WASHINGTON — U.S. authorities have long cast a wary eye on counterterrorism intelligence from Russia, Obama administration officials say, raising questions about whether a “trust deficit” clouded efforts to determine if Boston Marathon bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev posed a danger.

Any intelligence disconnect between the United States and Russia could have broader repercussions, complicating plans to cooperate on security for the 2014 Winter Olympics in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, not far from Russia’s restive north Caucasus region.

U.S. officials said they considered counterterrorism information emanating from Moscow’s bitter conflict with Islamist militants in Chechnya and other parts of the volatile north Caucasus especially suspect.

What little is known about how the FBI and other U.S. agencies handled a 2011 tip from Russia’s FSB spy service that Tsarnaev, an ethnic Chechen, had become a follower of radical Islam suggests they dealt with it professionally, although not as a top-priority matter.

But it would not have been out of character for the U.S. government to take a jaundiced view of such information. In Tsarnaev’s case, Moscow provided few details, U.S. officials have said.

“The Russians typically file spurious requests on people that are not really terrorists, and that’s why somebody might have discounted it,” a senior State Department official said. “One wouldn’t automatically take what the Russians say at face value. You’d always have to look for a second corroboration.”

Russian “watch lists” often include political dissidents and human rights activists mixed together with militants, the senior official said.

The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment for this story. But Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has repeatedly warned of the dangers of militancy from the Caucasus, may feel vindication by the Chechen connection to the Boston bombing.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper touched on U.S. unease at Moscow’s intelligence-sharing in a speech to a Washington conference on Thursday, in which he expressed pique at growing criticism over intelligence and law enforcement handling of the case.

“Whenever the Russians say something about arms control issues, well, we’re very suspicious. We’re supposed to trust but verify, not accept what the Russians say. But in this case, we accept it, whatever they say without question?” Clapper said with a shrug.

The FBI said it questioned Tsarnaev and found nothing to suggest he was a security threat. The bureau said it sought further details from the FSB, the post-Cold War successor to the KGB, but none were forthcoming.

Tamerlan, 26, was killed last week in a gun battle with police after the deadly April 15 Boston attack. His younger brother and alleged accomplice, Dzhokhar, 19, was later captured, wounded and hiding out in a suburban neighborhood.

More than two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States and Russia continue spying on each other. It was less than three years ago that they arranged a spy swap after the FBI arrested a cell of “sleeper agents.”

Though Russia was quick to rally behind the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, tangible actions such as regular sharing of deep intelligence have proven harder.

The question now is whether the two countries can put distrust aside for the sake of better security.

One senior U.S. official insisted that both sides are committed, especially now that the Boston bombing has reminded everyone of the security risks ahead of the Sochi games.

“Our intelligence services are always conflicted between the need to share and the need to protect sources and methods,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But we have a mutual interest as two countries that have been victims of terrorism … . This will keep us focused.”

In the lead-up to Sochi, Putin’s pet project, the attack’s Chechen link may give the Kremlin more leverage in its attempts to get the Americans to expand information on those whom Moscow brands “extremists,” even in cases where U.S. intelligence does not assess a real threat, the senior State Department official said.

The Obama administration is already debating whether to exchange terrorist “no-fly” lists as the Russians have requested and “act like everything they give us is legit,” the official added.

Washington and Moscow have sometimes seen eye to eye on the Caucasus. In 2011, President Barack Obama and then-President Dmitry Medvedev agreed that the Caucasus Emirate militant group was a terrorist organization with al-Qaida ties. The United States offered a $5 million reward for the group’s Chechen leader, Doku Umarov, the Kremlin’s most-wanted man.

More recently, Putin has bristled at the Obama administration’s criticism of what it sees as a heavy-handed response to a long-running Muslim insurgency in the Caucasus. Many analysts say the unrest has been fueled by Moscow’s brutal repression.

A common view inside and outside of the Obama administration is that clashing assessments like these and disputes over intelligence clouded U.S. handling of the Tsarnaev tip.

…

29 April 2013
Reuters

Find this story at 29 April 2013

© Copyright 2013. The Moscow Times. All rights reserved.

We are asked to believe that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was identified by the Russian government as an extremist Dagestani or Chechen Islamist terrorist, and they were so concerned about it that in late 2010 they asked the US government to take action. At that time, the US and Russia did not normally have a security cooperation relationship over the Caucasus, particularly following the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. For the Russians to ask the Americans for assistance, Tsarnaev must have been high on their list of worries.

In early 2011 the FBI interview Tsarnaev and trawl his papers and computers but apparently – remarkably for somebody allegedly radicalised by internet – the habitually paranoid FBI find nothing of concern.

So far, so weird. But now this gets utterly incredible. In 2012 Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who is of such concern to Russian security, is able to fly to Russia and pass through the airport security checks of the world’s most thoroughly and brutally efficient security services without being picked up. He is then able to proceed to Dagestan – right at the heart of the world’s heaviest military occupation and the world’s most far reaching secret police surveillance – again without being intercepted, and he is able there to go through some form of terror training or further Islamist indoctrination. He then flies out again without any intervention by the Russian security services.

That is the official story and I have no doubt it did not happen. I know Russia and I know the Russian security services. Whatever else they may be, they are extremely well-equipped, experienced and efficient and embedded into a social fabric accustomed to cooperation with their mastery. This scenario is simply impossible in the real world.

…

Craig Murray is an author, broadcaster and human rights activist. He was British Ambassador to Uzbekistan from August 2002 to October 2004 and Rector of the University of Dundee from 2007 to 2010.

By Craig Murray

April 23, 2013 “Information Clearing House” – There are gaping holes in the official story of the Boston bombings.

Find this story at 22 April 2013

© 2005-2013 GlobalResearch.ca

Critics say bureau is running a sting operation across America, targeting vulnerable people by luring them into fake terror plots

The FBI has drawn criticism over its apparent use of ‘entrapment’ tactics. Photograph: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

David Williams did not have an easy life. He moved to Newburgh, a gritty, impoverished town on the banks of the Hudson an hour or so north of New York, at just 10 years old. For a young, black American boy with a father in jail, trouble was everywhere.

Williams also made bad choices. He ended up going to jail for dealing drugs. When he came out in 2007 he tried to go straight, but money was tight and his brother, Lord, needed cash for a liver transplant. Life is hard in Newburgh if you are poor, have a drug rap and need cash quickly.

His aunt, Alicia McWilliams, was honest about the tough streets her nephew was dealing with. “Newburgh is a hard place,” she said. So it was perhaps no surprise that in May, 2009, David Williams was arrested again and hit with a 25-year jail sentence. But it was not for drugs offences. Or any other common crime. Instead Williams and three other struggling local men beset by drug, criminal and mental health issues were convicted of an Islamic terrorist plot to blow up Jewish synagogues and shoot down military jets with missiles.

Even more shocking was that the organisation, money, weapons and motivation for this plot did not come from real Islamic terrorists. It came from the FBI, and an informant paid to pose as a terrorist mastermind paying big bucks for help in carrying out an attack. For McWilliams, her own government had actually cajoled and paid her beloved nephew into being a terrorist, created a fake plot and then jailed him for it. “I feel like I am in the Twilight Zone,” she told the Guardian.

Lawyers for the so-called Newburgh Four have now launched an appeal that will be held early next year. Advocates hope the case offers the best chance of exposing the issue of FBI “entrapment” in terror cases. “We have as close to a legal entrapment case as I have ever seen,” said Susanne Brody, who represents another Newburgh defendant, Onta Williams.

Some experts agree. “The target, the motive, the ideology and the plot were all led by the FBI,” said Karen Greenberg, a law professor at Fordham University in New York, who specialises in studying the new FBI tactics.

But the issue is one that stretches far beyond Newburgh. Critics say the FBI is running a sting operation across America, targeting – to a large extent – the Muslim community by luring people into fake terror plots. FBI bureaux send informants to trawl through Muslim communities, hang out in mosques and community centres, and talk of radical Islam in order to identify possible targets sympathetic to such ideals. Or they will respond to the most bizarre of tip-offs, including, in one case, a man who claimed to have seen terror chief Ayman al-Zawahiri living in northern California in the late 1990s.

That tipster was quickly hired as a well-paid informant. If suitable suspects are identified, FBI agents then run a sting, often creating a fake terror plot in which it helps supply weapons and targets. Then, dramatic arrests are made, press conferences held and lengthy convictions secured.

But what is not clear is if many real, actual terrorists are involved.
The homes of the Fort Dix Five were raided by the FBI. Photograph: Joseph Kaczmarek/AP

Another “entrapment” case is on the radar too. The Fort Dix Five – accused of plotting to attack a New Jersey army base – have also appealed against their convictions. That case too involved dubious use of paid informants, an apparent over-reach of evidence and a plot that seemed suggested by the government.

Burim Duka, whose three brothers were jailed for life for their part in the scheme, insists they did not know they were part of a terror plot and were just buying guns for shooting holidays in a deal arranged by a friend. The “friend” was an informant who had persuaded another man of a desire to attack Fort Dix.

Duka is convinced his brothers’ appeal has a good chance. “I am hopeful,” he told the Guardian.

But things may not be that easy. At issue is the word “entrapment”, which has two definitions. There is the common usage, where a citizen might see FBI operations as deliberate traps manipulating unwary people who otherwise were unlikely to become terrorists. Then there is the legal definition of entrapment, where the prosecution merely has to show a subject was predisposed to carry out the actions they later are accused of.

Theoretically, a simple expression, like support for jihad, might suffice, and in post-9/11 America neither judges nor juries tend to be nuanced in terror trials. “Legally, you have to use the word entrapment very carefully. It is a very strict legal term,” said Greenberg.

But in its commonly understood usage, FBI entrapment is a widespread tactic. Within days of the 9/11 terror attacks, FBI director Robert Mueller issued a memo on a new policy of “forward leaning – preventative – prosecutions”.

Central to that is a growing informant network. The FBI is not choosy about the people it uses. Some have criminal records, including attempted murder or drug dealing or fraud. They are often paid six-figure sums, which critics say creates a motivation to entrap targets. Some are motivated by the promise of debts forgiven or immigration violations wiped clean. There has also been a relaxing of rules on what criteria the FBI needs to launch an investigation.

Often they just seem to be “fishing expeditions”. In the Newburgh case, the men involved met FBI informant Shahed Hussain simply because he happened to infiltrate their mosque. In southern California, FBI informant Craig Monteilh trawled mosques posing as a Muslim and tried to act as a magnet for potential radicals.

Monteilh, who bugged scores of people, is a convicted felon with serious drug charges to his name. His operation turned up nothing. But Monteilh’s professed terrorist sympathy so unnerved his Muslim targets that they got a restraining order against him and alerted the FBI, not realising Monteilh was actually working on the bureau’s behalf.

Muslim civil rights groups have warned of a feeling of being hounded and threatened by the FBI, triggering a natural fear of the authorities among people that should be a vital defence against real terror attacks. But FBI tactics could now be putting off many people from reporting tip-offs or suspicious individuals.

“They are making mosques suspicious of anybody. They are putting fear into these communities,” said Greenberg. Civil liberties groups are also concerned, seeing some FBI tactics as using terrorism to justify more power. “We are still seeing an expansion of these tools. It is a terrible prospect,” said Mike German, an expert at the American Civil Liberties Union and a former FBI agent who has worked in counter-terrorism.

German said suspects convicted of plotting terror attacks in some recent FBI cases bore little resemblance to the profile of most terrorist cells. “Most of these suspect terrorists had no access to weapons unless the government provided them. I would say that showed they were not the biggest threat to the US,” German said.

“Most terrorists have links to foreign terrorist groups and have trained in terrorism training camps. Perhaps FBI resources should be spent finding those guys.”

Also, some of the most serious terrorist attacks carried out in the US since 9/11 have revolved around “lone wolf” actions, not the sort of conspiracy plots the FBI have been striving to combat. The 2010 Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, only came to light after his car bomb failed to go off properly. The Fort Hood killer Nidal Malik Hasan, who shot dead 13 people on a Texas army base in 2009, was only discovered after he started firing. Both evaded the radar of an FBI expending resources setting up fictional crimes and then prosecuting those involved.

Yet, as advocates for those caught up in “entrapment” cases discover, there is little public or judicial sympathy for them. Even in cases where judges have admitted FBI tactics have raised serious questions, there has been no hesitation in returning guilty verdicts, handing down lengthy sentences and dismissing appeals.

The Liberty City Seven are a case in point. The 2006 case involved an informant, Elie Assaad, with a dubious past (he was once arrested, but not charged, for beating his pregnant wife). Assaad was let loose with another informant on a group of men in Liberty City, a poor, predominantly black, suburb of Miami. The targets were followers of a cult-like group called The Seas of David, led by former Guardian Angel Narseal Batiste.

The group was, perhaps, not even Muslim, as its religious practices involved Bible study and wearing the Star of David. Yet Assaad posed as an Al-Qaida operative, and got members of the group to swear allegiance. Transcripts of the “oath-taking” ceremony are almost farcical. Batiste repeatedly queries the idea and appears bullied into it. In effect, defence lawyers argued, the men were confused, impoverished members of an obscure cult.

Yet targets the group supposedly entertained attacking included the Sears Tower in Chicago, Hollywood movie studios and the Empire State Building. Even zealous prosecutors, painting a picture of dedicated Islamic terrorists, admitted any potential plots were “aspirational”, given the group had no means to carry them out.

…

Paul Harris in New York
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 16 November 2011 17.33 GMT

Find this story at 16 November 2011
© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

James Cromitie in police custody in May 2009, after his arrest by the FBI in a sting operation involving a bomb plot against a Jewish community centre in Riverdale, New York. Photograph: AP Photo/Robert Mecea Photograph: Robert Mecea/AP

On Wednesday, a much-publicised FBI terrorism sting concluded when three of four men from Newburgh, New York were sentenced to 25 years in prison (a fourth will be sentenced next Tuesday). The four men had, along with an FBI informant who led the plot, planted a bomb at a Jewish community centre just outside New York City and procured a Stinger missile with which to attack the army’s Stewart air base.

At first glance, it was the perfect homegrown terrorism trial. All the crucial ingredients were there: a group of suspects allegedly linked to a foreign terrorist organisation; the placement of explosives; and targets that were bound to arouse fear in discreet communities. The only problem, as Judge Colleen McMahon pointed out at sentencing, was that this was not really a typical terrorism case but “sui generis … unique and troubling”.

The reason, the judge explained, was that “there would never have been any case if the government had not made one up.” But this was only part of the troubling story.

The real problem began not with the suspects, but with the government’s confidential informant. Shahed Hussain, a 53-year-old Pakistani citizen who has reportedly lived in the United States for several years, served as the point person in a sting operation in which, as the judge explained, “no one except the government instigated, planned and brought [the plot] to fruition.”

Throughout the sentencing, Judge McMahon remained firm: this case was a government invention. The men in question did not agree to carry out the crime due to ideology. They had no allegiance to, or even knowledge, of the terrorist group Jaish-i-Mohammed, in whose name they allegedly acted. They were not motivated to criminal behaviour by their allegiance to Allah. They were motivated, purely and simply, by money; as such, they were criminals deserving punishment, but not terrorists. As Judge McMahon repeatedly stated, these men were not equivalent to the 2010 Times Square bomber, Faisal Shazad, or other ideologically motivated terrorists.

Still, McMahon could find no valid legal precedent for overturning the jury conviction of the defendants on trial for terrorism-related charges. She sentenced all three men to the mandatory minimum of 25 years, rejecting the prosecution’s request for life sentences. But the question remains: why did she uphold even the mandatory minimums when she repeatedly said that the government had dreamed up the whole case? Why did she decide this way when she expressed her disappointment repeatedly with the government’s conduct in the case? Was it because, as the lead prosecutor David Raskin declared, “The fact that it was all fake really doesn’t matter.” Was it because the defendants placed what they thought to be a live bomb outside a Jewish community centre in Riverdale, and were thus willing to kill many innocent people?

The rationale for McMahon’s harsh sentence was the most pronounced and least discussed element of this sting: the blatant antisemitism at the heart of it. In dozens of hours of taped conversation, Cromitie had expounded in graphic terms about his hatred for Jews and his desire to get back at those who he felt were biased against his Muslim practices.

On Thursday, as during the trial, Judge McMahon reminded the court just how appalling were those expressions of loathing. She excoriated Cromitie for his vile views, exhibiting to her mind “a hatred that is particularly horrifying to members of my generation whose fathers and grandfathers and friends and neighbours helped liberate the concentration camps from the Nazis”. She quoted from one of the more unpleasant passages of the trial itself, denouncing the sentiment that “all the evil in the world is due to the Jews”.

…

• Research for this piece was contributed by Susan Quatrone and Camilla MacFarland

Boston Marathon suspects planned New York attack, says Mayor Bloomberg – video

25 Apr 2013

New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg says Boston marathon bombing suspects planned to use remaining explosives to launch an attack on Times Square

25 Apr 2013

Boston suspects planned attack on New York City, Mayor Bloomberg says

22 Apr 2013

Bostonians share moment of silence for marathon bombing victims

21 Apr 2013

FBI faces questions over previous contact with Boston bombing suspect

One suspect dead, one on the run after night of violence and fear in Boston

19 Apr 2013

Ambush of a university police officer set in chain a high-speed chase and a bloody shootout with the two bombing suspects – and led to a panicked city being placed on lockdown. Ed Pilkington reports

Karen Greenberg
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 30 June 2011 20.30 BST

Find this story at 30 June 2011

© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Retired CIA officer Graham Fuller confirmed to Al-Monitor Saturday that his daughter was previously married to an uncle of the suspects in the Boston Marathon attacks, but called rumors of any links between the uncle and the Agency “absurd.”

Graham Fuller’s daughter, Samantha A. Fuller, was married to Ruslan Tsarnaev (now Tsarni) in the mid-1990s, and divorced in 1999, according to North Carolina public records. The elder Fuller had retired from the agency almost a decade before the brief marriage.

“Samantha was married to Ruslan Tsarnaev (Tsarni) for 3-4 years, and they lived in Bishkek for one year where Samantha was working for Price Waterhouse on privatization projects,” Fulller, a former CIA officer in Turkey and vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, told Al-Monitor by email Saturday. “They also lived in our house in [Maryland] for a year or so and they were divorced in 1999, I believe.”

“I, of course, retired from CIA in 1987 and had moved on to working as a senior political scientist for RAND,” Fuller continued.

Fuller said his former son in law was interesting but homesick, and moved back to Central Asia after the divorce.

“Like all Chechens, Ruslan was very concerned about his native land, but I saw no particular involvement in politics, [although] he did try to contact other Chechens around,” Fuller continued. “He also felt homesick and eventually went back to Central Asia after the divorce. His English was shaky. (We always spoke Russian together).”

A story on the Internet implying “possible connections between Ruslan and the Agency through me are absurd,” Fuller said.

“I doubt [Ruslan] even had much to say of intelligence value other than talking about his own family’s sad tale of deportation from Chechnya by Stalin to Central Asia,” Fuller said. “Every Chechen family has such stories.”

Fuller said he had made several visits to Central Asia to do research on post-Soviet political developments, and visited his daughter and Tsarni there. “Our visit is briefly mentioned in my recent memoir, Three Truths and a Lie, as well as their marriage celebration in [Maryland],” he wrote.

A former Russian history and literature major at Harvard, Fuller said he had a long interest in Soviet minorities, and found Ruslan interesting.

Ruslan Tsarni has said in media interviews that his family was estranged from his brother Aznor’s, over what Ruslan described as the growing religious fanaticism of Aznor’s wife, Zubeidat, and that the families had not spoken for several years. Aznor and Zubeidat’s sons Tamerlan, 26, and Dzhokhar, 19, are accused of carrying out the April 15th Boston Marathon bombings.

Fuller said he thinks he met Aznor Tsarnaev once, fleetingly, in Kazakhstan. His daughter, he said, knew the family better, but when Tamerlan was just a toddler, and Dzhokhar not yet born.

…

Posted on April 27, 2013 by Laura Rozen

Find this story at 27 April 2013

© 2013 AL-MONITOR

An uncle of the Boston bombers was previously married to a CIA officer’s daughter for three years, it emerged today.

Ruslan Tsarni, who publicly denounced his two terrorist nephews’ actions and called them ‘Losers’, even lived with his father-in-law agent Graham Fuller in his Maryland home for a year.

Mr Fuller was forced to explain the relationship today as news of the family link emerged online.

Son-in-law: Former CIA agent Graham Fuller, left, explained his relationship to the two Boston terror suspects’ uncle today. Ruslan Tsarni, right, was married for three years to his daughter, Samantha

He told Al-Monitor that his daughter, Samantha, was married to Ruslan, whose surname was then Tsarnaev, for three to four years in the 1990s.

The couple divorced in 1999 more than ten years after he left the agency in 1987.

‘Samantha was married to Ruslan Tsarnaev (Tsarni) for 3-4 years, and they lived in Bishkek for one year where Samantha was working for Price Waterhouse on privatization projects,’ Mr Fuller said.

‘They also lived in our house in [Maryland] for a year or so and they were divorced in 1999, I believe.

‘I, of course, retired from CIA in 1987 and had moved on to working as a senior political scientist for RAND.’

He said his son-in-law showed no interest in the agency or politics but spoke generally about his family in Chechnya.

He said any attempts to portray the relationship as a link between the security agency and the two terrorists was ‘absurd’.

‘Like all Chechens, Ruslan was very concerned about his native land, but I saw no particular involvement in politics,’ Fuller told Al-Monitor.

‘I doubt he even had much to say of intelligence value other than talking about his own family’s sad tale of deportation from Chechnya by Stalin to Central Asia. Every Chechen family has such stories.’

Nephews: Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev could at one time count a CIA agent’s daughter as their aunt

Outraged: Ruslan Tsarni made his feelings against his nephews actions known to the media in the aftermath of the Boston attacks

Fuller visited his daughter and her husband in Bishek, as a former Russian history graduate himself interested in ‘Soviet minorities’.

He said he may have met the terror suspects’ father, Aznor, there once and his daughter knew the Tsarnaev family when Tamerlan was a toddler and before his younger brother was born.

‘I for one was astonished at the events, and to find myself at two degrees of separation from them,’ he added.

Ruslan Tsarni, who lives in Montgomery Village, Maryland, was thrust into the spotlight as the names of his two nephews emerged in connection to the Boston terror attack.

He stood on his driveway and attacked the two men calling them ‘Losers’.

He has since reported a rift between his family and that of his brother Aznor’s and said his older nephew Tamerlan had become increasingly extreme in his religious views.

…

By Katie Davies

PUBLISHED: 23:34 GMT, 27 April 2013 | UPDATED: 05:55 GMT, 28 April 2013

Find this story at 27 April 2013

© Associated Newspapers Ltd

Nine months before the Boston Marathon bombing, a U.S. counterterrorism task force received a warning that a suspected militant had returned from a lengthy trip to Russia, U.S. officials said.

The warning was delivered to a single U.S. Customs and Border Protection official assigned to Boston’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, a cell of specialists from federal and local law enforcement agencies. The task force was part of a network of multi-agency organizations set up across the country after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to make sure that clues and tips were shared.

But officials said there is no indication that the unidentified customs officer provided the information to any other members of the task force, including FBI agents who had previously interviewed the militant.

The man whose return from Russia went largely unnoticed was one of the two brothers who would later be accused of carrying out the April 15 bombing that killed three people and injured more than 250 others near the finish line of the Boston Marathon.

The apparent failure to alert the FBI has emerged as a significant, if slender, missed opportunity to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s activities ahead of the Boston attack.

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there would not have been reason to scrutinize Tsarnaev further, even if the information on his travels had been shared more widely.

“The FBI investigation into the individual in question had been closed six months prior to his departure from the United States and more than a year before his return,” the official said. “Since there was no derogatory information, there was no reason to suggest that additional action was warranted.”

The disclosure — one of several to cause lawmakers to express concern about persistent gaps in U.S. counterterrorism procedures — came as U.S. officials revealed that the bombing suspects may have intended to carry out a follow-up attack in New York’s Times Square.

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 19, who is still recovering at a Boston hospital from gunshot wounds, told FBI interrogators that he and his brother came up with the Times Square plan spontaneously three days after the marathon bombings, officials said. Investigators, however, have not found any evidence that operational plans were ever set in motion.

The New York plot was derailed when the Tsarnaev brothers became the target of a manhunt by law enforcement. The older brother was killed, and the younger one captured, after a chaotic pursuit through neighborhoods of Watertown, Mass.

“We don’t know if we would have been able to stop the terrorists had they arrived here from Boston,” New York Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg (I) said during a news conference at which the plot was outlined. “We’re just thankful that we didn’t have to find out that answer.”

The criminal charges filed against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev indicate that the two brothers had at least a half-dozen explosive devices in addition to the two pressure-cooker bombs they are accused of detonating near the finish line of the marathon course.

U.S. officials said that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev has ceased cooperating with authorities since being read his Miranda rights during an unusual, makeshift court session at his hospital bedside on Monday. Before that, investigators had questioned him for about 16 hours.

The FBI opened an investigation of Tamerlan Tsarnaev in 2011 at the behest of Russian officials who expressed concern that he was becoming radicalized and could be planning an attack in Russia.

The bureau set the inquiry aside after concluding that Tsarnaev posed no threat. But notice that he had returned from a seven-month trip to Russia might have provided the FBI with new reasons to question him. He had traveled to the strife-torn region of Dagestan, in the North Caucasus, where rebels have adopted the tactics and language of militant Islamists.

After he returned to Boston, Tamerlan Tsarnaev began assembling an online library of jihadist videos and voiced anger in conversations with neighbors over the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Still, U.S. officials said it is not clear that the FBI would have reopened its inquiry after Tsarnaev’s return from Russia because no new information had surfaced to indicate he was a threat. A member of an anti-terrorism panel in Dagestan said in an interview this week that he wasn’t being observed there during his visit and had done nothing to attract notice.

U.S. officials also said that the customs officer in Boston may have mentioned Tsarnaev’s return to FBI agents serving on the task force without creating a computer file to record the information had been shared.

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said during an appearance at a conference in Washington on Thursday that he has seen no evidence that U.S. agencies failed. “The dots were connected,” he said. He also called on the public “not to hyperventilate for a while before we get all the facts.”

…

By Greg Miller,

Find this story at 25 April 2013

© The Washington Post Company

THE Russian FSB intelligence security service told the FBI in early 2011 about information that Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the brothers suspected in the Boston marathon bombings, was a follower of radical Islam, two law enforcement officials say.

Tamerlan Tsarnaev died in a shootout, and his younger brother Dzhokhar, 19, was captured alive.

They were identified by authorities and relatives as ethnic Chechens from southern Russia who had been in the US for about a decade.

According to an earlier FBI news release, a foreign government said that based on its information, Tsarnaev, 26, was a strong believer and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the US for travel to a region in that country to join unspecified underground groups.

The FBI did not name the foreign government, but the two law enforcement officials identified the FSB as the provider of the information to one of the FBI’s field offices and also to FBI headquarters in Washington DC.

The two officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak on the record about the matter.

The FBI said that in response, it interviewed Tsarnaev and relatives, and did not find any domestic or foreign terrorism activity.

The FBI said it provided the results in the summer of 2011.

The FBI also said that it requested but did not receive more specific or additional information from the foreign government.

The bureau added that in response to the request, it checked US government databases and other information to look for such things as derogatory telephone communications, possible use of online sites associated with the promotion of radical activity, associations with other persons of interest, travel history and plans and education history.

Meanwhile a doctor involved in treating the fatally wounded Tamerlan Tsarnaev says he had injuries from head to toe but all limbs intact when he arrived at hospital.

Dr David Schoenfeld said 26-year-old Tamerlan Tsarnaev was unconscious and had so many penetrating wounds when he arrived at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Centre after a shootout with police that it isn’t clear which ones killed him, and a medical examiner will have to determine the cause of death.

The older Tsarnaev’s clothes had been cut off by emergency responders at the scene, so if he had been wearing a vest with explosives, he wasn’t by the time he arrived at the hospital, the doctor said.

…

AP

Find this story at 21 April 2013

© The Australian

Failure of peace initiatives raises questions over whether British eagerness for political settlement may have been exploited

Hamid Karzai with the Finnish prime minister, Jyrki Katainen, in Helsinki. Photograph: Lehtikuva/Reuters

The CIA and MI6 have regularly given large cash payments to Hamid Karzai’s office with the aim of maintaining access to the Afghan leader and his top allies and officials, but the attempt to buy influence has largely failed and may have backfired, former diplomats and policy analysts say.

The Guardian understands that the payments by British intelligence were on a smaller scale than the CIA’s handouts, reported in the New York Times to have been in the tens of millions, and much of the British money has gone towards attempts to finance peace initiatives, which have so far proved abortive.

That failure has raised questions among some British officials over whether eagerness to promote a political settlement may have been exploited by Afghan officials and self-styled intermediaries for the Taliban.

Responding to the allegations while on a visit to Helsinki on Monday, Karzai said his national security council (NSC) had received support from the US government for the past 10 years, and the amounts involved were “not big” and were used for a variety of purposes including helping those wounded in the conflict. “It’s multi-purpose assistance,” he said, without commenting on the allegations that the money was fuelling corruption.

Yama Torabi, the director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan said that the presidency’s low-key response to the reports had “outraged people”.

“As a result, we don’t know what was the amount of money that was given, what it was used for and if there was any corruption involved. Money when it is unchecked can be abused and this looks like one. In addition, it can be potentially used to corrupt politicians and political circles, but there is no way to know this unless there is a serious investigation into it,” Torabi told The Guardian.

Kabul sources told the Guardian that the key official involved in distributing the payments within the NSC was Ibrahim Spinzada, a close confidant of the president known as Engineer Ibrahim. There is, however, no evidence that Spinzada personally gained from the cash payments or that in distributing them among the president’s allies and sometimes his foes he was breaking Afghan law.

Officials say the payments, referred to in a New York Times report as “ghost money”, helped prop up warlords and corrupt officials, deepening Afghan popular mistrust of the Kabul government and its foreign backers, and thereby helped drive the insurgency.

The CIA money has sometimes caused divisions between the various branches of US government represented in Kabul, according to diplomats stationed in Kabul, particularly when it helped give the CIA chief of station in Kabul direct access to Karzai without the US ambassador’s knowledge or approval.

One former Afghan budgetary official told the Guardian: “On paper there was very little money that went to the National Directorate of Security [NDS, the Afghan intelligence service], but we knew they were taken care of separately by the CIA.

“The thing about US money is a lot of it goes outside the budget, directly through individuals and companies, and that opens the way for corruption.”

Khalil Roman, who served as Karzai’s deputy chief of staff from 2002 until 2005, told the New York Times: “We called it ‘ghost money’. It came in secret, and it left in secret.”

One American official told the newspaper: “The biggest source of corruption in Afghanistan was the United States.”

Sources said the MI6 aid was on a smaller scale, and much of it was focused on trying to promote meetings between Karzai’s government and Taliban intermediaries, as was embarrassingly the case in 2010 when MI6 discovered a would-be Taliban leader in talks with Karzai was an impostor from the Pakistani city of Quetta.

The British payments have also been designed to bolster UK influence in Kabul, in what a source described as “an auction with each country trying to outbid the other” in the course of an often fraught relationship with the Karzai government.

Vali Nasr, a former US government adviser on Afghanistan, said: “Karzai has been lashing out against American officials and generals, so if indeed there has been funding by the CIA, you have to ask to what effect has that money been paid. It hasn’t clearly brought the sort of influence it was meant to.”

…

Karzai’s CIA cash has long precedent in Afghanistan – and a simple solution

30 Apr 2013

Nushin Arbabzadah: Afghans would have to back their own state in order to change foreign powers’ century-old system of buying leaders’ loyalty

29 Apr 2013

Afghanistan’s web of intrigue is a poor basis on which to rebuild a nation

27 Apr 2013

Small Wars, Far Away Places by Michael Burleigh – review

25 Apr 2013

Senator accuses US of ‘intelligence failings’ in tracking Tamerlan Tsarnaev

Hamid Karzai orders ban on ‘un-Islamic’ shows on Afghan TV

25 Apr 2013

President issues vague decree after clerics complain that many stations air programmes that are ‘counter to Islamic values’

Julian Borger, diplomatic editor
The Guardian, Tuesday 30 April 2013

Find this story at 30 April 2013

© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies.

KABUL, Afghanistan — For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been dropped off every month or so at the offices of Afghanistan’s president — courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency.

All told, tens of millions of dollars have flowed from the C.I.A. to the office of President Hamid Karzai, according to current and former advisers to the Afghan leader.

“We called it ‘ghost money,’ ” said Khalil Roman, who served as Mr. Karzai’s deputy chief of staff from 2002 until 2005. “It came in secret, and it left in secret.”

The C.I.A., which declined to comment for this article, has long been known to support some relatives and close aides of Mr. Karzai. But the new accounts of off-the-books cash delivered directly to his office show payments on a vaster scale, and with a far greater impact on everyday governing.

Moreover, there is little evidence that the payments bought the influence the C.I.A. sought. Instead, some American officials said, the cash has fueled corruption and empowered warlords, undermining Washington’s exit strategy from Afghanistan.

“The biggest source of corruption in Afghanistan,” one American official said, “was the United States.”

The United States was not alone in delivering cash to the president. Mr. Karzai acknowledged a few years ago that Iran regularly gave bags of cash to one of his top aides.

At the time, in 2010, American officials jumped on the payments as evidence of an aggressive Iranian campaign to buy influence and poison Afghanistan’s relations with the United States. What they did not say was that the C.I.A. was also plying the presidential palace with cash — and unlike the Iranians, it still is.

American and Afghan officials familiar with the payments said the agency’s main goal in providing the cash has been to maintain access to Mr. Karzai and his inner circle and to guarantee the agency’s influence at the presidential palace, which wields tremendous power in Afghanistan’s highly centralized government. The officials spoke about the money only on the condition of anonymity.

It is not clear that the United States is getting what it pays for. Mr. Karzai’s willingness to defy the United States — and the Iranians, for that matter — on an array of issues seems to have only grown as the cash has piled up. Instead of securing his good graces, the payments may well illustrate the opposite: Mr. Karzai is seemingly unable to be bought.

Over Iran’s objections, he signed a strategic partnership deal with the United States last year, directly leading the Iranians to halt their payments, two senior Afghan officials said. Now, Mr. Karzai is seeking control over the Afghan militias raised by the C.I.A. to target operatives of Al Qaeda and insurgent commanders, potentially upending a critical part of the Obama administration’s plans for fighting militants as conventional military forces pull back this year.

But the C.I.A. has continued to pay, believing it needs Mr. Karzai’s ear to run its clandestine war against Al Qaeda and its allies, according to American and Afghan officials.

Like the Iranian cash, much of the C.I.A.’s money goes to paying off warlords and politicians, many of whom have ties to the drug trade and, in some cases, the Taliban. The result, American and Afghan officials said, is that the agency has greased the wheels of the same patronage networks that American diplomats and law enforcement agents have struggled unsuccessfully to dismantle, leaving the government in the grips of what are basically organized crime syndicates.

The cash does not appear to be subject to the oversight and restrictions placed on official American aid to the country or even the C.I.A.’s formal assistance programs, like financing Afghan intelligence agencies. And while there is no evidence that Mr. Karzai has personally taken any of the money — Afghan officials say the cash is handled by his National Security Council — the payments do in some cases work directly at odds with the aims of other parts of the American government in Afghanistan, even if they do not appear to violate American law.

Handing out cash has been standard procedure for the C.I.A. in Afghanistan since the start of the war. During the 2001 invasion, agency cash bought the services of numerous warlords, including Muhammad Qasim Fahim, the current first vice president.

“We paid them to overthrow the Taliban,” the American official said.

The C.I.A. then kept paying the Afghans to keep fighting. For instance, Mr. Karzai’s half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, was paid by the C.I.A. to run the Kandahar Strike Force, a militia used by the agency to combat militants, until his assassination in 2011.

A number of senior officials on the Afghan National Security Council are also individually on the agency’s payroll, Afghan officials said.

While intelligence agencies often pay foreign officials to provide information, dropping off bags of cash at a foreign leader’s office to curry favor is a more unusual arrangement.

Afghan officials said the practice grew out of the unique circumstances in Afghanistan, where the United States built the government that Mr. Karzai runs. To accomplish that task, it had to bring to heel many of the warlords the C.I.A. had paid during and after the 2001 invasion.

By late 2002, Mr. Karzai and his aides were pressing for the payments to be routed through the president’s office, allowing him to buy the warlords’ loyalty, a former adviser to Mr. Karzai said.

Then, in December 2002, Iranians showed up at the palace in a sport utility vehicle packed with cash, the former adviser said.

The C.I.A. began dropping off cash at the palace the following month, and the sums grew from there, Afghan officials said.

Payments ordinarily range from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars, the officials said, though none could provide exact figures. The money is used to cover a slew of off-the-books expenses, like paying off lawmakers or underwriting delicate diplomatic trips or informal negotiations.

Much of it also still goes to keeping old warlords in line. One is Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek whose militia served as a C.I.A. proxy force in 2001. He receives nearly $100,000 a month from the palace, two Afghan officials said. Other officials said the amount was significantly lower.

Mr. Dostum, who declined requests for comment, had previously said he was given $80,000 a month to serve as Mr. Karzai’s emissary in northern Afghanistan. “I asked for a year up front in cash so that I could build my dream house,” he was quoted as saying in a 2009 interview with Time magazine.

Some of the cash also probably ends up in the pockets of the Karzai aides who handle it, Afghan and Western officials said, though they would not identify any by name.

That is not a significant concern for the C.I.A., said American officials familiar with the agency’s operations. “They’ll work with criminals if they think they have to,” one American former official said.

…

Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: April 29, 2013

An earlier version of this article misstated the job title that Khalil Roman held in Afghanistan from 2002 until 2005. He was President Hamid Karzai’s deputy chief of staff, not his chief of staff.

April 28, 2013
By MATTHEW ROSENBERG

Find this story at 29 April 2013

© 2013 The New York Times Company

President believes battle in which 10 children and a US agent died was fought by illegal militia working for spy agency

Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s campaign against CIA operations sets up a heated showdown with the US government. Photograph: S Sabawoon/EPA

President Hamid Karzai is determined to curb CIA operations in Afghanistan after the death of a US agent and 10 Afghan children in a battle he believes was fought by an illegal militia working for the US spy agency.

The campaign sets the Afghan leader up for another heated showdown with the US government, and will reignite questions about the CIA’s extensive but highly secretive operations in the country.

Karzai’s spokesman Aimal Faizi said the CIA controlled large commando-like units, some of whom operated under the nominal stamp of the Afghan government’s intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), but were not actually under its control.

“Some of them are said to be working with the NDS, but they are not armed by the NDS, not paid by the NDS, and not sent to operations by the NDS. Sometimes they only inform the NDS minutes before the operation,” Faizi said. “They are conducting operations without informing local authorities and when something goes wrong it is called a joint operation.”

One of these groups was involved in a battle with insurgents in a remote corner of eastern Kunar province in early April that left several Afghan children dead, Faizi said. Karzai has fired the provincial head of intelligence in connection with the incident.

The US citizen who died during the battle was advising the Afghan intelligence service, and the airstrike that killed the children is believed to have been called in after he was fatally injured.

The US embassy declined to comment on CIA issues, but sources with knowledge of the battle said he was an agent, and his name has not been released, usually an indication of intelligence work.

Bob Woodward in his 2010 book Obama’s Wars described a 3,000-strong Afghan militia working for the CIA, and Faizi said the Afghan government had little information about the teams. “There is a lack of clarity about their numbers and movement,” he said when asked how many men the CIA had on their payroll, or where these large teams might be based.

Woodward said the unofficial commando units were known as counter-terrorism pursuit teams, and described them as “a paid, trained and functioning tool of the CIA”, authorised by President George W Bush.

They were sent on operations to kill or capture insurgent leaders, but also went into lawless areas to try to pacify them and win support for the Afghan government and its foreign backers. Woodward said the units even conducted cross-border raids into Pakistan.

In the wake of the Kunar battle, Karzai has also ordered his security officials to step up implementation of a presidential decree issued in late February abolishing “parallel structures”. Faizi said this order was aimed primarily at dismantling CIA-controlled teams.

“The use of these parallel structures run by the CIA and US special forces is an issue of concern for the Afghan people and the Afghan government,” he said.

…

Emma Graham-Harrison in Kabul
The Guardian, Friday 19 April 2013 10.19 BST

Find this story at 19 April 2013
© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Discussions on allowing Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area of border-free travel may have been postponed until December, but the EU’s law enforcement authorities will soon start benefitting from easier access to fingerprint and vehicle registration data from the two countries as they move towards fully implementing the Prüm Decisions.

The Prüm Decisions (Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA, named after the town in which the original treaties were signed) mandate the exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data (VRD) amongst EU member states. They also permit the exchange of personal data for the prevention of terrorist offences and for joint police operations.

Last year a Statewatch analysis noted the ongoing difficulties states have had with implementing the “complex, technologically fraught and expensive” Decisions, which are ultimately intended to “overcome lengthy mutual legal assistance bureaucratic procedures by establishing a single national contact point as an electronic interface for automated information exchange.” [1]

The adoption of positive reports on Romania’s readiness to exchange fingerprints and Bulgaria’s readiness to exchange VRD shows that it may be easier for the personal data of Romanians and Bulgarians to cross the EU’s internal borders than it is for citizens of the two Black Sea countries.

On 25 March, the Working Party on Data Protection and Information Exchange (DAPIX) recommended to the Council that it permit the exchange of fingerprint data between Romanian and other EU authorities.

An “overall evaluation report on dactyloscopic [fingerprint] data exchange for Romania,” undertaken by a team from Austria, announced that “the implementation of the Prüm/dactyloscopic data-information flow, both on a legal and on a technical level, has been done up to a satisfactory level in Romania.” [2]

“All conditions are met for Romania to start the exchange of dactyloscopic data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA,” says the report.

No date has yet been set for the next JHA Council meeting when it will have to approve the draft Decision. When it does so, Romania will become a part of the networked national systems that ease the exchange of fingerprint data amongst European law enforcement authorities.

It seems likely that at the same Council meeting, Bulgaria’s vehicle registration databases will official become part of the Prüm network.

A recent document summarises the outcome of a visit by a joint Dutch and Belgian evaluation team which concluded that “for the purposes of automated searching of vehicle registration data (VRD), Bulgaria has fully implemented the general provisions on data protection of Chapter 6 of Decision 2008/615/JHA.” [3]

Romania has been exchanging vehicle registration data with other EU member states since 2011 and both countries also exchange DNA data with a number of EU countries. Bulgaria is able to exchange DNA profiles with Slovenia, Austria, the Netherlands and France, while Romania is connected to the systems of Austria, the Netherlands, Slovenia, France, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany and Spain, and is conducting tests with Cyprus and Estonia.

Bulgaria is also part of the Prüm network for exchanging fingerprint data and is connected to Austria, Germany, Spain, Slovakia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Cyprus.

However, it may be possible for one member state to obtain fingerprint data from another even if the two do not have a direct connection by using a state with which they both have connections as an intermediary. The extent to which this practice may or may not take place is, however, unknown.

It seems likely that the next JHA Council meeting will also authorise the exchange of Prüm data from countries other than Bulgaria and Romania. Council Decisions have been drawn up that, when agreed, will permit Sweden to exchange DNA data and Malta to exchange DNA and fingerprint data.

Previous coverage
– “Complex, technologically fraught and expensive” – the problematic implementation of the Prüm Decisions by Chris Jones, March 2012
– “Network with errors”: Europe’s emerging web of DNA databases by Eric Topfer, March 2011
– Searching for Needles in an ever expanding haystack: Cross-border DNA exchange in the wake of the Prüm Treaty by Eric Topfer, September 2008
Sources
[1] “Complex, technologically fraught and expensive” – the problematic implementation of the Prüm Decisions by Chris Jones, March 2012
[2] Presidency, “Prüm Decisions” – overall evaluation report on dactyloscopic data exchange for Romania, 25 March 2013, 7824/13; Presidency, Draft Council Decision on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to dactyloscopic data in Romania, 25 March 2013 7826/13
[3] Presidency, Draft Council Decision on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Bulgaria, 26 March 2013, 7942/13

11.04.2013

Find this story at 11 April 2013

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‘De EU bouwt aan een ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en recht. Eenmaal voltooid, zullen onder deze noemer zaken als het EU-burgerschap, de mobiliteit van personen, asiel en immigratie, het visumbeleid en het beheer van de buitengrenzen worden geregeld. Ze zal ook nauwe samenwerking bevorderen tussen de politie-, justitie- en douanediensten van de EU-landen. De ruimte moet ervoor zorgen dat de wetgeving die van toepassing is op EU-burgers, bezoekers en immigranten (en criminelen en terroristen) in de gehele Unie op dezelfde manier wordt toegepast.’ (europa.eu)

De ontwikkelingen op het gebied van de Europese samenwerking van politie en justitie gaan zo snel dat de oprichting van een Europese politie- en justitiedienst binnenkort een feit is. Is dat dan niet goed, een apparaat dat onze rechten en ons leven beschermt? Het klinkt mooi, een ‘ruimte van justitie, vrijheid en veiligheid’, maar zonder rechtsbescherming van verdachten, zonder transparante controle en toezicht op de samenwerking van opsporingsinstanties en zonder een apparaat dat maat weet te houden en de nuances ziet, blijft er weinig over van ons recht en onze vrijheden.

Ook aan de betrouwbaarheid van de gegevens van politie en justitie in allerlei databanken moet worden getwijfeld. Hoeveel zicht hebben burgers eigenlijk op de gevaren die de overheid ons voorschotelt? En zegt het wijzen op de gevaren van de georganiseerde criminaliteit en terrorisme eigenlijk niet meer over het onvermogen van diezelfde overheid adequaat te handelen op het gebied van preventie en de opsporing?

Buro Jansen & Janssen is niet tegen een verenigd Europa, maar zet wel vraagtekens bij de ontwikkeling van de zogenaamde ‘ruimte van justitie, vrijheid en veiligheid’ zoals de regeringsleiders ons die voorschotelt.

Het Europese veiligheidsbeleid is een complexe aangelegenheid. Aan de hand van verschillende artikelen proberen wij inzichtelijk te maken wat de bestaande structuur is, welke plannen er op stapel staan en op welke manieren de samenwerking van politie en justitie gewone burgers raakt.

Find this story at end 2010

In late January, Conservative MP and Minister for Security James Brokenshire led a delegation of nearly 25 “homeland security” firms to India on a trip which, in sharp contrast to the trade mission to India undertaken by David Cameron in February, received no coverage in the press whatsoever.

From 20 to 25 January multinational giants such as Agusta Westland, BAE Systems, G4S and Thales were taken to a number of Indian cities: Delhi, “for the government perspective”; Hyderabad, “the centre of the vast Naxal terrorism-troubled region and the home of a growing high tech industry base” where there was a “round table discussion with local security forces”; and Mumbai, “the focus of safer cities and coastal security initiatives” where attendees were treated to “a conference and round table discussion with local government security agencies and business.” [1]

A number of lesser-known firms were present alongside the major corporations. Evidence Talks attended, which was founded in 1993 and describes itself as “one of the most highly regarded digital forensic consultancies in the UK.” The company supplies tools for the extraction and analysis of data from digital devices and boasts that its SPEKTOR tool is “used worldwide by police, military, government and commercial customers…[and] enables users with minimal skills to safely, quickly and forensicly [sic] review the contents of computers, removable media and even cell phones.” [2]

Cunning Running also went on UKTI’s trip, and claims to provide “threat visualisation for the real world.” The firm say that they “develop high quality software solutions for the defence and homeland security markets,” supplying “direct to governments, law enforcement agencies, and militaries in the UK, USA, Europe and Australia.” [3]

“The security sector in India is vast and desperate to modernise,” said UKTI’s flyer for the mission. “India has approximately 1.2 million police and 1.3 million paramilitary forces personnel. With this, the Central Reserve Police Force, at 350,000, is the largest paramilitary force in the world” – a vast number of personnel who could be equipped with the latest “homeland security” gadgets and expertise.

The flyer for the mission seems to highlight the fact that backing the security industry as it moves into developing economies is seen as a national endeavour. “The [Indian] market is the subject of stiff competition from international competitors such as the US, Israel and France,” UKTI said, “but is simply too big to ignore.”

UKTI highlighted that “the on-the-ground costs of this mission (receptions, ground transport, conference facilities, promotional literature) are being wholly subsidised on behalf of UK companies by UKTI and its partners/sponsors” (emphasis in original). Those partners and sponsors included the Indian Home Ministry and the Confederation of Indian Industries.

Furthermore, companies were “able to avail a government-negotiated rate at the hotels being used throughout the programme.”

The “only charge to companies” was for the UKTI Overseas Market Introduction Service (OMIS) – a “flexible business tool, letting you use the services of our trade teams, located in our embassies, high commissions and consulates across the world, to benefit your business.” [4]

The government has recently made additional funding available in order to encourage wider use of OMIS by UK firms, with a 50% discount (up to a maximum of £750) available to “all eligible companies commissioning an order linked to a UKTI, Scottish Development International (SDI), Welsh Government (WG) or Invest Northern Ireland (INI) supported outward mission or Market Visit Support (MVS).” [5]

While UKTI has clawed back some money from the firms who went on the trade mission to India, the department – described by Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) as “a taxpayer-funded arms sales unit” [6] – initially spent over £35,000 subsidising companies. In its response to a freedom of information (FOI) request from Statewatch, UKTI said that “we have also generated income of £13,485 with another £1,170 expected. Therefore the net cost minus the expenses still to come is £20,997.98.”

This amount pales in comparison to the total amount of subsidies it is estimated are awarded to defence and security firms by the UK government every year, but it also highlights the breadth of support given to a highly controversial industry.

Research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that, between 2007 and 2010, total government subsidies for UK arms exports (including both defence and security firms) totalled at its highest £751.2 million, and at its lowest £668.3 million. [7]

A spokesperson for CAAT criticised the mission to India, saying that: “Unfortunately the UK government continues to prioritise promoting corporate interests over promoting human rights and real security – and expects the UK public to subsidise this.”

David Cameron’s February trade mission to India received heavy press coverage and saw the Prime Minister accompanied by a number of CEOs from defence and security firms, including Dick Oliver, the chairman of BAE Systems; Robin Southwell, the CEO of EADS UK; Steve Wadley, the UK managing director of the missile firm MBDA; and Victor Chavez, the chief executive of Thales UK. [8]

…

Sources
[1] UKTI DSO, UKTI homeland security trade mission to India
[2] Evidence Talks, Company Profile
[3] Cunning Running website
[4] UKTI, OMIS – Overseas Market Introduction Service, 25 January 2012
[5] UKTI, Response to FOI request, 22 March 2013
[6] Campaign Against Arms Trade, UKTI: Armed & Dangerous, 8 July 2011
[7] Susan T. Jackson, SIPRI assessment of UK arms export subsidies, 25 May 2011
[8] Kaye Stearman, Cameron’s Indian odyssey – brickbats and cricket bats, fighter jets and on-message execs, CAATblog, 22 February 2013
[9] Global Day of Action on Military Spending

15.4.2013

Find this story at 15 April 2013

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G4S chief executive Nick Buckles paid £1.19m, up £170,000 on last year
Company lost £88m in Olympics fiasco when they failed to provide security

The chief executive of the company behind the security-scandal at the London Olympics last summer received a record pay packet in 2012, following million pound losses during the Games.

G4S boss Nick Buckles was paid a total £1.19million in 2012, up £170,000 on his 2011 paycheck, despite the company nursing an £88million loss on the London 2012 contract.

The security giant failed to provide the 10,400 guards needed during this summer’s main event and the military was forced to step in.

Big Bucks: Nick Buckles, pictured defending his company in the Commons after G4S’s Olympics blunder, was paid an extra £170,000 in 2012 compared to the previous year

As well as an £830,000 salary, Mr Buckles’ 2012 pay packet included £23,500 in benefits and £332,000 in payments in lieu of pension. Mr Buckles 2012 pay packet was boosted by bigger pension payments.

However, neither he nor other executive directors earned a performance-related bonus.

G4S said in its annual report Mr Buckles’ and other executives’ salaries were frozen in 2012 and will not increase this year – the fourth time in five years their salaries have been frozen.

But it revealed plans to increase potential long-term share bonuses this year to ‘ensure that the directors continue to be incentivised and motivated’.

Mr Buckles’ maximum shares bonus could rise to 2.5 times his salary from a maximum of two times in 2012 – meaning a potential £2.1 million in shares if he hits targets.

Loss: G4S lost £88m in the London Olympics Games contract after they failed to provide all the security guards needed for the Games

Performance-related bonuses will also now depend on factors including organic growth, cash generation, strategic execution and organisation, instead of being tied purely to profits.

G4S’s Olympics failure saw Mr Buckles hauled before MPs, during which he admitted it was a ‘humiliating shambles for the company’. Extra military personnel had to be called in to fill the gap left by G4S’s failure to supply enough staff for the £284 million contract.

Mr Buckles said in the annual report it marked ‘one of the toughest periods in the group’s history’.

…

By Daily Mail Reporter

PUBLISHED: 18:12 GMT, 15 April 2013 | UPDATED: 06:42 GMT, 16 April 2013

Find this story at 15 April 2013

© Associated Newspapers Ltd