Geheimdienst-Kooperation; BND versorgte NSA mit TelefondatenJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Der Bundesnachrichtendienst soll mehr als drei Jahre lang Telefondaten in Frankfurt abgefangen und direkt an den US-Geheimdienst NSA weitergeleitet haben. Die Aktion sei beendet worden, weil sie als „politisch viel zu heikel“ galt, berichten Medien unter Berufung auf einen Insider.
Der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) soll laut Recherchen von „Süddeutscher Zeitung“ sowie den Sendern NDR und WDR jahrelang Telefondaten direkt an die NSA weitergeleitet haben. Noch im vergangenen Jahr hatten hochrangige Behördenvertreter gegenüber dem zuständigen Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium zwar zugegeben, dass sie einen Datenknotenpunkt in Frankfurt am Main anzapfen würden – aber laut der “Süddeutschen Zeitung” nicht erwähnt, dass sie einen Teil dieser Rohdaten an die NSA weitergeleitet hatten.
Gerüchte gab es schon lange
Gerüchte, dass die NSA den Frankfurter Datenknotenpunkt angezapft hätte, gab es spätestens seit den Enthüllungen durch Edward Snowden. Schließlich ist Frankfurt der wichtigste Telekommunikationsstandort Europas. Deshalb soll die NSA laut „Süddeutscher Zeitung“ darauf gedrängt haben, einen direkten Zugriff auf den Datenknoten zu erhalten. Der damalige Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder (SPD) habe dies jedoch verweigert. Dass der BND von da an einen Teil der Daten an die Amerikaner weitergeleitet hätte, sei demnach ein Kompromiss gewesen. Außerdem soll es eine Vereinbarung zwischen NSA und BND gegeben haben, dass keine Daten deutscher Staatsbürger übermittelt werden.
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Gerhard Schröder, Edward snowden, Geheimdienste, Frankfurt am Main, Telefondaten, BND, Bundesnachrichtendienst, NSA
Operation wurde erst 2007 beendet
Die Operation soll von 2004 bis 2007 gedauert haben. Zu Beginn der Zusammenarbeit regierte im Bund Rot-Grün, verantwortlich war zunächst der damalige Kanzleramtschef und heutige Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD). Die Einstellung der Kooperation begründete ein „mit den Abläufen vertrauter Beteiligter“ gegenüber der “Süddeutschen” damit, dass sie „politisch viel zu heikel“ gewesen sei. Die NSA habe die Operation fortführen wollen.
BND fasst weiterhin „interessante Ergebnisse“ zusammen
Seitdem haben angeblich nur noch die deutschen Nachrichtendienste Zugriff auf den Knotenpunkt in Frankfurt – zumindest stellten es Regierungskreise gegenüber dem Recherche-Team von Süddeutschen Zeitung, NRD und WDR so dar. Doch auch wenn die NSA keine Rohdaten mehr erhalte, so liefere der BND den US-Kollegen nach wie vor Zusammenfassungen interessanter Ergebnisse.
Donnerstag, 26.06.2014, 19:24
Find this story at 26 June 2014
Copyright http://www.focus.de/
Datenknoten Frankfurt BND gab jahrelang Telefondaten an die NSAJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Wie eng BND und NSA zusammenarbeiten, hat der SPIEGEL kürzlich enthüllt. Jetzt berichten Medien, der deutsche Geheimdienst habe vor Jahren auch Daten aus einem Netzknoten in Frankfurt weitergegeben. Bis es “zu heikel” wurde.
Über mehrere Jahre hinweg hat der BND offenbar Telefondaten aus seiner eigenen Sammlung an die NSA weitergegeben. Die “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, NDR und WDR berichten unter Berufung auf einen Insider, der BND habe von 2004 bis 2007 den amerikanischen Kollegen Daten weitergeleitet, die er an einem angezapften Datenknotenpunkt in Frankfurt abgefangen habe. Weil diese Form der Zusammenarbeit offenbar “zu heikel” war, wurde sie 2007 beendet.
Dass sich der Bundesnachrichtendienst in Frankfurt Zugriff auf den Internetverkehr verschafft hat, war bereits bekannt. Nach dem Gesetz muss der deutsche Geheimdient streng filtern, denn deutsche Bürger darf er nicht überwachen. Erst kürzlich wurde im Rahmen des NSA-Untersuchungsausschusses nach den Snowden-Enthüllungen auch die Abhörpraxis des BND genauer beleuchtet und kritisiert.
Nach den Enthüllungen Edward Snowdens wird generell auch vermehrt auf die Rolle der deutschen Dienste geschaut: Nachdem die Bundesregierung von den Machenschaften der NSA nichts gewusst haben will, enthüllten der SPIEGEL und SPIEGEL ONLINE vor einigen Tagen ein ganzes Dossier von Dokumenten aus dem Snowden-Fundus. Die als geheim eingestuften Schriftstücke geben nicht nur Auskunft über die Niederlassungen der NSA in Deutschland (unter anderem übrigens in Frankfurt), sondern auch einen Einblick in die enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem BND und seinen amerikanischen Kollegen.
25. Juni 2014, 19:43 Uhr
Find this story at 25 June 2014
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2014
BND leitete Telefondaten an NSA weiterJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Als “politisch viel zu heikel” wurde diese Zusammenarbeit von NSA und BND 2007 eingestellt. Zuvor aber hatte der Bundesnachrichtendienst jahrelang einen Datenknoten in Frankfurt angezapft und Rohdaten an die Amerikaner weitergeleitet. Ursprünglich soll die NSA noch mehr gefordert haben.
Der US-Geheimdienst NSA hatte mit Hilfe des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) in Frankfurt jahrelang Zugriff auf große Mengen von Telekommunikationsdaten. Nach Recherchen von Süddeutscher Zeitung, NDR und WDR leitete der BND in der Zeit der rot-grünen Bundesregierung mindestens drei Jahre lang in Frankfurt abgefangene Rohdaten direkt an den US-Partnerdienst weiter. Als Kanzleramtschef verantwortlich war damals zunächst der heutige Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD).
Die Operation von BND und NSA, die von 2004 bis 2007 gedauert haben soll, wurde beendet, weil die Aktion “politisch viel zu heikel” gewesen sei, erinnert sich ein mit den Abläufen vertrauter Beteiligter. Die NSA habe gegen die Einstellung der Operation protestiert.
Nach einer damals zwischen NSA und BND geschlossenen Vereinbarung seien Daten deutscher Staatsbürger dabei jedoch nicht übermittelt worden. Ein Sprecher der Bundesregierung erklärte auf Anfrage dazu: Die Arbeit des Auslandsnachrichtendienstes BND unterliege “der parlamentarischen Kontrolle. Grundsätzlich gilt daher, dass der BND zu Aspekten seiner operativen Arbeit ausschließlich der Bundesregierung und den zuständigen, geheim tagenden Gremien des Deutschen Bundestages berichtet”.
Schröder verweigerte NSA direkten Zugang
Wie mehrere Quellen erklären, sei der Fall Frankfurt im vergangenen Jahr von der Spitze des BND in dem zuständigen Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium vorgetragen worden. Dabei sei aber lediglich erklärt worden, der BND zapfe an diesem Datenknotenpunkt Leitungen an. Es sei aber nicht erwähnt worden, dass der BND über Jahre einen Teil der Daten an die NSA weitergeleitet habe.
Es soll sich bei der 2004 gestarteten deutsch-amerikanischen Zusammenarbeit um einen Kompromiss gehandelt haben. Zuvor sollen die Amerikaner darauf gedrungen haben, ihnen einen direkten Zugriff am Telekommunikationsstandort Frankfurt zu gewähren. Diesen Zugang soll die damalige Bundesregierung unter Kanzler Gerhard Schröder (SPD) verweigert haben, aber dafür im Gegenzug einer Weiterleitung von Teilen der abgefangenen Daten zugestimmt haben.
Frankfurt ist Telekommunikationsstandort Nummer eins in Europa und Drehkreuz für den nationalen wie internationalen Internetverkehr. In der Vergangenheit hatte es im Zuge der Snowden-Debatte Gerüchte gegeben, dass die NSA in der Vergangenheit Zugriff auf Daten in Frankfurt gehabt habe. “Wenn ein ausländischer Dienst den Internetknoten in Frankfurt anzapfen würde, wäre das eine Verletzung unserer Souveränitätsrechte”, hatte im vergangenen Jahr der damalige Innenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) erklärt.
Nach Angaben aus Regierungskreisen lauschen heute am Knotenpunkt Frankfurt angeblich nur die deutschen Dienste. Statt Rohdaten erhalte die NSA lediglich Zusammenfassungen interessanter Erkenntnisse.
25. Juni 2014 18:07 Geheimdienste
Von Hans Leyendecker, Georg Mascolo und Frederik Obermaier
Find this story at 25 June 2014
Copyright: Süddeutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien GmbH / Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH
New NSA Revelations Inside Snowden’s Germany FileJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
An analysis of secret documents leaked by Edward Snowden demonstrates that the NSA is more active in Germany than anywhere else in Europe — and that data collected here may have helped kill suspected terrorists.
Just before Christmas 2005, an unexpected event disrupted the work of American spies in the south-central German city of Wiesbaden. During the installation of a fiber-optic cable near the Rhine River, local workers encountered a suspicious metal object, possibly an undetonated World War II explosive. It was certainly possible: Adolf Hitler’s military had once maintained a tank repair yard in the Wiesbaden neighborhood of Mainz-Kastel.
The Americans — who maintained what was officially known as a “Storage Station” on Ludwig Wolker Street — prepared an evacuation plan. And on Jan. 24, 2006, analysts with the National Security Agency (NSA) cleared out their offices, cutting off the intelligence agency’s access to important European data streams for an entire day, a painfully long time. The all-clear only came that night: The potential ordinance turned out to be nothing more than a pile of junk.
Residents in Mainz-Kastel knew nothing of the incident.
Of course, everybody living there knows of the 20-hectare (49-acre) US army compound. A beige wall topped with barbed wire protects the site from the outside world; a sign outside warns, “Beware, Firearms in Use!”
Americans in uniform have been part of the cityscape in Wiesbaden for decades, and local businesses have learned to cater to their customers from abroad. Used-car dealerships post their prices in dollars and many Americans are regulars at the local brewery. “It is a peaceful coexistence,” says Christa Gabriel, head of the Mainz-Kastel district council.
But until now, almost nobody in Wiesbaden knew that Building 4009 of the “Storage Station” houses one of the NSA’s most important European data collection centers. Its official name is the European Technical Center (ETC), and, as documents from the archive of whistleblower Edward Snowden show, it has been expanded in recent years. From an American perspective, the program to improve the center — which was known by the strange code name “GODLIKELESION” — was badly needed. In early 2010, for example, the NSA branch office lost power 150 times within the space just a few months — a serious handicap for a service that strives to monitor all of the world’s data traffic.
On Sept. 19, 2011, the Americans celebrated the reopening of the refurbished ETC, and since then, the building has been the NSA’s “primary communications hub” in Europe. From here, a Snowden document outlines, huge amounts of data are intercepted and forwarded to “NSAers, warfighters and foreign partners in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.” The hub, the document notes, ensures the reliable transfer of data for “the foreseeable future.”
Soon the NSA will have an even more powerful and modern facility at their disposal: Just five kilometers away, in the Clay Kaserne, a US military complex located in the Erbenheim district of Wiesbaden, the “Consolidated Intelligence Center” is under construction. It will house data-monitoring specialists from Mainz-Kastel. The project in southern Hesse comes with a price tag of $124 million (€91 million). When finished, the US government will be even better equipped to satisfy its vast hunger for data.
One year after Edward Snowden made the breadth of the NSA’s global data monitoring public, much remains unknown about the full scope of the intelligence service’s activities in Germany. We know that the Americans monitored the mobile phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and we know that there are listening posts in the US Embassy in Berlin and in the Consulate General in Frankfurt.
But much remains in the dark. The German government has sent lists of questions to the US government on several occasions, and a parliamentary investigative committee has begun looking into the subject in Berlin. Furthermore, Germany’s chief public prosecutor has initiated an investigation into the NSA — albeit one currently limited to its monitoring of the chancellor’s cell phone and not the broader allegation that it spied on the communications of the German public. Neither the government nor German lawmakers nor prosecutors believe they will receive answers from officials in the United States.
German Left Party politician Jan Korte recently asked just how much the German government knows about American spying activities in Germany. The answer: Nothing. The NSA’s promise to send a package including all relevant documents to re-establish transparency between the two governments has been quietly forgotten by the Americans.
In response, SPIEGEL has again reviewed the Snowden documents relating to Germany and compiled a Germany File of original documents pertaining to the NSA’s activities in the country that are now available for download here. SPIEGEL has reported on the contents of some of the documents over the course of the past year. The content of others is now being written about for the first time. Some passages of the documents have been redacted in order to remove sensitive information like the names of NSA employees or those of the German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). This week’s reports are also based on documents and information from other sources.
An Omnipotent American Authority
The German public has a right to know exactly what the NSA is doing in Germany, and should be given the ability to draw its own conclusions about the extent of the US intelligence agency’s activities in the country and the scope of its cooperation with German agencies when it comes to, for example, the monitoring of fiber-optic cables.
The German archive provides the basis for a critical discussion on the necessity and limits of secret service work as well as on the protection of privacy in the age of digital communication. The documents complement the debate over a trans-Atlantic relationship that has been severely damaged by the NSA affair.
They paint a picture of an all-powerful American intelligence agency that has developed an increasingly intimate relationship with Germany over the past 13 years while massively expanding its presence. No other country in Europe plays host to a secret NSA surveillance architecture comparable to the one in Germany. It is a web of sites defined as much by a thirst for total control as by the desire for security. In 2007, the NSA claimed to have at least a dozen active collection sites in Germany.
The documents indicate that the NSA uses its German sites to search for a potential target by analyzing a “Pattern of Life,” in the words of one Snowden file. And one classified report suggests that information collected in Germany is used for the “capture or kill” of alleged terrorists.
According to Paragraph 99 of Germany’s criminal code, spying is illegal on German territory, yet German officials would seem to know next to nothing about the NSA’s activity in their country. For quite some time, it appears, they didn’t even want to know. It wasn’t until Snowden went public with his knowledge that the German government became active.
On June 11, August 26 and October 24 of last year, Berlin sent a catalogue of questions to the US government. During a visit to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland at the beginning of November, German intelligence heads Gerhard Schindler (of the BND) and Hans-Georg Maassen (of the domestic intelligence agency, known as the Office for the Protection of the Constitution or BfV) asked the most important questions in person and, for good measure, handed over a written list. No answers have been forthcoming. This leaves the Snowden documents as the best source for describing how the NSA has turned Germany into its most important base in Europe in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The NSA’s European Headquarters
On March 10, 2004, two US generals — Richard J. Quirk III of the NSA and John Kimmons, who was the US Army’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence — finalized an agreement to establish an operations center in Germany, the European Security Center (ESC), to be located on US Army property in the town of Griesheim near Darmstadt, Germany. That center is now the NSA’s most important listening station in Europe.
The NSA had already dispatched an initial team to southern Germany in early 2003. The agency stationed a half-dozen analysts at the its European headquarters in Stuttgart’s Vaihingen neighborhood, where their work focused largely on North Africa. The analysts’ aims, according to internal documents, included providing support to African governments in securing borders and ensuring that they didn’t offer safe havens to terrorist organizations or their accomplices.
The work quickly bore fruit. It became increasingly easy to track the movements of suspicious persons in Mali, Mauritania and Algeria through the surveillance of satellite telephones. NSA workers passed information on to the US military’s European Command, with some also being shared with individual governments in Africa. A US government document states that the intelligence insights have “been responsible for the capture or kill of over 40 terrorists and has helped achieve GWOT (Global War on Terror) and regional policy successes in Africa.”
Is Germany an NSA Beachhead?
The documents in Snowden’s archive raise the question of whether Germany has become a beachhead for America’s deadly operations against suspected terrorists — and whether the CIA and the American military use data collected in Germany in the deployment of its combat drones. When asked about this by SPIEGEL, the NSA declined to respond.
The operations of the NSA’s analysts in Stuttgart were so successful that the intelligence agency quickly moved to expand its presence. In 2004, the Americans obtained approximately 1,000 square meters (10,750 square feet) of office space in Griesheim to host 59 workers who monitored communications in an effort to “optimize support to Theater operations” of the US Armed Forces. Ten years later, the center, although largely used by the military, has become the NSA’s most important outpost in Europe — with a mandate that goes far beyond providing support for the US military.
In 2011, around 240 intelligence service analysts were working at the Griesheim facility, known as the Dagger Complex. It was a “diverse mix of military service members, Department of the Army civilians, NSA civilians, and contractors,” an internal document states. They were responsible for both collecting and analyzing international communication streams. One member of the NSA pointed out proudly that they were responsible for every step in the process: collection, processing, analyzing and distribution.
In May 2011, the installation was renamed the European Center for Cryptology (ECC) and the NSA integrated its Threat Operations Center, responsible for early danger identification, into the site. A total of 26 reconnaissance missions are managed from the Griesheim complex, which has since become the center of the “largest Analysis and Production activity in Europe,” with satellite stations in Mons, Belgium, and in Great Britain. Internal documents indicate that the ECC is the operative intelligence arm of the NSA’s European leadership in Stuttgart.
Targets in Africa, Targets in Europe
Much of what happens in Griesheim is classic intelligence work and threat identification, but a presentation dating from 2012 suggests that European data streams are also monitored on a broad scale. One internal document states there are targets in Africa as well as targets in Europe. The reason being that “most terrorists stop thru Europe.” For reconnaissance, the document mentions, the ECC relies on its own intelligence gathering as well as data and assistance from Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intelligence service.
The latter is likely a reference to the Tempora program, located in the British town of Bude, which collects all Internet data passing through several major fiber-optic cables. GCHQ, working together with the NSA, saves the data that travels through these major European network connections for at least three days. The ECC claims to have access to at least part of the GCHQ data.
NSA staff in Griesheim use the most modern equipment available for the analysis of the data streams, using programs like XKeyscore, which allows for the deep penetration of Internet traffic. Xkeyscore’s sheer power even awakened the interest of Germany’s BND foreign intelligence service as well as that of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which is responsible for monitoring extremists and possible terrorists within Germany.
An internal NSA report suggests that XKeyscore was being used at Griesheim not only to collect metadata — e.g. the who, what, where, with whom and at what time — but also the content of actual communications. “Raw content” is saved for a period of between “3 days to a couple of weeks,” an ECC slide states. The metadata are stored for more than 90 days. The document states that XKeyscore also makes “complex analytics like ‘Pattern of Life'” possible.
The NSA said in a statement that XKeyscore is an element of its foreign intelligence gathering activities, but it was using the program lawfully and that it allows the agency to help “defend the nation and protect US and allied troops abroad.” The statement said it engages in “extensive, close consultations” with the German government. In a statement provided to SPIEGEL, NSA officials pointed to a policy directive Barack Obama issued in January in which the US president affirmed that all persons, regardless of nationality, have legitimate privacy interests, and that privacy and civil liberties “shall be integral considerations in the planning of US signals intelligence activities.”
The statement reveals the significant gap between Germany’s understanding of what surveillance means and that of the Americans. In overseas operations, the NSA does not consider searching through emails to be surveillance as long as they are only stored temporarily. It is only considered to be a deeper encroachment on privacy when this data is transferred to the agency’s databases and saved for a longer period of time. The US doesn’t see it as a contradiction when Obama ensures that people won’t be spied upon, even as the NSA continues monitoring email traffic. The NSA did not respond to SPIEGEL’s more detailed questions about the agency’s outposts in Germany.
‘The Endangered Habitat of the NSA Spies’
The bustling activity inside the Dagger Complex listening station at Griesheim stands in stark contrast to its outward appearance. Only a few buildings can be recognized above ground, secured by two fences and a gate made of steel girders and topped by barbed wire.
Activist Daniel Bangart would love to see what is on the other side of that fence. He’s rattled the fence a number of times over the past year, but so far no one has let him in. Instead, he’s often been visited by police.
When Bangert first began inviting people to take a “walk” at Griesheim to “explore together the endangered habitat of the NSA spies,” he intended it as a kind of subversive satirical act. But with each new revelation from the Snowden archive, the 29-year-old has taken the issue more seriously. These days, the heating engineer — who often wears a T-shirt emblazoned with “Team Edward” — and a small group of campaigners regularly attempt to provoke employees at the Dagger Complex. He has developed his own method of counter-espionage: He writes down the license plate numbers of suspected spies from Wiesbaden and Stuttgart.
At one point, the anti-surveillance activist even tried to initiate a dialogue with a few of the Americans. At a street fair in Griesheim, he convinced one to join him for a beer, but the man only answered Bangert’s questions with queries of his own. Bangert says another American told him: “What is your problem? We are watching you!”
Spying as They Please
It’s possible Bangert has also attracted the attention of another NSA site, located in the US Consulate General in Frankfurt, not far from Griesheim. The “Special Collection Service” (SCS) is a listening station that German public prosecutors have taken a particular interest in since announcing earlier this month that it was launching an investigation into the spying on Angela Merkel’s mobile phone. The trail leads from the Chancellery in Berlin via the US Embassy next to the Brandenburg Gate and continues all the way to Laurel, Maryland, north of Washington DC.
That’s where the SCS is headquartered. The service is operated together by the NSA and the CIA and has agents spread out across the globe. They are the eyes and ears of the US and, as one internal document notes, establish a “Home field advantage in adversary’s space.”
The SCS is like a two-parent household, says Ron Moultrie, formerly the service’s vice president. “We must be mindful of both ‘parents’.” Every two years, leadership is swapped between the NSA and the CIA. The SCS, says Moultrie, is “truly a hybrid.” It is divided into four departments, including the “Mission Support Office” and the “Field Operations Office,” which is made up of a Special Operations unit and a center for signal development. In Laurel, according to internal documents, the NSA has established a relay station for communications intercepted overseas and a site for training.
Employees are stationed in US embassies and consulates in crisis regions, but are also active in countries that are considered neutral, like Austria. The agents are protected by diplomatic accreditation, even though their job isn’t covered by the international agreements guaranteeing diplomatic immunity: They spy pretty much as they please. For many years, SCS agents claimed to be working for the ominous-sounding “Defense Communications Support Group.” Sometimes, they said they worked for something called the “Defense Information Systems Agency.”
Spying Stations, from Athens the Zagreb
According to an internal document from 2011, information related to the SCS and the sites it maintains was to be kept classified for at least 75 years. It argued that if the agency’s activities were ever revealed, it would hamper the “effectiveness of intelligence methods currently in use” and result in “serious harm” to relations between the US and foreign governments.
In 1979, there were just over 40 such SCS branch offices. During the chilliest days of the Cold War, the number reached a high point of 88 only to drop significantly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. But following the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks, the government established additional sites, bringing the number of SCS spy stations around the world up to a total of around 80 today. The documents indicate that the SCS maintains two sites in Germany: in the US Consulate General in Frankfurt and the US Embassy in Berlin, just a few hundred meters away from the Chancellery.
The German agencies responsible for defending against and pursuing espionage — the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the office of the chief federal prosecutor — are particularly interested in the technology deployed by the SCS. The database entry relating to Merkel’s cell phone, which SPIEGEL first reported on in October 2013, shows that the SCS was responsible for its surveillance.
According to an internal presentation about the work done by the SCS, equipment includes an antenna rotator known as “Einstein,” a database for analysis of microwaves called “Interquake” and a program called “Sciatica” that allows for the collection of signals transmitted in gigahertz frequencies. A program called “Birdwatcher,” which intercepts encrypted signals and prepares them for analysis, can be remotely controlled from the SCS headquarters in Maryland. The tool allows the NSA to identify protected “Virtual Private Networks” or VPNs that might be of interest. VPNs are used by many companies and embassies for internal communication.
200 American Intelligence Workers in Germany
Following the revelations that Merkel’s mobile phone had been monitored, Hans-Georg Maassen of the domestic intelligence agency BfV, turned to US Ambassador to Germany John Emerson to learn more about the technology and the people behind it. Maassen also wanted to know what private contractors the NSA was working with in Germany. When Emerson said during a visit to the Chancellery that he assumed the questions had been straightened out, Maassen countered, in writing, that they remained pertinent.
Maassen says he received a “satisfactory” answer from Emerson about intelligence employees. But that could be because the US government has officially accredited a number of the intelligence workers it has stationed in Germany. SPIEGEL research indicates more than 200 Americans are registered as diplomats in Germany. There are also employees with private firms who are contracted by the NSA but are not officially accredited.
The list of questions the German government sent to the US Embassy makes it clear that German intelligence badly needs help. “Are there Special Collection Services in Germany?” reads one question. “Do you conduct surveillance in Germany?” And: “Is this reconnaissance targeted against German interests? ” There are many questions, but no answers.
Ultimately, Maassen will have to explain to the parliamentary investigative committee what he has learned about US spying in Germany and how he intends to fulfill his legally mandated task of preventing espionage. The explanation provided by the BfV thus far — that it is uncertain whether the chancellor was spied on from the US Embassy in Berlin or remotely from the headquarters in Maryland, making it unclear whether German anti-espionage officials should get involved — is certainly an odd one. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency is responsible for every act of espionage targeting the country, no matter where it originates. Cyber-attacks from China are also viewed by the BfV as espionage, even if they are launched from Shanghai.
The order to monitor the chancellor was issued by the department S2C32, the NSA unit responsible for Europe. In 2009, Merkel was included in a list of 122 heads of state and government being spied on by the NSA. The NSA collects all citations relating to a specific person, including the different ways of referring to them, in a database called “Nymrod.”
The NSA introduced Nymrod in January 2008 and the entries refer to a kind of register of “intelligence reports from NSA, CIA, and DoD (Department of Defense) databases.” In Merkel’s case, there are more than 300 reports from the year 2009 in which the chancellor is mentioned. The content of these reports is not included in the documents, but according to a Nymrod description from 2008, the database is a collection of “SIGINT-Targets.” SIGINT stands for signals intelligence.
Collection Sites in Germany
Is it possible that the German government really knew nothing about all of these NSA activities within Germany? Are they really — as they claimed in August 2013 in response to a query from the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) — “unaware of the surveillance stations used by the NSA in Germany”?
That is difficult to believe, especially given that the NSA has been active in Germany for decades and has cooperated closely with the country’s foreign intelligence agency, the BND, which is overseen by the Chancellery. A top-secret NSA paper from January 2013 notes: “NSA established a relationship with its SIGINT counterpart in Germany, the BND-TA, in 1962, which includes extensive analytical, operational, and technical exchanges.”
When the cooperation with its junior partner from West Germany began, the NSA was just 10 years old and maintained stations in Augsburg and West Berlin in addition to its European headquarters in Stuttgart-Vaihingen.
American intelligence agencies, like those of the three other World War II victors, immediately began to monitor Germans within their zones of occupation, as confirmed by internal guidelines relating to the evaluation of reports stemming from the years 1946 to 1967.
In 1955, the British and French reduced their surveillance of Germans and focused on operations further to the east. The Americans, however, did not and continued to monitor telephone and other transmissions both within Germany and between the country and others in Western Europe. By the mid 1950s, US spies may have been listening in on some 5 million telephone conversations per year in Germany.
The easternmost NSA surveillance post in Europe during the Cold War was the Field Station Berlin, located on Teufelsberg (Devil’s Mountain) in West Berlin. The hill is made from the rubble left over from World War II — and the agents operating from its top were apparently extremely competent. They won the coveted Travis Trophy, awarded by the NSA each year to the best surveillance post worldwide, four times.
‘A Perpetual State of Domination’
Josef Foschepoth, a German historian, refers to German-American relations as “a perpetual state of domination.” He speaks of a “common law developed over the course of 60 years” allowing for uncontrolled US surveillance in Germany. Just how comprehensive this surveillance was — and remains — can be seen from the so-called SIGAD lists, which are part of the Snowden archive. SIGAD stands for “Signal Intelligence Activity Designator” and refers to intelligence sources that intercept radio or telephone signals. Every US monitoring facility carries a code name made up of letters and numbers.
Documents indicate that the Americans often opened new SIGAD facilities and closed old ones over the decades, with a total of around 150 prior to the fall of the Wall. The technology used for such surveillance operations has advanced tremendously since then, with modern fiber-optic cables largely supplanting satellite communications. Data has become digital, making the capture of large quantities of it far easier.
The Snowden documents include a 2007 list that goes all the way back to 1917 and includes the names of many former and still active US military installations as well as other US facilities that are indicated as sites of data collection. It notes that a number of the codes listed are no longer in operation, and a deactivation date is included for at least a dozen. In other instances, the document states that the closing date is either unknown or that the SIGADs in question are still in operation. These latter codes include sites in Frankfurt, Berlin, Bad Aibling and Stuttgart — all places still known to have an active NSA presence.
Because Americans tended to monitor their targets themselves, Germany’s BND long had little to offer, creating a largely one-sided relationship in which the Germans played the subservient role. Only at the beginning of the last decade did the nature of the cooperation begin to change, partially as a result of the BND’s successful effort to massively upgrade its technical abilities, as an internal NSA document notes approvingly. But the pecking order in the relationship has remained constant.
The former East Germany appears to have been better informed about the NSA’s spying activities than Berlin currently claims to be. The NSA’s work was known to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), East Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, a unit of the Ministry for State Security, the secret police more commonly known as the “Stasi.” One internal Stasi document noted of the NSA: “This secret intelligence service of the USA saves all radio signals, conversations, etc., around the globe from friends and foes.”
At the beginning of 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, HVA officers delivered around 40 binders with copies of NSA documents — obtained by two spies — to the Stasi’s central archive. The HVA officers wanted to preserve the highly controversial material for historians and others who might be interested in it.
Not Enough for the USA
After US diplomats were informed by the German Federal Prosecutor of the documents’ existence, Washington began applying pressure on the German government to hand over the NSA files. Finally, in July 1992, employees of the German agency responsible for executing the Stasi archive handed “two sealed containers with US documents” over to the German Federal Border Guard, which in turn delivered them to the Interior Ministry. Once in possession of them, the Americans used the files as evidence in the trial against a former NSA employee who had spied for East Germany.
Apparently the first haul of documents wasn’t enough for the NSA. In 2008, during Merkel’s first term in office, several NSA employees visited the Stasi archives to view all the remaining documents — from the Stasi’s Main Department III, which was responsible for signals intelligence — containing information about US facilities.
The German Interior Ministry classified and blocked access to most of the material and they are no longer viewable by journalists or researchers. By the time Edward Snowden began publishing the NSA documents last year, only two files pertaining to the NSA remained available for viewing, and both were filled with harmless material. It is unlikely the remaining historical documents will be much help to the federal prosecutors now investigating the NSA.
But one person who could potentially contribute to clarifying the NSA’s role in Germany was in Munich this week. General Keith Alexander, who recently left his position as NSA chief, spoke at a conference organized by Deutsche Telekom on Monday night. When officials at the Federal Prosecutor’s Office were asked days before his keynote speech whether they would try to question Alexander as a witness, they, responded by saying, “We do not conduct criminal investigative proceedings publicly.”
It seems Germany’s chief federal investigator may ultimately follow the dictum given by Foschepoth: “The German government is more concerned about keeping the Americans happy than it is about our constitution.”
By Sven Becker, Hubert Gude, Judith Horchert, Andy Müller-Maguhn, Laura Poitras, Ole Reißmann, Marcel Rosenbach, Jörg Schindler, Fidelius Schmid, Michael Sontheimer and Holger Stark
Translated from the German by Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey
06/18/2014 04:20 PM
By SPIEGEL Staff
Find this story at 18 June 2014
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2014
New leaks show Germany’s collusion with NSAJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Several new Snowden-leaked documents show how closely Germany’s intelligence agencies work with the NSA. But did the German government deliberately soften laws protecting privacy to make life easier for them?
This week German news magazine Der Spiegel published the largest single set of files leaked by whistleblower and former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. The roughly 50 documents show the depth of the German intelligence agencies’ collusion with the NSA.
They suggest that the German Intelligence Agency (BND), the country’s foreign spy agency, and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the German domestic spy agency, worked more closely with the NSA than they have admitted – and more than many observers thought.
NSA successes
The documents as published by Der Spiegel offer glimpses, but not a comprehensive view of what is essentially a transatlantic spy alliance. An NSA document from January 2013 shows the spirit of cooperation that existed between the NSA and first the BND and then the BfV, as well as the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). The documents also show that the BND has been “eager” for closer ties with the NSA on an analytical and operational level since 1962.
NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss 05.06.2014 Berlin
Germany’s parliamentary committee wants to question Snowden
Among its “success stories,” the documents praise how the German government was able to weaken the public’s protection from surveillance. “The German government has changed its interpretation of the G10 law, which protects German citizens’ communications, to allow the BND to be more flexible with the sharing of protected information with foreign partners.” Germany’s G10 law regulates in what circumstances its intelligence agencies are allowed to break Article 10 of the German constitution, which guarantees the privacy of letters and telecommunications.
Malte Spitz, member of the German Green party and spokesman for the Federal Association of Media and Internet policy, is always concerned when the NSA celebrates such “successes” in Europe. “The important question is whether the chancellery helped the agencies to get the permissions that made far-reaching surveillance possible by offering an alternative interpretation of the G10 law,” he said.
Secretive list
Another document, entitled “JSA Restrictions,” raises further questions. JSA stands for Joint SigInt Activity – in other words, joint technical investigations of the NSA and the BND at a facility in Bad Aibling, Bavaria. Since the BND, as a foreign intelligence agency, is not allowed to spy on German citizens, the document guarantees that domains ending with the German “.de” can’t be investigated. Similarly excluded are all domain endings belonging to the so-called “Five Eyes” countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain, and the US.
But since many German citizens use email addresses with endings like “.net”, “.com” or “.org”, the document includes a list of other Internet addresses that can’t be kept under surveillance either. This list is surprisingly short – comprising just 50 names – and bizarrely random. Apart from domains that might be expected, like bundeswehr.org, mercedes-benz.com, deutsche-bank and siemens.com, the list also contains addresses that seem completely willful: like feuerwehr-ingolstadt.org, (Ingolstadt fire brigade), orgelbau.com (organ manufacturer), and seniorenheim.com (senior citizens’ home).
“It would be funny if it wasn’t so serious,” says Andre Meister, editor of the Internet rights portal netzpolitik.org. “We don’t have a .de domain – netzpolitik.org – but unfortunately we’re not on the list either. So we have to assume we’re being kept under surveillance.” The same is true of German email services like gmx.net.
Malte Spitz Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Spitz is concerned whenever the NSA boasts of success in Germany
Spitz can’t make any sense of the list, and he wants answers. Why are some companies on the list and not others? Why are there no email addresses of politicians or journalists on there? Who drew up the list? Was the BND, or even the chancellor’s office, involved?
Parliamentary committee
The German parliamentary committee set up to investigate NSA activities in Germany could provide answers to all these questions. It wanted to ask Edward Snowden directly, but he has refused to answer questions in Moscow, where he was granted asylum after the US revoked his passport. The Green party and the socialist Left party want to question him in Berlin, but Chancellor Angela Merkel is unlikely to want to provoke a conflict with the US.
At the start of June, parliamentarians from Germany’s governing parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party had wanted to organize an informal meeting with Snowden in Moscow in early July. His lawyer said on Friday (20.06.2014), however, that this would be impossible. Now the committee has to decide how much it wants Snowden to testify. The ball is in the court of the government parties.
Date 21.06.2014
Author Marcus Lütticke / bk
Editor Nicole Goebel
Find this story at 21 June 2014
© 2014 Deutsche Welle
Snowden-Dokumente; Hier sitzt die NSA in DeutschlandJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Nirgendwo in Europa ist die NSA so aktiv wie in Deutschland. Dutzende Dokumente aus dem Archiv von Edward Snowden, die SPIEGEL ONLINE nun veröffentlicht, offenbaren Details der Spionage – und die Kooperation mit den Deutschen.
Auf einer bayerischen Wiese, unter der hessischen Erde oder mitten in Berlin: Die Spione der NSA sitzen direkt in unserer Nachbarschaft. Das zeigt ein Satz von NSA-Dokumenten, die der SPIEGEL und SPIEGEL ONLINE jetzt veröffentlichen. Die Dokumente stammen aus dem Fundus des Whistleblowers Edward Snowden, sie sind quasi seine Deutschland-Akte.
Aus diesem Dossier geht hervor: Deutschland ist für den Geheimdienst der wichtigste Standort in Europa. In mehreren Einrichtungen werden Daten zusammengetragen und ausgewertet. Von Deutschland aus abgefangene Daten dienen offenbar auch dazu, Terrorverdächtige zu töten.
Die Veröffentlichung der Dokumente liegt auch im Interesse der Bundesregierung: Die hat bisher vergeblich bei den amerikanischen Partnern um Aufklärung gebeten – und weiß angeblich bis heute nicht genau, was die NSA in Deutschland treibt. Auch deshalb haben Sicherheitsbehörden und Politiker den SPIEGEL um Einsicht in die Snowden-Dokumente gebeten. Journalisten sind aber vor allem der Aufklärung der Öffentlichkeit verpflichtet – deshalb zeigen wir das Dossier öffentlich. Lediglich Namen, E-Mail-Adressen, Telefonnummern und – in begründeten Einzelfällen – konkrete Spionageziele haben wir in den Dokumenten zum Teil geschwärzt.
Direkt zu den Dokumenten: Snowdens Deutschland-Akte
Abkürzungen erklärt: So lesen Sie die NSA-Dokumente
Hier finden Sie außerdem das Material nach Standorten in Deutschland geordnet. Klicken Sie auf die Flaggen auf der Karte, dahinter verbergen sich eine Beschreibung der jeweiligen NSA-Einrichtung, Fotos und die Originaldokumente.
Einen Eindruck über die umfassende Überwachung geben auch die sogenannten Sigad-Listen aus dem Snowden-Archiv. Sigad steht für “Signal Intelligence Activity Designator”, bezeichnet also eine Stelle, an der oder von der aus technische Aufklärung betrieben werden kann – die Ergebnisse werden dann unter dieser Sigad an die NSA-Datenbanken weitergeleitet. Eine Liste mit historischen Sigads zeigt, dass es im Laufe der Jahrzehnte insgesamt rund 150 solcher Punkte in Deutschland gegeben hat. Viele sind mittlerweile außer Betrieb, für mindestens ein Dutzend wird kein Schließungsdatum genannt – laut Dokument ist es dann entweder nicht bekannt oder der jeweilige Standort ist noch aktiv. Zur besseren Lesbarkeit der Listen hat der SPIEGEL aus dem Material in diesem Fall ein eigenes Dokument erstellt:
Der Dokumentenschatz enthält allerdings viel mehr als nur Informationen zu den einzelnen Standorten des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes auf deutschem Boden. Interne Berichte beschreiben etwa die Kooperation der NSA mit den deutschen Diensten und sogar mit dem Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) – das die deutschen Nutzer eigentlich vor Cyber-Bedrohungen von außen schützen sollte.
Vor allem aber belegt das Deutschland-Dossier die enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen NSA und BND. Nicht nur abgefangene Informationen werden geteilt: Die NSA veranstaltet Lehrgänge, man zeigt sich gegenseitig Spähfähigkeiten und tauscht untereinander Überwachungssoftware aus. So haben die Deutschen das mächtige XKeyscore bekommen, die Amerikaner durften MIRA4 und VERAS ausprobieren.
Das Argument der Unwissenheit gilt nicht mehr
Der Datensatz zeigt auch, wie wohlwollend die NSA die Anstrengungen des BND um eine verstärkte Kooperation zur Kenntnis nimmt. In einem Dokument heißt es, die Regierung hätte ihre Interpretation des G-10-Gesetzes angepasst, damit der BND einfacher Daten mit Partnerdiensten tauschen könne. Eigentlich stellt das Gesetz die Kommunikation von Bürgern unter besonderen Schutz. Auch der britische Geheimdienst GCHQ hatte sich damit gebrüstet, bei der Auslegung des restriktiven Gesetzes geholfen zu haben. Die Bundesregierung will davon nichts wissen.
Ein Jahr nach den ersten Snowden-Enthüllungen steht fest: Die NSA-Affäre ist nicht beendet, die Vorwürfe sind nicht ausgeräumt, wie im August der damalige Kanzleramtsminister Ronald Pofalla und der damalige Innenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich behauptet hatten.
Sollten Zweifel an der Echtheit der Dokumente bestehen, sollte es Fragen zu ihrer Einordnung geben, könnte Edward Snowden zur Hilfe geholt werden. Wenn die Bundesregierung den Whistleblower endlich nach Deutschland holen würde, damit er vor dem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschuss und beim Generalbundesanwalt aussagen kann.
Lesen Sie mehr zur Aktivität der NSA in Deutschland in der Titelgeschichte des aktuellen SPIEGEL. Die englische Version finden Sie hier.
18. Juni 2014, 16:18 Uhr
Von Sven Becker, Hubert Gude, Judith Horchert, Andy Müller-Maguhn, Laura Poitras, Ole Reißmann, Marcel Rosenbach, Jörg Schindler, Fidelius Schmid, Michael Sontheimer und Holger Stark
Find this story at 18 June 2014
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2014
Spying Together Germany’s Deep Cooperation with the NSAJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Cooperation between Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, and America’s NSA is deeper than previously believed. German agents appear to have crossed into constitutionally questionable territory.
Three months before Edward Snowden shocked the world with his revelations, members of NSA’s “Special Source Operations department” sat down for a weekly meeting at their headquarters in the US state of Maryland. The group, considered internally to be particularly efficient, has several tasks, one of which is overseeing the intelligence agency’s delicate relationship with large telecommunications firms. It is the department that Snowden referred to as the “crown jewels” of the NSA.
At this particular meeting, one significant slip-up was on the meeting agenda. On March 14, 2013, an SSO member had reported a potentially damaging incident. “Commercial consortium personnel” had apparently discovered the program “Wharpdrive,” for which SSO had tapped a fiber-optic cable. “Witting partner personnel have removed the evidence,” he explained further, “and a plausible cover story was provided.” According to an internal NSA document to which SPIEGEL has access, a team was quietly put together to to reinstall the program.
The NSA, apparently, did not perform the highly sensitive operation on its own. All signs indicate that the agency had help from Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the country’s foreign intelligence agency. The code name Wharpdrive appears in a paper drafted in preparation for a BND delegation’s visit to NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, and which instructs NSA leaders to “thank the BND for their assistance with the trilateral program.” It also makes clear that the German agency plays a leadership role in the Wharpdrive program, with the NSA providing only technical assistance.
It isn’t clear from the document exactly where the BND and NSA accessed the fiber-optic cable nor is there any indication of the operation’s target. Neither agency responded to questions about Wharpdrive. What appears obvious, however, is that the BND cooperates closely with NSA in one of its most sensitive areas of operation.
Germany’s collaboration with US intelligence, which Berlin officials agreed to in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks, is opaque and convoluted: opaque because the German parliament and public are unable to review most of what is delivered to the United States; convoluted because there are questions about its legality.
Constitutionally Unacceptable
Leading constitutional law experts have their doubts. In testimony before the NSA investigation committee in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, heavyweight constitutional law experts Hans-Jürgen Papier, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem and Matthias Bäcker stated that the BND is potentially violating the German constitution by working with data received from the NSA. Furthermore, they argued that basic constitutional rights such as the privacy of correspondence, post and telecommunications apply to Germans abroad and to foreigners in Germany. That would mean that surveillance performed by the BND and NSA is constitutionally unacceptable.
German intelligence agencies, for their part, consider their cooperation with the NSA to be indispensable — for counter-terrorism efforts, for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for the battle against organized crime. According to a classified paper created by the government in response to a query from the opposition, the BND does not keep official statistics on the amount of telephone, email and text message metadata that is shuttled to American agencies. “All metadata” collected at the NSA site in Bad Aibling in Bavaria “is made available,” the response states. In 2012 and 2013, some 3 million items of content data, or intercepted conversations and messages, were sent to the United States each month.
These facts and figures, until now available only to select parliamentarians, offer a window into German-American intelligence cooperation. Documents SPIEGEL has seen from the archive of whistleblower Edward Snowden, when combined with SPIEGEL’s own reporting, open up a much broader panorama.
They show that the exchange of data, spying tools and know-how is much more intense than previously thought. Given this close partnership, BND statements claiming they knew little about the programs and methods used by the NSA are, at minimum, startling.
One location in Germany is particularly illustrative of the trans-Atlantic pact. It is located in the Alpine foothills, in the beautiful valley of Mangfalltal. For decades, the NSA maintained its largest listening post in Germany in Bad Aibling, population 18,000. The agency once had up to 1,800 workers stationed here: They frequented Chicken Joe, a bar near the American base, and Johnny’s Bowling. And they cruised through town in American off-road vehicles sporting US license plates.
The Americans’ affection for the town can be seen in “A Little Bad Aibling Nostalgia,” a document that NSA employees posted on the agency’s intranet. They reminisced wistfully about “free bier” emails and leberkäse, a bologna-like substance “made neither of liver nor cheese.” German locals were fond of the agents, in part because they were reliable tenants. “Two men who specialized in Arabic dialects lived at my place,” recalled jeweler Max Regensburger. “Nice people.” Everyone, from baker to butcher to carpenter, profited from the Americans. When they left the base in 2004, Bad Aibling residents waved American flags in farewell.
The Tin Can
But the NSA did not completely abandon Bad Aibling. The BND took over most of the facilities on site, including nine white Radomes, the oversized golf ball-like structures crucial to many surveillance operations. But one small NSA special unit remained active and joined BND agents in the Mangfall Kaserne. The Americans built a specially constructed windowless building with an exterior of black-painted metal.
BND agents refer to the American complex, which houses the “Special US Liaison Activity Germany,” or SUSLAG, as the “Tin Can.” The unit’s very existence is classified information. But it is clear that the Germans and Americans who work there know each other and value one-another’s presence.
The official nature of the cooperation between Germany and the US in Bad Aibling is documented in a contract, written two years prior to the NSA’s official departure, drafted under the auspices of then-Chancellery Chief of Staff Frank-Walter Steinmeier, now Germany’s foreign minister. The “Memorandum of Agreement,” signed on April 28, 2002, is six pages long and marked Top Secret. It is not from Snowden’s material.
Much of the document consists of broad declarations of “good cooperation,” but the important points can be found in the 74-page appendix. There, the two sides agree on joint espionage areas and targets, such as counter-terrorism, and the battles against organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Surveillance as such isn’t mentioned, at least initially. The treaty signatories, instead, commit to respecting fundamental rights such as the privacy of correspondence, post and telecommunications and agree not to conduct surveillance on German or American citizens. The deal is valid both for “real” and “legal entities,” meaning it applies to companies and associations as well.
But even in this memorandum, the crux is in the small print — the addenda and exceptions. In the case of “terrorist activity,” the taboos mentioned earlier no longer apply. Should it become clear that intercepted information originated from a German citizen, it can still be used as long as the partner agency is informed and agrees. The same is true in cases where the end point of monitored communications is located in a foreign country.
‘Exciting Joint Ventures’
According to the German constitution, the BND is not allowed to perform surveillance on German citizens. But does the memorandum’s small print open up a back door? Does the NSA provide information about radicals that the German intelligence agency is not permitted to have access to?
The BND denies the existence of such channels and says, “At no time has there been a deviation from the legal framework.”
It seems doubtful that the Germans know exactly what their NSA colleagues are doing in Bad Aibling. According to the agreement, the NSA is allowed to carry out its own surveillance operations and only has to allow the German partners to look at its task assignments and operational details if asked.
In any case, internal documents indicate that the NSA is pleased with the Bad Aibling facility. “Two exciting joint ventures” are carried out there. One involves teams for working on joint surveillance (referred to as “Joint SIGINT Activity”) and the other for the analysis of captured signals (Joint Analysis Center or JAC). Snowden’s documents hint at what precisely the trans-Atlantic allies were collaborating on. In 2005, for example, five NSA employees worked “side-by-side” with BND analysts on a BND operation called Orion. Its targets lay outside NATO’s eastern border.
According to the documents, most of the targets monitored jointly by the BND and NSA are in Africa and Afghanistan. One document, though, reveals something else. Stemming from 2009, it includes a list of companies and organizations with domain endings such as .com, .net and .org that are explicitly to be removed from the surveillance efforts because they are German web addresses. Among them are basf.com and bundeswehr.org, but also such domains as orgelbau.com and feuerwehr-ingolstadt.org.
German Aid for US Drone Attacks?
The list includes addresses that appear to have fallen into the surveillance crosshairs and were only later revealed to be German. This indicates that the filtering system the BND reportedly uses does not reliably prevent German targets with .com and .org domain names from being monitored, and that those names must be removed retroactively.
In response to questioning about the close cooperation in Bad Aibling, the BND said that the Joint SIGINT Activity and the Joint Analytical Center were discontinued “in 2012 and 2011, respectively.” In addition, the BND noted in a statement, no joint surveillance took place prior to the facility’s discontinuation: “Even before, signals intelligence was performed exclusively by the BND.”
The NSA documents, though, tell a different tale, for example in a document pertaining to the one-year anniversary of the Tin Can. In reference to the JSA, the document notes that the cooperation is “unique as a jointly manned, jointly tasked DNI site,” with DNI referring to Digital Network Intelligence. An American document referring to levels of secrecy from 2005 notes that “the fact that NSA and BND … perform SIGINT collection at Mangfall Kaserne” must remain confidential.
Bad Aibling also plays a central role in the question of whether the NSA is collecting data in Germany. A map from the spy program Boundless Informant, published by SPIEGEL in the summer of 2013, indicates that the NSA collects vast amounts of data in Germany and points to primary metadata collection points (or “SIGADS”), identified by the codes US-987LA and US-987LB.
The document shows that these two SIGADS sent some 500 million points of metadata from Germany to NSA databases during a four-week period from the end of 2012 to the beginning of 2013. One document, which explains the program, says that data is collected “against” a target country.
The NSA has never explicitly commented on the two collection sites, but according to the BND, there is an explanation that refutes the accusation that the US spied on Germany. The BND believes “that the SIGADs US 987-LA and US 987-LB refer to Bad Aibling and to a signals intelligence site in Afghanistan.” That would mean, the BND says, that the 500 million data points might have been collected by the BND outside of Germany and then transferred to the NSA. Still, the German intelligence agency noted that it couldn’t say for sure whether that would account for all of the data listed by the NSA.
Should the BND’s explanation be correct, it would mean that the formulation used by “Boundless Informant” — and SPIEGEL’s own interpretation — were misleading. But it would also provide yet more evidence for the enormous exchange of information between Germany and the NSA.
In the Wharpdrive program, BND specialists are taking the lead. According to one document from the Snowden archive, Germany’s cooperation with the NSA’s Special Source Operations is meant to provide “unconventional special access” to fiber-optic cables.
‘High Interest Target Areas’
In that same document, the Americans express their respect, praising the Germans for operations undertaken “under risky conditions” and noted that the BND “offered NSA unique accesses in high interest target areas.”
A 2006 document verifies that the BND and the NSA not only work closely together, but that they are also often on equal technological footing. At the time, US intelligence workers visited a BND office in the town of Schöningen, Lower Saxony. The office is just a few kilometers away from the city center’s half-timbered houses. The site’s location near the former border with East Germany used to help the BND eavesdrop on its communist neighbors.
As Germany got consumed by hosting the World Cup in the summer of 2006, BND analysts gave presentations to their American colleagues about which electronic tools they used. The equipment, the Americans noted in meeting minutes, were sometimes more effective than the NSA’s own.
As far back as 2006, the BND was working in Schöningen on algorithms that could detect patterns or anomalies and thus enable it to exploit social networks for intelligence purposes. With a subject line on meeting notes reading “Visitors impressed with software demos,” the Americans expressed high regard for their German colleagues. They also praised the intercepts from Afghanistan that the “BND shares on a daily basis.”
Indeed, NSA staff seemed to be pleased with much of what the BND does in Afghanistan. There is no other issue in Snowden’s documents that is the subject of as much praise for the BND, the role it plays and what it shares. There are numerous instances in which the agency lauds the Germans for leadership and for the monitoring of additional civilian and military targets that they have taken on.
A presentation on the cooperation among 14 intelligence services in Afghanistan shows that the partners have the ability to exchange intelligence in “near real time,” including the contents of encrypted mobile phone conversations and so-called “target packages” containing information on targets.
Difficult Questions
When SPIEGEL reported last summer on the sharing of target information, the BND did not deny this activity. But it did challenge the conjecture that the data might serve as the basis for American drone attacks. The situation remains a complicated one: It’s not possible to target a drone attack based on a mobile phone number’s having accessed a cell phone base station, but drones can be turned into flying mobile phone base stations by equipping them with what are known as IMSI catchers — phones then automatically connect to an IMSI catcher when the drone flies overhead. This also means that metadata supplied through BND surveillance could very well contribute to guiding the deadly drones to their targets. Indeed, the former head of NSA and CIA Michael Hayden recently confirmed, “We kill people based on metadata.”
New documents also indicate the high significance of German surveillance to the US military in Afghanistan. Germany and 13 of its allies deliver intelligence to a unit on the American military base in Bagram. This is home to the NSA’s “Cryptologic Services Group,” a unit that feeds intelligence to controversial units like the secret Task Force 373, who had the mission of capturing or killing high-value Taliban or al-Qaida targets.
These connections between the BND and NSA raise difficult questions about the German government and its foreign intelligence service, such as whether Germany participated indirectly in death squad operations, which can result in the deaths of civilians or police.
The government has declined to comment on such questions. So far, there have merely been general statements, like the one made most recently by German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière at an event in Berlin. He described the United States as Germany’s most important ally and said, “If it were up to us, we would continue it in absolute terms and even intensify it.”
There is substantial evidence in Snowden’s documents that German authorities are trying to do just that. In April 2013, a BND delegation led by an official named Dietmar B. visited the NSA. The BND “is eager to present its SIGINT capabilities … with the goal of expanding the partnership,” an NSA document notes. The document says that officials welcome “the BND’s eagerness to strengthen and expand cooperation with NSA.”
Smooth Sailing
Other documents state that the BND offers “language assistance” in African languages. It is also clear that the BND shares the results of its monitoring of two foreign ministries as well as Internet telephony originating from a crisis-plagued country in the Middle East.
These days, tensions between the upper echelons of government in Germany and the United States are at their highest in years, but these documents suggest a smooth relationship between the eager BND and the covetous NSA.
There was only one point on which the United States expressed reserve: A request by the Germans to use information from NSA surveillance in “open court.” The document, from April 2013, said there were concerns that the disclosure of surveillance capabilities in a German court could have ramifications and that the “desired and planned level of cooperation” could not be maintained.
In this instance, Germany’s adherence to its own constitution seems bothersome to the Americans.
By Hubert Gude, Andy Müller-Maguhn, Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Jörg Schindler and Fidelius Schmid
Translated from the German by Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey
06/18/2014 04:20 PM
By SPIEGEL Staff
Find this story at 18 June 2014
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2014
Verfassungsschutz weitet Zusammenarbeit mit US-Geheimdiensten ausJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Trotz der Snowden-Affäre intensiviert der deutsche Verfassungsschutz laut Recherchen von SZ, NDR und WDR die Zusammenarbeit mit US-Nachrichtendiensten wie CIA und NSA. Die Zahl der an die Amerikaner übermittelten Datensätze hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren demnach verfünffacht.
Der Verfassungsschutz hat seine Zusammenarbeit mit amerikanischen Geheimdiensten in den vergangenen Jahren ausgebaut – und sich dabei offenbar auch von den Snowden-Enthüllungen nicht bremsen lassen. Wie aus geheimen Regierungsdokumenten hervorgeht, die SZ, WDR und NDR einsehen konnten, ist die Zahl der Datensätze, die der Verfassungsschutz an US-Dienste übermittelt hat, erheblich gestiegen. Im Jahr 2013 schickte der Verfassungsschutz 1163 Datensätze an die Amerikaner. Allein in den ersten drei Monaten dieses Jahres waren es bereits etwa 400. In den vergangenen vier Jahren hat sich die Zahl damit fast verfünffacht. Bei den übermittelten Daten soll es sich unter anderem um Handynummern, Reisebewegungen und Aufenthaltsorte verdächtiger Personen handeln.
Das Pikante daran: Der Verfassungsschutz ist Deutschlands Inlandsgeheimdienst, er arbeitet also nur auf deutschem Boden. Es liegt also nahe, dass der Dienst in Deutschland erhobene Daten an die Amerikaner weitergibt. Das Ganze ist Teil eines großen Tauschgeschäfts unter “befreundeten Diensten”: Deutschlands In- und Auslandsgeheimdienste, also der Verfassungsschutz sowie der Bundesnachrichtendienst, leiten Daten an die Amerikaner weiter und bekommen im Gegenzug dann Informationen von CIA, NSA und Co. Der Verfassungsschutz erklärte auf Anfrage, mit US-Nachrichtendiensten zusammenzuarbeiten. Man halte sich dabei strikt an die gesetzlichen Aufgaben und Befugnisse.
Nach Informationen von SZ, NDR und WDR übermittelte der Inlandsgeheimdienst zuletzt Informationen an die Nachrichtendienste des US-Heeres und der Luftwaffe sowie an die Bundespolizei FBI. Die meisten Daten gingen aber an die CIA und das Joint Issues Staff, womit die CIA-Dependencen im Ausland gemeint sind. Im Falle Deutschlands wären das vor allem die Stützpunkte in der Berliner Botschaft und dem Generalkonsulat in Frankfurt. Dort sitzt auch der Special Collection Service: jene Spezialeinheit von CIA und NSA, die das Handy von Angela Merkel ausgespäht haben soll.
Fokus auf Spione aus China und Russland
Mit den Ausspähungen der Amerikaner beschäftigt sich derzeit ein Untersuchungsausschuss, zudem ermittelt der Generalbundesanwalt. Diese ausländische Spionage in Deutschland zu verhindern, ist eigentlich Aufgabe des Verfassungsschutzes. Der blickt aber fast ausschließlich auf die Spione von Staaten wie China und Russland. Es existiert zwar ein Plan, künftig auch das Treiben der Briten und Amerikaner besser im Auge zu behalten, er wurde vor einigen Monaten auch im Bundeskanzleramt vorgestellt. Bislang ist dem Vernehmen nach aber noch keine Entscheidung gefallen.
Es ist derzeit nicht zu erwarten, dass die Regierung dem Plan zustimmt. Er würde die Verfassungsschützer vor eine schwierige Aufgabe stellen: Sie müssten Dienste beobachten, auf deren Informationen sie angewiesen sind. Allein der Inlandsgeheimdienst bekommt jedes Jahr mehr als 1000 Datensätze von den Amerikanern, beim Bundesnachrichtendienst sind es sogar etwa 100 000 Datensätze. Außerdem nutzt der BND die NSA-Spionagesoftware XKeyscore. Der Verfassungsschutz besitzt eine Testversion des Programms.
11. Juni 2014 18:21 Spionage
Von John Goetz und Frederik Obermaier
Find this story at 11 June 2014
Copyright: Süddeutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien GmbH / Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH
BND gibt sich in Bad Aibling und Gablingen zu erkennenJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Was ohnehin schon jeder spätestens seit dem Bekanntwerden des NSA-Skandals zumindest ahnte, wird nun vom BND offiziell bestätigt: Bad Aibling ist eine Abhörstation.
Ein wenig mehr Transparenz soll es künftig sein beim Bundesnachrichtendienst, allerdings dann auch nicht zu viel. Im oberbayerischen Bad Aibling ist die «Transparenzoffensive» des BND seit Freitag sichtbar und etwa 30 mal 45 Zentimeter groß: ein Behördenschild «Bundesnachrichtendienst» an der Mangfall-Kaserne mit ihren 13 weit sichtbaren Antennen zum Abhören von Telefonaten und E-Mails.
Was ohnehin schon jeder spätestens seit dem Bekanntwerden des NSA-Skandals vor einem Jahr wusste oder zumindest ahnte, wird nun vom BND offiziell bestätigt: Bad Aibling ist eine Abhörstation der deutschen Spione. Auch zu fünf weiteren Lauschposten bekennt sich der BND künftig. Gablingen, Stockdorf und Söcking, alle in Bayern, sowie Rheinhausen in Baden-Württemberg und Schöningen in Niedersachsen bekamen ebenfalls BND-Schilder.
Der BND will sich weniger verschlossen geben
Seit den Enthüllungen des ehemaligen US-Geheimdienstmitarbeiters Edward Snowden hat der BND ein Problem. Denn viele Bürger misstrauen dem Staat, besonders den Gemeindiensten. Der BND will sich deswegen nun weniger verschlossen geben. Die Behördenschilder sind ein kleiner Schritt dabei. In der neuen BND-Zentrale in der Berliner Chausseestraße soll es künftig ein Besucherzentrum geben, und auf seiner Internetseite erklärt der Geheimdienst seine Arbeit.
Doch bei der häufig gestellten Frage, ob auch der US-Geheimdienst National Security Agency (NSA) von Bad Aibling aus operiert, gibt sich BND-Präsident Gerhard Schindler wieder verschlossen. «Dies ist ein Gelände des BND», lautete seine kryptische Antwort darauf. Snowden hatte berichtet, dass in der Kaserne auch NSA-Spezialisten aktiv seien.
Kein ausländischer Dienst habe direkten Zugriff
Der BND hatte die Spionageanlage übernommen, nachdem sie zuvor bis 2004 eine Einrichtung der USA gewesen war. Es sei immer noch zum großen Teil amerikanische Technik, erklärt ein namenloser Dienststellenleiter. Dafür seien die US-Mitarbeiter nötig. Dennoch habe kein ausländischer Dienst direkten Zugriff auf die Anlage und die gewonnenen Daten.
Von Bad Aibling aus wird mit bis zu 18 Meter großen Parabolantennen Kommunikation belauscht, die über Satelliten geführt wird. Dies können Telefonate in Krisengebieten wie Afghanistan sein. Spezialisten werten die in verschiedensten Sprachen geführten Gespräche dann aus. Es kann manchmal Tage dauern, bis geheime Botschaften entschlüsselt sind. Schindler sagt, der BND habe mit solchen Methoden mehr als zehn konkrete Anschläge auf Bundeswehrsoldaten in Afghanistan vereitelt. Deutsche sollen hingegen auch dann nicht ins Visier des Geheimdienstes kommen, wenn sie sich im Ausland aufhalten. «Es werden keine Staatsbürger überwacht», betont Schindler.
Auch im baden-württembergischen Dorf Rheinhausen wussten sie schon seit mehr als vier Jahrzehnten, dass es die Spione im Maisfeld nebenan gibt. Die gut sichtbaren weißen Satellitenschüsseln rund um den unscheinbaren Flachbau in den Rheinauen stehen seit Anfang der 1970er Jahre. Hier, nahe der Grenze zu Frankreich, hat der BND ebenfalls eine Abhörstation.
Der BND will künftig auch auf Tarnbezeichnungen verzichten
«Die Station ist ja nicht zu übersehen», sagt der Bürgermeister der 3500-Einwohner-Gemeinde, Jürgen Louis. Inmitten von Wäldern und Maisfeldern hat sie ihren Sitz. Dass sie etwas mit dem Geheimdienst zu tun hat, kann man sich schon beim ersten Blick denken.
Doch der BND wollte nicht, dass dies bekannt wird. Er gab dem Horchposten den Titel Ionosphäreninstitut und damit einen Fantasienamen. Was dort gemacht wird, und wer die Verantwortung trägt, war auch auf Nachfrage nie zu erfahren. Zäune und Panzerglas hindern Interessierte daran, allzu nahe zu kommen. Selbst als ein örtlicher Bundestagsabgeordneter jüngst Näheres wissen wollte, stieß er auf eisernes Schweigen.
Im Rahmen der Transparenzoffensive will der BND künftig nun auch auf Tarnbezeichnungen verzichten, wie ein Sprecher der Behörde in Berlin am Freitag sagt. Das bedeutet: Rheinhausen ist nun offiziell BND-Standort – der einzige in Baden-Württemberg. Ans Tor kommt ein Schild mit der Aufschrift «Bundesnachrichtendienst».
Doch das war es dann auch schon mit der Offenheit: Was genau und wer von Rheinhausen aus abgehört wird, bleibt – ebenso wie in Bad Aibling – Staatsgeheimnis. Details zur Einrichtung und zur Frage, ob es weitere im Südwesten gibt, werden nicht genannt. Und selbst das neue Schild ist tabu. Da es sich um militärisches Sperrgebiet handele, ist das Betreten ebenso verboten wie das Fotografieren, heißt es in der BND-Zentrale. Schon am Beginn des Weges ins Maisfeld also ist Schluss mit der Transparenz.
06. Juni 2014 16:18 Uhr
Find this story at 6 June 2014
copyright http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/
Prozess um BND-Ausspähpraxis Wer kontrolliert die Harpunierer von Pullach? (2014)July 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Im Kleinen macht der Bundesnachrichtendienst nichts anderes als die NSA: Er fischt nach Daten. Angeblich tut er das mit “Harpunen” – und nicht mit “Schleppnetzen” wie die Amerikaner. Ein Berliner Jurist zweifelt daran und klagt gegen die Bundesregierung und ihren Geheimdienstapparat. Heute beginnt das Verfahren.
Wenn der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) vom Ausspähen von Mails und Telefonaten redet, wird er zum Fischer. Gerhard Schindler spricht dann von Schleppnetzen und Harpunen. Mit Schleppnetzen, so erklärt er, gingen NSA, GCHQ & Co auf die Jagd nach Informationen. Massenhaft werde gespeichert, gelesen und analysiert.
Seine Behörde hingegen fische mit der Harpune: Aus dem Strom an Mails, Chats und Telefonaten picke der deutsche Auslandsdienst Nachrichten heraus. Ein gezielter Schuss, und schon ist die Sache erledigt – so die Theorie. Die Praxis steht an diesem Mittwoch in Leipzig vor Gericht.
Niko Härting, ein Rechtsanwalt aus Berlin, hat die Bundesregierung vor dem Bundesverwaltungsgericht verklagt, weil er die sogenannte strategische Fernmeldeaufklärung des BND für unverhältnismäßig hält. 2010 habe der BND beispielsweise allein zum Thema Massenvernichtungswaffen 27 Millionen Telefonate, E-Mails und Faxe abgefangen, um zwölf “nachrichtendienstlich relevante” E-Mails zu finden.
Deutsche und ausländische Fische
“Das steht für mich in keiner Relation”, sagt Härting. Und damit nicht genug: Eigentlich darf der BND nur ausländische Mails mitlesen. Die Harpune von BND-Chef Schindler muss also zwischen deutschen und nicht-deutschen Fischen unterscheiden. “Und das halte ich für technisch unmöglich”, sagt Härting. Es könne gut sein, dass der BND verbotenerweise Korrespondenz zwischen ihm als Anwalt und seinem Mandanten mitgelesen habe – und dies noch immer tue.
Erst vergangene Woche hatten drei Verfassungsrechtler im NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss das Treiben des BND als teilweise grundgesetzwidrig kritisiert. Die Geheimdienstler zuckten. Und nun das Verfahren vor dem Bundesverwaltungsgericht. Plötzlich steht ihr Kerngeschäft zur Debatte.
Martin Schlüter
Martin Schlüter
Martin Schlüter
Fotos aus Pullach Still und dunkel steht die BND-Zentrale
Der BND forscht nach eigenen Angaben auch Amerikaner aus
Mehr als die Hälfte der Informationen, die der BND an die Bundesregierung weitergibt, soll nämlich aus dem Ausspähen von Mails und Telefonaten stammen. Von den 6000 Nachrichtendienstlern arbeitet etwa in Viertel in diesem Bereich. Weltweit hat der deutsche Dienst mehrere Glasfaserkabel angezapft.
Wo genau die Geheimdienstler die Daten abgreifen, ist ein Betriebsgeheimnis. So viel allerdings ist bekannt: Vom Netzknoten De-Cix in Frankfurt, über den ein großer Teil der weltweiten Kommunikation abgewickelt wird, führt eine Leitung direkt in die BND-Zentrale. Im Kleinen macht der deutsche Dienst also das Gleiche wie NSA und GCHQ auch: Er zapft Kabel an, zweigt Daten ab. Die Liste der Gebiete, über die der BND Informationen sammeln soll, ist lang, wie aus Unterlagen für den Prozess in Leipzig hervorgeht: 196 Länder stehen darauf, übrigens auch die USA und Großbritannien.
Harpune – einfach, weil der Speicher nicht reichte
Früher, als beim Surfen im Internet noch das Modem fiepte, versuchte es auch der BND mit der Schleppnetz-Methode. Sämtliche Daten, etwa der Leitung zwischen Deutschland und Iran, wurden abgegriffen und gesichtet. Mit steigenden Bandbreiten konnte der deutsche Dienst allerdings nicht mehr mithalten. Die Speicher waren zu klein – und für einen Datenspeicher, wie ihn sich die NSA für mehr als eine Milliarde Dollar in Utah gebaut hat, fehlte das Geld.
Blieb nur die vom BND viel zitierte Harpune. Sie dient als Argument, wenn es darum geht, was eigentlich die Tätigkeit des BND vom Treiben der NSA unterscheide. Die Snowden-Dokumente haben allerdings gezeigt, dass der BND allein in einem Monat 500 Millionen Verbindungsdaten an die NSA weitergegeben hat. Das klingt nach Schleppnetz, nicht nach Harpune. Der BND verweist aber gerne darauf, dass er die Daten im Gegensatz zu den Amerikanern nicht speichere und dann analysiere. Vielmehr würden die Daten “aus dem fließenden Verkehr” gezogen.
BND Zentrale in Pullach, 2013
Ionosphäreninstitut des Bundesnachrichtendienstenstes
BND Standorte in Berlin
Geheime Außenstellen des BND Sie sind mitten unter uns
Nach eigenen Angaben weiß nicht einmal die Bundesregierung, wie viele Gespräche täglich ins Erfassungssystem des BND gelangen. Eine statistische Erfassung finde nicht statt, heißt es lapidar in der Antwort auf eine Bundestagsanfrage der Linken. Das ist eine erstaunliche Aussage.
Denn laut Gesetz darf der BND im Ausland zwar so viel Daten abgreifen, wie er will. Fließen die Daten aber zwischen Deutschland und dem Ausland oder umgekehrt, gibt es eine Obergrenze: maximal 20 Prozent der Übertragungskapazität. Wie aber sollen die Geheimdienstkontrolleure überprüfen, ob sich der BND an die Regel hält, wenn sie nicht wissen, wie viel er sammelt?
Faktisch, so eine Studie der Stiftung “Neue Verantwortung”, sei die strategische Aufklärung des BND damit “einer effektiven parlamentarischen Kontrolle entzogen”. Viele Vorwürfe, die dem US-Geheimdienst NSA gemacht würden, beträfen auch den BND. Der Dienst könne nicht ausschließen, dass bei seiner Auslandsüberwachung auch Deutsche erfasst würden.
Dokumente der Bundesregierung nähren die Zweifel an den BND-Aussagen
“Was deutsch ist, fliegt raus”, beharrte der BND bisher. Deutsche seien vor dem Zugriff des eigenen Dienstes geschützt. Das war eine klare Ansage. Dokumente, die die Bundesregierung auf Fragen der Bundesverwaltungsrichter nach Leipzig geschickt hat, nähren indes Zweifel an der Aussage.
Denn wie will der BND ausschließen, dass in den Millionen Daten keine Mails von Deutschen sind? Ganz einfach, heißt es beim BND: Zunächst würden spezielle Programme prüfen, wer Absender und Empfänger sind und in welcher Sprache sie sich unterhalten, Mails mit der Endung “.de” würden aussortiert. Spezielle Suchbegriffe kämen ins Spiel. Mails, die den Namen von Terrororganisationen enthalten, werden herausgefischt. So weit, so klar.
28. Mai 2014 09:14
Von Frederik Obermaier
Find this story at 28 Mai 2014
Copyright: Süddeutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien GmbH / Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH
BND übermittelt afghanische Funkzellendaten an NSA (2013)July 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Die Daten können Experten zufolge Hinweise für gezielte Tötungen liefern: Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen stammt ein beträchtlicher Teil der an die NSA übertragenen Daten aus der Funkzellenauswertung in Afghanistan. Der BND wiegelt ab.
Hamburg – Der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) übermittelt nach SPIEGEL-Informationen afghanische Funkzellendaten an den US-Geheimdienst NSA. Spionageprogramme wie XKeyscore erstellen daraus Bewegungsprofile. Sie zeigen mit nur wenigen Minuten Verzögerung an, wo sich Handy-Nutzer aufhalten – und spielten womöglich eine wichtige Rolle bei der gezielten Tötung von Qaida-Kämpfern durch US-Drohnen.
Der BND erklärte, Mobilfunkdaten seien für eine zielgenaue Lokalisierung eines Menschen nicht geeignet. Experten gehen aber davon aus, dass Funkzellendaten Hinweise für gezielte Tötungen liefern können. Auch die “Süddeutsche Zeitung” hatte am Samstag einen Experten zitiert, wonach die Daten des BND zur Ortung nützlich seien.
Der Bürgerrechtler Burkhard Hirsch (FDP) hält den Datentransfer, der offenbar jenseits der parlamentarischen Kontrolle stattfindet, für sehr problematisch. “Wenn der BND in solchem Umfang für einen anderen Geheimdienst tätig wird, dann ist das ein politischer Vorgang, der unter allen Umständen im zuständigen Bundestagsgremium hätte behandelt werden müssen”, sagte Hirsch dem SPIEGEL.
BND-Präsident Gerhard Schindler sagte der “Bild am Sonntag”, die Kooperation mit der NSA diene “auch dem unmittelbaren Schutz unserer in Afghanistan eingesetzten Soldatinnen und Soldaten”. Die durch die Fernmeldeaufklärung gewonnenen Erkenntnisse trügen dazu bei, Anschlagsplanungen von Terroristen rechtzeitig erkennen zu können. Dies gehöre zu den “prioritären Aufgaben” eines Auslandsnachrichtendiensts.
Gegenüber dem SPIEGEL erklärte der BND, er habe seit Januar 2011 “maßgebliche Hilfe” bei der Verhinderung von vier Anschlägen auf deutsche Soldaten in Afghanistan geleistet. Bei weiteren 15 verhinderten Anschlägen habe die Datenüberwachung “zu diesen Erfolgen beigetragen”.
11. August 2013, 14:12 Uhr
Find this story at 11 August 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
GCHQ and European spy agencies worked together on mass surveillance (2013)July 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Edward Snowden papers unmask close technical cooperation and loose alliance between British, German, French, Spanish and Swedish spy agencies BND NSA GCHQ DGSE
The German, French, Spanish and Swedish intelligence services have all developed methods of mass surveillance of internet and phone traffic over the past five years in close partnership with Britain’s GCHQ eavesdropping agency.
The bulk monitoring is carried out through direct taps into fibre optic cables and the development of covert relationships with telecommunications companies. A loose but growing eavesdropping alliance has allowed intelligence agencies from one country to cultivate ties with corporations from another to facilitate the trawling of the web, according to GCHQ documents leaked by the former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden.
The files also make clear that GCHQ played a leading role in advising its European counterparts how to work around national laws intended to restrict the surveillance power of intelligence agencies.
The German, French and Spanish governments have reacted angrily to reports based on National Security Agency (NSA) files leaked by Snowden since June, revealing the interception of communications by tens of millions of their citizens each month. US intelligence officials have insisted the mass monitoring was carried out by the security agencies in the countries involved and shared with the US.
The US director of national intelligence, James Clapper, suggested to Congress on Tuesday that European governments’ professed outrage at the reports was at least partly hypocritical. “Some of this reminds me of the classic movie Casablanca: ‘My God, there’s gambling going on here,’ ” he said.
Sweden, which passed a law in 2008 allowing its intelligence agency to monitor cross-border email and phone communications without a court order, has been relatively muted in its response.
The German government, however, has expressed disbelief and fury at the revelations from the Snowden documents, including the fact that the NSA monitored Angela Merkel’s mobile phone calls.
After the Guardian revealed the existence of GCHQ’s Tempora programme, in which the electronic intelligence agency tapped directly into the transatlantic fibre optic cables to carry out bulk surveillance, the German justice minister, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, said it sounded “like a Hollywood nightmare”, and warned the UK government that free and democratic societies could not flourish when states shielded their actions in “a veil of secrecy”.
‘Huge potential’
However, in a country-by-country survey of its European partners, GCHQ officials expressed admiration for the technical capabilities of German intelligence to do the same thing. The survey in 2008, when Tempora was being tested, said the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), had “huge technological potential and good access to the heart of the internet – they are already seeing some bearers running at 40Gbps and 100Gbps”.
Bearers is the GCHQ term for the fibre optic cables, and gigabits per second (Gbps) measures the speed at which data runs through them. Four years after that report, GCHQ was still only able to monitor 10 Gbps cables, but looked forward to tap new 100 Gbps bearers eventually. Hence the admiration for the BND.
The document also makes clear that British intelligence agencies were helping their German counterparts change or bypass laws that restricted their ability to use their advanced surveillance technology. “We have been assisting the BND (along with SIS [Secret Intelligence Service] and Security Service) in making the case for reform or reinterpretation of the very restrictive interception legislation in Germany,” it says.
The country-by-country survey, which in places reads somewhat like a school report, also hands out high marks to the GCHQ’s French partner, the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE). But in this case it is suggested that the DGSE’s comparative advantage is its relationship with an unnamed telecommunications company, a relationship GCHQ hoped to leverage for its own operations.
“DGSE are a highly motivated, technically competent partner, who have shown great willingness to engage on IP [internet protocol] issues, and to work with GCHQ on a “cooperate and share” basis.”
Noting that the Cheltenham-based electronic intelligence agency had trained DGSE technicians on “multi-disciplinary internet operations”, the document says: “We have made contact with the DGSE’s main industry partner, who has some innovative approaches to some internet challenges, raising the potential for GCHQ to make use of this company in the protocol development arena.”
GCHQ went on to host a major conference with its French partner on joint internet-monitoring initiatives in March 2009 and four months later reported on shared efforts on what had become by then GCHQ’s biggest challenge – continuing to carry out bulk surveillance, despite the spread of commercial online encryption, by breaking that encryption.
“Very friendly crypt meeting with DGSE in July,” British officials reported. The French were “clearly very keen to provide presentations on their work which included cipher detection in high-speed bearers. [GCHQ’s] challenge is to ensure that we have enough UK capability to support a longer term crypt relationship.”
Fresh opportunities
In the case of the Spanish intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Centre (CNI), the key to mass internet surveillance, at least back in 2008, was the Spaniards’ ties to a British telecommunications company (again unnamed. Corporate relations are among the most strictly guarded secrets in the intelligence community). That was giving them “fresh opportunities and uncovering some surprising results.
“GCHQ has not yet engaged with CNI formally on IP exploitation, but the CNI have been making great strides through their relationship with a UK commercial partner. GCHQ and the commercial partner have been able to coordinate their approach. The commercial partner has provided the CNI some equipment whilst keeping us informed, enabling us to invite the CNI across for IP-focused discussions this autumn,” the report said. It concluded that GCHQ “have found a very capable counterpart in CNI, particularly in the field of Covert Internet Ops”.
GCHQ was clearly delighted in 2008 when the Swedish parliament passed a bitterly contested law allowing the country’s National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct Tempora-like operations on fibre optic cables. The British agency also claimed some credit for the success.
“FRA have obtained a … probe to use as a test-bed and we expect them to make rapid progress in IP exploitation following the law change,” the country assessment said. “GCHQ has already provided a lot of advice and guidance on these issues and we are standing by to assist the FRA further once they have developed a plan for taking the work forwards.”
The following year, GCHQ held a conference with its Swedish counterpart “for discussions on the implications of the new legislation being rolled out” and hailed as “a success in Sweden” the news that FRA “have finally found a pragmatic solution to enable release of intelligence to SAEPO [the internal Swedish security service.]”
GCHQ also maintains strong relations with the two main Dutch intelligence agencies, the external MIVD and the internal security service, the AIVD.
“Both agencies are small, by UK standards, but are technically competent and highly motivated,” British officials reported. Once again, GCHQ was on hand in 2008 for help in dealing with legal constraints. “The AIVD have just completed a review of how they intend to tackle the challenges posed by the internet – GCHQ has provided input and advice to this report,” the country assessment said.
“The Dutch have some legislative issues that they need to work through before their legal environment would allow them to operate in the way that GCHQ does. We are providing legal advice on how we have tackled some of these issues to Dutch lawyers.”
European allies
In the score-card of European allies, it appears to be the Italians who come off the worse. GCHQ expresses frustration with the internal friction between Italian agencies and the legal limits on their activities.
“GCHQ has had some CT [counter-terrorism] and internet-focused discussions with both the foreign intelligence agency (AISE) and the security service (AISI), but has found the Italian intelligence community to be fractured and unable/unwilling to cooperate with one another,” the report said.
A follow-up bulletin six months later noted that GCHQ was “awaiting a response from AISI on a recent proposal for cooperation – the Italians had seemed keen, but legal obstacles may have been hindering their ability to commit.”
It is clear from the Snowden documents that GCHQ has become Europe’s intelligence hub in the internet age, and not just because of its success in creating a legally permissive environment for its operations. Britain’s location as the European gateway for many transatlantic cables, and its privileged relationship with the NSA has made GCHQ an essential partner for European agencies. The documents show British officials frequently lobbying the NSA on sharing of data with the Europeans and haggling over its security classification so it can be more widely disseminated. In the intelligence world, far more than it managed in diplomacy, Britain has made itself an indispensable bridge between America and Europe’s spies.
Julian Borger
The Guardian, Friday 1 November 2013 17.02 GMT
Find this story at 1 November 2013
© 2014 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
Berlin Denies Military Knew About Prism (2013)July 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
A media report on Wednesday alleged that a NATO document proves the German military knew about the NSA’s Prism surveillance program in 2011. But both Berlin and the country’s foreign intelligence agency deny the account, saying there was a NATO program with the same name in Afghanistan.
The German government has so far claimed that it knew nothing of the United States’ Prism spying program, revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden last month. But parts of a confidential NATO document published by daily Bild on Wednesday show that the German military, the Bundeswehr, may have already been aware of the National Security Agency’s operations in 2011, the paper alleged.
The document, reportedly sent on Sept. 1, 2011 to all regional commands by the joint NATO headquarters in Afghanistan, gives specific instructions for working together on a program called Prism, which the paper said was the same as that run by the NSA. According to Bild, the document was also sent to the regional command in northern Afghanistan, for which Germany was responsible at the time under General Major Markus Kneip.
Should the media report be confirmed, Berlin’s claims of ignorance will prove to have been false. But on Wednesday afternoon, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s spokesman Steffen Seibert denied the Bild story, saying that the document referred to a separate program that had been run by NATO troops, and not the US. The programs were “not identical,” he said.
The BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, also weighed in with a statement, saying that the program had not been confidential and was also not the same as the NSA’s Prism operation. “The program called Prism by the Bild report today is a NATO/ISAF program that is not identical to the NSA’s program,” it said. “The BND had no knowledge of the name, range or scope of the NSA program.”
A Separate Prism Program?
According to the document cited by Bild, as of Sept. 15 that year, regional commands were instructed to apply for monitoring telephone calls and e-mails, according to the document, in which Prism is named at least three times. “Existing COMINT (communications intelligence) nominations submitted outside of PRISM must be resubmitted into PRISM IOT,” it reads.
It also states that access to the Prism program is regulated by the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which is used by various US intelligence services to transmit classified information.
“Coalition RCs (regional commands) will utilize the US military or civilian personnel assigned to their collection management shop ISRLO (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Liaison Officer),” it goes on. In Bild’s assessment, “military or civilian personnel” stands for US intelligence service staff.
Keeping Track of Terrorists
The purpose of all this was to “submit the telephone numbers and email addresses of terrorists into the surveillance system,” the paper reports.
It also claims to have seen documents indicating that the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, provided such telephone numbers to NATO, where they were ultimately fed into the surveillance system as well.
The reason for the NATO order was that the NSA’s director had tasked the US military with coordinating surveillance in Afghanistan, Bild reported.
The German Defense Ministry told the paper that it had “no information and knowledge of such an order,” but would be looking into the matter.
In response to the report, Green party parliamentarian and defense spokesman Omid Nouripour told SPIEGEL ONLINE that Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière must clarify the situation. “These circumstances destroy the government’s line of defense” on the NSA scandal, he said. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s center-right coalition can “no longer claim it didn’t know anything about Prism.”
As more details emerge about the scope of the NSA’s worldwide spying program and Germany’s alleged role in the surveillance, the scandal is becoming a central issue in the country’s campaign for the upcoming general election. Germans are particularly sensitive about data protection because of their history of state encroachment on civil liberties, first under the Nazis and then in communist East Germany. And if it turns out that Berlin knowingly tolerated and participated in the NSA activities, many would see it as a betrayal by the government.
07/17/2013 12:29 PM
Find this story at 17 July 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
„Prism ist nur die Spitze des Eisbergs“ NSA-Mitarbeiter: BND nutzt seit den 90ern Spähsoftware (2013)July 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
Eine Kuppel der ehemaligen Abhörstation der NSA auf dem Teufelsberg in Berlin
Der BND und der US-Geheimdienst NSA arbeiten offenbar bereits 20 Jahre bei der Datenspionage zusammen. Einem Medienbericht zufolge wurden entsprechende Spähprogramme schon früher geteilt. Auch Kanzlerin Merkel könnte ausspioniert worden sein.
Die Zusammenarbeit des Bundesnachrichtendienstes BND und der amerikanischen National Security Agency (NSA) bei der Nutzung von Spähsoftware war offenbar schon in den 1990er-Jahren intensiver als bislang bekannt. In einem Gespräch mit dem Magazin „Stern“ sagte der langjährige NSA-Mitarbeiter William Binney, der BND habe neben „Xkeyscore“ noch ein weiteres NSA-Ausspähprogramm genutzt. Der Entschlüsselungsspezialist arbeitete mehr als 30 Jahre in leitender Funktion bei der NSA und war viele Jahre auch für die technische Zusammenarbeit mit dem BND zuständig.
Laut Binney soll die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Spähsoftware bereits Anfang der 1990er-Jahre begonnen haben. 1999 habe der BND von der NSA den Quellcode zum damals entwickelten Spähprogramm „Thin Thread“ erhalten. „Thin Thread“ sollte die Erfassung und Analyse von Verbindungsdaten wie Telefondaten, E-Mails oder Kreditkartenrechnungen weltweit ermöglichen. „Mein Ziel war es, den Datenverkehr der ganzen Welt zu erfassen“, sagte Binney dem „Stern“. Der BND sei „bis heute einer unserer wichtigsten Partner“.
Mindestens 50 Spähprogramm lieferten Daten
Auf der Basis von „Thin Thread“ sei eine Vielzahl von Abhör- und Spähprogrammen entwickelt worden. Eines der wichtigsten davon soll das Dachprogramm „Stellar Wind“ sein, dem nach Angaben von Binney mindestens 50 Spähprogramme Daten zugeliefert haben – auch die durch Edward Snowden bekannt gewordene Software „Prism“ zur direkten Erfassung von Telefon- und Internetdaten bei Telekommunikationsunternehmen.
„Stellar Wind“ sei mindestens bis 2009, möglicherweise auch bis 2011 im Einsatz gewesen. Es werde heute wahrscheinlich unter anderem Namen fortgeführt, so Binney gegenüber dem Magazin.
Nach Schätzungen von Binney speichert die NSA mittlerweile zwischen 40 und 50 Billionen Telefonate und E-Mails aus der ganzen Welt, vor allem Verbindungsdaten, aber auch Inhalte. Das von der NSA zurzeit gebaute Datenzentrum in Bluffdale im US-Bundesstaat Utah könne aufgrund seiner Kapazitäten „mindestens 100 Jahre der globalen Kommunikation speichern“, sagte Binney dem „Stern“. „Dieser Ort sollte uns endgültig in Angst und Schrecken versetzen. Die NSA will alles. Jederzeit.“ Er fügte hinzu: „Diese Macht gefährdet unsere Demokratie.“
Regierungskommunikation im Visier der NSA
Neben William Binney äußerten sich im „Stern“ zwei weitere ehemalige ranghohe NSA-Mitarbeiter, die zu Whistleblowern wurden: J. Kirk Wiebe, der für die Datenanalyse zuständig war, und Thomas Drake, der zur Führungsebene des Geheimdienstes gehörte. Binney trat im Oktober 2001 aus Protest gegen die NSA-Spähprogramme unter der Regierung von George W. Bush von seinem Posten zurück.
Die Ex-Geheimdienstler halten es für möglich, dass selbst Daten von Kanzlerin Angela Merkels Handy auf den Servern der NSA landen. „Prism ist nur die Spitze des Eisbergs“, so Drake gegenüber dem „Stern“. „Ihre Kanzlerin könnte sich einmal für das Programm „Ragtime“ interessieren. Es dient unter anderem der Abschöpfung von Regierungskommunikation durch die NSA“. Auch Binney hält das Ausspionieren von Merkels Verbindungsdaten für nicht ausgeschlossen. „Ich würde sogar sagen, dass es durchaus möglich ist“, sagte er dem Magazin.
Mittwoch, 24.07.2013, 16:59
Find this story at 24 July 2013
© FOCUS Online 1996-2013
For Western Allies, a Long History of Swapping IntelligenceJuly 8, 2014
Van nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
BERLIN — When Edward J. Snowden disclosed the extent of the United States data mining operations in Germany, monitoring as many as 60 million of the country’s telephone and Internet connections in one day and bugging its embassy, politicians here, like others in Europe, were by turns appalled and indignant. But like the French before them, this week they found themselves backpedaling.
In an interview released this week Mr. Snowden said that Germany’s intelligence services are “in bed” with the National Security Agency, “the same as with most other Western countries.” The assertion has added to fresh scrutiny in the European news media of Berlin and other European governments that may have benefited from the enormous American snooping program known as Prism, or conducted wide-ranging surveillance operations of their own.
The outrage of European leaders notwithstanding, intelligence experts and historians say the most recent disclosures reflect the complicated nature of the relationship between the intelligence services of the United States and its allies, which have long quietly swapped information on each others’ citizens.
“The other services don’t ask us where our information is from and we don’t ask them,” Mr. Snowden said in the interview, conducted by the documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras and Jacob Appelbaum, a computer security researcher, and published this week in the German magazine Der Spiegel. “This way they can protect their political leaders from backlash, if it should become public how massively the private spheres of people around the globe are being violated.”
Britain, which has the closest intelligence relationship with the United States of any European country, has been implicated in several of the data operations described by Mr. Snowden, including claims that Britain’s agencies had access to the Prism computer network, which monitors data from a range of American Internet companies. Such sharing would have allowed British intelligence agencies to sidestep British legal restrictions on electronic snooping. Prime Minister David Cameron has insisted that its intelligence services operate within the law.
Another allegation, reported by The Guardian newspaper, is that the Government Communications Headquarters, the British surveillance center, tapped fiber-optic cables carrying international telephone and Internet traffic, then shared the information with the N.S.A. This program, known as Tempora, involved attaching intercept probes to trans-Atlantic cables when they land on British shores from North America, the report said.
President François Hollande of France was among the first European leaders to express outrage at the revelations of American spying, and especially at accusations that the Americans had spied on French diplomatic posts in Washington and New York.
There is no evidence to date that French intelligence services were granted access to information from the N.S.A., Le Monde reported last week, however, that France’s external intelligence agency maintains a broad telecommunications data collection system of its own, amassing metadata on most, if not all, telephone calls, e-mails and Internet activity coming in and out of France.
Mr. Hollande and other officials have been notably less vocal regarding the claims advanced by Le Monde, which authorities in France have neither confirmed nor denied.
Given their bad experiences with domestic spying, first under the Nazis and then the former the East German secret police, Germans are touchy when it comes to issues of personal privacy and protection of their personal data. Guarantees ensuring the privacy of mail and all forms of long-distance communications are enshrined in Article 10 of their Constitution.
When the extent of the American spying in Germany came to light the chancellor’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert, decried such behavior as “unacceptable,” insisting that, “We are no longer in the cold war.”
But experts say ties between the intelligence services remain rooted in agreements stemming from that era, when West Germany depended on the United States to protect it from the former Soviet Union and its allies in the East.
“Of course the German government is very deeply entwined with the American intelligence services,” said Josef Foschepoth, a German historian from Freiburg University. Mr. Foschepoth spent several years combing through Germany’s federal archives, including formerly classified documents from the 1950s and 1960s, in an effort to uncover the roots of the trans-Atlantic cooperation.
In 1965, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, known by the initials BND, was created. Three years later, the West Germans signed a cooperation agreement effectively binding the Germans to an intensive exchange of information that continues up to the present day, despite changes to the agreements.
The attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, in the United States saw a fresh commitment by the Germans to cooperate with the Americans in the global war against terror. Using technology developed by the Americans and used by the N.S.A., the BND monitors networks from the Middle East, filtering the information before sending it to Washington, said Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, an expert on secret services who runs the Research Institute for Peace Politics in Bavaria.
In exchange, Washington shares intelligence with Germany that authorities here say has been essential to preventing terror attacks similar to those in Madrid or London. It is a matter of pride among German authorities that they have been able to swoop in and detain suspects, preventing several plots from being carried out.
By focusing the current public debate in Germany on the issue of personal data, experts say Chancellor Angela Merkel is able to steer clear of the stickier questions about Germany’s own surveillance programs and a long history of intelligence sharing with the United States, which still makes many Germans deeply uncomfortable, more than two decades after the end of the cold war.
“Every postwar German government, at some point, has been confronted with this problem,” Mr. Foschepoth said of the surveillance scandal. “The way that the chancellor is handling it shows that she knows very well, she is very well informed and she wants the issue to fade away.”
Reporting contributed by Stephen Castle from London, Scott Sayare from Paris and Eric Schmitt from Washington.
July 9, 2013
By MELISSA EDDY
Find this story at 9 July 2013
© 2013 The New York Times Company
<< oudere artikelen nieuwere artikelen >>