungsministerium wollte sich nichtdazu äußern, die US-Botschaft in Wien ebenso wenig, sie betonte jedoch die „sehr gute Kooperation mit dem österreichischen Militär und den österreichischen Nachrichtendiensten“.
FPÖ-Chef Heinz-Christian Strache forderte Bundeskanzler Faymann und Verteidigungsminister Klug auf, unverzüglich Stellung zum Geheimvertrag mit der NSA zu nehmen. Es müsse überprüft werden, inwieweit die Neutralität verletzt worden sei.
13.07.2013 | 17:57 | von CHRISTIAN ULTSCH (Die Presse)
Find this story at 13 July 2013
© 2013 DiePresse.com
NSA hat Vertrag mit Österreich abgeschlossenAugust 16, 2013
Die National Security Agency schloss im Kalten Krieg eine Vereinbarung mit dem Heeresnachrichtenamt und finanzierte dessen Horchposten bei Hainburg. Im Krieg gegen den Terror haben Österreich und die USA das Abkommen erneuert.
Es ist eines der großen Geheimnisse der Republik, aber wirklich gut gehütet ist es nicht: Das neutrale Österreich hat mit dem US-Nachrichtendienst NSA (National Security Agency) einen Vertrag abgeschlossen. Darin sind die Rahmenbedingungen für die Zusammenarbeit und den Informationsaustausch zwischen der US-Überwachungsbehörde und dem Heeresnachrichtenamt HNaA, dem Auslandsnachrichtendienst des österreichischen Bundesheeres, festgelegt. Seine Wurzeln hat das Dokument im Kalten Krieg, doch nach den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 hat es der damalige NSA-Direktor, Michael Hayden, erneuern lassen. Das erfuhr „Die Presse“ aus mehreren Quellen: von österreichischen Politikern und hochrangigen Beamten im Sicherheitsbereich.
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Michael Bauer, der Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums, will die Existenz des NSA-Vertrags mit Österreich weder bestätigen noch dementieren: „Ich kann dazu nichts sagen.“ Auch die US-Botschaft in Wien äußert sich nicht zu der Vereinbarung. Sie weist jedoch ausdrücklich auf die „sehr gute Kooperation mit dem österreichischen Militär und den österreichischen Nachrichtendiensten“ hin.
Minister Klug schweigt
Die NSA war zuletzt auch Thema im parlamentarischen Unterausschuss für Landesverteidigung. Doch Verteidigungsminister Gerald Klug zog es vor, über den Vertrag zu schweigen. Dass das Heeresnachrichtenamt als Kontaktstelle für die NSA fungiert, ist bekannt. Das Verteidigungsressort hat diesen Umstand nach einem Bericht der „Presse“ vom 13. Juni nicht abgestritten. Damals wie heute betont das Ministerium jedoch, dass das HNaA keinen Massenaustausch von Daten mit anderen Nachrichtendiensten betreibe.
Wie breit der Fluss österreichischer Daten in die USA ist, darüber gehen die Einschätzungen auseinander. Ein Geheimdienst-Insider gab sich gegenüber der „Presse“ überzeugt, dass die Amerikaner in der Lage sind, jegliche elektronische Kommunikation abzufangen. Allein mithilfe ihres Überwachungsprogramms Prism kann die NSA die Verbindungsdaten jeglichen Internetverkehrs aufzeichnen, der über US-Server läuft. Das gestand der US-Botschafter in Wien bei einem Treffen mit Innenministerin Johanna Mikl-Leitner ein. Nachzuvollziehen ist ihre Empörung nicht ganz. Denn ihr Verfassungsschutz ist im Bild über die Aktivitäten der NSA in Österreich.
Die Amerikaner sind unglücklich über den Verlauf der Diskussion seit den Enthüllungen des Ex-NSA-Mitarbeiters Snowden. Denn ihre Dienste nehmen nicht nur, sie geben auch. So halfen sie jüngst bei der Befreiung der österreichischen Geisel im Jemen. Umgekehrt lieferte Österreich angeblich Informationen an die NSA, die 2007 zur Ergreifung der Sauerland-Gruppe, einer deutschen Terrorzelle, führten.
Die Partnerschaft zwischen österreichischen und US-Geheimdiensten reicht lang zurück, in die Zeit, als Europa noch geteilt war. Einer ihrer Brennpunkte war immer die Königswarte, ein Horchposten des Heeresnachrichtenamts bei Hainburg an der Grenze zur Slowakei, dort, wo früher der Eiserne Vorhang verlief. Die Österreicher waren in der Lage, von den niederen Karpaten aus tief in das sowjetische Imperium hineinzuhören. Ihre Informationen teilten sie zuweilen mit den Amerikanern.
Unterschrieb Platter das Papier?
Auch 24 Jahre nach Ende des Kalten Kriegs ist die Lauschstation des HNaA noch in Betrieb. Vor einiger Zeit wurde sie erneuert. In Militärkreisen kursieren Gerüchte, dass die teure Ausrüstung auf der Königswarte aus den USA stamme. Unter anderem das sei in einem Appendix zum NSA-Vertrag mit Hayden in den Nullerjahren vereinbart worden. Das Papier soll die Unterschrift von Günther Platter tragen, der 2003 bis 2007 Verteidigungsminister war. Im Büro des heutigen Tiroler Landeshauptmannes will man davon nichts wissen.
Michael Bauer, der Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums, bestreitet, dass die Amerikaner die Renovierung der Königswarte finanziert hätten. Ob sie freilich Equipment zur Verfügung stellten, kann der Oberst nicht sagen. Was er jedoch bestätigen kann, ist für das historische Selbstverständnis Österreichs brisant: „Die Königswarte war zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges ein Vorposten der Amerikaner. Sie haben die Anlage finanziell unterstützt.“ Wirklich neutral agierte Österreich schon damals nicht.
(“Die Presse” Printausgabe vom 13.07.2013)
12.07.2013 | 17:08 | VON RAINER NOWAK UND CHRISTIAN ULTSCH (Die Presse)
Find this story at 12 July 2013
© 2013 DiePresse.com
The NSA’s mass and indiscriminate spying on BraziliansAugust 16, 2013
As it does in many non-adversarial countries, the surveillance agency is bulk collecting the communications of millions of citizens of Brazil
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The National Security Administration headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Whistleblower Edward Snowden worked as a data miner for the NSA in Hawaii. Photograph: Jim Lo Scalzo/EPA
I’ve written an article on NSA surveillance for the front page of the Sunday edition of O Globo, the large Brazilian newspaper based in Rio de Janeiro. The article is headlined (translated) “US spied on millions of emails and calls of Brazilians”, and I co-wrote it with Globo reporters Roberto Kaz and Jose Casado. The rough translation of the article into English is here. The main page of Globo’s website lists related NSA stories: here.
As the headline suggests, the crux of the main article details how the NSA has, for years, systematically tapped into the Brazilian telecommunication network and indiscriminately intercepted, collected and stored the email and telephone records of millions of Brazilians. The story follows an article in Der Spiegel last week, written by Laura Poitras and reporters from that paper, detailing the NSA’s mass and indiscriminate collection of the electronic communications of millions of Germans. There are many more populations of non-adversarial countries which have been subjected to the same type of mass surveillance net by the NSA: indeed, the list of those which haven’t been are shorter than those which have. The claim that any other nation is engaging in anything remotely approaching indiscriminate worldwide surveillance of this sort is baseless.
As those two articles detail, all of this bulk, indiscriminate surveillance aimed at populations of friendly foreign nations is part of the NSA’s “FAIRVIEW” program. Under that program, the NSA partners with a large US telecommunications company, the identity of which is currently unknown, and that US company then partners with telecoms in the foreign countries. Those partnerships allow the US company access to those countries’ telecommunications systems, and that access is then exploited to direct traffic to the NSA’s repositories. Both articles are based on top secret documents provided by Edward Snowden; O Globo published several of them.
The vast majority of the GuardianUS’s revelations thus far have concerned NSA domestic spying: the bulk collection of telephone records, the PRISM program, Obama’s presidential directive that authorizes domestic use of cyber-operations, the Boundless Informant data detailing billions of records collected from US systems, the serial falsehoods publicly voiced by top Obama officials about the NSA’s surveillance schemes, and most recently, the bulk collection of email and internet metadata records for Americans. Future stories in the GuardianUS will largely continue to focus on the NSA’s domestic spying.
But contrary to what some want to suggest, the privacy rights of Americans aren’t the only ones that matter. That the US government – in complete secrecy – is constructing a ubiquitous spying apparatus aimed not only at its own citizens, but all of the world’s citizens, has profound consequences. It erodes, if not eliminates, the ability to use the internet with any remnant of privacy or personal security. It vests the US government with boundless power over those to whom it has no accountability. It permits allies of the US – including aggressively oppressive ones – to benefit from indiscriminate spying on their citizens’ communications. It radically alters the balance of power between the US and ordinary citizens of the world. And it sends an unmistakable signal to the world that while the US very minimally values the privacy rights of Americans, it assigns zero value to the privacy of everyone else on the planet.
This development – the construction of a worldwide, ubiquitous electronic surveillance apparatus – is self-evidently newsworthy, extreme, and dangerous. It deserves transparency. People around the world have no idea that all of their telephonic and internet communications are being collected, stored and analyzed by a distant government. But that’s exactly what is happening, in secrecy and with virtually no accountability. And it is inexorably growing, all in the dark. At the very least, it merits public understanding and debate. That is now possible thanks solely to these disclosures.
The Guardian’s reporting
One brief note on the Guardian is merited here: I’ve been continuously amazed by how intrepid, fearless and committed the Guardian’s editors have been in reporting these NSA stories as effectively and aggressively as possible. They have never flinched in reporting these stories, have spared no expense in pursuing them, have refused to allow vague and baseless government assertions to suppress any of the newsworthy revelations, have devoted extraordinary resources to ensure accuracy and potency, and have generally been animated by exactly the kind of adversarial journalistic ethos that has been all too lacking over the last decade or so (see this Atlantic article from yesterday highlighting the role played by the Guardian US’s editor-in-chief, Janine Gibson).
I don’t need to say any of this, but do so only because it’s so true and impressive: they deserve a lot of credit for the impact these stories have had. To underscore that: because we’re currently working on so many articles involving NSA domestic spying, it would have been weeks, at least, before we would have been able to publish this story about indiscriminate NSA surveillance of Brazilians. Rather than sit on such a newsworthy story – especially at a time when Latin America, for several reasons, is so focused on these revelations – they were enthused about my partnering with O Globo, where it could produce the most impact. In other words, they sacrificed short-term competitive advantage for the sake of the story by encouraging me to write this story with O Globo. I don’t think many media outlets would have made that choice, but that’s the kind of journalistic virtue that has driven the paper’s editors from the start of this story.
This has been a Guardian story from the start and will continue to be. Snowden came to us before coming to any other media outlet, and I’ll continue to write virtually all NSA stories right in this very space. But the O Globo story will resonate greatly in Brazil and more broadly in Latin America, where most people had no idea that their electronic communications were being collected in bulk by this highly secretive US agency. For more on how the Guardian’s editors have overseen the reporting of the NSA stories, see this informative interview on the Charlie Rose Show from last week with Gibson and Guardian editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger:
Glenn Greenwald
theguardian.com, Sunday 7 July 2013 00.32 BST
Find this story at 7 July 2013
© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
Brazil wants answers on US surveillanceAugust 16, 2013
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota is deeply concerned about the scope of a US monitoring programme targeting Brazilians.
Whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed top secret US surveillance programmes to alert the public [Reuters]
Brazil’s foreign minister has said his government is worried by a report that the United States has collected data on millions of telephone and email conversations in his country and promised to push for international protection of internet privacy.
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota on Sunday expressed “deep concern at the report that electronic and telephone communications of Brazilian citizens are being the object of espionage by organs of American intelligence.
“The Brazilian government has asked for clarifications” through the US Embassy in Brazil and Brazil’s embassy in Washington, he said.
Patriota also said Brazil will ask the UN for measures “to impede abuses and protect the privacy” of internet users, laying down rules for governments.
The O Globo newspaper reported over the weekend that information released by NSA leaker Edward Snowden shows that the number of telephone and email messages logged by the US National Security Agency in January alone was not
far behind the 2.3 million reportedly collected in the United States.
The spokesman for the US embassy in Brazil’s capital, Dean Chaves, said earlier that any response to the O Globo report would be issued in Washington.
There was no immediate response from the office of the US national intelligence director’s office on Sunday, but in response to earlier reports of covert monitoring in Europe, the office said it would respond to concerns of specific nations through diplomatic channels.
However, “as a matter of policy, we have made clear that the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations,” last month’s statement said, without providing further details.
The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Sunday that Snowden’s overall disclosures have undermined US relationships with other countries and affected what he calls “the importance of trust”.
O Globo’s article said that “Brazil, with extensive digitalised public and private networks operated by large telecommunications and internet companies, appears to stand out on maps of the US agency as a priority target for telephony and data traffic, alongside nations such as China, Russia and Pakistan.”
The report did not describe the sort of data collected, but the US programs appear to gather what is called metadata: Logs of message times, addresses and other information rather than the content of the messages.
The report was co-authored by US journalist Glenn Greenwald, who has been key in earlier reports on Snowden’s revelations.
In a column Sunday for the British-based newspaper The Guardian, Greenwald said that “the NSA has, for years, systematically tapped into the Brazilian telecommunication network and indiscriminately intercepted, collected and stored the email and telephone records of millions of Brazilians.”
He said Brazil was merely an example of a global practice.
Last Modified: 07 Jul 2013 20:49
Find this story at 7 July 2013
© www.aljazeera.com
XKeyscore: NSA tool collects ‘nearly everything a user does on the internet’August 16, 2013
• XKeyscore gives ‘widest-reaching’ collection of online data
• NSA analysts require no prior authorization for searches
• Sweeps up emails, social media activity and browsing history
• NSA’s XKeyscore program – read one of the presentations
One presentation claims the XKeyscore program covers ‘nearly everything a typical user does on the internet’
A top secret National Security Agency program allows analysts to search with no prior authorization through vast databases containing emails, online chats and the browsing histories of millions of individuals, according to documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.
The NSA boasts in training materials that the program, called XKeyscore, is its “widest-reaching” system for developing intelligence from the internet.
The latest revelations will add to the intense public and congressional debate around the extent of NSA surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to the Guardian’s earlier stories on bulk collection of phone records and Fisa surveillance court oversight.
The files shed light on one of Snowden’s most controversial statements, made in his first video interview published by the Guardian on June 10.
“I, sitting at my desk,” said Snowden, could “wiretap anyone, from you or your accountant, to a federal judge or even the president, if I had a personal email”.
US officials vehemently denied this specific claim. Mike Rogers, the Republican chairman of the House intelligence committee, said of Snowden’s assertion: “He’s lying. It’s impossible for him to do what he was saying he could do.”
But training materials for XKeyscore detail how analysts can use it and other systems to mine enormous agency databases by filling in a simple on-screen form giving only a broad justification for the search. The request is not reviewed by a court or any NSA personnel before it is processed.
XKeyscore, the documents boast, is the NSA’s “widest reaching” system developing intelligence from computer networks – what the agency calls Digital Network Intelligence (DNI). One presentation claims the program covers “nearly everything a typical user does on the internet”, including the content of emails, websites visited and searches, as well as their metadata.
Analysts can also use XKeyscore and other NSA systems to obtain ongoing “real-time” interception of an individual’s internet activity.
Under US law, the NSA is required to obtain an individualized Fisa warrant only if the target of their surveillance is a ‘US person’, though no such warrant is required for intercepting the communications of Americans with foreign targets. But XKeyscore provides the technological capability, if not the legal authority, to target even US persons for extensive electronic surveillance without a warrant provided that some identifying information, such as their email or IP address, is known to the analyst.
One training slide illustrates the digital activity constantly being collected by XKeyscore and the analyst’s ability to query the databases at any time.
The purpose of XKeyscore is to allow analysts to search the metadata as well as the content of emails and other internet activity, such as browser history, even when there is no known email account (a “selector” in NSA parlance) associated with the individual being targeted.
Analysts can also search by name, telephone number, IP address, keywords, the language in which the internet activity was conducted or the type of browser used.
One document notes that this is because “strong selection [search by email address] itself gives us only a very limited capability” because “a large amount of time spent on the web is performing actions that are anonymous.”
The NSA documents assert that by 2008, 300 terrorists had been captured using intelligence from XKeyscore.
Analysts are warned that searching the full database for content will yield too many results to sift through. Instead they are advised to use the metadata also stored in the databases to narrow down what to review.
A slide entitled “plug-ins” in a December 2012 document describes the various fields of information that can be searched. It includes “every email address seen in a session by both username and domain”, “every phone number seen in a session (eg address book entries or signature block)” and user activity – “the webmail and chat activity to include username, buddylist, machine specific cookies etc”.
Email monitoring
In a second Guardian interview in June, Snowden elaborated on his statement about being able to read any individual’s email if he had their email address. He said the claim was based in part on the email search capabilities of XKeyscore, which Snowden says he was authorized to use while working as a Booz Allen contractor for the NSA.
One top-secret document describes how the program “searches within bodies of emails, webpages and documents”, including the “To, From, CC, BCC lines” and the ‘Contact Us’ pages on websites”.
To search for emails, an analyst using XKS enters the individual’s email address into a simple online search form, along with the “justification” for the search and the time period for which the emails are sought.
The analyst then selects which of those returned emails they want to read by opening them in NSA reading software.
The system is similar to the way in which NSA analysts generally can intercept the communications of anyone they select, including, as one NSA document put it, “communications that transit the United States and communications that terminate in the United States”.
One document, a top secret 2010 guide describing the training received by NSA analysts for general surveillance under the Fisa Amendments Act of 2008, explains that analysts can begin surveillance on anyone by clicking a few simple pull-down menus designed to provide both legal and targeting justifications. Once options on the pull-down menus are selected, their target is marked for electronic surveillance and the analyst is able to review the content of their communications:
Chats, browsing history and other internet activity
Beyond emails, the XKeyscore system allows analysts to monitor a virtually unlimited array of other internet activities, including those within social media.
An NSA tool called DNI Presenter, used to read the content of stored emails, also enables an analyst using XKeyscore to read the content of Facebook chats or private messages.
An analyst can monitor such Facebook chats by entering the Facebook user name and a date range into a simple search screen.
Analysts can search for internet browsing activities using a wide range of information, including search terms entered by the user or the websites viewed.
As one slide indicates, the ability to search HTTP activity by keyword permits the analyst access to what the NSA calls “nearly everything a typical user does on the internet”.
The XKeyscore program also allows an analyst to learn the IP addresses of every person who visits any website the analyst specifies.
The quantity of communications accessible through programs such as XKeyscore is staggeringly large. One NSA report from 2007 estimated that there were 850bn “call events” collected and stored in the NSA databases, and close to 150bn internet records. Each day, the document says, 1-2bn records were added.
William Binney, a former NSA mathematician, said last year that the agency had “assembled on the order of 20tn transactions about US citizens with other US citizens”, an estimate, he said, that “only was involving phone calls and emails”. A 2010 Washington Post article reported that “every day, collection systems at the [NSA] intercept and store 1.7bn emails, phone calls and other type of communications.”
The XKeyscore system is continuously collecting so much internet data that it can be stored only for short periods of time. Content remains on the system for only three to five days, while metadata is stored for 30 days. One document explains: “At some sites, the amount of data we receive per day (20+ terabytes) can only be stored for as little as 24 hours.”
To solve this problem, the NSA has created a multi-tiered system that allows analysts to store “interesting” content in other databases, such as one named Pinwale which can store material for up to five years.
It is the databases of XKeyscore, one document shows, that now contain the greatest amount of communications data collected by the NSA.
In 2012, there were at least 41 billion total records collected and stored in XKeyscore for a single 30-day period.
Legal v technical restrictions
While the Fisa Amendments Act of 2008 requires an individualized warrant for the targeting of US persons, NSA analysts are permitted to intercept the communications of such individuals without a warrant if they are in contact with one of the NSA’s foreign targets.
The ACLU’s deputy legal director, Jameel Jaffer, told the Guardian last month that national security officials expressly said that a primary purpose of the new law was to enable them to collect large amounts of Americans’ communications without individualized warrants.
“The government doesn’t need to ‘target’ Americans in order to collect huge volumes of their communications,” said Jaffer. “The government inevitably sweeps up the communications of many Americans” when targeting foreign nationals for surveillance.
An example is provided by one XKeyscore document showing an NSA target in Tehran communicating with people in Frankfurt, Amsterdam and New York.
In recent years, the NSA has attempted to segregate exclusively domestic US communications in separate databases. But even NSA documents acknowledge that such efforts are imperfect, as even purely domestic communications can travel on foreign systems, and NSA tools are sometimes unable to identify the national origins of communications.
Moreover, all communications between Americans and someone on foreign soil are included in the same databases as foreign-to-foreign communications, making them readily searchable without warrants.
Some searches conducted by NSA analysts are periodically reviewed by their supervisors within the NSA. “It’s very rare to be questioned on our searches,” Snowden told the Guardian in June, “and even when we are, it’s usually along the lines of: ‘let’s bulk up the justification’.”
In a letter this week to senator Ron Wyden, director of national intelligence James Clapper acknowledged that NSA analysts have exceeded even legal limits as interpreted by the NSA in domestic surveillance.
Acknowledging what he called “a number of compliance problems”, Clapper attributed them to “human error” or “highly sophisticated technology issues” rather than “bad faith”.
However, Wyden said on the Senate floor on Tuesday: “These violations are more serious than those stated by the intelligence community, and are troubling.”
In a statement to the Guardian, the NSA said: “NSA’s activities are focused and specifically deployed against – and only against – legitimate foreign intelligence targets in response to requirements that our leaders need for information necessary to protect our nation and its interests.
“XKeyscore is used as a part of NSA’s lawful foreign signals intelligence collection system.
“Allegations of widespread, unchecked analyst access to NSA collection data are simply not true. Access to XKeyscore, as well as all of NSA’s analytic tools, is limited to only those personnel who require access for their assigned tasks … In addition, there are multiple technical, manual and supervisory checks and balances within the system to prevent deliberate misuse from occurring.”
“Every search by an NSA analyst is fully auditable, to ensure that they are proper and within the law.
“These types of programs allow us to collect the information that enables us to perform our missions successfully – to defend the nation and to protect US and allied troops abroad.”
Glenn Greenwald
theguardian.com, Wednesday 31 July 2013 13.56 BST
Find this story at 31 July 2013
© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies
Snooping Fears; German Firms Race to Shield SecretsAugust 16, 2013
Edward Snowden’s revelations about data surveillance have left German firms feeling acutely vulnerable to industrial espionage. In the medium-sized business sector, which contains a host of world leaders in high-tech fields, the race is on to shield vital know-how.
Markus Stäudinger is a cautious person — especially when he’s sitting in front of his computer. He’s an IT security expert at Gustav Eirich, a southern German engineering company that makes industrial mixing equipment, and he has been encrypting his emails for years. “While I was typing I always had in the back of my mind that it could still be deciphered,” says Stäudinger, 48. He has tried to entrench that mindset in his company.
Stäudinger has spent years trying to enhance the security of Eirich’s data and communications. He kept telling colleagues to be careful when dealing with sensitive information. He installed extra security features on notebooks and smartphones before they were taken off company premises. Some of the firm’s 750 employees probably shook their heads at all this paranoia. But now, after the NSA revelations of whistleblower Edward Snowden, they all know that Stäudinger was right. “We were always aware that the intelligence services and business work closely together in the US,” said the IT expert. “When we heard about what’s been going on, it didn’t hit us completely out of the blue.”
Other companies were taken by surprise, though. Be it Prism, Tempora or XKeyscore, reports about mass electronic surveillance and tapped Internet hubs and trans-Atlantic data lines have alarmed German companies. Many firms are now worried that the intelligence services aren’t just trying to pinpoint terrorists but to get at German industrial secrets as well. They fear that their lead over US, British and French competitors could be at risk. And they’ve suddenly realized that they’ve got to do something to protect themselves against the organized theft of data.
“The reports of the activities of intelligence services are a wake-up call for many companies. It sent alarm bells ringing,” said Rainer Glatz, director of product and know-how protection at the VDMA German engineering association. In the past, warnings of hacker attacks and IT espionage often fell on deaf ears. But now Germany’s small and medium-sized business sector, or Mittelstand, often described as the backbone of the German economy, has woken up to the risk. “There is growing sensitivity,” said Glatz. “In many firms, the management boards are now thinking about how they can shield themselves better.”
Spying Causes Billions of Euros in Damage
Action is urgently needed. At most, only one in four Mittelstand firms has an IT security strategy, said Christian Schaaf, founder of the Munich-based consultancy Corporate Trust. Many have limited themselves to a simple firewall and a few anti-virus programs. But that’s not enough to keep out professional hackers, let alone the likes of the NSA. “Many companies are starting to realize that they have to cast a safety net over their data,” said Schaaf.
There’s plenty to spy on in the Mittelstand, with its thousands of high-tech businesses, ranging from newly developed products to production processes and process control systems, as well as customer lists and price offers in contract tenders. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, estimates that industrial espionage causes damage totalling between €30 billion and €60 billion ($40 billion to $80 billion) per year. No one knows the exact figure because companies in Germany and across Europe tend to keep quiet when they find out they have been spied on. There are a number of reasons for this: They’re afraid of copycat espionage, they don’t want to reveal to potential new attackers where their weak points are and what they’re doing to protect themselves. And they’re afraid that they may lose customers if their data leaks become public.
Engineering company Gustav Eirich would be worth spying on. The 150-year-old, family-owned business from Hardheim in the Odenwald region of southern Germany is among the world leaders in its field. Eirich’s machines can mix chemicals and all sorts of materials faster, more thoroughly and more efficiently than those of its international competitors. This is thanks to a host of inventions and innovations that the company has had patented. “Our know-how is our big competitive advantage,” said security chief Stäudinger. And Eirich is doing all it possibly can to protect that lead.
Possible Boost For German Data Security Firms
The company refrains from storing information in foreign data processing centers. Video conferences, data transmission and emails — Eirich handles all that via its own cloud server. Skype is forbidden, and the use of Facebook is discouraged. All staff members are given clear instructions to avoid any unintentional releases of sensitive data. As a rule, the company encrypts all emails it sends outside the firm, if the clients go along with that, and they use German software to do the encrypting. “With US programs the intelligence agency will definitely have the general key,” said Stäudinger. “That’s why we try to use domestic products whenever we can.” In Germany, security authorities usually don’t get access to the algorhythms of firms that offer encryption.
Germany’s comparatively strict rules on data privacy protection represent a possible competitive advantage for German suppliers of IT security. Data processing centers based in Germany have been enjoying a strong increase in demand of late, said Gatz, VDMA’s IT security expert. Providers of private clouds such as Demando, a subsdiary of the Kaiserslautern municipal utility company, offer their customers their own server cabinets and can even make exclusive glass fiber lines available to them so that they don’t have to send sensitive data through the Internet.
However, even such lines can be tapped into, and almost every encryption code can be cracked. “You can never guarantee 100 percent security,” said Stäudinger. “We know there’s a residual risk. But we set the hurdles as high as possible.” Maybe that will make potential attackers seek easier targets: among companies with less distrustful security chiefs.
07/23/2013 06:04 PM
By Claus Hecking
Find this story at 23 July 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
Ghosts of the NSA Relics of Cold War Spying Dot GermanyAugust 16, 2013
The National Security Agency has long been active in Germany, though much of its spying was conducted against the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Today, former listening stations and other facilities dot the German landscape.
Tracking down traces of the National Security Agency in Germany isn’t particularly difficult. One merely has to head to Berlin and look for the city’s highest point. It can be found in the southwest corner of the city — Teufeslberg, or “Devil’s Mountain.” Made of piled up rubble gathered from Berlin following World War II, the “mountain” rises 115 meters (377 feet) above the nearby waterway known as the Havel.
In the winter, it is the place where Berliners meet to sled; in the summer it is a haven for mountain bikers and daytrippers. And hobby historians: At the very top of the hill stands the most famous NSA relict in Germany — five gigantic white radar balls. The listening station was used until the end of the Cold War, primarily to spy on the east.
Teufelsberg used to be part of the NSA’s global espionage network called Echelon, which the US intelligence service used to keep an eye on Moscow. From 1957 to 1991, the NSA maintained a presence on Teufelsberg and eavesdropped on satellite-based telephone conversations, filtered fax reports and analyzed Internet datasets. The NSA was still doing all that in 2013, as SPIEGEL recently reported, but it no longer requires the massive radar towers.
Desolate and in Disrepair
Today, the artificial hill looks desolate. When the Americans withdrew, the listening station began to fall into disrepair. The covering on the radomes is torn in many places, and inside the facility weeds are growing out of the debris.
But it’s not just weather and age that have led the buildings to deteriorate. Shortly after the turn of the century, the government of the city-state of Berlin decided that guarding the empty facility had become too expensive. It then became the target of regular break-ins and vandalism. Rotraud von der Heide, an artist and the curator of the Initiative Teufelsberg, a group seeking to preserve the facility, says, “the facility is totally destroyed because private owners weren’t able to carry out their construction plans, and now the building permits have expired. For the past year-and-a-half, two young people have been leasing it.” Originally, a conference hotel had been envisioned for the site, but those plans ultimately failed.
Those leasing the site are now responsible for security at the facility. Using revenues generated through frequent tours, they are financing the constant repairs required for the fence surrounding property. “New holes are cut in the fence every night, and we turn trespassers over to the police,” said von der Heide. “Earlier, people had parties in the facility. There were also copper thieves who ripped wires out of the walls. That’s no longer possible now.”
Big Plans
The initiative has big plans for the hill. During Germany’s “Day of Open Monuments,” in September, they plan to open the former listening station to the public for three days.
By then, von der Heide plans to completely transform the area into one giant artwork. “The hill is becoming more and more fantastic. It’s a magical art space that is constantly changing,” the artist says. That’s also a product of anonymous graffiti artists whose paintings cover the massive walls and the insides of the radomes, she says.
A second NSA listening station in Germany, located some 200 kilometers to the west — represents the opposite extreme. Whereas the Teufelsberg radomes were difficult to ignore, the facility in Schöningen, near Braunschweig, was more hidden. Mayor Henry Bäsecke says that there was an American facility in the nearby forest consisting of “containers and large antennas. But the facility has since been torn down. “There’s nothing left here, and nature is slowly reconquering the property,” Bäsecke says.
At Least 17 Surveillance Hubs at Cold War Peak
Some 50 kilometers south of Munich is yet another listening post of note. Bad Aibling the southernmost facility in a chain of such espionage centers operated in Germany by US intelligence agencies. In 1989, shortly before the end of the Cold War, SPIEGEL counted 17 such surveillance hubs. But it’s a figure that may have been even higher. The network extended from the town of Schleswig near the Danish border right down to the edge of the Alps. Most of the facilities were located close to the former border between West and East Germany, as close as possible to the enemy.
In Bad Aibling, the outsized radomes of the disused listening station also dominate the landscape. In 2004, the Americans left, but Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, the BND, continues to operate nearby. The 17,000 resident city is hard at work transforming the 134 hectare (331 acre) property for civilian use. The community has already turned a small part of the property into sporting facilities, Peter Schmid of the city administration says. Here, local teams play football in the shadows of the radomes. The rest is to be built up by a property developer, with plans for a zero-energy settlement to be constructed.
Still, the area’s eventful history hasn’t been forgotten. Since 2009, it has hosted an annual electro- and house-music festival that attracted 17,000 fans last year to revel between the radar towers and a former aircraft hangar. The name of the two-day festival recalls the American spy network: The Echelon festival.
07/05/2013 03:24 PM
By Johannes Korge
Find this story at 5 July 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
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