Auch ein UN-Gesandter kritisiert die sexualisierte Informationsbeschaffung britischer verdeckter Ermittler. Der Guardian enthüllte am Wochenende, wie die Polizisten Identitäten toter Kinder stehlen

Britische verdeckte Ermittler haben in den letzten Jahrzehnten in mindestens 80 Fällen die Identitäten gestorbener Kinder und Jugendlicher angenommen. Dies berichtete der Guardian am Wochenende. Die Spitzel bzw. deren Vorgesetzte suchten sich jene Kinder aus, deren Geburtsdatum etwa ihrem eigenen entsprach. Mit der jetzt vielfach kritisierten Praxis sollte das Auffliegen der Spitzel erschwert werden, da diese neben Geburtsdokumenten auch eine Biographie vorzeigen konnten.

Zur Ausgestaltung der falschen Identitäten unternahmen die Polizisten bisweilen Ausflüge in die frühere Umgebung der Toten, um auf etwaige Fragen antworten zu können. In keinem Fall wurden die Eltern der Kinder hiervon benachrichtigt. Die Verwandten der Gestorbenen tragen aber im Falle des Auffliegens der Spitzel ein beträchtliches Risiko, wenn etwa wütende, ausgeforschte Demonstranten bei ihnen vorstellig werden. Nach der Veröffentlichung bemühte sich die Polizei um Schadensbegrenzung: Angeblich würde der Identitätsdiebstahl nicht mehr angewandt.

Spitzel zeugen Kinder und tauchen ab

Der Skandal wirft ein weiteres Schlaglicht auf die dubiosen Methoden der britischen Polizei. Heute befasst sich der Innenausschuss des Parlaments in einer Anhörung mit Spitzeln, die mit den von ihnen ausgeforschten Ziel- oder Kontaktpersonen jahrelang emotionale Bindungen eingingen und Sexualität praktizierten. Dies hatte in der britischen Öffentlichkeit für Entsetzen gesorgt.

Elf Frauen und ein Mann brachten die Fälle letztes Jahr vor Gericht und verwiesen darauf, dass die Polizisten dabei mindestens drei Kinder gezeugt hatten (Emotionaler und sexueller Missbrauch durch Polizisten wird öffentlich). Die zwischen sieben Monaten und sechs Jahre dauernden Beziehungen endeten aber mit dem plötzlichen Abtauchen der vermeintlichen Partner, wenn deren Einsatz abgebrochen wurde. Die Klagen richten sich gegen die britische Metropolitan Police und die halbprivate “Association of Chief Police Officers”, die für die klandestinen Ermittlungen zuständig war.

Die Zivilklage betont unter anderem die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, die in Artikel 8 das “Recht auf Achtung des Privat- und Familienlebens” behandelt. Der zuständige Richter verglich das sexuelle Gebaren mit dem Geheimagenten James Bond, was in Großbritannien zu Debatten geführt hatte. Zwar unterstrich der traditionell gelockte Richter die Glaubwürdigkeit der Klagen, beschloss aber gleichzeitig, dass diese in Teilen nicht-öffentlich verhandelt werden. Derartige Geheimverfahren waren bislang nur für den Geheimdienst MI5 vorgesehen. Für die Klägerinnen bedeutet dies, dass sie nicht auf Einlassungen der Polizisten reagieren können.

Vom Geheimverfahren betroffen sind die Einsätze des bekannten Spitzels Mark Kennedy, der jetzt in den USA lebt. Mit seinem Kollegen, der unter dem Namen “Marco Jacobs” auftrat, unterwanderte Kennedy die linke Mobilisierung gegen den G8-Gipfel in Heiligendamm 2007 und den NATO-Gipfel in Strasbourg 2009 (Polizeispitzel belügen Staatsanwaltschaften und Gerichte).

Bundesregierung verweigert Aufklärung

Der geltungssüchtige Kennedy, der seine Spitzelei sogar in einer Doku-Fiction zu Geld machte, hatte sich letztes Jahr selbst zum Opfer erklärt: Öffentlichkeitswirksam nutzt er die Klagen der Frauen, um seinerseits Schadensersatz von seinen früheren Vorgesetzten zu fordern. Da diese ihn nicht an den sexuellen Affären und Beziehungen gehindert hätten, sollen sie ihm den dadurch entstandenen posttraumatischen Stress mit rund 120.000 Euro vergüten.

Im Januar schlug sich der UN-Berichterstatter für Versammlungsfreiheit und Vereinigung, Maina Kiai, auf die Seite der betroffenen Frauen. Der Kenianer richtete eine Protestnote an die britische Regierung, in der er eine öffentliche Untersuchung zu den Vorfällen fordert. Dies würde auch ein neues Licht auf den Spitzeltausch mit Deutschland werfen.

…

Matthias Monroy

Find this story at 5 February 2013

Copyright © 2013 Heise Zeitschriften Verlag

In England hatte ein Undercover-Polizist regelmäßig Sex mit Frauen aus der überwachten Szene. In Deutschland wäre das unzulässig, beteuert das Innenministerium.von Christian Rath

Die Berichterstattung des „Guardian“ über Mark Kennedy brachte den Stein ins Rollen. Bild: screenshot guardian.co.uk

BERLIN taz | Verdeckte Ermittler von Bundeskriminalamt und Bundespolizei dürfen keine sexuellen Beziehungen eingehen, um Informationen zu erlangen. Das erklärte jetzt das Bundesinnenministerium auf eine parlamentarische Anfrage des Linken-Abgeordneten Andrej Hunko.

Anlass der Nachfrage ist der Fall des englischen Polizisten Mark Kennedy, der mit falschem Namen, langen Haaren und Ohrringen einige Jahre lang militante Umweltschützer und Globalisierungskritiker in ganz Europa ausspionierte. Auch in Deutschland war Kennedy aktiv: während des G-8-Gipfels in Heiligendamm 2007 sowie beim Nato-Gipfel in Baden Baden 2009.

Im Rahmen seiner Spitzeltätigkeit unterhielt der Polizist Kennedy auch zahlreiche Liebschaften. Wie die englische Zeitung Guardian aufdeckte, war es durchaus üblich, dass verdeckte Ermittler sexuelle Beziehungen in der von ihr überwachten Szene knüpften. Jetzt klagen zehn Frauen und ein Mann vor dem englischen High Court auf Schadensersatz. Sie hätten ein emotionales Trauma erlitten, nachdem Menschen, mit denen sie „tiefe persönliche“ Beziehungen eingingen, sich als Spitzel entpuppten.
Die Lustfrage

Der Bundestagsabgeordnete Andrej Hunko wollte deshalb von der Bundesregierung wissen, ob sie es für zulässig hält, wenn Verdeckte Ermittler „Sexualität oder sonstige emotional tiefgehende Beziehungen mit ihren Zielpersonen oder deren Kontaktpersonen praktizieren“. Antwort: Die Bundesregierung ist der Auffassung, „dass das Eingehen derartiger Beziehungen aus ermittlungstaktischen Gründen in aller Regel unzulässig ist“. Und Innenstaatssekretär Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, von dem die Antwort stammt, fügt hinzu: „Dies gilt auch für den Einsatz von Mitarbeitern ausländischer Behörden in Deutschland mit deutscher Zustimmung.“

Die Auskunft klingt eindeutig, enthält aber eine wichtige Einschränkung: Unzulässig ist der Ermittler-Sex nur, wenn er „aus ermittlungstaktischen Gründen“ stattfindet – sprich: Wenn der Polizist eigentlich keine Lust hat. Wenn der Verdeckte Ermittler aber aus Lust und/oder Liebe gerne mit einer Ziel- oder Kontaktperson schlafen will, scheint dies nach Ansicht von Staatssekretär Fritsche rechtlich nicht ausgeschlossen.

Dagegen hatte der auf Geheimdienstrecht spezialisierte Anwalt Udo Kauß 2011 im taz-interview gefordert: „Genauso wie ein Verdeckter Ermittler keine Straftaten begehen darf, darf er mit den Zielpersonen und deren Umfeld auch keine Liebesbeziehungen führen.“ Wenn ein Einsatz „aus dem Ruder“ laufe, müsse er abgebrochen werden.
Der deutsche Fall Bromma

In Baden-Württemberg hatte die Polizei 2010 den jungen Beamten Simon Bromma in linke studentische Gruppen eingeschleust. Er sollte herausfinden, ob im Umfeld der Antifaschistischen Initiative Heidelberg (AIHD) Gewaltakte gegen Polizisten und Nazis geplant waren. Er erschlich sich mit seiner freundlichen und hilfsbereiten Art in den Kreisen um die studentische „Kritische Initiative“ zahlreiche Freundschaften, flog dann aber auf, als ihn eine Ferienbekanntschaft erkannte.

Sieben Betroffene aus der bespitzelten Szene erhoben im August 2011 Klage beim Verwaltungsgericht Karlsruhe. Sie verlangen die Feststellung, dass der Undercover-Einsatz gegen die linke Heidelberger Szene generell rechtswidrig war. Sie seien keine „gewaltbereiten Gefährder“. Außerdem seien die Privatsphäre und die Menschenwürde verletzt, wenn den Aktivisten „ohne eigenes Wissen eine Freundschaft/Bekanntschaft zu einem polizeilichen Ermittler aufgezwungen“ werde.

Das Verfahren kommt allerdings nicht voran, weil der baden-württembergische Innenminister Reinhold Gall (SPD) alle Spitzelberichte Brommas gesperrt hat. Die Arbeitsweise Verdeckter Ermittler müsse geheim bleiben, da die Undercover-Agenten sonst leicht enttarnt werden könnten, argumentierte Gall. Dagegen klagten die Betroffenen in einem Zwischenverfahren und erzielten nun einen Teilerfolg.
Teilweise rechtswidrig

…

04.02.20133 Kommentare

Find this story at 4 February 2013

© der taz

Mehr als 20 Jahre lang sollen zwei russische Agenten in Deutschland gelebt haben: Sie nannten sich Andreas und Heidrun Anschlag, studierten, arbeiteten, heirateten, bekamen eine Tochter und spitzelten wohl durchweg für Moskau. Wie geht das?

Kann es richtiges Leben geben in einem falschen? Welche Regungen sind echt, welche Entscheidungen aufrichtig, welche Handlungen gehören einem selbst? In dem Moment, als in Saal 18 des Stuttgarter Oberlandesgericht die Geburtsurkunde ihrer Tochter verlesen wird, bricht die Frau, die sich Heidrun Anschlag nennt, in Tränen aus. Sie presst ein Taschentuch vor das Gesicht und schluchzt hinein. Der Mann, den sie vor 22 Jahren im österreichischen Altaussee geheiratet hat und der sich Andreas Anschlag rufen lässt, schaut ausdruckslos ins Leere.

Die Eheleute heißen in Wirklichkeit anders, kolportiert werden die Namen Sascha und Olga, doch bestätigt sind auch die nicht. Festzustehen scheint jedoch, dass die beiden russische Staatsangehörige sind und vor mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten als Spitzel des KGB in die Bundesrepublik entsandt wurden. Später spionierten sie dann wohl für dessen Nachfolgeorganisation SWR, im Herbst 2011 flogen sie auf. Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat die Anschlags daher unter anderem wegen geheimdienstlicher Agententätigkeit angeklagt, ihnen drohen im Falle einer Verurteilung bis zu zehn Jahre Gefängnis.

Mit Handschellen gefesselt wird Andreas Anschlag in den Raum geführt. Die Haare des mutmaßlichen Agenten sind kurz und grau, sein Gesicht ist fahl. Den offenkundig falschen österreichischen Personalpapieren zufolge ist der Mann 1,80 Meter groß, 53 Jahre alt und wurde im argentinischen Valentin Alsina geboren. Anschlag trägt einen schwarzen Pullunder, ein schwarzes Hemd und Jeans.

Auch seine Frau ist eine unauffällige Person, 1,60 Meter groß, blonde Haare, orangefarbener Pullover zu hellblauer Jeans. Ihre Legende besagt, sie sei im peruanischen Lima geboren und inzwischen 47 Jahre alt. Während ihr Mann in Aachen Maschinenbau studierte und später als Diplomingenieur bei verschiedenen Automobilzulieferern arbeitete, war Heidrun Anschlag nach außen vor allem Hausfrau. Sie kümmerte sich um die gemeinsame Tochter.

Im Unterschied zu Spionen, die als Diplomaten in ihre Einsatzgebiete reisen, arbeiten mutmaßliche Agenten wie Heidrun und Andreas Anschlag nicht im Schutz der Botschaften. Diplomaten droht im schlimmsten Fall die Ausweisung – allen anderen eine langjährige Haftstrafe. Aufgrund des hohen Risikos werden sie in russischen Geheimdienstkreisen als “Wunderkinder” verehrt. Einem Staatsschützer zufolge ist mit weiteren Spähern in Deutschland zu rechnen.

Die Bundesanwälte werfen den Eheleuten vor, sie seien “hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter des russischen Auslandsnachrichtendienstes SWR”. Demnach stehe Andreas Anschlag im Rang eines Abteilungsleiters und beziehe monatlich 4300 Euro, seine Gattin sei stellvertretende Abteilungsleiterin und erhalte 4000 Euro – die Ersparnisse der Eheleute sollen sich auf etwa 600.000 Euro belaufen. Das “Ausforschungsinteresse” der Agenten mit den Decknamen “Pit” und “Tina” habe sich auf “politische, militärische und militärpolitische Aufklärungsziele” konzentriert, heißt es in der Anklageschrift. Vor allem sei es den beiden um Informationen aus Nato- und EU-Kreisen gegangen.

Botschaften in “toten Briefkästen”

Zu diesem Zweck führten die Anschlags laut Bundesanwaltschaft von Oktober 2008 bis kurz vor ihrer Festnahme im Herbst 2011 den niederländischen Diplomaten Raymond P. als Quelle. Der Beamte des Den Haager Außenministeriums, Deckname “BR”, soll in dieser Zeit mehrere hundert vertrauliche Dokumente geliefert haben und dafür mit mindestens 72.200 Euro entlohnt worden sein. Die Übergabe der Papiere erfolgte zumeist in den Niederlanden, danach deponierte Andreas Anschlag die Akten in “toten Briefkästen” im Raum Bonn, wo sie anschließend von Mitarbeitern der russischen Botschaft abgeholt wurden.

Laut Anklage handelte es sich dabei unter anderem um

einen Sitzungsbericht des Nordatlantikrates zur Zusammenarbeit der Nato mit Russland im Bereich der Raketenabwehr,

Dokumente zur Strukturreform der Nato,

Papiere zur Nato-Strategie während der Revolution in Libyen,

Berichte über den Isaf-Einsatz in Afghanistan.

Darüber hinaus besuchte Andreas Anschlag der Bundesanwaltschaft zufolge über Jahre Tagungen der Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft, der Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, der Gesellschaft für Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, über die er Moskau fortlaufend Bericht erstattete. Zudem wies er seine Geheimdienstkollegen auf mögliche Informanten hin, die er bei den Veranstaltungen kennenlernte. Auch seine Arbeitgeber spähte er laut Anklage nach “wissenschaftlich-technischen Informationen” aus.

Für die Kommunikation mit der Zentrale soll vor allem Heidrun Anschlag zuständig gewesen sein, so die Bundesanwälte: Sie war es, die in ihrem angemieteten, 200 Quadratmeter großen Haus im hessischen Marburg geheime Direktiven aus Moskau erhielt. Dazu nutzte sie einen Kurzwellenempfänger, der mit einem Decoder und einem Computer verbunden war. Die Rückmeldungen erfolgten über Textnachrichten, die per Satellit verschickt wurden. Auch mittels YouTube tauschte sich Heidrun Anschlag als “Alpenkuh1” mit ihren russischen Kollegen aus. Dazu nutzten die Geheimdienstler offenbar codierte Kommentare.

…

15. Januar 2013, 15:44 Uhr
Von Jörg Diehl, Stuttgart

Find this story at 15 January 2013

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013

A married couple accused of spying for the Russian secret services for more than 20 years went on trial in Germany on Tuesday, in one of the biggest espionage court cases since the Cold War.
Germany charges two alleged Russian spies – National (28 Sep 12)
Russian spies suspected of stealing car secrets – National (25 Oct 11)
Suspected Russian spy pair arrested – National (22 Oct 11)

The pair, identified only by codenames Andreas and Heidrun Anschlag (which means attack in German), are said to have been planted in West Germany from 1988 by the Soviet Union’s KGB and later used by its SVR successor secret service.

The defendants declined to confirm any details about their real identities or the charges against them as the trial got underway in the higher regional court in the southwestern city of Stuttgart.

Defence lawyer Horst-Dieter Pötschke said they had Russian citizenship.

Prosecutors say one of them arrived in still divided Germany in 1988 — a year before the Berlin Wall fell — and the other in 1990, posing as Austrian citizens who had been born and grew up in South America.

According to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, light could only be shed on the final three years of their alleged activities as agents.

They had “the mission from SVR headquarters to obtain NATO and EU political and military secrets”, federal public prosecutor Wolfgang Siegmund said, adding: “Particularly also geo-strategic findings on the relationship of NATO and the EU with the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.”

Prosecutors say the couple set up a “middle-class existence” to cover up their activity for the secret services.

Andreas Anschlag studied engineering and worked in the auto industry while Heidrun was a housewife. According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung weekly, even their own daughter had no idea about their double lives.

The couple allegedly passed on documents they obtained from a Dutch official in the foreign ministry between 2008 and 2011.

The court heard that the official, Raymond Valentino Poeteray, obtained several hundred pages of classified, partly secret documents from different Dutch embassies and received more than €72,000 for his efforts.

The accused left the documents in “dead-letter boxes”, for example under certain trees, from where they were picked up by employees of the Russian consulate general in the western city of Bonn, according to the federal prosecutor.

Heidrun Anschlag was responsible for communicating with the SVR via short-wave radio, the court heard.

The pair, who were allegedly jointly paid around €100,000 a year, communicated with their Moscow masters using text messages, satellite phones and hidden messages in comments in YouTube videos under agreed names, it heard.

In mid-2011, Siegmund said the pair had received orders to withdraw from Germany because of the risk of being exposed and were preparing to do so when they were arrested in October of that year.

They face up to 10 years in prison if found guilty.

On the sidelines of the trial, defence lawyer Pötschke said the documents in question were “of average quality” and “so, no so-called grave damage occurred” to Germany.

…

Published: 15 Jan 13 11:25 CET | Print version
Updated: 15 Jan 13 15:58 CET

Find this story at 15 January 2013

© The Local Europe GmbHc

A spectacular trial has begun at a Stuttgart court involving a German-based couple accused of spying on NATO and the EU for decades on Russia’s behalf. Neighbors say they knew something was fishy.

It reads like a John le Carre novel: “dead mail boxes,” secret radio signals, encrypted messages hidden in plain sight on the Internet.

According to accusations, a married couple has been spying in Germany for more than 20 years – first at the behest of the Soviet Union and thereafter for its post-Soviet incarnation, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

On Tuesday (15.01.2013) the trial against 54-year-old Andreas Anschlag and his 48-year-old wife, Heidrun, opened up in Stuttgart. Federal prosecutors accused them of “secret agent activity” and of “forgery of documents.”
The former KGB building is today’s Foreign Intelligence headquarters

As to whether those are the real names of the accused, however, there is reason to doubt. In an interview with DW, the couples’ defense lawyer, Horst-Dieter Pötschke, did not deny that “Anschlag” might not be the true surname of the suspected agent pair. He also responded evasively to questions about the accusations themselves. What the Munich lawyer did say, however, is that the potential ten-year sentence is nothing short of excessive.

In cases of espionage, Pötschke is on familiar ground. In the 70s and 80s he defended former agents who had fled the Soviet KGB or the East German state security apparatus, the Stasi. One of his most well-known cases involved Günter Guillaume, a speaker for former German Chancellor Willy Brandt who also turned out to be an East German spy. When Guillaume’s true identity was revealed in 1974, Chancellor Brandt resigned.

A discrete life

The history of the purported agent couple begins at a time when the Soviet Union still existed and the Cold War was still cold. According to accusations, Andreas Anschlag traveled to West Germany in 1988 with the help of a forged Austrian passport. His wife did the same in 1990. Both were supposed to have been born in South America. The two settled in Aachen, close to the western border with Belgium, where Mr. Anschlag studied mechanical engineering.

With the birth of a daughter their German disguise was complete. The couple moved to a popular neighborhood of Meckenheim, a small town of 24,000 inhabitants close to the former West German capital of Bonn. There they lived discreetly. Neighbors describe them as friendly, if a bit distant.
The house in Michelbach in which the accused “Anschlag” couple lived

“They didn’t have much contact with others,” a neighbor said. “I never saw the husband, even though we lived close to each other.”

NATO documents for Moscow

For their informant, the couple managed to recruit a Dutch diplomat, says the German Attorney General. The diplomat, in turn, is supposed to have provided dozens of secret documents from NATO and the EU. Among the topics covered within those documents were issues relating to Russia.

The files were delivered via “dead mail boxes,” according to official charges, to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in Moscow. The couple apparently received further commands through an agent radio network and sent their own messages via satellite and through an internet video platform.

When they were arrested in October 2011, the German news magazine Der Spiegel reported that the woman was sitting in front of a shortwave receiver, writing down secret messages. At that point the pair was living in a house in Michelbach, a small community in the German state of Hesse.

“Suddenly we had this spy thriller taking place right outside our window – it was better than the movies,” one of the neighbors told DW.

The husband was arrested on the same day 200 kilometers (120 miles) away in the town of Balingen. For days thereafter, German criminal officers – with the help of special electronic devices – searched the house and the foundation of the supposed “agent couple.”

A post-judgment exchange?

How can it be that the Russian agents could work in Germany for so many years without their cover being blown? A neighbor in Michelbach claims to have recognized the pair’s eastern European accent. The story about the “Austrian” couple’s Latin American origins appeared suspicious, some now say, as did a few of the pair’s habits. “The wife usually went into the backyard to make telephone calls, even in winter,” a woman said.
The entrance to the Upper Regional Court in Stuttgart, where the trial is taking place

…

Date 14.01.2013
Author Mikhail Bushuev / rg, cd
Editor Gabriel Borrud

Find this story at 14 January 2013

© 2012 Deutsche Welle

The two accused spies, their faces not shown due to a court order, appearing in a German courtroom Tuesday.

Germany put a married couple thought to be in their mid-40s on trial this week on suspicion that they spied for Russia for more than two decades under the cover of being an ordinary middle-class family.

The case of Andreas and Heidrun Anschlag, names believed to be aliases, is likely to add pressure to Berlin’s troubled relations with Moscow until June.

The court in the southwestern city of Stuttgart is planning to hold 31 hearings over five months, according to a schedule on the court’s website.

Prosecutors say the pair collected sensitive information from NATO and the European Union for Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service while posing as Austrian nationals with Latin American heritage.

Their names and passports are thought to be fake, but the judge said at the initial hearing Tuesday that she would continue to address them as Herr and Frau Anschlag “to make communication easier,” local media outlets reported.

The couple, who face up to a decade in prison if convicted, denied guilt but declined to make any further statements. The hearing continued Thursday with the questioning of a federal police investigator, court spokesman Stefan SchЯler said by e-mail.

The case has been linked to the “deep cover” sleeper agents uncovered in the U.S. in 2010. According to a report by German weekly Der Spiegel, the Anschlags’ October 2011 arrest was made possible when the FBI passed on information from Alexander Poteyev, a Foreign Intelligence Service colonel who reportedly acted as a U.S. mole.

Poteyev, who ostensibly betrayed the spy ring even as he ran it, fled Moscow just days before the FBI rolled up the operation on June 27, 2010. In 2011, a Moscow military court sentenced him in absentia to 25 years in prison on charges of treason and desertion.

Analysts have speculated about why the Anschlags’ case went to court while the U.S. spy ring was whisked off to Russia within weeks in a Cold War-style spy swap.

German media reported last year that Berlin had decided to press charges after the Kremlin failed to react to a German offer for a spy swap.

…

18 January 2013 | Issue 5049
By Nikolaus von Twickel

Find this story at 18 January 2013

© Copyright 1992-2013. The Moscow Times

Most law enforcement agencies refuse to reveal the surveillance technologies they use, claiming doing so could threaten national security. But authorities in Germany have shown it’s possible to be transparent without the sky falling in—by disclosing how they’ve spent millions on spy tools to help monitor Skype, email, and mobile phones.

Earlier this year, German politician Jan Korte submitted a series of written questions to the country’s federal ministry of home affairs regarding surveillance tools. The request was prompted by a scandal about how police had paid a private company to develop a controversial spy trojan to infiltrate and monitor suspects’ computers—a tactic that in most circumstances violates the German constitution. The answers Korte received were published in German in July, but have only this month been translated into English. (Update, Nov. 14: Thanks to blogger Anne Roth for the translation.)

What the answers revealed is the technology used by some of the country’s federal agencies and the companies contracted to provide it. Between 2005 and 2011, for instance, the Federal Office of Administration, which carries out work for all of Germany’s federal ministries, spent more than €1.9 million ($2.5 million) on telecom and internet surveillance gear provided by the companies TU München and Syborg, plus €158,000 ($204,000) on facial recognition software from the firm Cognitec.

Some police and intelligence agencies declined to provide Korte with the requested information, claiming it was restricted or classified. But others did not show the same concern. Customs authorities, for one, released details about the sophisticated surveillance tools they purchased, including spending more than €100,000 ($130,000) on software to monitor Skype, Gmail, Hotmail, AIM, Yahoo Mail, and Bit Torrent. The customs authorities, tasked with tackling drug crime in Germany, also paid a company called Schönhofer €1.8 million ($2.3 million) for equipment such as “ICT vehicles” designed to help gather data from target areas using “signal interrogator” technology. They additionally splashed out €170,000 ($220,000) on a cellphone-tracking tactic described as “stealthping,” which involves sending a covert signal to a phone in order find out its nearest location tower to discover the whereabouts of a person.

…

By Ryan Gallagher
Posted Wednesday, Oct. 31, 2012, at 5:04 PM ET Slate.com

Find this story at 31 October 2012

The answers Korte received were published in German in July, but have only this month been translated into English.

All contents © 2013 The Slate Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

Willi Voss started as a petty criminal in Germany’s industrial Ruhr Valley. Before long, though, he found himself helping the PLO, even playing a minor role in the 1972 Munich Olympics attack. He went on to become a valuable CIA informant, and has now written a book about his life in the shadows. By SPIEGEL Staff

In the summer of 1975, Willi Voss was left with few alternatives: prison, suicide or betrayal. He chose betrayal. After all, he had just been betrayed by the two men whom he had trusted, and whose struggle had forced him to lead a clandestine existence.

It was Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s closest advisers who had used him and jeopardized his life: Abu Daoud, the mastermind behind the terror attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, and Abu Iyad, head of the PLO intelligence service Razd.

Voss, a petty criminal from West Germany’s industrial Ruhr region, in cahoots with Palestinian leaders who were feared around the world? It took a number of coincidences and twists of fate in Voss’ life before he found himself in such a position, but here he was on a mission for the Palestinians — in a Mercedes-Benz, traveling from Beirut to Belgrade, together with his girlfriend Ellen, so it would all look like a vacation trip.

His job was to deliver the car, Iyad and Daoud had said. But they had neglected to mention that the Mercedes contained automatic weapons, a sniper rifle and explosives, which were hidden in a secret compartment and consisted of a number of packages, each weighing 20 kilos (44 pounds) — complete with fully assembled detonators made of mercury fulminate, a highly unstable substance. If Voss had gotten into an accident or hit a deep pothole, he, the car and his girlfriend would have been blown to pieces.

Voss only found out about his dangerous cargo when Romanian customs officials tore the vehicle apart. The only thing that saved the 31-year-old and his companion from ending up behind bars was the fact that the PLO maintained excellent ties with the Romanian regime. Romanian officials placed the two Germans in a car driven by a couple of pensioners from the Rhineland region, who were on their way back home to Germany after a vacation. Voss and his girlfriend hopped out in Belgrade. This was the end of the road for them — and, as Voss recalls today, the day when they had to make a fateful decision: prison, suicide or betrayal?

Becoming a Defector

Prison: In Germany there was a warrant for Voss’ arrest. A few years earlier, he had been taken into custody during a raid at the Munich home of a former SS officer who was in league with neo-Nazis. Investigators had secured weapons and explosives from the PLO along with plans for terror attacks and hostage-taking missions in Cologne and Vienna.

Suicide: Voss and his companion spent three days and nights in a tawdry hotel in Belgrade, where they continuously debated whether they should put an end to their lives. But they decided against this option as well.

That left only betrayal. Voss and his girlfriend went to the American embassy, demanded to speak to a diplomat and made the statements that would add yet another twist to his already eventful life: “I am an officer of Fatah. This is my wife. I’m in a position to make an interesting offer to your intelligence agency.”

Voss became a defector. He went from being an accomplice of Palestinian terrorists to a member of the US intelligence agency — from a handmaiden of terror to a CIA spy. As if his first life were not eventful enough, Voss opted for a second life: as a CIA spook with the codename “Ganymede,” named after the kidnapped lover of Zeus, the father of the gods in Greek mythology.

His career as an undercover agent took him from Milan and Madrid back to Beirut and the headquarters of the PLO intelligence service. “Ganymede” provided information and documents that helped thwart attacks in the Middle East and Europe. Duane Clarridge, the legendary and infamous founder of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, even gave him the mission of catching top terrorist Carlos, “The Jackal.”

Today, as he sits in a Berlin café and talks about his life, the gray-haired man clad in a black leather jacket appears at times bitingly ironic, at times shy and prone to depression — making it all the more difficult to reconcile him with the daredevil who lived through this lunacy.

‘Naked Fury’

Voss, who was called Pohl until he adopted the name of his first wife, often says: “That’s exactly how it was, but nobody believes it anyway” — as if he himself had trouble tying together all the loose ends of his life to create a coherent biography. He is 68 years old and wants to get one thing straight: He has never been a neo-Nazi, he insists. “I was a stray dog — one that had been kicked so often that it wanted to bite back, no matter how,” says Voss. “If I had met Andreas Baader at the time,” he contends, “I would have presumably ended up with the Red Army Faction.”

It’s a statement that only becomes plausible when one considers the other formative experiences of his life. He recounts that his childhood was marred by violence, sexual abuse and other humiliations. “As a child, I constantly faced situations in which I was completely powerless,” says Voss, “and that triggered a naked fury, utter shame and the feeling that I was the most worthless thing in the world.”

As a teenager, he sought to escape this world by joining a clique of young rowdies whose dares including stealing mopeds for joy rides. That got him a year in juvenile detention.

This could have led to a small, or even substantial, career as a criminal in the industrial Ruhr region. But in 1960, Voss met Udo Albrecht in prison, who later became a major figurehead in the German neo-Nazi scene. Albrecht fascinated his fellow prisoners with his dream of using mini submarines to smuggle in diamonds from the beaches of southwest Africa.

Yes, he actually believed this nonsense at the time, admits Voss. Politics didn’t come into the picture until later on, he says, when the two jailbirds met in another prison in 1968. This time Voss was doing time for breaking and entering. “Albrecht talked and acted then like an unabashed Nazi,” says Voss. But he says that this did nothing to diminish his friendship with the self-proclaimed leader of the “People’s Liberation Front of Germany.”

Hooking Up with the Palestinians

Voss’ connection with the PLO began when he helped smuggle his buddy Albrecht out of prison in a container. The neo-Nazi slipped away to Jordan, where he hooked up with the Palestinians. When Daoud, the architect of the Munich massacre, asked him if he knew a reliable man in Germany, Albrecht recommended his prison pal from the Ruhr region.

Voss made himself useful. In Dortmund he purchased a number of Mercedes sedans for Daoud — and he established contact to a passport forger in his circle of acquaintances. Today, Voss believes that he was even involved in the preparations for the Munich attack. For a number of weeks, he says, he drove the leader of Black September, a terrorist group with ties to the PLO, “all across Germany, where he met with Palestinians in various cities.”

The Palestinians used him to handle other jobs, as well: “I was to hold a press conference in Vienna, in which I would comment on a mission that I would only find out about once it was successfully completed,” as the PLO chief of intelligence Iyad had told him. When Voss saw the images on TV, he realized that the “mission” was the massacre at the 1972 Summer Olympics. Instead of securing the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, as the hostage-takers had demanded, it ended in a bloodbath: Nine Israeli hostages, five Palestinian terrorists and one German policeman died.

Six weeks later, Voss was arrested in Germany. He had machine guns and hand grenades that stemmed from the same source as the weapons used by the Palestinian hostage-takers in Munich. This marked the beginning of wild negotiations initiated by Voss’ lawyer Wilhelm Schöttler, who sent a letter with a “classified” offer to Federal Minister for Special Affairs Egon Bahr.

The offer was simple: Release Voss to allow for negotiations with Black September. The objective was to prevent further attacks on German soil. Today, it is known that high-ranking officials at the Foreign Ministry met with the lawyer, who was considered a right-wing radical, and discussed an ongoing series of demands until March 1974, when then-Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher decided to end the negotiations.

Looking for Carlos
Six days later, a court in Munich handed Voss a relatively mild prison sentence of 26 months for contravening the War Weapons Control Act.

In December of 1974, his sentence was suspended despite the fact that he was still under investigation on suspicion of being a member of Black September. In Feb. 1975, he slipped out of Germany and headed back to Beirut, where he was soon serving the Palestinian cause again — right up until that big turning point in his life when he drove a car packed with weapons and explosives to the Romanian border in the summer of 1975.

Even today, one can sense the enormous respect that CIA veterans still have for their former German agent. “I’ve often wondered if he made it,” says Terrence Douglas, “although we are trained to keep our distance and to forget everything after the job is done and move on.”

Douglas, codename “Gordon,” was Voss’ commanding officer at the CIA. He has a very high opinion of his operative “Ganymede”: “Willi was a very cool guy. He was creative and a bit crazy — we spent a very, very intense time together.”

It takes a healthy dose of courage to secretly photograph documents at the PLO intelligence service headquarters. “Ganymede” foiled attacks in Sweden and Israel, identified terror cells in diverse countries and supplied information on collaborations between the neo-Nazi Albrecht and his accomplices with Arafat’s Fatah. And, as if all that were not enough, Voss lived next door to top terrorist Abu Nidal.

Surprisingly, though, the CIA agents stationed in Belgrade and Zagreb who Voss first met were not particularly thrilled with the young German. “They thought he was too boring,” says Douglas with a laugh. “But they had no clue. They didn’t know about the Black September list of people to be released with the hostage-taking at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Sudan in March 1973.”

Refusing to Tell the Truth

Members of the terror organization had also sought the release of a German during their operation in Sudan: Willi Voss. “That was his reference,” says Douglas. “That’s the reason why we were excited by him.”

The CIA made sure that Voss no longer had to fear being arrested in Germany. “It was clear to him that he couldn’t continue with his previous lifestyle,” says Douglas. “He wanted to survive and someday be able to settle again undisturbed in Germany,” he recalls. “After all, he had a wife, and she had a 10-year-old kid. It was a package deal, I took care of them.”

“As always in such situations, we informed the CIA office in Bonn, and they arranged everything with the BND or the BKA, depending on the situation,” says spymaster Clarridge, referring to Germany’s foreign intelligence agency and domestic criminal investigation agency respectively. Only a few weeks after the first meeting, the German arrest warrant had been rescinded.

Today, German authorities still refuse to tell the truth about these events. In the wake of revelations published in a June 2012 SPIEGEL article on the Munich massacre, Bavarian state parliamentarians Susanna Tausendfreund and Sepp Dürr of the Green Party demanded that the state government reveal “what documents from what Bavarian government agencies responsible at the time (exist) … on Willi Voss.”

In late August 2012, the Bavarian Interior Ministry responded — and it had a surprise. Ministry officials said that Voss had submitted a plea for clemency, which had received a positive response. “The content of this plea for clemency,” they noted, however, was “classified.” This is demonstrably false. Voss has never submitted a plea for clemency.

On the Terrace of an Athens Hotel

In any case, the deal certainly paid off for the Americans: Voss didn’t disappoint them, even at risk of life and limb. In the fall of 1975, the Christian Phalange militia in Lebanon held him captive because they thought he was what he pretended to be — a German member of Black September.

For weeks, Voss endured torture and mock executions without blowing his cover. For the CIA, this was a recommendation for an even riskier job. When Voss was released, he was told to hunt down Carlos, “The Jackal,” who, as a terror mercenary employed by Libyan revolutionary leader Moammar Gadhafi, had stormed OPEC headquarters in Vienna, and was committing murders for Palestinian terror groups.

Voss traveled to Athens. On the terrace of a hotel with a view of the Acropolis, not only Douglas, but also Clarridge — who had specially flown in from Washington — were waiting to meet the daring German operative. In his memoirs, Clarridge described the meeting as follows: “Just hours before I had left headquarters at Langley on this trip, a very senior clandestine service officer asked to see me alone in his office on the seventh floor. He could be excruciatingly elliptical when he desired — and this was such an occasion. Referring to my meeting with this agent in Athens, he hinted that if the agent could set up Carlos to be taken by a security service, it would be a boon for mankind and worth a bonus. I recall ten thousand dollars being mentioned. If Carlos were killed in the process, so be it. I acknowledged that I understood and left for Athens.”

Voss’ job was to find out where the Jackal was staying. But “Ganymede” lost his nerve this time. “Abu Daoud had told me that Carlos had a place in Damascus, not far from his own apartment,” Voss recalls today. “If something had happened to him, the people at the PLO intelligence service would have automatically suspected me. I found that too risky.”

‘CIA Beats Nazi’

In retrospect, his CIA contact Douglas was extremely happy about this decision. On December 6, 2012, after meeting with SPIEGEL, he sent an e-mail to his former agent: “I was delighted to hear that you are ageing gracefully — the alternative would have been unthinkable for me. … Let me say, I hold you in deep respect for your courage, quickness, wry humor, dedication and trustworthiness.” Douglas had written a book before he found out that Voss had survived his adventurous life. It’s a novel about a “plot in the Middle East” entitled: “Ganymede”.

Voss is also writing books; his third life. He specializes in crime thrillers and screenplays, having completed some 30 works since the late 1970s. But the author has never dared to tackle the most thrilling material of all — his complete life story.

Now, he’s telling the story for the first time. The German title of his book is “UnterGrund” (“Under Ground”) and, according to the preface, readers should not expect “a written confession seeking forgiveness.” Instead, he notes that “this is an account of events that, for security reasons, I thought I would have to keep secret forever.” Voss intends to save his honor and provide an explanation for his actions. In order to report on the 1972 Munich massacre, last spring SPIEGEL had applied for the release of classified files and written two articles mentioning Voss’ role in the attack. Afterwards, at least in the author’s eyes, his reputation was in tatters.

…

BY KARIN ASSMANN, FELIX BOHR, GUNTHER LATSCH and KLAUS WIEGREFE

01/02/2013 06:07 PM

Find this story at 2 January 2013

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013

A German far-right militant, whose animosity against Jews led him to aid Palestinians kill Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich massacre, says he was later recruited by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Willi Pohl, also known as Willi Voss, 68, was arrested by German authorities a few weeks after Palestinian terrorist group Black September stormed the Olympic village in Munich and took hostage 11 Israeli athletes. All of them were eventually killed by their captors during a botched escape attempt at the nearby Fürstenfeldbruck airport. Voss, who was a known neo-Nazi activist at the time, was charged with possession of weapons and providing logistical support to the Black September militants. However, after his sentence was suspended, Voss managed to secretly emigrate to Beirut, Lebanon, where he was recruited as an agent of Jihaz el-Razd, the intelligence service of the Fatah, the main group in the Palestine Liberation Organization. But in 1975, while on a PLO mission in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, he decided to switch sides. He made the decision after discovering that the car he and his girlfriend were transporting on behalf of the PLO from Beirut to Belgrade contained weapons and highly unstable explosives. He says that the PLO had apparently failed to mention the existence of the hidden items when they asked him to transport the car to Europe. According to Voss’ new book, which has just been published in Germany under the title UnterGrund (Underground), the guns and explosives were discovered by customs officers in Romania (then Rumania); but because at that time the communist country was an ally of the PLO, Voss and his girlfriend were allowed to travel to Belgrade, minus the car and the weapons. Once in the Yugoslav capital, they made the decision to walk in the US embassy, identify themselves as agents of the Jihaz el-Razd and offer their services to Washington. In an interview with German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, published this week, Voss claims he was recruited by the CIA and given the operational codename GANYMEDE. The interview in Der Spiegel includes confirmation of Voss’ CIA role by his intelligence handler CIA officer Terrence Douglas. Douglas says he instructed Voss to return to the service of the PLO and Black September, which was a separate group, and provide the US with information about the activities of leading Palestinian militants from various factions, including Abu Daoud, Abu Nidal, and Abu Jihad, who led the Jihaz el-Razd.

…

January 4, 2013 by intelNews 5 Comments

By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |

Find this story at 4 January 2013

Explicit warnings that a terrorist attack might take place at the 1972 Munich Olympics were ignored by German officials, according to previously classified documents seen by SPIEGEL. The new details also reveal efforts to cover up the extent of their failure to stop the brutal murders of Israeli athletes.

It is no secret that the German authorities’ handling of the massacre of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics was characterized by bumbling and cover-ups. But new documents seen by SPIEGEL reveal that officials concealed even more — and more blatant — errors than previously thought. Indeed, there were even several warnings prior to the Games that an attack was imminent.

ANZEIGE

Previously classified documents from investigative officials, embassy dispatches, and cabinet protocols released to SPIEGEL by the Chancellery, Foreign Office and state and federal intelligence agencies have revealed the lengths to which officials went to hide their mistakes.

In the attack on Sept. 5, 1972, Palestinian terrorists killed 11 members of Israel’s Olympic delegation, along with one German police officer. Five of the eight terrorists from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist group called “Black September” were also killed during the botched rescue attempt by German police at the Fürstenfeldbruck military airport, where the hostages were being held in two helicopters.

‘No Self-Criticism’

Already on Sept. 7, just one day after the memorial ceremony for the victims took place in Munich’s Olympic Stadium, a Foreign Ministry official told a special sitting of the federal cabinet what would ultimately become the maxim for both Bavarian and West German officials. “Mutual incriminations must be avoided,” a protocol for the meeting reads. “Also, no self-criticism.”

Just how closely this advice was followed can be seen in documentation from both the federal government and the Bavarian state government, which falsely described the “precision” with which the terrorists carried out their attack. In reality, officials knew that the “Black September” members were actually so poorly prepared that they even had trouble finding hotel rooms in Munich before their attack.

On the day of the attack, the Palestinians were even known to have gone right past the Israelis’ apartments in the Olympic village, encountering athletes from Hong Kong on an upper level of the building instead. An “analytic evaluation” of the attack by the Munich criminal police later explicitly determined that the terrorists had “conducted no precise reconnaissance” ahead of time.

But none of these details were revealed to the public. The fact that Bavarian state prosecutors in Munich were pursuing an investigation against police president Manfred Schreiber and his chief of operation on suspicion of negligent manslaughter also wasn’t mentioned in the document.

Clear Warnings

Concrete warnings of a potential attack also went unmentioned, despite the fact that they were so clear that their dismissal remains difficult to comprehend. On Aug. 14, 1972, a German embassy officer in Beirut heard that “an incident would be staged by from the Palestinian side during the Olympic Games in Munich.” Four days later, the Foreign Office forwarded the warning to the state intelligence agency in Bavaria, along with the recommendation to “take all possible available security measures” against such an attack.

Security agencies didn’t even register warnings that appeared in the press. On Sept. 2, three days ahead of the deadly hostage-taking, the Italian publication Gente wrote that terrorists from Black September were planning a “sensational act during the Olympic Games.” Only later — two days after the bloodbath in Munich — was the warning put on record through a tip-off from the Hamburg criminal police.

…

Released: July 23, 2012 | 12:20 PM

Find this story at 23 July 2012

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2012

El servicio secreto de Mohamed VI es, tras el ruso, el que más agentes pierde en el Viejo Continente
Yassin Mansouri, compañero de estudios del rey, dirige lo dirige desde 2005

Bagdad A., marroquí, de 59 años, se movía con soltura en el seno de la inmigración magrebí en Alemania. Recopilaba “informaciones sobre manifestaciones organizadas por grupos de oposición”, según la fiscalía federal germana. En 2007 se ofreció a los servicios secretos de su país alegando que poseía “una amplia red de contactos” en el seno de la comunidad marroquí. Le contrataron. Cinco años después, el 7 de diciembre, la fiscalía de Karlsruhe le imputó por “actividades por cuenta de servicios secretos extranjeros”.

Bagdad A. es el cuarto marroquí detenido por espionaje en Alemania desde 2011. Todos se consagraban a informar sobre las actividades de sus 230.000 compatriotas allí residentes, excepto Mohamed B., de 56 años, apresado en febrero en Berlín, y que se dedicaba a vigilar a los miembros del Frente Polisario. Cobró por ello 22.800 euros, según la fiscalía.

De todos los agentes marroquíes caídos estos últimos años en Europa, el que hizo más ruido fue, en 2008, Redouane Lemhaouli, de 42 años, un policía de origen marroquí que tenía acceso a las bases de datos del Ministerio del Interior de los Países Bajos. De ahí sacó información sobre “actuaciones contra el rey de Marruecos”, “terrorismo” y “tráfico de armas”, para comunicársela a los espías que, con cobertura diplomática, le habían reclutado.

El caso de Re, el apodo que habían puesto sus compañeros al policía, ha sido el que más repercusión tuvo porque el agente llegó a codearse con la princesa Máxima, esposa del príncipe Orange, y con un miembro del Gobierno holandés. Se sentó a su lado, en primera fila, durante una ceremonia en la que 57 chavales inmigrantes, muchos de ellos de origen marroquí, recibieron diplomas que les habilitaban para trabajar como personal de tierra en el aeropuerto de Rotterdam. Re les había formado.

Meses después, el policía fue expulsado del cuerpo y condenado a 240 horas de trabajos sociales. El que era entonces ministro de Exteriores holandés, Maxime Verhagen, envió una carta a los diputados lamentando “la intervención de sectores o servicios para influir a los ciudadanos de origen marroquí”.

Los agentes marroquíes sufren traspiés en la Europa del norte, pero se mueven con más libertad en la del sur

En total, desde 2008 han trascendido 10 detenciones y procesamientos de agentes o expulsiones de diplomáticos de Marruecos en Europa —Mauritania echó también a un undécimo confidente el año pasado—, un número solo superado por Rusia, que en los últimos cinco años perdió a 31 espías en el Viejo Continente.

Los 11 agentes marroquíes trabajaban para la Dirección General de Estudios y Documentación (DGED), el servicio de espionaje exterior de Yassin Mansouri, de 50 años, el primer civil que lo dirige. Es el único servicio de inteligencia que formalmente depende del palacio real de Marruecos y se ha convertido en algo más que un servicio secreto. Es un instrumento de la diplomacia marroquí. La personalidad de su jefe lo explica.

Mansouri forma parte del círculo de estrechos colaboradores del rey Mohamed VI, con el que estudió en el colegio real. Es además el único entre los íntimos del monarca que no ha sido salpicado por un escándalo económico o político.

Su travesía del desierto

acabó poco después

de la entronización

de Mohamed VI

Su lealtad al futuro rey le provocó incluso, en 1997, ser apartado del puesto que desempeñaba en el Ministerio del Interior por su titular, Driss Basri. Sospechaba que le espiaba por cuenta del príncipe heredero, al que él sí vigilaba por encargo de su padre, Hassan II. Mansouri fue, sin embargo, el único de los amigos de juventud del príncipe que cayó bien a Basri. Ensalzó ante Hassan II su capacidad de trabajo y el rey le envió en 1992 a EE UU para que le formase el FBI.

Nacido en Beejad, en el centro del país, hijo de un alem (sabio del islam), Mansouri recibió una educación religiosa, algo trastornada por las amistades izquierdistas de su hermano, hasta que se le ofreció plaza en el colegio real. Aún hoy día sigue siendo un hombre piadoso que intenta rezar con frecuencia, que no bebe alcohol, ni fuma, ni hace ostentación.

Su travesía del desierto acabó tras la entronización de Mohamed VI, que en 1999 le nombró director de la MAP, la agencia de prensa oficial, desde donde regresó en 2003, esta vez por la puerta grande, a Interior. Durante dos años estuvo al frente de la más importante dirección general del ministerio del que Basri ya había sido expulsado. De ahí dio el salto al espionaje y a la diplomacia discreta.

Mansouri formó, por ejemplo, parte de la delegación marroquí que acudió a Nueva York en 2007 a presentar al secretario general de la ONU la oferta de autonomía para el Sáhara; se sentó varias veces a negociar con el Polisario y se entrevistó en secreto en París, en 2007, con la ministra israelí de Exteriores, Tzipi Livn. En 2008 recibió en Rabat al secretario de Estado adjunto norteamericano, David Welsh, al que expresó su preocupación por la fragilidad del régimen tunecino y la “codicia” de su dictador Ben Ali, según revelaron posteriormente los cables de Wikileaks. Tres años después, Ben Ali fue derrocado. Mansouri fue de los pocos que acertaron en su pronóstico sobre Túnez..

La DGED se ha dedicado, desde su creación en 1973, a vigilar a los exiliados enemigos de la monarquía alauí, antes izquierdistas y ahora más bien islamistas y a los independentistas saharauis. Pero a medida que la emigración marroquí ha ido creciendo también se esfuerza en supervisarla para que no germine en ella el extremismo, para que sea leal al trono.

En España, Marruecos ha elaborado “una estrategia de gran magnitud”, señalaba en mayo de 2011 un informe del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) enviado por su director, el general Félix Sanz, a tres ministros. “Su objetivo es extender su influencia e incrementar el control sobre las colonias marroquíes utilizando la excusa de la religión”, añadía. Esta supervisión la ejerce, según el CNI, “a través de su embajada y consulados (…), personal afín”, es decir, agentes de la DGED con cobertura diplomática y confidentes reclutados sobre el terreno. También colabora la Fundación Hassan II, que preside la princesa Lalla Meryem, hermana de Mohamed VI, cuyo presupuesto no está sometido al control del Parlamento.

Prueba del interés de la DGED por la religión fue la intervención de Mansouri, en noviembre de 2008, ante un nutrido grupo de imanes, procedentes de España e Italia, e invitados a Marraquech por el Ministerio de Asuntos Islámicos. Un año antes, Mansouri viajó a Mallorca para reunirse con el que era entonces su homólogo español, Alberto Saiz, y advertirle de que estaba “jugando con fuego” al fomentar en Ceuta el auge de los tablig, una corriente islámica de origen indio, en detrimento del islam malekita que impera en Marruecos.

…

Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 14 DIC 2012 – 20:47 CET

Find this story at 14 December 2012

© EDICIONES EL PAÍS, S.L.

Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat am 8. November 2012 vor dem Staatsschutzsenat des Kammergerichts in Berlin gegen

den 59-jährigen deutschen und marokkanischen Staatsangehörigen Bagdad A.

Anklage wegen geheimdienstlicher Agententätigkeit (§ 99 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 StGB) erhoben.

Dem Angeschuldigten wird in der nunmehr zugestellten Anklageschrift vorgeworfen, von Mai 2007 bis Ende Februar 2012 für den marokkanischen Nachrichtendienst Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Oppositionelle beschafft zu haben.

In der Anklageschrift ist im Wesentlichen folgender Sachverhalt dargelegt:

Der Angeschuldigte verfügt über ein weit verzweigtes Netz von Kontakten zu den in Deutschland lebenden Marokkanern. Im Jahr 2007 erklärte er sich gegenüber dem marokkanischen Auslandsgeheimdienst bereit, seine Kontakte zu nutzen, um Informationen über marokkanische Oppositionelle in Deutschland zu beschaffen. Bis Ende Februar 2012 stand er ununterbrochen in Kontakt zu seinen nachrichtendienstlichen Auftraggebern und unterrichtete sie über seine Erkenntnisse aus der marokkanischen Gemeinschaft. Insbesondere berichtete er seinen Führungsfunktionären von Demonstrationen oppositioneller Gruppierungen.

07.12.2012 – 34/2012

Find this story at 7 December 2012

Karlsruhe (ots) – Nr. 16

Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat am 9. Mai 2012 vor dem Staatsschutzsenat des Kammergerichts in Berlin gegen

den 47-jährigen deutschen und marokkanischen Staatsangehörigen Mohammed B.

Anklage wegen geheimdienstlicher Agententätigkeit (§ 99 Abs. 1 Nr. 1, 2 StGB) und Urkundenfälschung (§ 267 StGB) erhoben.

Dem Angeschuldigten wird in der nunmehr zugestellten Anklageschrift vorgeworfen, ab Januar 2011 Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Marokkaner an den marokkanischen Nachrichtendienst weitergegeben zu haben.

Im Einzelnen wird in der Anklageschrift von folgendem Sachverhalt ausgegangen:

Der Angeschuldigte hat für seine nachrichtendienstlichen Auftraggeber vor allem marokkanische Oppositionelle und Anhänger der “Frente Polisario”, einer Befreiungsbewegung für die Westsahara, ausgespäht. So berichtete er seinen Führungsoffizieren etwa über eine Veranstaltung mit einem Repräsentanten der “Frente Polisario” in Berlin. Zudem veranlasste er, dass Informationen über die in Berlin ansässige “Projektgruppe Westsahara” zusammengetragen und an seine Auftraggeber weitergeleitet wurden. Außerdem berichtete er seinen Auftraggebern über die Haltung eines Gelehrten und eines Botschaftsangehörigen zur marokkanischen Staatsführung.

Für seine Dienste erhielt der Angeschuldigte im Jahr 2011 einen Agentenlohn von 22.800 Euro. Um die Herkunft des Geldes zu verschleiern, stellte der Angeschuldigte Rechnungen über angebliche Werbeveranstaltungen für die staatliche marokkanische Fluggesellschaft aus.

Der Angeschuldigte wurde am 15. Februar 2012 aufgrund eines Haftbefehls des Ermittlungsrichters des Bundesgerichtshof vom 14. Februar 2012 festgenommen (vgl. Pressemitteilung Nr. 5/2012 vom 15. Februar 2012) und befand sich bis 5. Juni 2012 in Untersuchungshaft. Der Haftbefehl war am 4. Juni 2012 außer Vollzug gesetzt worden, nachdem der Angeschuldigte den Tatvorwurf der geheimdienstlichen Agententätigkeit eingeräumt hatte.

Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof (GBA)
Frauke Köhler
Staatsanwältin
Brauerstr. 30
76137 Karlsruhe
Telefon: +49 (0)721 8191-410
E-Mail: pressestelle@gba.bund.de
http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/

12.06.2012 | 14:25 Uhr

Find this story at 12 June 2012

Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat einen mutmaßlichen Spion Marokkos festnehmen lassen. Der Mann soll marokkanische Aktivisten an den Geheimdienst seines Landes verraten haben.

Eine Truppe der Westsahara-Rebellenbewegung Frente Polisario, deren Anhänger der mutmaßliche Spion verraten haben soll.

Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat in Berlin einen 56-jährigen Marokkaner wegen mutmaßlicher Spionage festnehmen lassen. Er sei dringend verdächtig, Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Landsleute an den marokkanischen Geheimdienst weitergegeben zu haben. Ein Ermittlungsrichter des Bundesgerichtshofs ordnete Untersuchungshaft an.

Dem Festgenommenen wird geheimdienstliche Agententätigkeit vorgeworfen. Insbesondere soll er Informationen über Anhänger der Widerstandsbewegung für die Westsahara, Frente Polisario, beschafft haben. Die Rebellenbewegung kämpft mit Unterstützung Algeriens für die vollständige Unabhängigkeit der Westsahara. Die Region war früher eine spanische Kolonie, die nach ihrer Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 1975 von Marokko annektiert wurde.

…

15.02.2012 – 18:30 Uhr

Find this story at 15 February 2012

© ZEIT ONLINE GmbH

Berlin – Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble steht nach seinem Auftritt im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags in der Kritik. Der Ausschussvorsitzende Sebastian Edathy warf dem damaligen Innenminister Desinteresse an der Aufklärung der Morde vor. Schäuble habe sich für die Sache so gut wie gar nicht interessiert, sagte der SPD-Politiker dem RBB-Inforadio. Zudem seien 2006 in Schäubles Ministerverantwortung gravierende Fehlentscheidungen getroffen worden. Unter anderem habe man die Abteilungen für Links- und Rechtsextremismus beim Verfassungsschutz zusammengeführt.

15.12.12

Find this story at 15 December 2012

© Axel Springer AG 2012 – Alle Rechte vorbehalten